{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "38",
    "document_number": "310-1",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 38 of 80\n\nsame or similar story, further supports the admissibility of this evidence under the doctrine of chances.\" Id.\n\nThe trial court recognized that the alleged assaults upon the prior bad acts witnesses were remote in time, but it explained that remoteness \"is but one factor that the court should consider.\" Id. at 97. The court reasoned that the distance in time between the prior acts and the incident involving Constand was \"inversely proportional to the similarity of the other crimes or acts.\" Id. (citing Tyson, 119 A.3d at 359). Stated more simply, the \"more similar the crimes, the less significant the length of time that has passed.\" Id.at 98 (citing Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. 1996)).\n\nThe court noted that, while there was a significant temporal gap between the prior incidents and Constand's case, the alleged assaults involving the prior bad acts witnesses occurred relatively close in time to each other. Thus, \"[w]hen taken together,\" the court explained, \"the sequential nature of the acts coupled with their nearly identical similarities renders the lapse of time unimportant.\" Id. at 109.\n\nTo be unfairly prejudicial, the trial court emphasized, the proffered evidence must be \"unfair,\" and must have a \"tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.\" Id. at 100 (quoting Pa.R.E. 403 cmt). Evidence \"will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant,\" and a court \"is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts.\" Id. at 100-01 (quoting Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1180-81 (Pa. Super. 2018)). For the trial court, the aforementioned similarities between Constand's claim and that of the other alleged victims weighed in favor of admissibility, particularly because the court believed that the Commonwealth had a \"substantial need\" for the evidence. Id. at 109. \"Where the parties agreed that the digital penetration occurred, the evidence of other acts was necessary to rebut [Cosby's] characterization of\n\n[J-100-2020] - 37\nDOJ-OGR-00004850",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 38 of 80",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "same or similar story, further supports the admissibility of this evidence under the doctrine of chances.\" Id.\n\nThe trial court recognized that the alleged assaults upon the prior bad acts witnesses were remote in time, but it explained that remoteness \"is but one factor that the court should consider.\" Id. at 97. The court reasoned that the distance in time between the prior acts and the incident involving Constand was \"inversely proportional to the similarity of the other crimes or acts.\" Id. (citing Tyson, 119 A.3d at 359). Stated more simply, the \"more similar the crimes, the less significant the length of time that has passed.\" Id.at 98 (citing Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. 1996)).\n\nThe court noted that, while there was a significant temporal gap between the prior incidents and Constand's case, the alleged assaults involving the prior bad acts witnesses occurred relatively close in time to each other. Thus, \"[w]hen taken together,\" the court explained, \"the sequential nature of the acts coupled with their nearly identical similarities renders the lapse of time unimportant.\" Id. at 109.\n\nTo be unfairly prejudicial, the trial court emphasized, the proffered evidence must be \"unfair,\" and must have a \"tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.\" Id. at 100 (quoting Pa.R.E. 403 cmt). Evidence \"will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant,\" and a court \"is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts.\" Id. at 100-01 (quoting Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1180-81 (Pa. Super. 2018)). For the trial court, the aforementioned similarities between Constand's claim and that of the other alleged victims weighed in favor of admissibility, particularly because the court believed that the Commonwealth had a \"substantial need\" for the evidence. Id. at 109. \"Where the parties agreed that the digital penetration occurred, the evidence of other acts was necessary to rebut [Cosby's] characterization of",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[J-100-2020] - 37",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004850",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Constand",
      "Cosby"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Commonwealth"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Pennsylvania"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21",
      "1996",
      "2018"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "310-1",
      "J-100-2020",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004850"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Bill Cosby, with discussions on the admissibility of evidence and prior bad acts."
}