{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "8",
    "document_number": "397",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 8 of 84\n\nparticular case, the expert's testimony will often rest upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to the jury's own.\" Id. at 149 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2021) (\"Such specialized knowledge can be grounded in scientific or other particularized training, but it can also derive from personal observations or experience, see id., so long as those observations or experience are outside the ken of the average person.\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee's Note (2000) (explaining that expert testimony may be based on \"experience alone—or experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education\").\n\nThe key question is whether \"an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.\" Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152; see Williams, 506 F.3d at 160 (explaining that the Daubert test is \"flexible\"). In particular, if an expert's testimony is within \"the range where the experts might reasonably differ,\" the jury, not the trial court, should be the one to decide among the conflicting views of different experts. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153. So long as the testimony is not \"speculative or conjectural or based on assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison . . . any other contentions that the assumptions are unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony.\" Phelps, 2020 WL 7028954, at *3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, \"'the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.'\" Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 287\n\n7\n\nDOJ-OGR-00005791",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 8 of 84",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "particular case, the expert's testimony will often rest upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to the jury's own.\" Id. at 149 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2021) (\"Such specialized knowledge can be grounded in scientific or other particularized training, but it can also derive from personal observations or experience, see id., so long as those observations or experience are outside the ken of the average person.\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 702, Advisory Committee's Note (2000) (explaining that expert testimony may be based on \"experience alone—or experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education\").",
      "position": "main body"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The key question is whether \"an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.\" Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152; see Williams, 506 F.3d at 160 (explaining that the Daubert test is \"flexible\"). In particular, if an expert's testimony is within \"the range where the experts might reasonably differ,\" the jury, not the trial court, should be the one to decide among the conflicting views of different experts. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153. So long as the testimony is not \"speculative or conjectural or based on assumptions that are so unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in essence an apples and oranges comparison . . . any other contentions that the assumptions are unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony.\" Phelps, 2020 WL 7028954, at *3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, \"'the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.'\" Floyd v. City of New York, 861 F. Supp. 2d 274, 287",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "7",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005791",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21",
      "2000",
      "2020"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 397",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005791"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the admissibility of expert testimony and references various legal precedents."
}