{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "13",
    "document_number": "11",
    "date": "07/12/19",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 13 of 14\n\nHonorable Richard M. Berman\nUnited States District Judge\nJuly 12, 2019\nPage 13\n\n(2d Cir. 2010) (“A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.”) (citing United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). Moreover, any references in an NPA to the “Government” or the “United States” do not abrogate these principles. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672 (“[A] plea agreement whereby a federal prosecutor agrees that ‘the Government’ will dismiss counts of an indictment . . . might be thought to bar the United States from reprosecuting the dismissed charges in any judicial district unless the agreement expressly limits the scope of the agreement . . . . However, the law has evolved to the contrary.”). “The mere use of the term ‘government’ in the plea agreement does not create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Brown, No. 99-1230, 2002 WL 34244994, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (in analyzing an SDFL plea agreement, reiterating the holding of Annabi and noting that it applies “even if the plea agreement purports to bind ‘the Government’” or the “United States”) (summary order); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument that the phrase ‘United States’ shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney’s Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant’s liability in the SDFL.”).8\n\nIn sum, this issue is a distraction that has little relevance to the bail determination and does nothing to address the defendant’s risk of flight or mitigate the danger he poses to the community.\n\nB. The Defendant Wrongly Argues the Statute Does Not Apply to His Sex Trafficking\n\nNext, the defendant wrongly argues that the “principal conduct” giving rise to the charges is his payment of underage girls for sex acts, and that such conduct could not possibly fall under the charged statutes. As the defendant implicitly concedes, Release Motion at 14, this is an issue for a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the defendant’s argument is incorrect for two reasons.\n\nFirst, although the defendant undoubtedly participated on the demand side of the crime, he was also instrumental on the supply side given his role in recruiting and causing others to recruit additional victims. He organized, funded, and perpetuated a sex trafficking scheme in two states, including with co-conspirators. The fact that he did so for his own eventual and frequent sexual gratification does not vitiate his role in enticing and recruiting victims, consistent with the elements of the offense with which he is charged. The defendant was the leader of a sex-trafficking enterprise, not a mere consumer.\n\n8 This analysis similarly extends to a non-prosecution agreement. See United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851, 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Defendant’s argument, in effect, is that unless there is an explicit statement to the contrary, it is presumed that a non-prosecution agreement binds offices of the United States Attorney that are not parties to the agreement. This position is at odds with the law in this Circuit, which presumes a narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively establish that a more expansive interpretation was contemplated.”) (citing Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672).\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000341",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 13 of 14",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Honorable Richard M. Berman\nUnited States District Judge\nJuly 12, 2019\nPage 13",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "(2d Cir. 2010) (“A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.”) (citing United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). Moreover, any references in an NPA to the “Government” or the “United States” do not abrogate these principles. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672 (“[A] plea agreement whereby a federal prosecutor agrees that ‘the Government’ will dismiss counts of an indictment . . . might be thought to bar the United States from reprosecuting the dismissed charges in any judicial district unless the agreement expressly limits the scope of the agreement . . . . However, the law has evolved to the contrary.”). “The mere use of the term ‘government’ in the plea agreement does not create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Brown, No. 99-1230, 2002 WL 34244994, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) (in analyzing an SDFL plea agreement, reiterating the holding of Annabi and noting that it applies “even if the plea agreement purports to bind ‘the Government’” or the “United States”) (summary order); United States v. Bruno, 159 F. Supp. 3d 311, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The Court disagrees with Defendant’s argument that the phrase ‘United States’ shows an intent to bind all United States Attorney’s Offices. Rather, the plea agreement covers only Defendant’s liability in the SDFL.”).8",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In sum, this issue is a distraction that has little relevance to the bail determination and does nothing to address the defendant’s risk of flight or mitigate the danger he poses to the community.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "B. The Defendant Wrongly Argues the Statute Does Not Apply to His Sex Trafficking",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Next, the defendant wrongly argues that the “principal conduct” giving rise to the charges is his payment of underage girls for sex acts, and that such conduct could not possibly fall under the charged statutes. As the defendant implicitly concedes, Release Motion at 14, this is an issue for a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the defendant’s argument is incorrect for two reasons.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "First, although the defendant undoubtedly participated on the demand side of the crime, he was also instrumental on the supply side given his role in recruiting and causing others to recruit additional victims. He organized, funded, and perpetuated a sex trafficking scheme in two states, including with co-conspirators. The fact that he did so for his own eventual and frequent sexual gratification does not vitiate his role in enticing and recruiting victims, consistent with the elements of the offense with which he is charged. The defendant was the leader of a sex-trafficking enterprise, not a mere consumer.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "8 This analysis similarly extends to a non-prosecution agreement. See United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851, 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Defendant’s argument, in effect, is that unless there is an explicit statement to the contrary, it is presumed that a non-prosecution agreement binds offices of the United States Attorney that are not parties to the agreement. This position is at odds with the law in this Circuit, which presumes a narrow reading of the boundaries of a plea agreement unless a defendant can affirmatively establish that a more expansive interpretation was contemplated.”) (citing Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672).",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000341",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Richard M. Berman"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States District Court",
      "United States Attorney"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "July 12, 2019",
      "April 26, 2002"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:19-cr-00490-RMB",
      "Document 11",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000341"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a sex trafficking case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 13 of 14."
}