{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "14",
    "document_number": "424",
    "date": "11/08/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 14 of 41\n\nThat opinion is only one of those noticed by the defense, however. The defense expert notice includes four other sets of opinions that supposedly respond to Dr. Rocchio but do not satisfy the Daubert standard. First, the expert notice—which closely parallels the defense's Daubert motion—improperly discusses the facts of this particular case and comments on various legal documents, even though it offers no basis whatsoever to conclude that Dr. Dietz has any legal expertise or has reliably applied any expertise to the facts of this case. In particular, the notice states that Dr. Dietz will opine that Dr. Rocchio's opinion on grooming \"carries the risk of imputing motive and intent to the Defendant\" (Ex. A at 3), that \"Dr. Rocchio's proposed testimony is silent as to whether she is expected to impute a theory of 'grooming-by-proxy' to the defendant,\" and that \"Ms. Maxwell is not accused of soliciting or enticing sexualized massages for herself,\" but instead that she \"recruited and groomed minors to provide sexualized massages for Mr. Epstein\" (id. at 4). These opinions, while potentially relevant to the Court's consideration of a Daubert motion, are not properly put before a jury.\n\nSecond, certain of Dr. Dietz's opinions about grooming are not themselves reliable or invade the province of the jury. In particular, it is circular to say that \"grooming\" \"imputes motive and intent,\" because grooming is defined to be a strategic pattern of behavior used to develop relationships of attachment and coercion between perpetrators and victims. (Ex. A at 3). That is, if the behaviors lack the requisite motive and intent, they are not grooming behaviors. If Dr. Dietz's point is that determining motive and intent is for the factfinder (id.), the Government agrees—and Dr. Dietz should not be permitted to testify that grooming behaviors \"impute[] motive and intent without adequate evidence.\" (Id.) The adequacy of the evidence is a question for the jury. Dr. Rocchio's testimony will inform the jury about the existence of grooming behaviors, but\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006225",
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      "content": "That opinion is only one of those noticed by the defense, however. The defense expert notice includes four other sets of opinions that supposedly respond to Dr. Rocchio but do not satisfy the Daubert standard. First, the expert notice—which closely parallels the defense's Daubert motion—improperly discusses the facts of this particular case and comments on various legal documents, even though it offers no basis whatsoever to conclude that Dr. Dietz has any legal expertise or has reliably applied any expertise to the facts of this case. In particular, the notice states that Dr. Dietz will opine that Dr. Rocchio's opinion on grooming \"carries the risk of imputing motive and intent to the Defendant\" (Ex. A at 3), that \"Dr. Rocchio's proposed testimony is silent as to whether she is expected to impute a theory of 'grooming-by-proxy' to the defendant,\" and that \"Ms. Maxwell is not accused of soliciting or enticing sexualized massages for herself,\" but instead that she \"recruited and groomed minors to provide sexualized massages for Mr. Epstein\" (id. at 4). These opinions, while potentially relevant to the Court's consideration of a Daubert motion, are not properly put before a jury.",
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      "content": "Second, certain of Dr. Dietz's opinions about grooming are not themselves reliable or invade the province of the jury. In particular, it is circular to say that \"grooming\" \"imputes motive and intent,\" because grooming is defined to be a strategic pattern of behavior used to develop relationships of attachment and coercion between perpetrators and victims. (Ex. A at 3). That is, if the behaviors lack the requisite motive and intent, they are not grooming behaviors. If Dr. Dietz's point is that determining motive and intent is for the factfinder (id.), the Government agrees—and Dr. Dietz should not be permitted to testify that grooming behaviors \"impute[] motive and intent without adequate evidence.\" (Id.) The adequacy of the evidence is a question for the jury. Dr. Rocchio's testimony will inform the jury about the existence of grooming behaviors, but",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006225",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Rocchio",
      "Dr. Dietz",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Mr. Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/08/21"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 424",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006225"
    ]
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses expert testimony and the Daubert standard. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}