{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "100",
    "date": "12/18/20",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 100 Filed 12/18/20 Page 10 of 36\n\nAdditionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In such a case, “the defendant ‘bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose . . . a risk of flight.’” United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). The act of producing such evidence, however, “does not eliminate the presumption favoring detention.” Id. Rather, the presumption “remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court,” while the Government retains the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the defendant presents a risk of flight. Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436.\n\nWhen the Court has already issued a detention order, the Bail Reform Act provides that the detention hearing “may be reopened . . . if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance” of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Accordingly, “[a] court may properly reject an attempt to reopen a detention hearing where the new information presented is immaterial to the issue of flight risk.” United States v. Petrov, 15 Cr. 66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015). Although courts in this Circuit have recognized that “a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing,” United States v. Rowe, 02 Cr. 756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003), generally the moving party must establish that its arguments “warrant\n\n7\n\nDOJ-OGR-00002171",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 100 Filed 12/18/20 Page 10 of 36",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Additionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In such a case, “the defendant ‘bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that he does not pose . . . a risk of flight.’” United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)). The act of producing such evidence, however, “does not eliminate the presumption favoring detention.” Id. Rather, the presumption “remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court,” while the Government retains the ultimate burden of demonstrating that the defendant presents a risk of flight. Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "When the Court has already issued a detention order, the Bail Reform Act provides that the detention hearing “may be reopened . . . if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance” of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Accordingly, “[a] court may properly reject an attempt to reopen a detention hearing where the new information presented is immaterial to the issue of flight risk.” United States v. Petrov, 15 Cr. 66 (LTS), 2015 WL 11022886, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015). Although courts in this Circuit have recognized that “a release order may be reconsidered even where the evidence proffered on reconsideration was known to the movant at the time of the original hearing,” United States v. Rowe, 02 Cr. 756 (LMM), 2003 WL 21196846, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003), generally the moving party must establish that its arguments “warrant",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "7",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002171",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Department of Justice"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "12/18/20",
      "March 26, 2015",
      "May 21, 2003"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 100",
      "18 U.S.C. §§ 2422",
      "18 U.S.C. § 2423",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E)",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)",
      "629 F.3d 311",
      "254 F.3d 433",
      "15 Cr. 66 (LTS)",
      "02 Cr. 756 (LMM)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002171"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 10 of 36."
}