{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "12",
    "document_number": "207",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 12 of 34\n\n865 F.3d at 60. Maxwell nonetheless contends that using a case-specific approach for § 3283 would be impractical because the Government would need to prove conduct beyond the elements of the offense. It may be true that this approach requires the Government to prove some additional facts, but any statute-of-limitations defense presents factual issues (including, at least, when the alleged conduct took place). This is not a serious practical problem and does not justify setting aside the statute's language and apparent purpose.\n\nMaxwell relies primarily on Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), to urge this Court to cast Weingarten aside. The Supreme Court in Bridges addressed a statute that extended the limitations period for defrauding the United States during the Second World War. In that case, the Supreme Court first concluded that making false statements at an immigration hearing was not subject to the extended limitations period because it lacked any pecuniary element as required by the statute. Id. at 221. Then, as an alternative basis for its holding, it explained that the offense did not require fraud as an \"essential ingredient.\" Id. at 222. It reached that conclusion in large part because the statute's legislative history made clear that Congress intended it to apply only to a narrow class of war frauds causing pecuniary loss. Id. at 216.\n\nAs the Second Circuit explained in Weingarten, Congress had the opposite intent in enacting the PROTECT Act. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 & n. 10. \"In passing recent statutes related to child sex abuse, including extensions of the § 3283 limitations period, Congress 'evinced a general intention to \"cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.\"'\" Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bridges' holding—legislative history supporting a narrow interpretation—does not exist here. Instead, both the statute's plan meaning and its legislative history suggest it should apply more broadly.\n\n12\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003686",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 12 of 34",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "865 F.3d at 60. Maxwell nonetheless contends that using a case-specific approach for § 3283 would be impractical because the Government would need to prove conduct beyond the elements of the offense. It may be true that this approach requires the Government to prove some additional facts, but any statute-of-limitations defense presents factual issues (including, at least, when the alleged conduct took place). This is not a serious practical problem and does not justify setting aside the statute's language and apparent purpose.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell relies primarily on Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953), to urge this Court to cast Weingarten aside. The Supreme Court in Bridges addressed a statute that extended the limitations period for defrauding the United States during the Second World War. In that case, the Supreme Court first concluded that making false statements at an immigration hearing was not subject to the extended limitations period because it lacked any pecuniary element as required by the statute. Id. at 221. Then, as an alternative basis for its holding, it explained that the offense did not require fraud as an \"essential ingredient.\" Id. at 222. It reached that conclusion in large part because the statute's legislative history made clear that Congress intended it to apply only to a narrow class of war frauds causing pecuniary loss. Id. at 216.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As the Second Circuit explained in Weingarten, Congress had the opposite intent in enacting the PROTECT Act. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 & n. 10. \"In passing recent statutes related to child sex abuse, including extensions of the § 3283 limitations period, Congress 'evinced a general intention to \"cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.\"'\" Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bridges' holding—legislative history supporting a narrow interpretation—does not exist here. Instead, both the statute's plan meaning and its legislative history suggest it should apply more broadly.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "12",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003686",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States",
      "Supreme Court",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Congress"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1953",
      "2010"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "207",
      "865 F.3d",
      "346 U.S. 209",
      "597 F.3d 1347",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003686"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a case involving child sex abuse. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 12 of 34."
}