{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "75",
    "document_number": "310-1",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 75 of 80\nenforcement of the non-prosecution agreement with the police. This Court found that the non-prosecution agreement was invalid, because the police did not have the authority to make it. Only a prosecutor holds that power. Id.\n\nWe recognized that what befell the Stipetiches may have been \"fundamentally unfair,\" particularly if their discussions with the police produced additional evidence of criminality, including possibly self-incriminating statements. Id. at 1296. In dicta, we suggested that the remedy might be to suppress the evidence or statements that were obtained after the police purported to bind the Commonwealth in a non-prosecution agreement. Id.\n\nThis remedy is insufficient here, for a number of reasons. First, as noted, the remedy statement was dicta, and is not the law in Pennsylvania. Second, the circumstances that led to the suggestion of that remedy are markedly different than those that occurred in the present case. In Stipetich, the agreement was formulated with arresting officers, who lacked the authority to make the promise not to prosecute. Here, conversely, the non-prosecution decision was made by the elected District Attorney of Montgomery County, whose public announcement of that decision was fully within his authority, and was objectively worthy of reasonable reliance. Finally, a one-size-fits-all remedy does not comport with the individualized due process inquiry that must be undertaken. As outlined above, a court must ascertain, contemplating the individual circumstances of each case, the remedy that accords with the due process of law. In some instances, suppression of evidence may be an adequate remedy; in others, only specific enforcement will suffice.\n\nHere, only full enforcement of the decision not to prosecute can satisfy the fundamental demands of due process. See Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528 (explaining that, when a promise induces a defendant to waive his Fifth Amendment rights by testifying or\n\n[J-100-2020] - 74\nDOJ-OGR-00004887",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 75 of 80",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "enforcement of the non-prosecution agreement with the police. This Court found that the non-prosecution agreement was invalid, because the police did not have the authority to make it. Only a prosecutor holds that power. Id.\n\nWe recognized that what befell the Stipetiches may have been \"fundamentally unfair,\" particularly if their discussions with the police produced additional evidence of criminality, including possibly self-incriminating statements. Id. at 1296. In dicta, we suggested that the remedy might be to suppress the evidence or statements that were obtained after the police purported to bind the Commonwealth in a non-prosecution agreement. Id.\n\nThis remedy is insufficient here, for a number of reasons. First, as noted, the remedy statement was dicta, and is not the law in Pennsylvania. Second, the circumstances that led to the suggestion of that remedy are markedly different than those that occurred in the present case. In Stipetich, the agreement was formulated with arresting officers, who lacked the authority to make the promise not to prosecute. Here, conversely, the non-prosecution decision was made by the elected District Attorney of Montgomery County, whose public announcement of that decision was fully within his authority, and was objectively worthy of reasonable reliance. Finally, a one-size-fits-all remedy does not comport with the individualized due process inquiry that must be undertaken. As outlined above, a court must ascertain, contemplating the individual circumstances of each case, the remedy that accords with the due process of law. In some instances, suppression of evidence may be an adequate remedy; in others, only specific enforcement will suffice.\n\nHere, only full enforcement of the decision not to prosecute can satisfy the fundamental demands of due process. See Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528 (explaining that, when a promise induces a defendant to waive his Fifth Amendment rights by testifying or",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[J-100-2020] - 74",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004887",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "Commonwealth",
      "District Attorney of Montgomery County"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Pennsylvania",
      "Montgomery County"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "310-1",
      "J-100-2020",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004887"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the enforcement of a non-prosecution agreement and the due process implications of such an agreement. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}