{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "78 of 80",
    "document_number": "310-1",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 78 of 80\n\nmore, falls short of what our law demands. Though this appeal emanates from Cosby's criminal convictions, we cannot ignore the true breadth of the due process violation. The deprivation includes the fact that D.A. Castor's actions handicapped Cosby in the derivative civil suit. Nor can we ignore the fact that weakening Cosby's position in that civil case was precisely why D.A. Castor proceeded as he did. Suppression of evidence in a third criminal trial can never restore Cosby to the position he held before he forfeited his Fifth Amendment rights. The consequences of D.A. Castor's actions include the civil matter, and no exclusion of deposition testimony can restore Cosby's injuries in that regard.\n\nIt was not only the deposition testimony that harmed Cosby. As a practical matter, the moment that Cosby was charged criminally, he was harmed: all that he had forfeited earlier, and the consequences of that forfeiture in the civil case, were for naught. This was, as the CDO itself characterizes it, an unconstitutional \"coercive bait-and-switch.\"32\n\nIt is the true and full breadth of the consequences of the due process violation that separates this case from the cases relied upon by the CDO, including Stipetich.33 Each of those prosecutions involved defective or unenforceable promises that resulted in suppression remedies. Critically, none of them featured the additional harm inflicted in this case. In none of those cases did the effects of the constitutional violation extend to matters beyond the criminal trial, as was the circumstance here. Accordingly, none of those cases support, much less compel, the limited remedy that the CDO proffers.\n\nThe impact of the due process violation here is vast. The remedy must match that impact. Starting with D.A. Castor's inducement, Cosby gave up a fundamental\n\n32 Id. at 1.\n33 See CDO at 6-8 (citing Stipetich, Commonwealth v. Peters, 373 A.2d 1055 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Parker, 611 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1922); People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. 1988); and United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966)).\n\n[J-100-2020] - 77\nDOJ-OGR-00004890",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 78 of 80",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "more, falls short of what our law demands. Though this appeal emanates from Cosby's criminal convictions, we cannot ignore the true breadth of the due process violation. The deprivation includes the fact that D.A. Castor's actions handicapped Cosby in the derivative civil suit. Nor can we ignore the fact that weakening Cosby's position in that civil case was precisely why D.A. Castor proceeded as he did. Suppression of evidence in a third criminal trial can never restore Cosby to the position he held before he forfeited his Fifth Amendment rights. The consequences of D.A. Castor's actions include the civil matter, and no exclusion of deposition testimony can restore Cosby's injuries in that regard.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It was not only the deposition testimony that harmed Cosby. As a practical matter, the moment that Cosby was charged criminally, he was harmed: all that he had forfeited earlier, and the consequences of that forfeiture in the civil case, were for naught. This was, as the CDO itself characterizes it, an unconstitutional \"coercive bait-and-switch.\"32",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It is the true and full breadth of the consequences of the due process violation that separates this case from the cases relied upon by the CDO, including Stipetich.33 Each of those prosecutions involved defective or unenforceable promises that resulted in suppression remedies. Critically, none of them featured the additional harm inflicted in this case. In none of those cases did the effects of the constitutional violation extend to matters beyond the criminal trial, as was the circumstance here. Accordingly, none of those cases support, much less compel, the limited remedy that the CDO proffers.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The impact of the due process violation here is vast. The remedy must match that impact. Starting with D.A. Castor's inducement, Cosby gave up a fundamental",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "32 Id. at 1.\n33 See CDO at 6-8 (citing Stipetich, Commonwealth v. Peters, 373 A.2d 1055 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth v. Parker, 611 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1922); People v. Gallego, 424 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. 1988); and United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966)).",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[J-100-2020] - 77\nDOJ-OGR-00004890",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Cosby",
      "D.A. Castor"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "CDO"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21",
      "1977",
      "1922",
      "1988",
      "1966"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "310-1",
      "J-100-2020",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004890"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Bill Cosby, with references to various legal precedents and citations."
}