{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "17",
    "document_number": "144",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "by statutes whose retroactive application, while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of 'familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.'\") Thus, in the criminal context, the second step of Landgraf should be read as providing protections broader than simply violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and as prohibiting retroactive application of a criminal statute of limitations—and the resulting expansion of an individual's exposure to criminal liability for completed conduct—even where the charge is not time-barred at the time of the amendment.\n\nStatutes of limitations \"applicable to criminal prosecutions are designed principally to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges supported by facts that are remote in time.\" United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995). That concern is heightened here, where the government seeks to rely on the retroactive extension of a criminal statute of limitations to prosecute a case based on conduct more than two decades old, with little, if any, evidence other than witness testimony. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (observing that statute of limitations \"may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity\"). Since the time of the alleged conduct, memories have become faded or corrupted, documents have been lost or destroyed, and witnesses have died, all to the extreme prejudice of Ms. Maxwell.5 Retroactively applying the 2003 Amendment here not only would fly in the face of congressional intent; it would violate all notions of fundamental fairness.6\n\n5 See Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Six of the Superseding Indictment for Pre-Indictment Delay.\n6 In Weingarten, the court stated that if the defendant's counsel had successfully persuaded the trial court that the 2003 Amendment could not retroactively extend the statute of limitations for live charges, the trial court's holding would have been in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006). But in Leo Sure Chief, the alleged victim had not yet reached age 25 as of the time of the indictment, and thus the charges would not have been time-barred under either version of § 3283. Thus, the court in Leo Sure Chief did not perform a Landgraf analysis.",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "by statutes whose retroactive application, while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of 'familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.'\") Thus, in the criminal context, the second step of Landgraf should be read as providing protections broader than simply violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and as prohibiting retroactive application of a criminal statute of limitations—and the resulting expansion of an individual's exposure to criminal liability for completed conduct—even where the charge is not time-barred at the time of the amendment.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Statutes of limitations \"applicable to criminal prosecutions are designed principally to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges supported by facts that are remote in time.\" United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995). That concern is heightened here, where the government seeks to rely on the retroactive extension of a criminal statute of limitations to prosecute a case based on conduct more than two decades old, with little, if any, evidence other than witness testimony. See Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (observing that statute of limitations \"may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity\"). Since the time of the alleged conduct, memories have become faded or corrupted, documents have been lost or destroyed, and witnesses have died, all to the extreme prejudice of Ms. Maxwell.5 Retroactively applying the 2003 Amendment here not only would fly in the face of congressional intent; it would violate all notions of fundamental fairness.6",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5 See Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Six of the Superseding Indictment for Pre-Indictment Delay.\n6 In Weingarten, the court stated that if the defendant's counsel had successfully persuaded the trial court that the 2003 Amendment could not retroactively extend the statute of limitations for live charges, the trial court's holding would have been in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006). But in Leo Sure Chief, the alleged victim had not yet reached age 25 as of the time of the indictment, and thus the charges would not have been time-barred under either version of § 3283. Thus, the court in Leo Sure Chief did not perform a Landgraf analysis.",
      "position": "bottom"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "2003"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "144",
      "17",
      "25",
      "72 F.3d 277",
      "281",
      "397 U.S.",
      "115",
      "438 F.3d 920",
      "§ 3283",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002665"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the retroactive application of statutes and the statute of limitations. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 17 of 25."
}