{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "39",
    "document_number": "439",
    "date": "11/12/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 439 Filed 11/12/21 Page 39 of 69\n\nAccordingly, the Florida Investigation will already be a central part of the case presented to the jury. It will not be confusing or distracting to elicit evidence of how that investigation concluded, as the government contends. See Mot. at 27. In fact, the opposite is true. Without that evidence, the jury will be left to speculate how and when the Florida Investigation ended, and whether Ms. Maxwell was charged in connection with that investigation. Accordingly, eliciting evidence of how the Florida Investigation ended, including who was (and was not) charged in the proposed indictment, and who was (and was not) immunized in the NPA, will be necessary to avoid jury confusion and speculation, as well as prejudice to Ms. Maxwell.\n\nThe government also suggests that introducing the NPA would require an extended \"trial within a trial\" concerning the history of its creation, which was the subject of the 290-page report from the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility (the \"OPR Report\"). Mot. at 27-28. Not so. The defense has no interest in probing the minutiae of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the NPA. It seems even less likely that the government would do so, given that the OPR Report found that the NPA was \"flawed\" and was extremely critical of how the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Alexander Acosta, handled the resolution of the investigation. OPR Report at 284. The risk of delay or juror confusion by putting the NPA at issue in the trial is therefore illusory. It should not be excluded under Rule 403.20\n\n20 The NPA is also not hearsay. It is an agreement that has independent legal significance and is a \"verbal act\" \"containing legally operative language affecting the rights of the parties\" that does not qualify as hearsay. Spencer v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 2852 (KMW), 2011 WL 13257640, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 5, 2011); United States v. Martin, No. 04 Cr. 1106 MCA, 2005 WL 8163890, at *5 (D.N.M. Apr. 11, 2005); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), committee notes, subdivision (c).",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 439 Filed 11/12/21 Page 39 of 69",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Accordingly, the Florida Investigation will already be a central part of the case presented to the jury. It will not be confusing or distracting to elicit evidence of how that investigation concluded, as the government contends. See Mot. at 27. In fact, the opposite is true. Without that evidence, the jury will be left to speculate how and when the Florida Investigation ended, and whether Ms. Maxwell was charged in connection with that investigation. Accordingly, eliciting evidence of how the Florida Investigation ended, including who was (and was not) charged in the proposed indictment, and who was (and was not) immunized in the NPA, will be necessary to avoid jury confusion and speculation, as well as prejudice to Ms. Maxwell.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government also suggests that introducing the NPA would require an extended \"trial within a trial\" concerning the history of its creation, which was the subject of the 290-page report from the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility (the \"OPR Report\"). Mot. at 27-28. Not so. The defense has no interest in probing the minutiae of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the NPA. It seems even less likely that the government would do so, given that the OPR Report found that the NPA was \"flawed\" and was extremely critical of how the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, Alexander Acosta, handled the resolution of the investigation. OPR Report at 284. The risk of delay or juror confusion by putting the NPA at issue in the trial is therefore illusory. It should not be excluded under Rule 403.20",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "20 The NPA is also not hearsay. It is an agreement that has independent legal significance and is a \"verbal act\" \"containing legally operative language affecting the rights of the parties\" that does not qualify as hearsay. Spencer v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 2852 (KMW), 2011 WL 13257640, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 5, 2011); United States v. Martin, No. 04 Cr. 1106 MCA, 2005 WL 8163890, at *5 (D.N.M. Apr. 11, 2005); Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), committee notes, subdivision (c).",
      "position": "footnote"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Alexander Acosta"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Department of Justice",
      "Office of Professional Responsibility"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Florida",
      "Southern District of Florida",
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/12/21",
      "Jul. 5, 2011",
      "Apr. 11, 2005"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 439",
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and easy to read. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}