{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "104",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 104 of 239\n\n\"Agent Orange\" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Andover Data Servs., a Div. of Players Computer, Inc. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1989) (\"It is well-settled here and elsewhere, for instance, that a Rule 26(c) protective order may be overturned or modified based on a finding of improvidenc, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need.\")\n\nIn Martindell, the Government informally—and without use of a grand jury subpoena—sought access to discovery materials from a civil litigation that were subject to a protective order. 594 F.2d at 294. The Second Circuit found that the \"deponents [had] testified in reliance upon [a] Rule 26(c) protective order, absent which they may have refused to testify.\" Id. at 296. In so ruling, the Second Circuit reasoned that the interest in the enforcement of Rule 26(c) protective orders—which included securing just and speedy determination of civil disputes—was sufficient to outweigh the Government's interest in obtaining information by means of an informal document request. Id. at 295-96. The Second Circuit held that \"absent a showing of improvidenc in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, . . . a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government.\" Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) (\"The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of immunity because the test allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidenc in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need.\"); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that \"absent an express finding by the district court of improvidenc in the magistrate's initial grant of the protective orders or of extraordinary circumstances or compelling need by the State for the",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 104 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"Agent Orange\" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Andover Data Servs., a Div. of Players Computer, Inc. v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 876 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1989) (\"It is well-settled here and elsewhere, for instance, that a Rule 26(c) protective order may be overturned or modified based on a finding of improvidenc, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need.\")",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In Martindell, the Government informally—and without use of a grand jury subpoena—sought access to discovery materials from a civil litigation that were subject to a protective order. 594 F.2d at 294. The Second Circuit found that the \"deponents [had] testified in reliance upon [a] Rule 26(c) protective order, absent which they may have refused to testify.\" Id. at 296. In so ruling, the Second Circuit reasoned that the interest in the enforcement of Rule 26(c) protective orders—which included securing just and speedy determination of civil disputes—was sufficient to outweigh the Government's interest in obtaining information by means of an informal document request. Id. at 295-96. The Second Circuit held that \"absent a showing of improvidenc in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, . . . a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government.\" Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Apr. 19, 1991, 945 F.2d 1221, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1991) (\"The Martindell test [ ] does not transform a protective order into a grant of immunity because the test allows a protective order to be overcome by a showing of improvidenc in the grant of the order, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need.\"); Palmieri v. State of N.Y., 779 F.2d 861, 862 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that \"absent an express finding by the district court of improvidenc in the magistrate's initial grant of the protective orders or of extraordinary circumstances or compelling need by the State for the",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "77",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003038",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "Apr. 19, 1991"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "821 F.2d 139",
      "876 F.2d 1080",
      "594 F.2d",
      "945 F.2d 1221",
      "779 F.2d 861",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003038"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with a header indicating the case number, document number, filing date, and page number. The text is a legal argument discussing Rule 26(c) protective orders and referencing various court cases. There are no visible stamps or handwritten annotations."
}