{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "20 of 22",
    "document_number": "140",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 140 Filed 02/04/21 Page 20 of 22\n\ncase and use her own words against her. 594 F.2d at 294. The Fifth Amendment would mean nothing if an individual were told by a district court that she need not invoke its protections because the government could not use her testimony against her—or at least could not do so without notice and an opportunity to be heard—only to find out that the testimony she offered with the district court's blessing was the primary evidence against her in a criminal case and the basis of perjury charges.\n\nThat is the lesson of United States v. Oshatz, in which this Court quashed a government subpoena issued to a court reporter for a transcript of a deposition offered by the defendant in a civil proceeding. 700 F. Supp. 696, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Oshatz (who had been indicted at the time of his deposition) was deposed and did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on “the understanding that a protective order would preserve his Fifth Amendment rights.” Id. at 699. Applying Martindell, this Court quashed the government’s subpoena and refused to release the deposition transcript because the “government [had] not argued that the protective order was improvidently granted or that there [were] some extraordinary circumstances or compelling need.” Id. at 701.\n\nHere, as in Oshatz, Maxwell was deposed on “the understanding that a protective order would preserve” the confidentiality of her testimony. And even though Maxwell had not been indicted at the time of her depositions, the threat of an investigation was obvious, and that threat was the very reason the Protective Order deliberately excluded a law-enforcement exception. (Moreover, Maxwell moved the court to require Giuffre to disclose any law enforcement investigation of which she was aware.) As in Oshatz, the Protective Order was designed to preserve Maxwell’s Fifth Amendment rights. Where this Court in Oshatz granted a motion to quash, here it should grant a motion to suppress.\n\n16\n\nDOJ-OGR-00002568",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 140 Filed 02/04/21 Page 20 of 22",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "case and use her own words against her. 594 F.2d at 294. The Fifth Amendment would mean nothing if an individual were told by a district court that she need not invoke its protections because the government could not use her testimony against her—or at least could not do so without notice and an opportunity to be heard—only to find out that the testimony she offered with the district court's blessing was the primary evidence against her in a criminal case and the basis of perjury charges.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "That is the lesson of United States v. Oshatz, in which this Court quashed a government subpoena issued to a court reporter for a transcript of a deposition offered by the defendant in a civil proceeding. 700 F. Supp. 696, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Oshatz (who had been indicted at the time of his deposition) was deposed and did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on “the understanding that a protective order would preserve his Fifth Amendment rights.” Id. at 699. Applying Martindell, this Court quashed the government’s subpoena and refused to release the deposition transcript because the “government [had] not argued that the protective order was improvidently granted or that there [were] some extraordinary circumstances or compelling need.” Id. at 701.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Here, as in Oshatz, Maxwell was deposed on “the understanding that a protective order would preserve” the confidentiality of her testimony. And even though Maxwell had not been indicted at the time of her depositions, the threat of an investigation was obvious, and that threat was the very reason the Protective Order deliberately excluded a law-enforcement exception. (Moreover, Maxwell moved the court to require Giuffre to disclose any law enforcement investigation of which she was aware.) As in Oshatz, the Protective Order was designed to preserve Maxwell’s Fifth Amendment rights. Where this Court in Oshatz granted a motion to quash, here it should grant a motion to suppress.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "16",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002568",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Giuffre",
      "Oshatz",
      "Martindell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "1988"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 140",
      "594 F.2d",
      "700 F. Supp. 696",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002568"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the Fifth Amendment rights of a defendant and the implications of a protective order on the use of testimony in a criminal proceeding. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}