{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "99",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 99 of 239\n\nOn or about April 9, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon granted the Government's application and issued a memorandum and order. (Def. Mot. 3, Exs. F & G). The Court noted that while the Government's application was procedurally \"[i]rregular,\" there was precedent for granting the Government's request and, therefore, the Court would consider the application. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. G at 6, 8-9). The Court found that, contrary to the Government's arguments, it was appropriate for the Court to analyze the Government's application in light of the Martindell factors. (Id. at 9-12).\n\nIn so doing, Chief Judge McMahon considered, among other things, \"the degree to which . . . the party who could be expected to oppose unsealing[] reasonably relied on the protective order.\" (Id. at 16). She concluded that such reliance was unreasonable. (Id. at 22). She evaluated the factors under Second Circuit case law that are relevant to assessing whether a party's reliance on the protective order was reasonable, namely the scope of the protective order, the language of the order itself, the court's level of inquiry before granting the order, and the nature of reliance on the order. (Id. at 17). She concluded that first three factors favored granting the Government's application for modification. (Id. at 17-20). Chief Judge McMahon noted that, as the order \"plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the absence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury's scrutiny.\" (Id. at 18-19).\n\nAs to the last factor, Chief Judge McMahon found that \"the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modification.\" (Id. at 20). She noted that the record indicated that \"Giuffre likely could not have secured Maxwell's deposition—at least in the absence of substantial court involvement—without\" the protective order. (Id.). \"However, the only thing\n72\nDOJ-OGR-00003033",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 99 of 239",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "On or about April 9, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon granted the Government's application and issued a memorandum and order. (Def. Mot. 3, Exs. F & G). The Court noted that while the Government's application was procedurally \"[i]rregular,\" there was precedent for granting the Government's request and, therefore, the Court would consider the application. (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. G at 6, 8-9). The Court found that, contrary to the Government's arguments, it was appropriate for the Court to analyze the Government's application in light of the Martindell factors. (Id. at 9-12).",
      "position": "main content"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In so doing, Chief Judge McMahon considered, among other things, \"the degree to which . . . the party who could be expected to oppose unsealing[] reasonably relied on the protective order.\" (Id. at 16). She concluded that such reliance was unreasonable. (Id. at 22). She evaluated the factors under Second Circuit case law that are relevant to assessing whether a party's reliance on the protective order was reasonable, namely the scope of the protective order, the language of the order itself, the court's level of inquiry before granting the order, and the nature of reliance on the order. (Id. at 17). She concluded that first three factors favored granting the Government's application for modification. (Id. at 17-20). Chief Judge McMahon noted that, as the order \"plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the absence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury's scrutiny.\" (Id. at 18-19).",
      "position": "main content"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As to the last factor, Chief Judge McMahon found that \"the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modification.\" (Id. at 20). She noted that the record indicated that \"Giuffre likely could not have secured Maxwell's deposition—at least in the absence of substantial court involvement—without\" the protective order. (Id.). \"However, the only thing",
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      "content": "72",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003033",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "McMahon",
      "Maxwell",
      "Giuffre"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Court",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "April 9, 2019",
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003033"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}