{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "60 of 84",
    "document_number": "452",
    "date": "11/12/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 452 Filed 11/12/21 Page 60 of 84\nThe defense errs when it suggests that the Court ordered the Government to specifically itemize any co-conspirator statements contained in its disclosures. When the Court first set a disclosure schedule for Jencks Act material, it adopted the “Government’s proposal,” which opposed any requirement that the Government isolate co-conspirator statements from other witness statements. (Order at 1, Dkt. No. 297). When the Court ordered the Government to produce the identities of co-conspirators, it again ordered the Government to “disclose” all co-conspirator statements, citing the Court’s earlier order. (Order at 2, Dkt. No. 335). Neither order expressly directed the Government to produce a set of co-conspirator statements it would offer at trial separately from the other evidence it would offer at trial.\nA requirement to “disclose statements” is not a requirement to isolate statements. For one, the Court denied the defense request for effectively that relief in the first round of pretrial motions. (Op. & Order at 30-31, Dkt. No. 207). For another, in the defense’s many rounds of briefing on this issue, it has cited no case—not from this District, nor any other—in which a Court ordered the Government to segregate and itemize co-conspirator statements from other statements for the convenience of the defense. The Government is aware of no such case—likely because such an order would be in considerable tension with Circuit precedent, see In re U.S., 834 F.2d at 286. For a third, the guiding principle of the defense’s justification for its request is to facilitate litigation of those statements’ admissibility pre-trial. But the law of the Second Circuit is that such statements can be conditionally admitted during the trial, and their admissibility litigated thereafter. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 273 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011)(citing United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969)); Op. & Order at 30, Dkt. No. 207. As much\n59\nDOJ-OGR-00006768",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 452 Filed 11/12/21 Page 60 of 84",
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      "content": "The defense errs when it suggests that the Court ordered the Government to specifically itemize any co-conspirator statements contained in its disclosures. When the Court first set a disclosure schedule for Jencks Act material, it adopted the “Government’s proposal,” which opposed any requirement that the Government isolate co-conspirator statements from other witness statements. (Order at 1, Dkt. No. 297). When the Court ordered the Government to produce the identities of co-conspirators, it again ordered the Government to “disclose” all co-conspirator statements, citing the Court’s earlier order. (Order at 2, Dkt. No. 335). Neither order expressly directed the Government to produce a set of co-conspirator statements it would offer at trial separately from the other evidence it would offer at trial.",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A requirement to “disclose statements” is not a requirement to isolate statements. For one, the Court denied the defense request for effectively that relief in the first round of pretrial motions. (Op. & Order at 30-31, Dkt. No. 207). For another, in the defense’s many rounds of briefing on this issue, it has cited no case—not from this District, nor any other—in which a Court ordered the Government to segregate and itemize co-conspirator statements from other statements for the convenience of the defense. The Government is aware of no such case—likely because such an order would be in considerable tension with Circuit precedent, see In re U.S., 834 F.2d at 286. For a third, the guiding principle of the defense’s justification for its request is to facilitate litigation of those statements’ admissibility pre-trial. But the law of the Second Circuit is that such statements can be conditionally admitted during the trial, and their admissibility litigated thereafter. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 273 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011)(citing United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969)); Op. & Order at 30, Dkt. No. 207. As much",
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      "content": "59",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006768",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Court",
      "District",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/12/21",
      "2011",
      "1969"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 452",
      "Dkt. No. 297",
      "Dkt. No. 335",
      "Dkt. No. 207",
      "834 F.2d",
      "676 F.3d 260",
      "417 F.2d 1116",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006768"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 60 of 84."
}