{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "165",
    "date": "03/09/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 165 Filed 03/09/21 Page 5 of 9\nPage 5\n1. The Defendant's Alleged Willingness to Renounce Her Foreign Citizenship Should Not Alter the Court's Prior Bail Determinations\nThe defendant contends that she has materially strengthened her proposed bail package by offering to renounce her foreign citizenship \"if the Court so requires.\" (Mot. at 2). She claims that such a renunciation will \"eliminate any opportunity for her to seek refuge\" in France and the United Kingdom or \"remove[] any incentive the Court and government believe she may have to seek refuge in those countries.\" (Id. at 2, 5). The defendant is wrong. That she is \"willing\" to renounce her foreign citizenship would do nothing to prevent the defendant from fleeing and then fighting extradition once abroad, and it does nothing to diminish the risk that the defendant could choose to flee to another jurisdiction altogether, including one with which the United States does not have an extradition treaty and from which extradition is impossible. The Court previously found that the likelihood that the defendant \"would be able to frustrate any extradition requests . . . weighs strongly in favor of detention\" (Dec. Op. at 13); the defendant's Motion provides no basis to disturb this finding. Indeed, just as the defendant's offer to execute anticipatory extradition waivers failed to provide the Court with any assurance that she would not frustrate any potential extradition, so too should her offer to renounce her foreign citizenship.\nFirst, the defendant's willingness to renounce her citizenship is an offer of unclear validity. As an initial matter, the defendant's offer is itself of little value, as she would at bare minimum have to follow the legal requirements attendant to each country in order to formally renounce her citizenship. Moreover, she provides no assurances—nor could she—that she will not contest the validity and/or voluntariness of such a renunciation once she is actually in France or the United Kingdom. For example, the Government understands that in order to give up one's British citizenship or status, one must be, among other things, \"of sound mind (unless it's decided that it's in your best interest).\" See www.gov.uk/renounce-british-nationality. The defendant could choose to frustrate any future extradition proceedings by claiming that her decision to give up her citizenship was compelled by some person or circumstance, or that she was not of sound mind. Simply put, while the defendant may believe that it is in her interest to give up her citizenship now, there is no way for the defendant to assure the Court that she will not take the contrary position in the future if she believes it to be in her interest at the time. And even if the defendant could not challenge her renunciation, it is unclear whether, as a separate matter, she could seek to have her citizenship rights restored.\nSecond, and related, the defendant has offered no authority for the proposition that her offer to renounce foreign citizenship would have any impact on an extradition proceeding, nor has she reckoned with the Court's findings regarding her offer to sign a so-called irrevocable waiver of her extradition rights. See United States v. Cohen, No. 10 Cr. 547 (SI), 2010 WL 5387757, at *9 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010) (\"Defendant's offers to turn in his passports, to 'renounce' his Israeli citizenship, and have someone 'instruct' the Israeli embassy to deny new documents or travel authorizations to defendant, as well as his offer to waive extradition—assuming he flees overseas at some point—do not sufficiently assure the Court that defendant is not still a flight risk. Defendant offers no authority about the real impact of these offers or whether they are enforceable in Israel if defendant were to flee there.\"). The Court placed \"little weight\" on the defendant's argument in the Second Bail Motion that waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order indicates\nDOJ-OGR-00002752",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 165 Filed 03/09/21 Page 5 of 9",
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    {
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      "content": "Page 5",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "1. The Defendant's Alleged Willingness to Renounce Her Foreign Citizenship Should Not Alter the Court's Prior Bail Determinations",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant contends that she has materially strengthened her proposed bail package by offering to renounce her foreign citizenship \"if the Court so requires.\" (Mot. at 2). She claims that such a renunciation will \"eliminate any opportunity for her to seek refuge\" in France and the United Kingdom or \"remove[] any incentive the Court and government believe she may have to seek refuge in those countries.\" (Id. at 2, 5). The defendant is wrong. That she is \"willing\" to renounce her foreign citizenship would do nothing to prevent the defendant from fleeing and then fighting extradition once abroad, and it does nothing to diminish the risk that the defendant could choose to flee to another jurisdiction altogether, including one with which the United States does not have an extradition treaty and from which extradition is impossible. The Court previously found that the likelihood that the defendant \"would be able to frustrate any extradition requests . . . weighs strongly in favor of detention\" (Dec. Op. at 13); the defendant's Motion provides no basis to disturb this finding. Indeed, just as the defendant's offer to execute anticipatory extradition waivers failed to provide the Court with any assurance that she would not frustrate any potential extradition, so too should her offer to renounce her foreign citizenship.",
      "position": "body"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "First, the defendant's willingness to renounce her citizenship is an offer of unclear validity. As an initial matter, the defendant's offer is itself of little value, as she would at bare minimum have to follow the legal requirements attendant to each country in order to formally renounce her citizenship. Moreover, she provides no assurances—nor could she—that she will not contest the validity and/or voluntariness of such a renunciation once she is actually in France or the United Kingdom. For example, the Government understands that in order to give up one's British citizenship or status, one must be, among other things, \"of sound mind (unless it's decided that it's in your best interest).\" See www.gov.uk/renounce-british-nationality. The defendant could choose to frustrate any future extradition proceedings by claiming that her decision to give up her citizenship was compelled by some person or circumstance, or that she was not of sound mind. Simply put, while the defendant may believe that it is in her interest to give up her citizenship now, there is no way for the defendant to assure the Court that she will not take the contrary position in the future if she believes it to be in her interest at the time. And even if the defendant could not challenge her renunciation, it is unclear whether, as a separate matter, she could seek to have her citizenship rights restored.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, and related, the defendant has offered no authority for the proposition that her offer to renounce foreign citizenship would have any impact on an extradition proceeding, nor has she reckoned with the Court's findings regarding her offer to sign a so-called irrevocable waiver of her extradition rights. See United States v. Cohen, No. 10 Cr. 547 (SI), 2010 WL 5387757, at *9 n.11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010) (\"Defendant's offers to turn in his passports, to 'renounce' his Israeli citizenship, and have someone 'instruct' the Israeli embassy to deny new documents or travel authorizations to defendant, as well as his offer to waive extradition—assuming he flees overseas at some point—do not sufficiently assure the Court that defendant is not still a flight risk. Defendant offers no authority about the real impact of these offers or whether they are enforceable in Israel if defendant were to flee there.\"). The Court placed \"little weight\" on the defendant's argument in the Second Bail Motion that waiver of the right to appeal an extradition order indicates",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002752",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "Government",
      "Israeli embassy"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "France",
      "United Kingdom",
      "Israel",
      "United States"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "03/09/21",
      "Dec. 20, 2010"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 165",
      "No. 10 Cr. 547 (SI)"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a bail hearing. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}