{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "169",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 169 of 239\n\nmassages that were part of the scheme, will also prove the falsity of the statements charged in Count Six. Indeed, were severance to be granted, the facts involving Counts One through Four “would be central to a separate trial” on Counts Five and Six. Butler, 2004 WL 2274751, at *4; see Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19 (“Virtually every overt act alleged in the conspiracy count formed the subject matter of one of the eight perjury counts, and would therefore be admissible in a perjury trial to show the falsity of Sweig’s denial before the grand jury.”).\n\nCritically, the Government expects that proof to include testimony from victims of sexual abuse. For instance, the Government anticipates that Minor Victim-2 will testify that the defendant gave her an unsolicited massage during which Minor Victim-2 was topless. Indictment ¶ 7(b). That is an overt act charged in Counts One and Three. Id. ¶¶ 11(c), 17(c). It is also strong evidence that the defendant’s statement “I never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage” was false, as charged in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid “requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying”).\n\nSimilarly, the defendant’s efforts to conceal her crimes by lying in a deposition is itself compelling evidence of her consciousness of guilt as to the offenses charged in Counts One through Four and indeed would almost certainly be relevant and admissible at a trial as to those counts even if severance were granted. In particular, and among other examples, the defendant’s false denial of the existence of a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages, and her specific (and equally false) denials as to Minor Victim-2, would be admissible as evidence of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt, even at a trial focused exclusively on Counts One through Four. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A]cts that exhibit a\n\n142\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003103",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 169 of 239",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "massages that were part of the scheme, will also prove the falsity of the statements charged in Count Six. Indeed, were severance to be granted, the facts involving Counts One through Four “would be central to a separate trial” on Counts Five and Six. Butler, 2004 WL 2274751, at *4; see Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19 (“Virtually every overt act alleged in the conspiracy count formed the subject matter of one of the eight perjury counts, and would therefore be admissible in a perjury trial to show the falsity of Sweig’s denial before the grand jury.”).\n\nCritically, the Government expects that proof to include testimony from victims of sexual abuse. For instance, the Government anticipates that Minor Victim-2 will testify that the defendant gave her an unsolicited massage during which Minor Victim-2 was topless. Indictment ¶ 7(b). That is an overt act charged in Counts One and Three. Id. ¶¶ 11(c), 17(c). It is also strong evidence that the defendant’s statement “I never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage” was false, as charged in Count Six. Id. ¶ 23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid “requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying”).\n\nSimilarly, the defendant’s efforts to conceal her crimes by lying in a deposition is itself compelling evidence of her consciousness of guilt as to the offenses charged in Counts One through Four and indeed would almost certainly be relevant and admissible at a trial as to those counts even if severance were granted. In particular, and among other examples, the defendant’s false denial of the existence of a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages, and her specific (and equally false) denials as to Minor Victim-2, would be admissible as evidence of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt, even at a trial focused exclusively on Counts One through Four. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A]cts that exhibit a",
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    {
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      "content": "142",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003103",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Minor Victim-2",
      "Sweig",
      "Butler",
      "Richardson",
      "Marsh",
      "Anderson"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1987",
      "2014"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "Counts One through Six",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003103"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a header indicating the case number, document number, and filing date. The text discusses the government's expectations for testimony from victims of sexual abuse and the defendant's efforts to conceal their crimes. The document includes citations to legal precedents and references to specific counts in the indictment."
}