{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "137",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 137 of 239\ndesigned to deter illegal conduct.” Coke, 2011 WL 3738969, at *6 (quoting United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)). “However, while there are times when a district court may properly find it absolutely necessary[, in order] to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system, to suppress evidence under its inherent or supervisory authority, ‘the Supreme Court has explained that a court’s inherent power to refuse to receive material evidence is a power that must be sparingly exercised [only in cases of] manifestly improper conduct by federal officials.” United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 401 (2d Cir. 2018) (alterations and emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Second Circuit has ““recognized that courts cannot fashion their own sub-constitutional limitations on the conduct of law enforcement agents.”” Id. (quoting United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 792 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 847 (2d Cir. 1982). “Accordingly, the court should not exercise its inherent or supervisory power ‘as a substitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which adequately safeguards against unlawful searches and seizures.” Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401 (quoting Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) (“the supervisory power does not extend so far” as to “confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing”).\nb. Discussion\nBy asking the Court to exercise its inherent authority, the defendant apparently means to suggest that the Court should grant the relief she seeks, even if she has failed to establish a violation of the Constitution or other governing law. The defendant fails to provide justification for the extraordinary remedy of suppression or to cite persuasive case law in favor of such an extraordinary use of the Court’s inherent authority.\n110\nDOJ-OGR-00003071",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 137 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "designed to deter illegal conduct.” Coke, 2011 WL 3738969, at *6 (quoting United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)). “However, while there are times when a district court may properly find it absolutely necessary[, in order] to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system, to suppress evidence under its inherent or supervisory authority, ‘the Supreme Court has explained that a court’s inherent power to refuse to receive material evidence is a power that must be sparingly exercised [only in cases of] manifestly improper conduct by federal officials.” United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368, 401 (2d Cir. 2018) (alterations and emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Second Circuit has ““recognized that courts cannot fashion their own sub-constitutional limitations on the conduct of law enforcement agents.”” Id. (quoting United States v. Ming He, 94 F.3d 782, 792 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 847 (2d Cir. 1982). “Accordingly, the court should not exercise its inherent or supervisory power ‘as a substitute for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which adequately safeguards against unlawful searches and seizures.” Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401 (quoting Ming He, 94 F.3d at 792); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) (“the supervisory power does not extend so far” as to “confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing”).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "b. Discussion",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "By asking the Court to exercise its inherent authority, the defendant apparently means to suggest that the Court should grant the relief she seeks, even if she has failed to establish a violation of the Constitution or other governing law. The defendant fails to provide justification for the extraordinary remedy of suppression or to cite persuasive case law in favor of such an extraordinary use of the Court’s inherent authority.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "110",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003071",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003071"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is likely a page from a larger filing."
}