{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "26",
    "document_number": "207",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 26 of 34\nThe balance of these considerations favors severance. \"Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.\" United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will best ensure a fair and expeditious resolution of all charges in this case.\nVI. Maxwell's motion to strike surplusage is premature\nMaxwell moves to strike allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S1 superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture.\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. \"Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only where the challenged allegations are not relevant to the crime charged and are inflammatory and prejudicial.\" United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). Courts in this District generally delay ruling on any motion to strike until after the presentation of the Government's evidence at trial, because that evidence may affect how specific allegations relate to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. 18-cr-224 (AJN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).\nMaxwell contends that the allegations related to \"Minor Victim-3\" are surplusage because the indictment does not charge that Minor Victim-3 traveled in interstate commerce or was below the age of consent in England where the alleged activities took place. Thus, she argues, these allegations do not relate to the charged conspiracy and instead reflect an attempt to introduce Minor Victim-3's testimony for impermissible purposes.\nThe Court will not strike any language from the S1 superseding indictment at this juncture. The standard under Rule 7(d) is \"exacting\" and requires the defendant to demonstrate\n26\nDOJ-OGR-00003700",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 26 of 34",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The balance of these considerations favors severance. \"Motions to sever are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.\" United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir. 1989). In its discretion, the Court concludes that trying the perjury counts separately will best ensure a fair and expeditious resolution of all charges in this case.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "VI. Maxwell's motion to strike surplusage is premature",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell moves to strike allegations related to one of the alleged victims from the S1 superseding indictment as surplusage. The Court declines to do so at this juncture.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) allows a court to strike surplusage from an indictment on a defendant's motion. \"Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only where the challenged allegations are not relevant to the crime charged and are inflammatory and prejudicial.\" United States v. Hernandez, 85 F.3d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). Courts in this District generally delay ruling on any motion to strike until after the presentation of the Government's evidence at trial, because that evidence may affect how specific allegations relate to the overall charges. See, e.g., United States v. Nejad, No. 18-cr-224 (AJN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2019); United States v. Mostafa, 965 F. Supp. 2d 451, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell contends that the allegations related to \"Minor Victim-3\" are surplusage because the indictment does not charge that Minor Victim-3 traveled in interstate commerce or was below the age of consent in England where the alleged activities took place. Thus, she argues, these allegations do not relate to the charged conspiracy and instead reflect an attempt to introduce Minor Victim-3's testimony for impermissible purposes.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court will not strike any language from the S1 superseding indictment at this juncture. The standard under Rule 7(d) is \"exacting\" and requires the defendant to demonstrate",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "26",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003700",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Casamento",
      "Hernandez",
      "Nejad",
      "Mostafa",
      "Minor Victim-3"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "England"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "Dec. 6, 2019"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 207",
      "18-cr-224 (AJN)",
      "2019 WL 6702361"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 26 of 34."
}