{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "19",
    "document_number": "311-4",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 19 of 27\nTo Be Filed Under Seal\nwhile the Protective Order also had a permanent aspect about it—i.e., it provides for the return or destruction of documents upon conclusion of the case (see Protective Order ¶ 12)—this provision neither trumped the law concerning the public's right of access to materials filed in court, nor specifically required the designating party to maintain confidentiality over its own designated materials once the Protective Order expired. (See id.)\nOf course, this case contains an unusual fact that might seem to render Maxwell's reliance on a blanket Protective Order reasonable, as against even disclosure pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. We know that Maxwell refused to agree to any Protective Order containing a provision that is customary in all the protective orders entered by this Court: a provision permitting the production of confidential materials to law enforcement without further order of the court. (See Def.'s Reply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order, 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 49 at 5.) This might seem ironic, since Maxwell argued, in support of her motion for entry of a protective order, that prosecution of anyone based on Giuffre's allegations was unlikely. (Id.)\nBut whether prosecution seemed likely or not, Maxwell did indeed bargain for such a provision; and for whatever reason, Giuffre and Boies Schiller agreed to it.\nHowever, the Protective Order entered by Judge Sweet contains a provision that permits the court to order disclosure of Confidential Material in circumstances other than those listed in Paragraph 5 (a)–(h). See Protective Order ¶ 5 (\"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION shall not, without the consent of the party producing it or further Order of the Court, be disclosed[.]\") (emphasis added). All the list of exceptions at subparagraphs 5(a) through (h) does is indicate when there is no need for the opponent's consent or a court order before disclosure can be made.\nAs the Protective Order plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the\n18\nSDNY_GM_00000892\nDOJ-OGR-00004942",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 19 of 27",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To Be Filed Under Seal",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "while the Protective Order also had a permanent aspect about it—i.e., it provides for the return or destruction of documents upon conclusion of the case (see Protective Order ¶ 12)—this provision neither trumped the law concerning the public's right of access to materials filed in court, nor specifically required the designating party to maintain confidentiality over its own designated materials once the Protective Order expired. (See id.)",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Of course, this case contains an unusual fact that might seem to render Maxwell's reliance on a blanket Protective Order reasonable, as against even disclosure pursuant to a grand jury subpoena. We know that Maxwell refused to agree to any Protective Order containing a provision that is customary in all the protective orders entered by this Court: a provision permitting the production of confidential materials to law enforcement without further order of the court. (See Def.'s Reply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order, 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 49 at 5.) This might seem ironic, since Maxwell argued, in support of her motion for entry of a protective order, that prosecution of anyone based on Giuffre's allegations was unlikely. (Id.)",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "But whether prosecution seemed likely or not, Maxwell did indeed bargain for such a provision; and for whatever reason, Giuffre and Boies Schiller agreed to it.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "However, the Protective Order entered by Judge Sweet contains a provision that permits the court to order disclosure of Confidential Material in circumstances other than those listed in Paragraph 5 (a)–(h). See Protective Order ¶ 5 (\"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION shall not, without the consent of the party producing it or further Order of the Court, be disclosed[.]\") (emphasis added). All the list of exceptions at subparagraphs 5(a) through (h) does is indicate when there is no need for the opponent's consent or a court order before disclosure can be made.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As the Protective Order plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "18",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "SDNY_GM_00000892",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004942",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Giuffre",
      "Judge Sweet"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Boies Schiller"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "311-4",
      "15-cv-7433",
      "Dkt. No. 49",
      "SDNY_GM_00000892",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004942"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Maxwell. The text discusses the Protective Order and its implications. The document is marked 'To Be Filed Under Seal' and contains references to other court documents and filings."
}