{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "18",
    "document_number": "206",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 206 Filed 04/16/21 Page 18 of 22\n\ncommission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the offense.\" Id. at 39 (emphasis added by Court). Because § 3283 contains no such modification to the words \"offense involving,\" Nijhawan is entirely consistent not only with the Supreme Court cases that interpret \"offense involving\" language as referring to elements of the offense, but also with a similar interpretation of the language as it appears in § 3283.10\n\nThe Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011), squares perfectly with this approach. In Coutentos, the court held that § 3283 did not apply to a charge of possession of child pornography, even though the facts of the case involved conduct that went beyond the elements of child pornography and, according to the court, constituted sexual abuse. 651 F.3d at 817. The government's attempt to distinguish Coutentos on the ground that \"this case does not involve the possession of child pornography\" (Opp. 41) misses the point: In determining whether § 3283 applied, the court did not consider evidence of actual sexual abuse and instead confined its focus to the elements of the offense of possession of child pornography. In other words, it used the \"necessarily entails\" approach. Similarly, § 3283 requires the Court here to look only to the elements of § 2422(a) and § 2423(a), and to disregard allegations of conduct beyond those elements.\n\nFinally, the government attempts to distinguish Bridges, in which the Supreme Court used the equivalent of a \"necessarily entails\" approach specifically with respect to a statute of limitations, and argues that Bridges is an outlier based on its legislative history. But the government fails to identify a single statute of limitations other than § 3283 in which a fact-\n\n10 The government cites the Second Circuit's statement in a footnote in Weingarten that the \"offense involving\" language is \"equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach.\" Opp. 39-40 (quoting Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60 n.11). However, Weingarten relied exclusively on Nijhawan for that proposition; like the government, it cited no case in which a fact-based approach had been used to apply an \"offense involving\" statute other than § 3283. In any event, the Second Circuit did not hold that a fact-based approach applies to § 3283; it held only, in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, that it was \"not obvious\" which approach applies. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60.\n\n13\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003670",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 206 Filed 04/16/21 Page 18 of 22",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "commission of the offense of conviction, rather than to the elements of the offense.\" Id. at 39 (emphasis added by Court). Because § 3283 contains no such modification to the words \"offense involving,\" Nijhawan is entirely consistent not only with the Supreme Court cases that interpret \"offense involving\" language as referring to elements of the offense, but also with a similar interpretation of the language as it appears in § 3283.10",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011), squares perfectly with this approach. In Coutentos, the court held that § 3283 did not apply to a charge of possession of child pornography, even though the facts of the case involved conduct that went beyond the elements of child pornography and, according to the court, constituted sexual abuse. 651 F.3d at 817. The government's attempt to distinguish Coutentos on the ground that \"this case does not involve the possession of child pornography\" (Opp. 41) misses the point: In determining whether § 3283 applied, the court did not consider evidence of actual sexual abuse and instead confined its focus to the elements of the offense of possession of child pornography. In other words, it used the \"necessarily entails\" approach. Similarly, § 3283 requires the Court here to look only to the elements of § 2422(a) and § 2423(a), and to disregard allegations of conduct beyond those elements.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Finally, the government attempts to distinguish Bridges, in which the Supreme Court used the equivalent of a \"necessarily entails\" approach specifically with respect to a statute of limitations, and argues that Bridges is an outlier based on its legislative history. But the government fails to identify a single statute of limitations other than § 3283 in which a fact-",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "10 The government cites the Second Circuit's statement in a footnote in Weingarten that the \"offense involving\" language is \"equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach.\" Opp. 39-40 (quoting Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60 n.11). However, Weingarten relied exclusively on Nijhawan for that proposition; like the government, it cited no case in which a fact-based approach had been used to apply an \"offense involving\" statute other than § 3283. In any event, the Second Circuit did not hold that a fact-based approach applies to § 3283; it held only, in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, that it was \"not obvious\" which approach applies. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 60.",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "13",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003670",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Eighth Circuit",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 206",
      "§ 3283",
      "§ 2422(a)",
      "§ 2423(a)",
      "651 F.3d 809",
      "865 F.3d at 60 n.11",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003670"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing, likely a memorandum or brief, discussing the application of a specific statute (§ 3283) to a case involving child pornography. The text is dense and technical, referencing various court cases and legal precedents. There are no visible redactions or damages to the document."
}