{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "59",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 59 of 239 defendant, in 2003, Congress wanted to ensure that every perpetrator who abused a minor in the future was subject to prosecution for the lifetime of the minor, but Congress simultaneously was content to let all previous perpetrators avoid prosecution whenever their victims turned twenty- five. No such intent is manifest in either the text or in Senator Leahy’s statement. The reach of Section 3283 is clear. Because Congress has expressly extended the statute of limitations to pre-enactment conduct, the Court should resolve its analysis at Landgraf step one and apply the statute as Congress intended. In the alternative, however, the statute is—at worst— ambiguous. If the Court takes that view, it should proceed to Landgraf step two. 2. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step Two of Landgraf If the Court were to determine that the legislative intent behind Section 3283 is ambiguous, the inquiry then extends to the second step of the Landgraf analysis, which examines the retroactive effects of the statute. As the Supreme Court explained in Landgraf, “[a] statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law.” 511 U.S. at 269. Instead, the question is whether the statute “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). Applying Section 3283 here would have none of those effects. Maxwell’s rights, liabilities, and duties were governed by the substantive criminal statutes governing her conduct. Until the statute of limitations expired, Maxwell had the same legal liability, the same rights, and the same incentives to retain evidence. A statute extending that period attaches no new legal consequences; rather, it preserves the status quo. Therefore, the statute does not operate “retrospectively” within the meaning of Landgraf. See Cruz v. Maypa, 32 DOJ-OGR-00002993",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 59 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "defendant, in 2003, Congress wanted to ensure that every perpetrator who abused a minor in the future was subject to prosecution for the lifetime of the minor, but Congress simultaneously was content to let all previous perpetrators avoid prosecution whenever their victims turned twenty- five. No such intent is manifest in either the text or in Senator Leahy’s statement. The reach of Section 3283 is clear. Because Congress has expressly extended the statute of limitations to pre-enactment conduct, the Court should resolve its analysis at Landgraf step one and apply the statute as Congress intended. In the alternative, however, the statute is—at worst— ambiguous. If the Court takes that view, it should proceed to Landgraf step two.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step Two of Landgraf If the Court were to determine that the legislative intent behind Section 3283 is ambiguous, the inquiry then extends to the second step of the Landgraf analysis, which examines the retroactive effects of the statute. As the Supreme Court explained in Landgraf, “[a] statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law.” 511 U.S. at 269. Instead, the question is whether the statute “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). Applying Section 3283 here would have none of those effects. Maxwell’s rights, liabilities, and duties were governed by the substantive criminal statutes governing her conduct. Until the statute of limitations expired, Maxwell had the same legal liability, the same rights, and the same incentives to retain evidence. A statute extending that period attaches no new legal consequences; rather, it preserves the status quo. Therefore, the statute does not operate “retrospectively” within the meaning of Landgraf. See Cruz v. Maypa,",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "32",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002993",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Senator Leahy",
      "Maxwell",
      "Cruz",
      "Maypa"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Congress",
      "Supreme Court"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "2003",
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "511 U.S. at 269",
      "511 U.S. at 280",
      "49 F.3d 886",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002993"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}