{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "3",
    "document_number": "20-6033",
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  "full_text": "Case 20-6033 Document 79-2 Filed 09/12/20 Page 3 of 4 unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.\" United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus far, the Supreme Court has identified just four circumstances in criminal cases that come within this exception: motions to dismiss invoking double jeopardy, motions to reduce bail, motions to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause, and the forced administration of antipsychotic medication. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that an order permitting the forced administration of antipsychotic medication is immediately appealable), see also Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (listing the recognized exceptions). Maxwell does not appeal from an order falling within one of these categories. Instead, she appeals from a denial of her motion to modify a protective order, which we have held does not fall within the collateral order exception. See Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107-08 (2009) (holding that pretrial discovery orders are not immediately appealable absent a showing that \"delaying review until the entry of a final judgment would imperil a substantial public interest or some particular value of a high order\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); S.E.C. v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory \"discovery orders allegedly adverse to a claim of privilege or privacy\"); United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory protective orders governing \"the right of a criminal defendant to disclose information given to [her] in discovery\"). We decline to exercise jurisdiction where we have none, and accordingly dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In the alternative, Maxwell asks that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to modify the protective order. This Court will issue the writ as an exception to the finality rule \"only in exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion.\" In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 932 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"[M]ere error, even gross error in a particular case, as distinguished from a calculated and repeated disregard of governing rules, does not suffice to support issuance of the writ.\" United States v. DiStefano, 464 F.2d 845, 850 (2d Cir. 1972). Here, Maxwell failed to demonstrate that such exceptional circumstances exist and that the District Court usurped its power or abused its discretion. Accordingly, we decline to issue a writ modifying the protective order. Finally, Maxwell also seeks to consolidate the instant appeal with the civil appeal pending in Guiffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413-cv. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Maxwell's appeal of the denial of her motion to modify her protective order, and because mandamus relief is not warranted, we deny as moot her motions to consolidate this appeal with the civil appeal. In any event, this Court has heard Maxwell's criminal appeal in tandem with her civil appeal. To secure the further relief of formal consolidation, Maxwell \"bear[s] the burden of showing the commonality of factual and legal issues in different actions.\" In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig, 11 F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1993). Here, the parties, Judges, and legal issues presented in these appeals lack common identity. The criminal appeal concerns a denial of Maxwell's motion to modify a protective order while the civil 3 DOJ-OGR-00001826",
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      "content": "Case 20-6033 Document 79-2 Filed 09/12/20 Page 3 of 4",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.\" United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus far, the Supreme Court has identified just four circumstances in criminal cases that come within this exception: motions to dismiss invoking double jeopardy, motions to reduce bail, motions to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause, and the forced administration of antipsychotic medication. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (holding that an order permitting the forced administration of antipsychotic medication is immediately appealable), see also Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 799 (listing the recognized exceptions). Maxwell does not appeal from an order falling within one of these categories. Instead, she appeals from a denial of her motion to modify a protective order, which we have held does not fall within the collateral order exception. See Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107-08 (2009) (holding that pretrial discovery orders are not immediately appealable absent a showing that \"delaying review until the entry of a final judgment would imperil a substantial public interest or some particular value of a high order\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); S.E.C. v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory \"discovery orders allegedly adverse to a claim of privilege or privacy\"); United States v. Caparros, 800 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory protective orders governing \"the right of a criminal defendant to disclose information given to [her] in discovery\"). We decline to exercise jurisdiction where we have none, and accordingly dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In the alternative, Maxwell asks that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to modify the protective order. This Court will issue the writ as an exception to the finality rule \"only in exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion.\" In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 932 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"[M]ere error, even gross error in a particular case, as distinguished from a calculated and repeated disregard of governing rules, does not suffice to support issuance of the writ.\" United States v. DiStefano, 464 F.2d 845, 850 (2d Cir. 1972). Here, Maxwell failed to demonstrate that such exceptional circumstances exist and that the District Court usurped its power or abused its discretion. Accordingly, we decline to issue a writ modifying the protective order.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Finally, Maxwell also seeks to consolidate the instant appeal with the civil appeal pending in Guiffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413-cv. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Maxwell's appeal of the denial of her motion to modify her protective order, and because mandamus relief is not warranted, we deny as moot her motions to consolidate this appeal with the civil appeal. In any event, this Court has heard Maxwell's criminal appeal in tandem with her civil appeal. To secure the further relief of formal consolidation, Maxwell \"bear[s] the burden of showing the commonality of factual and legal issues in different actions.\" In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig, 11 F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1993). Here, the parties, Judges, and legal issues presented in these appeals lack common identity. The criminal appeal concerns a denial of Maxwell's motion to modify a protective order while the civil 3",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Punn",
      "Sell",
      "United States",
      "Carpenter",
      "Rajaratnam",
      "Caparros",
      "DiStefano",
      "Guiffre"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "District Court",
      "S.E.C."
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "09/12/20",
      "2013",
      "2003",
      "2009",
      "2010",
      "1986",
      "1972",
      "1993"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "20-6033",
      "20-2413-cv",
      "DOJ-OGR-00001826",
      "737 F.3d 1",
      "539 U.S. 166",
      "489 U.S.",
      "558 U.S. 100",
      "622 F.3d 159",
      "800 F.2d 23",
      "464 F.2d 845",
      "607 F.3d 923",
      "11 F.3d 368"
    ]
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