{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "13",
    "document_number": "307",
    "date": "06/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 13 of 21\nor another substantive constitutional provision supplies a standard for the suppression of evidence, courts must follow that standard, not invent their own. See Payner, 447 U.S. at 735.\nMaxwell has not established a violation of due process or justified the exercise of the Court's inherent supervisory authority. Not every misstep by the Government during a criminal investigation justifies suppressing relevant evidence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that the exclusionary rule weighs the interest in deterring investigatory misconduct against the truth-seeking function of the judicial process. That balance \"do[es] not change because a court has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power instead of\" some other constitutional provision. Id. at 736. Due process provides an independent basis to suppress evidence only when the Government engages in conduct that is \"fundamentally unfair or shocking to our traditional sense of justice\" or is \"so outrageous that common notions of fairness and decency would be offended were judicial processes invoked to obtain a conviction against the accused.\" United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"Ordinarily such official misconduct must involve either coercion or violation of the defendant's person.\" Id. (citations omitted). This case involves neither. Omitting information about communications with BSF years earlier falls well short of the sort of extreme misconduct supporting suppression as a matter of due process.\nTo the extent Maxwell asks the Court to engage in a freewheeling exercise of its inherent supervisory power instead, the Court declines to do so. To begin with, suppression under a court's supervisory authority is only appropriate, if at all, when the Government has engaged in \"willful disobedience of law.\" Payner, 447 U.S. at 735 n.7 (emphasis added). Maxwell all but concedes that the present record does not show willful misconduct, contending instead that it \"doesn't matter\" whether the prosecutor knew his statements to Judge McMahon were\n13\nDOJ-OGR-00004797",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 13 of 21",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "or another substantive constitutional provision supplies a standard for the suppression of evidence, courts must follow that standard, not invent their own. See Payner, 447 U.S. at 735.\nMaxwell has not established a violation of due process or justified the exercise of the Court's inherent supervisory authority. Not every misstep by the Government during a criminal investigation justifies suppressing relevant evidence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that the exclusionary rule weighs the interest in deterring investigatory misconduct against the truth-seeking function of the judicial process. That balance \"do[es] not change because a court has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power instead of\" some other constitutional provision. Id. at 736. Due process provides an independent basis to suppress evidence only when the Government engages in conduct that is \"fundamentally unfair or shocking to our traditional sense of justice\" or is \"so outrageous that common notions of fairness and decency would be offended were judicial processes invoked to obtain a conviction against the accused.\" United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"Ordinarily such official misconduct must involve either coercion or violation of the defendant's person.\" Id. (citations omitted). This case involves neither. Omitting information about communications with BSF years earlier falls well short of the sort of extreme misconduct supporting suppression as a matter of due process.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To the extent Maxwell asks the Court to engage in a freewheeling exercise of its inherent supervisory power instead, the Court declines to do so. To begin with, suppression under a court's supervisory authority is only appropriate, if at all, when the Government has engaged in \"willful disobedience of law.\" Payner, 447 U.S. at 735 n.7 (emphasis added). Maxwell all but concedes that the present record does not show willful misconduct, contending instead that it \"doesn't matter\" whether the prosecutor knew his statements to Judge McMahon were",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "13",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004797",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Payner",
      "Judge McMahon"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Government",
      "BSF"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "06/25/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 307",
      "447 U.S. at 735",
      "105 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1997)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004797"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Maxwell. The text discusses the suppression of evidence and the court's supervisory authority. The document is well-formatted and free of handwritten notes or stamps."
}