{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10 of 11",
    "document_number": "435",
    "date": "11/11/21",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 435 Filed 11/11/21 Page 10 of 11\n\nUnited States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994)). For the reasons already provided, the Court finds that fit is satisfied here.\n\nThird, the probative value of Dr. Rocchio's testimony is not substantially outweighed by 403 prejudice to Ms. Maxwell. The Court finds that Dr. Rocchio's testimony would not unduly \"simplify\" an otherwise complex case\" or mislead jurors by a supposedly infallible expert. Dkt. No. 386 at 11. Dr. Rocchio's opinions speak only to concepts and will not (and indeed may not) suggest that the jury find any alleged victim witness to be credible or to find Ms. Maxwell guilty. The more general nature of Dr. Rocchio's opinions, which the Court heard in detail at the Daubert hearing, therefore mitigates its prejudicial effect. Telles, 6 F.4th at 1097. It is the jury's role to determine whether and how Dr. Rocchio's opinions apply to the facts of this case and the credibility of the witnesses.\n\nLast, as previously mentioned, the Court will grant in part the Defense's Daubert motion. The Defense argues that Dr. Rocchio's opinion that grooming can be done to facilitate sexual abuse by a third party or that the presence of a third party can otherwise facilitate grooming is unreliable. The Defense calls this \"grooming-by-proxy.\" E.g., Dkt. No. 386 at 9. Terminology aside, the Court agrees with this narrower objection to Dr. Rocchio's testimony. As discussed at the hearing, this phenomenon is not identified in the relevant literature regarding child sexual abuse and has not been subjected to peer review. Instead, the Court understands this opinion to be an extrapolation of the broader principle of how grooming functions through the development of trust. That extrapolation may be logical and follow common sense, but it is for the jury to make on the facts of this case. The Court therefore excludes Dr. Rocchio's opinion that the presence of a third party can facilitate grooming. Dr. Rocchio's core opinions about grooming, however, remain admissible under the Rule 702 and Daubert standard and remain relevant\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006351",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 435 Filed 11/11/21 Page 10 of 11",
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      "content": "United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994)). For the reasons already provided, the Court finds that fit is satisfied here.\n\nThird, the probative value of Dr. Rocchio's testimony is not substantially outweighed by 403 prejudice to Ms. Maxwell. The Court finds that Dr. Rocchio's testimony would not unduly \"simplify\" an otherwise complex case\" or mislead jurors by a supposedly infallible expert. Dkt. No. 386 at 11. Dr. Rocchio's opinions speak only to concepts and will not (and indeed may not) suggest that the jury find any alleged victim witness to be credible or to find Ms. Maxwell guilty. The more general nature of Dr. Rocchio's opinions, which the Court heard in detail at the Daubert hearing, therefore mitigates its prejudicial effect. Telles, 6 F.4th at 1097. It is the jury's role to determine whether and how Dr. Rocchio's opinions apply to the facts of this case and the credibility of the witnesses.",
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      "content": "Last, as previously mentioned, the Court will grant in part the Defense's Daubert motion. The Defense argues that Dr. Rocchio's opinion that grooming can be done to facilitate sexual abuse by a third party or that the presence of a third party can otherwise facilitate grooming is unreliable. The Defense calls this \"grooming-by-proxy.\" E.g., Dkt. No. 386 at 9. Terminology aside, the Court agrees with this narrower objection to Dr. Rocchio's testimony. As discussed at the hearing, this phenomenon is not identified in the relevant literature regarding child sexual abuse and has not been subjected to peer review. Instead, the Court understands this opinion to be an extrapolation of the broader principle of how grooming functions through the development of trust. That extrapolation may be logical and follow common sense, but it is for the jury to make on the facts of this case. The Court therefore excludes Dr. Rocchio's opinion that the presence of a third party can facilitate grooming. Dr. Rocchio's core opinions about grooming, however, remain admissible under the Rule 702 and Daubert standard and remain relevant",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006351",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Rocchio",
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/11/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 435",
      "Dkt. No. 386",
      "42 F.3d 97",
      "6 F.4th",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006351"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case United States v. Maxwell. The text discusses the admissibility of expert testimony by Dr. Rocchio and the Court's decision to grant in part the Defense's Daubert motion. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}