{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "114",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 114 of 239 omitted). “As the rule seeks to deter future Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court advises district courts to only suppress evidence where it serves such a purpose.” United States v. Williams, No. 10 Cr. 622 (ADS), 2018 WL 4623017, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it results in appreciable deterrence.” United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”). As a result, exclusion should be a “last resort” rather than a “first impulse.” United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The exclusionary rule should be used only where law enforcement “exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights.”” United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 957 (11th Cir. 2020) (“It follows that when officers act with ‘an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful’—i.e., by acting in reasonable reliance on a warrant, statute, or court order—the exclusionary rule does not apply because there is little, if any, deterrence benefit in such circumstances.” (citations omitted)). In the context of search warrants, suppression will generally not be warranted where the evidence at issue was “obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). As a result, although the burden is on the Government to establish good faith, “[s]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to 87 DOJ-OGR-00003048",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 114 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "omitted). “As the rule seeks to deter future Fourth Amendment violations, the Supreme Court advises district courts to only suppress evidence where it serves such a purpose.” United States v. Williams, No. 10 Cr. 622 (ADS), 2018 WL 4623017, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it results in appreciable deterrence.” United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009)); see also Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 (concluding that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”). As a result, exclusion should be a “last resort” rather than a “first impulse.” United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The exclusionary rule should be used only where law enforcement “exhibit[s] deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights.”” United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Stokes, 733 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 957 (11th Cir. 2020) (“It follows that when officers act with ‘an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful’—i.e., by acting in reasonable reliance on a warrant, statute, or court order—the exclusionary rule does not apply because there is little, if any, deterrence benefit in such circumstances.” (citations omitted)). In the context of search warrants, suppression will generally not be warranted where the evidence at issue was “obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). As a result, although the burden is on the Government to establish good faith, “[s]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to",
      "position": "main body"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "87",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003048",
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    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "E.D.N.Y.",
      "2d Cir.",
      "11th Cir."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "Sept. 26, 2018",
      "04/16/21",
      "2009",
      "2010",
      "2013",
      "2015",
      "2020",
      "1984"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "No. 10 Cr. 622 (ADS)",
      "2018 WL 4623017",
      "933 F.3d 110",
      "555 U.S. 135",
      "626 F.3d 56",
      "780 F.3d 105",
      "733 F.3d 438",
      "981 F.3d 945",
      "468 U.S. 897",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003048"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the exclusionary rule and its application to Fourth Amendment violations. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}