{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "62 of 84",
    "document_number": "397",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 62 of 84\ncharged in the S2 indictment.), and Order at 3, Dkt. No. 335 (following the above sentence with \"In light of the interests discussed above . . . the Court will require the Government to disclose the identities of any unnamed co-conspirators . . .\").\nThe defense also argues that failure to provide an index of co-conspirator statements permits \"the presentation of false testimony\" and is \"an invitation to manufacture evidence,\" because a witness will offer a co-conspirator statement for the first time. (Def. Mot. 1 at 4). This argument is nonsensical and offensive. It is deeply unfortunate that defense counsel would so casually resort to baseless allegations that the Government would manufacture evidence and present false testimony at trial. And in any event, the Government produced to the defense Jencks Act material containing co-conspirator statements in its possession on October 11 and will continue to make Jencks Act productions as it prepares for trial. To the extent the defense is concerned that a witness will say something on the stand for the first time, the Government cannot disclose that in advance because no lawyer can know a witness's verbatim answer in advance. But were that to occur, the defense would be well positioned to cross-examine the witness.15\n15 The defendant's motion also makes the puzzling argument that co-conspirator statements are problematic in this case because the defense is limited in its ability to call co-conspirators to testify as defense witnesses. (Def. Mot. 1 at 4). That is true in essentially every criminal case, as the Court has previously noted. (See Op. & Order at 17-18, Dkt. No. 207 (\"There are also serious doubts under all of the relevant circumstances that a jury would have found testimony from Epstein credible even if he had waived his right against self-incrimination and testified on her behalf.\")). In any event, to the extent the defense takes issue with the rule that co-conspirator statements can be admitted without requiring the declarant to testify, that complaint is properly directed to the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence.\n61\nDOJ-OGR-00005845",
  "text_blocks": [
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 62 of 84",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "charged in the S2 indictment.), and Order at 3, Dkt. No. 335 (following the above sentence with \"In light of the interests discussed above . . . the Court will require the Government to disclose the identities of any unnamed co-conspirators . . .\").\nThe defense also argues that failure to provide an index of co-conspirator statements permits \"the presentation of false testimony\" and is \"an invitation to manufacture evidence,\" because a witness will offer a co-conspirator statement for the first time. (Def. Mot. 1 at 4). This argument is nonsensical and offensive. It is deeply unfortunate that defense counsel would so casually resort to baseless allegations that the Government would manufacture evidence and present false testimony at trial. And in any event, the Government produced to the defense Jencks Act material containing co-conspirator statements in its possession on October 11 and will continue to make Jencks Act productions as it prepares for trial. To the extent the defense is concerned that a witness will say something on the stand for the first time, the Government cannot disclose that in advance because no lawyer can know a witness's verbatim answer in advance. But were that to occur, the defense would be well positioned to cross-examine the witness.15",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "15 The defendant's motion also makes the puzzling argument that co-conspirator statements are problematic in this case because the defense is limited in its ability to call co-conspirators to testify as defense witnesses. (Def. Mot. 1 at 4). That is true in essentially every criminal case, as the Court has previously noted. (See Op. & Order at 17-18, Dkt. No. 207 (\"There are also serious doubts under all of the relevant circumstances that a jury would have found testimony from Epstein credible even if he had waived his right against self-incrimination and testified on her behalf.\")). In any event, to the extent the defense takes issue with the rule that co-conspirator statements can be admitted without requiring the declarant to testify, that complaint is properly directed to the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "61",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005845",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "October 11",
      "10/29/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "397",
      "335",
      "207",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005845"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}