{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "204-8",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204-8 Filed 04/16/21 Page 4 of 6\n\nPage 4\n\nMartindell, the district court opined that had the Government obtained judicial relief to issue an uncontested subpoena for documents—precisely the scenario here—such relief would be appropriate. Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 94.\n\nSecond, any presumption against modification of a protective order is unreasonable where, as here, the protective order is on its face temporary or limited. Such protective orders “that are on their face temporary or limited may not justify reliance by the parties [and] in such circumstances reliance may be unreasonable.” S.E.C. v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2001). “Where a litigant or deponent could not reasonably have relied on the continuation of a protective order”—for example, where such an order was limited to the pretrial stages of litigation—“a court may properly permit modification of the order.” Id. (citing In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Allen v. City of New York, 420 F.Supp.2d 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Mag. J. Gorenstein) (analyzing the differently-situated interests of civil litigants but where, as here, the relevant protective order specified that a party could object to the designation of a document as confidential, and was also temporary or limited on its face). In such a case, “‘[w]hether to lift or modify a protective order is a decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’” TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 231 (modification in original) (citing In re Agent Orange, 821 F.3d at 147) (additional citations omitted). Here, the parties in the Litigation explicitly contemplated the public disclosure of such information at trial by the very terms of the Protective Order, thereby establishing precisely the kind of temporal limit described above. See Prot. Order at 5 (“This Protective Order shall have no force and effect on the use of any CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION at trial in this matter.”). The parties could not have—as, for example, they might in a bankruptcy proceeding such as in Subpoena Duces Tecum—relied upon the Protective Order to indefinitely keep the relevant materials hidden.\n\nIn this case, where the Protective Order is limited by its terms to only the pretrial stages of the civil litigation, no confidential business information appears to be at issue, and counsel for the victims of the suspected crimes being investigated have indicated a willingness to voluntarily comply with the Subpoena, the “sound discretion of [this] court,” TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 231, militates overwhelmingly toward limited, narrow modification of the Protective Order to permit compliance with the Subpoena.2 This is consistent with the grand jury’s “wide ranging authority to inquire into suspected violations of the criminal law; and to effectuate such investigations it may compel the production of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary.” Id. at 421-22; see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (“Although the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge, the longstanding principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,’ except for those\n\n2 The Government notes that any materials produced pursuant to a grand jury subpoena fall under the protections and restrictions set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), and further notes and emphasizes that the proposed order accompanying the Application provides no additional exception or modification to the Protective Order as to the recipient of the subpoena other than the narrow, limited ability to comply with grand jury process. The Protective Order will remain otherwise intact and fully enforceable.\n\nCONFIDENTIAL\n\nSDNY_GM_00000850\nDOJ-OGR-00003547",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204-8 Filed 04/16/21 Page 4 of 6",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Page 4",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Martindell, the district court opined that had the Government obtained judicial relief to issue an uncontested subpoena for documents—precisely the scenario here—such relief would be appropriate. Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 94.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, any presumption against modification of a protective order is unreasonable where, as here, the protective order is on its face temporary or limited. Such protective orders “that are on their face temporary or limited may not justify reliance by the parties [and] in such circumstances reliance may be unreasonable.” S.E.C. v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2001). “Where a litigant or deponent could not reasonably have relied on the continuation of a protective order”—for example, where such an order was limited to the pretrial stages of litigation—“a court may properly permit modification of the order.” Id. (citing In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Allen v. City of New York, 420 F.Supp.2d 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Mag. J. Gorenstein) (analyzing the differently-situated interests of civil litigants but where, as here, the relevant protective order specified that a party could object to the designation of a document as confidential, and was also temporary or limited on its face). In such a case, “‘[w]hether to lift or modify a protective order is a decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’” TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 231 (modification in original) (citing In re Agent Orange, 821 F.3d at 147) (additional citations omitted). Here, the parties in the Litigation explicitly contemplated the public disclosure of such information at trial by the very terms of the Protective Order, thereby establishing precisely the kind of temporal limit described above. See Prot. Order at 5 (“This Protective Order shall have no force and effect on the use of any CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION at trial in this matter.”). The parties could not have—as, for example, they might in a bankruptcy proceeding such as in Subpoena Duces Tecum—relied upon the Protective Order to indefinitely keep the relevant materials hidden.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In this case, where the Protective Order is limited by its terms to only the pretrial stages of the civil litigation, no confidential business information appears to be at issue, and counsel for the victims of the suspected crimes being investigated have indicated a willingness to voluntarily comply with the Subpoena, the “sound discretion of [this] court,” TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d at 231, militates overwhelmingly toward limited, narrow modification of the Protective Order to permit compliance with the Subpoena.2 This is consistent with the grand jury’s “wide ranging authority to inquire into suspected violations of the criminal law; and to effectuate such investigations it may compel the production of documentary evidence or the testimony of witnesses, as it deems necessary.” Id. at 421-22; see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (“Although the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge, the longstanding principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,’ except for those",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 The Government notes that any materials produced pursuant to a grand jury subpoena fall under the protections and restrictions set forth in Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e), and further notes and emphasizes that the proposed order accompanying the Application provides no additional exception or modification to the Protective Order as to the recipient of the subpoena other than the narrow, limited ability to comply with grand jury process. The Protective Order will remain otherwise intact and fully enforceable.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "CONFIDENTIAL",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "SDNY_GM_00000850",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003547",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Chemical Bank",
      "S.E.C.",
      "TheStreet.com",
      "City of New York"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "2001",
      "1987",
      "2006",
      "1972"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "204-8",
      "154 F.R.D.",
      "273 F.3d 222",
      "821 F.2d 139",
      "420 F.Supp.2d 295",
      "408 U.S. 665",
      "SDNY_GM_00000850",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003547"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with some formatting indicating headers, footers, and footnotes. The content discusses legal precedents and the modification of protective orders in the context of grand jury subpoenas."
}