{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "19",
    "document_number": "207",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 19 of 34\n\nIII. The indictment describes the charged offenses with specificity\n\nMaxwell seeks to dismiss the Mann Act counts for lack of specificity or in the alternative to compel the Government to submit a bill of particulars providing greater detail of the charges.\nThe Court concludes that the charges in the S1 superseding indictment are clear enough.\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7, an indictment must contain \"a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.\"\nThe indictment must be specific enough to inform the defendant of the charges and allow the defendant to plead double jeopardy in a later prosecution based on the same events. United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1992). \"Under this test, an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.\" United States. v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d Cir. 1975). In addition to dismissal, \"Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a defendant to seek a bill of particulars in order to identify with sufficient particularity the nature of the charge pending against him, thereby enabling defendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should he be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.\" United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987).\nThe S1 superseding indictment sets out the elements of each charged crime and the facts supporting each element. Nonetheless, Maxwell contends that the indictment is too vague because it refers to open-ended time periods, describes conduct like \"grooming\" and \"befriending\" that is not inherently criminal, and does not identify the alleged victims by name.\nMaxwell's first argument fails because the Government need only describe the time and place of charged conduct \"in approximate terms.\" Tramunti, 513 F.2d at 1113. The details are subject to proof at trial. \"[T]he Second Circuit routinely upholds the 'on or about' language used\n\n19\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003693",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 19 of 34",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "III. The indictment describes the charged offenses with specificity",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell seeks to dismiss the Mann Act counts for lack of specificity or in the alternative to compel the Government to submit a bill of particulars providing greater detail of the charges.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court concludes that the charges in the S1 superseding indictment are clear enough.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7, an indictment must contain \"a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.\"",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The indictment must be specific enough to inform the defendant of the charges and allow the defendant to plead double jeopardy in a later prosecution based on the same events. United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1992). \"Under this test, an indictment need do little more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.\" United States. v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d Cir. 1975). In addition to dismissal, \"Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a defendant to seek a bill of particulars in order to identify with sufficient particularity the nature of the charge pending against him, thereby enabling defendant to prepare for trial, to prevent surprise, and to interpose a plea of double jeopardy should he be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.\" United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The S1 superseding indictment sets out the elements of each charged crime and the facts supporting each element. Nonetheless, Maxwell contends that the indictment is too vague because it refers to open-ended time periods, describes conduct like \"grooming\" and \"befriending\" that is not inherently criminal, and does not identify the alleged victims by name.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell's first argument fails because the Government need only describe the time and place of charged conduct \"in approximate terms.\" Tramunti, 513 F.2d at 1113. The details are subject to proof at trial. \"[T]he Second Circuit routinely upholds the 'on or about' language used",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "19",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003693",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1975",
      "1987",
      "1992"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 207",
      "952 F.2d 686",
      "513 F.2d 1087",
      "820 F.2d 572",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003693"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 19 of 34."
}