{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "207",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 4 of 34\n\nA. The non-prosecution agreement does not bind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York\n\nUnited States Attorneys speak for the United States. When a U.S. Attorney makes a promise as part of a plea bargain, both contract principles and due process require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. The question is whether the terms of the NPA did so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not.\n\nIn United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: \"A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.\" 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam). This is something akin to a clear statement rule. Single-district plea agreements are the norm. Nationwide, unlimited agreements are the rare exception. Applying Annabi, panels of the Second Circuit have stated that courts cannot infer intent to depart from this ordinary practice from an agreement's use of phrases like \"the government\" or \"the United States.\" United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement need not painstakingly spell out \"the Office of the United States Attorney for Such-and-Such District\" in every instance to make clear that it applies only in the district where signed.\n\nMaxwell asks this Court to draw the opposite conclusion. The provision of the NPA dealing with co-conspirators does not expressly state that it binds U.S. Attorneys in other districts. It does not expressly state that it applies in other districts. The relevant language, in\n\n4\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003678",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 4 of 34",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A. The non-prosecution agreement does not bind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "United States Attorneys speak for the United States. When a U.S. Attorney makes a promise as part of a plea bargain, both contract principles and due process require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. The question is whether the terms of the NPA did so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: \"A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.\" 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam). This is something akin to a clear statement rule. Single-district plea agreements are the norm. Nationwide, unlimited agreements are the rare exception. Applying Annabi, panels of the Second Circuit have stated that courts cannot infer intent to depart from this ordinary practice from an agreement's use of phrases like \"the government\" or \"the United States.\" United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement need not painstakingly spell out \"the Office of the United States Attorney for Such-and-Such District\" in every instance to make clear that it applies only in the district where signed.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell asks this Court to draw the opposite conclusion. The provision of the NPA dealing with co-conspirators does not expressly state that it binds U.S. Attorneys in other districts. It does not expressly state that it applies in other districts. The relevant language, in",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003678",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "United States Attorneys",
      "U.S. Attorney",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Southern District of New York",
      "Florida",
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1971",
      "1996",
      "1985",
      "1998",
      "2004"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 207",
      "404 U.S. 257",
      "82 F.3d 551",
      "771 F.2d 670",
      "152 F.3d 88",
      "93 F. App'x 268",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003678"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with a clear and legible format. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}