{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "179",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 179 of 239\n\nis the \"specification of what statements are alleged to be false, and in what respect they are false, in charges of criminal falsity,\" as well as \"the subject matter of the congressional inquiry\" for charges of \"refusal to answer questions in a congressional inquiry.\" Id. at 125-26 (citing, inter alia, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962)). Similarly, \"where an indictment charges a crime that depends in turn on violation of another statute, the indictment must identify the underlying offense.\" United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2000). When delineating the contours of this narrow category of crimes requiring additional specificity in an indictment, the Second Circuit has previously found that the failure to name a specific victim of fraud does not render an indictment inadequate under this standard. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 127. In other words, absent some affirmative indication that additional specificity is required when charging a particular statute, there is no basis to conclude that an indictment need contain more than the elements of the offense and the approximate time and place of the alleged violation. See Wey, 2017 WL 237651 at *5 (declining to \"depart from the usual sufficiency framework\" where defendant \"cites no authority\" suggesting that the statutes at issue fall into the narrow exception to the general rule when considering motion to dismiss for lack of specificity).\n\nB. Discussion\n\nBecause each of the four counts at issue—Counts One, Two, Three, and Four—clearly lays out each element of the charged offense and adequately informs the defendant of the accusations against her, the Indictment easily satisfies the standard for sufficiency. Tellingly, the defendant does not claim that any of these counts fails to allege an essential element or to track the language of the relevant statute. Nor could she, as the face of the Indictment not only contains each and every essential element of the crimes charged, but also goes beyond the basic requirements for pleading each charge by providing additional factual background. Instead, the defendant baldly\n\n152\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003113",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 179 of 239",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "is the \"specification of what statements are alleged to be false, and in what respect they are false, in charges of criminal falsity,\" as well as \"the subject matter of the congressional inquiry\" for charges of \"refusal to answer questions in a congressional inquiry.\" Id. at 125-26 (citing, inter alia, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962)). Similarly, \"where an indictment charges a crime that depends in turn on violation of another statute, the indictment must identify the underlying offense.\" United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2000). When delineating the contours of this narrow category of crimes requiring additional specificity in an indictment, the Second Circuit has previously found that the failure to name a specific victim of fraud does not render an indictment inadequate under this standard. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 127. In other words, absent some affirmative indication that additional specificity is required when charging a particular statute, there is no basis to conclude that an indictment need contain more than the elements of the offense and the approximate time and place of the alleged violation. See Wey, 2017 WL 237651 at *5 (declining to \"depart from the usual sufficiency framework\" where defendant \"cites no authority\" suggesting that the statutes at issue fall into the narrow exception to the general rule when considering motion to dismiss for lack of specificity).",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "B. Discussion",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Because each of the four counts at issue—Counts One, Two, Three, and Four—clearly lays out each element of the charged offense and adequately informs the defendant of the accusations against her, the Indictment easily satisfies the standard for sufficiency. Tellingly, the defendant does not claim that any of these counts fails to allege an essential element or to track the language of the relevant statute. Nor could she, as the face of the Indictment not only contains each and every essential element of the crimes charged, but also goes beyond the basic requirements for pleading each charge by providing additional factual background. Instead, the defendant baldly",
      "position": "main content"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "152",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003113",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1962",
      "2000",
      "2017"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "369 U.S. 749",
      "212 F.3d 86",
      "730 F.3d at 127",
      "2017 WL 237651",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003113"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and easy to read. There are no visible redactions or damages."
}