{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "9",
    "document_number": "206",
    "date": "04/16/21",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 206 Filed 04/16/21 Page 9 of 22\n\nthat Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision was motivated by such concerns,1\nCongress nonetheless chose to address those concerns by eliminating the retroactivity provision altogether, rather than simply modifying it to prohibit the revival of time-barred charges. If Congress had intended to distinguish between live charges and time-barred charges, it could easily have done so. Its decision to drop the provision completely demonstrates a clear intent that the 2003 Amendment not be applied retroactively. The Court may not override that clear intent merely because doing so may have been a broader measure than necessary to address the concerns Senator Leahy articulated.2\n\nThe government also contends that heeding Congress' specific intent not to make the 2003 Amendment retroactive would “undermine Congress's plain purpose” in enacting it—i.e., to extend the limitations period “to ensure that prosecutors could seek justice for child sex abuse victims who come forward or identify their abusers after a delay.” See Opp. 31. But statutory amendments, by nature, are designed to remedy perceived deficiencies in existing law, and thus a decision not to apply any amendment retroactively will typically limit, or “undermine,” the effectuation of that purpose. For that reason, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Landgraf, an amendment's purpose is immaterial to a retroactivity analysis:\n\n1 While Senator Leahy's floor statement confirms that Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision was intentional, his statement as to why the provision was rejected cannot be ascribed to other members of Congress.\n\n2 The government implicitly asks the Court to disregard the voluminous authority emphasizing the significant weight to be given congressional consideration and explicit rejection of a proposed statutory provision (see Mem. 7-8), relying solely on the Supreme Court's treatment in Landgraf of an omission from the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1991 of an “elaborate retroactivity provision” that had been included in a vetoed civil rights bill passed by a prior Congress. See Opp. 31 n.14 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 256). That omission is not analogous. There was no indication in Landgraf that Congress had even considered, let alone rejected, such a provision in the legislation it ultimately enacted. Moreover, the provision from the prior Congress' bill was indeed “elaborate”: it did not simply prescribe retroactivity, as the provision stricken from the 2003 Amendment would have done, but assigned a series of different effective dates to different subsections. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 255 n.8. The absence of such a detailed scheme from subsequent legislation, passed by a subsequent Congress, could not be reasonably interpreted as a clear reflection of congressional intent regarding retroactivity, and there is no indication in the opinion that any party argued otherwise.\n\n4\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003661",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 206 Filed 04/16/21 Page 9 of 22",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "that Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision was motivated by such concerns,1\nCongress nonetheless chose to address those concerns by eliminating the retroactivity provision altogether, rather than simply modifying it to prohibit the revival of time-barred charges. If Congress had intended to distinguish between live charges and time-barred charges, it could easily have done so. Its decision to drop the provision completely demonstrates a clear intent that the 2003 Amendment not be applied retroactively. The Court may not override that clear intent merely because doing so may have been a broader measure than necessary to address the concerns Senator Leahy articulated.2",
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      "content": "The government also contends that heeding Congress' specific intent not to make the 2003 Amendment retroactive would “undermine Congress's plain purpose” in enacting it—i.e., to extend the limitations period “to ensure that prosecutors could seek justice for child sex abuse victims who come forward or identify their abusers after a delay.” See Opp. 31. But statutory amendments, by nature, are designed to remedy perceived deficiencies in existing law, and thus a decision not to apply any amendment retroactively will typically limit, or “undermine,” the effectuation of that purpose. For that reason, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Landgraf, an amendment's purpose is immaterial to a retroactivity analysis:",
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      "content": "1 While Senator Leahy's floor statement confirms that Congress' rejection of the retroactivity provision was intentional, his statement as to why the provision was rejected cannot be ascribed to other members of Congress.\n\n2 The government implicitly asks the Court to disregard the voluminous authority emphasizing the significant weight to be given congressional consideration and explicit rejection of a proposed statutory provision (see Mem. 7-8), relying solely on the Supreme Court's treatment in Landgraf of an omission from the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1991 of an “elaborate retroactivity provision” that had been included in a vetoed civil rights bill passed by a prior Congress. See Opp. 31 n.14 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 256). That omission is not analogous. There was no indication in Landgraf that Congress had even considered, let alone rejected, such a provision in the legislation it ultimately enacted. Moreover, the provision from the prior Congress' bill was indeed “elaborate”: it did not simply prescribe retroactivity, as the provision stricken from the 2003 Amendment would have done, but assigned a series of different effective dates to different subsections. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 255 n.8. The absence of such a detailed scheme from subsequent legislation, passed by a subsequent Congress, could not be reasonably interpreted as a clear reflection of congressional intent regarding retroactivity, and there is no indication in the opinion that any party argued otherwise.",
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      "content": "4",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003661",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Leahy"
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    "organizations": [
      "Congress",
      "Supreme Court"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1991"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "206",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003661",
      "511 U.S. at 256",
      "511 U.S. at 255 n.8"
    ]
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a formal tone and legal language. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}