{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "13",
    "document_number": "136",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 136 Filed 02/04/21 Page 13 of 27\nEx. 1, Case No.15-cv-7433, Tr. of Jan. 19, 2021 Hearing at 6-7 (emphasis supplied). After finding that the questions were “far afield” from the allegations in the case, Judge Preska kept sealed or redacted the entire testimony that forms the basis of Count 6.\n\nARGUMENT\nI. Poorly Worded Questions and Literally Truthful Responses Cannot Support a Perjury Prosecution\nA. Legal Authority\nIn the Second Circuit, “a perjury conviction which might have been based on questions that were ambiguous or on responses that were literally truthful may not be sustained.” United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1986). The Lighte panel reversed a perjury conviction, holding that some of the questions giving rise to the allegedly perjurious testimony were “fundamentally ambiguous” and should never have been submitted to the jury.” Id. at 375-77. “When a line of questioning is so vague as to be ‘fundamentally ambiguous,’ the answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury conviction.” Id. at 375 (quoting United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970)).\nWhere ambiguity exists on the questioner’s part, the test is whether the question, as the declarant objectively understood it, is falsely answered. Perjury does not exist by implication.\nA jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture of whether any unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether he does not believe his answer to be true.\nBronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-60 (1973); see also United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1985) (declarant’s testimony cannot be perjurious when declarant made to guess at question’s meaning); United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 654 (11th Cir. 1984) (questioning cannot be vague or ill-defined); United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 199-200 (3d\n8\nDOJ-OGR-00002422",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 136 Filed 02/04/21 Page 13 of 27",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Ex. 1, Case No.15-cv-7433, Tr. of Jan. 19, 2021 Hearing at 6-7 (emphasis supplied). After finding that the questions were “far afield” from the allegations in the case, Judge Preska kept sealed or redacted the entire testimony that forms the basis of Count 6.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "ARGUMENT",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "I. Poorly Worded Questions and Literally Truthful Responses Cannot Support a Perjury Prosecution",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A. Legal Authority",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In the Second Circuit, “a perjury conviction which might have been based on questions that were ambiguous or on responses that were literally truthful may not be sustained.” United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir. 1986). The Lighte panel reversed a perjury conviction, holding that some of the questions giving rise to the allegedly perjurious testimony were “fundamentally ambiguous” and should never have been submitted to the jury.” Id. at 375-77. “When a line of questioning is so vague as to be ‘fundamentally ambiguous,’ the answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury conviction.” Id. at 375 (quoting United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Where ambiguity exists on the questioner’s part, the test is whether the question, as the declarant objectively understood it, is falsely answered. Perjury does not exist by implication.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture of whether any unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether he does not believe his answer to be true.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-60 (1973); see also United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1985) (declarant’s testimony cannot be perjurious when declarant made to guess at question’s meaning); United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 654 (11th Cir. 1984) (questioning cannot be vague or ill-defined); United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 199-200 (3d",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "8",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002422",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Judge Preska"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "Jan. 19, 2021",
      "02/04/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 136",
      "Case No.15-cv-7433",
      "Count 6",
      "782 F.2d 367",
      "437 F.2d 862",
      "409 U.S. 352",
      "772 F.2d 559",
      "734 F.2d 643",
      "577 F.2d 194",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002422"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a perjury prosecution. The text is well-formatted and printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document includes citations to various court cases and legal references."
}