{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "205",
    "document_number": "204-3",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 205 of 348\n\nTo be clear, OPR is not suggesting that prosecutors must obtain all available evidence before reaching plea agreements or that prosecutors cannot reasonably determine that reaching a resolution is more beneficial than continuing to litigate evidentiary issues. Every case is different and must be judged on its own facts. In this case, however, given the unorthodox nature of the state-based resolution, the fact that Acosta's decision to pursue it set the case on a wholly different track than what had been originally contemplated by his experienced staff, the nature and scope of Epstein's criminal conduct, the circumstances surrounding the removal of the computers from Epstein's residence, and the potential for obtaining evidence revealing serious additional criminal conduct, Acosta had a responsibility to ensure that he was fully informed about the consequences of pursing the course of action that he proposed and particularly about the consequences flowing from the express terms of the NPA. In deciding to resolve the case pre-charge, Acosta lost sight of the bigger picture that the investigation was not completed and viable leads remained to be pursued. The decision to forgo the government's efforts to obtain the computer evidence and to pursue significant investigative steps should have been made only after careful consideration of all the costs and benefits of the proposed action. OPR did not find evidence that Acosta fully considered the costs of ending the investigation prematurely.255\n\nC. OPR Was Unable to Determine the Basis for the Two-Year Term of Incarceration, That It Was Tied to Traditional Sentencing Goals, or That It Satisfied the Federal Interest in the Prosecution\n\nThe heart of the controversy surrounding the Epstein case is the apparent undue leniency afforded him concerning his sentence. After offering a deal that required a \"non-negotiable\" 24-month term of incarceration, Acosta agreed to resolve it for an 18-month term of incarceration, knowing that gain time would reduce it further, and indeed, Epstein served only 13 months. Epstein ultimately did not serve even that minimal sentence incarcerated on a full-time basis because the state allowed Epstein into its work release program within the first four months of his sentence. As Lourie told OPR, \"[E]verything else that happened to [Epstein] is exactly what should have happened to him. . . . He had to pay a lot of money. He had to register as a sex offender,\" but \"in the perfect world, [Epstein] would have served more time in jail.\"\n\nDue to the passage of time and the subjects' inability to recall many details of the relevant events, OPR was unable to develop a clear understanding of how the original two-year sentence requirement was developed or by whom. Two possibilities were articulated during OPR's subject interviews: (1) the two years represented the sentence Epstein would have received had he pled guilty to an unspecified charge originally contemplated by the state; or (2) the two years represented the sentence the USAO determined Epstein would be willing to accept, thus avoiding the need for a trial. As to the former possibility, Acosta told OPR that his \"best understanding\" of the two-year proposal was that it correlated to \"one of the original state charges.\" He elaborated,\n\n255 In commenting on OPR's draft report, Acosta's attorney objected to OPR's conclusion that Acosta knew or should have known about the litigation regarding the computers and that he should have given greater consideration to pursuing the computers before the NPA was signed. Acosta's attorney asserted that Acosta was not involved in that level of \"granularity\"; that his \"'small thoughts' edits\" on the NPA were limited and focused on policy; and that it was appropriate for him to rely on his staff to raise any issues of concern to him. For the reasons stated above, OPR nonetheless concludes that having developed a unique resolution to a federal investigation, Acosta had a greater obligation to understand and consider what the USAO was giving up and the appropriateness of doing so.\n\n179\nDOJ-OGR-00003381",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204-3 Filed 04/16/21 Page 205 of 348",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To be clear, OPR is not suggesting that prosecutors must obtain all available evidence before reaching plea agreements or that prosecutors cannot reasonably determine that reaching a resolution is more beneficial than continuing to litigate evidentiary issues. Every case is different and must be judged on its own facts. In this case, however, given the unorthodox nature of the state-based resolution, the fact that Acosta's decision to pursue it set the case on a wholly different track than what had been originally contemplated by his experienced staff, the nature and scope of Epstein's criminal conduct, the circumstances surrounding the removal of the computers from Epstein's residence, and the potential for obtaining evidence revealing serious additional criminal conduct, Acosta had a responsibility to ensure that he was fully informed about the consequences of pursing the course of action that he proposed and particularly about the consequences flowing from the express terms of the NPA. In deciding to resolve the case pre-charge, Acosta lost sight of the bigger picture that the investigation was not completed and viable leads remained to be pursued. The decision to forgo the government's efforts to obtain the computer evidence and to pursue significant investigative steps should have been made only after careful consideration of all the costs and benefits of the proposed action. OPR did not find evidence that Acosta fully considered the costs of ending the investigation prematurely.255",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "C. OPR Was Unable to Determine the Basis for the Two-Year Term of Incarceration, That It Was Tied to Traditional Sentencing Goals, or That It Satisfied the Federal Interest in the Prosecution",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The heart of the controversy surrounding the Epstein case is the apparent undue leniency afforded him concerning his sentence. After offering a deal that required a \"non-negotiable\" 24-month term of incarceration, Acosta agreed to resolve it for an 18-month term of incarceration, knowing that gain time would reduce it further, and indeed, Epstein served only 13 months. Epstein ultimately did not serve even that minimal sentence incarcerated on a full-time basis because the state allowed Epstein into its work release program within the first four months of his sentence. As Lourie told OPR, \"[E]verything else that happened to [Epstein] is exactly what should have happened to him. . . . He had to pay a lot of money. He had to register as a sex offender,\" but \"in the perfect world, [Epstein] would have served more time in jail.\"",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Due to the passage of time and the subjects' inability to recall many details of the relevant events, OPR was unable to develop a clear understanding of how the original two-year sentence requirement was developed or by whom. Two possibilities were articulated during OPR's subject interviews: (1) the two years represented the sentence Epstein would have received had he pled guilty to an unspecified charge originally contemplated by the state; or (2) the two years represented the sentence the USAO determined Epstein would be willing to accept, thus avoiding the need for a trial. As to the former possibility, Acosta told OPR that his \"best understanding\" of the two-year proposal was that it correlated to \"one of the original state charges.\" He elaborated,",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "255 In commenting on OPR's draft report, Acosta's attorney objected to OPR's conclusion that Acosta knew or should have known about the litigation regarding the computers and that he should have given greater consideration to pursuing the computers before the NPA was signed. Acosta's attorney asserted that Acosta was not involved in that level of \"granularity\"; that his \"'small thoughts' edits\" on the NPA were limited and focused on policy; and that it was appropriate for him to rely on his staff to raise any issues of concern to him. For the reasons stated above, OPR nonetheless concludes that having developed a unique resolution to a federal investigation, Acosta had a greater obligation to understand and consider what the USAO was giving up and the appropriateness of doing so.",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "179",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003381",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Acosta",
      "Epstein",
      "Lourie"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "OPR",
      "USAO"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204-3",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003381"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document related to the Epstein case, discussing the investigation and sentencing. The text is printed, with no handwritten content or stamps."
}