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    "page_number": "23",
    "document_number": "615",
    "date": "02/24/22",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 23 of 49\nwould have truthfully affirmed that he could be fair and impartial, then the record is clear that the Court would not have struck him for cause, and the defendant's motion should be denied.\nb. The Defendant's Arguments Regarding Bias Are Unpersuasive\nA party may challenge a juror for cause based only on \"narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable bases.\" United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotation and citation omitted). In the context of voir dire, challenges for cause generally fall into one of three \"limited\" categories: actual bias, implied bias, or inferable bias. Id. However, in the different context presented here—a post-trial allegation of juror bias, in a retrospective determination of a hypothetical challenge for cause—the Second Circuit has stated that it is an open question whether the second and third of these categories are applicable. See Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. That is, \"the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias,\" Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (emphasis added), and, as such, it is unclear that bias may be implied or inferred, see Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. The Government submits that actual bias is the only relevant inquiry in this context, see Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, but nevertheless addresses each category in turn.\ni. Actual Bias\n\"Actual bias is 'bias in fact'—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 43 (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)). \"[A] finding of actual bias is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province.\" Id. at 44 (quotation and citation omitted). Actual bias \"cannot be found unless a prospective juror is adequately questioned on voir dire with respect to his or her ability to apply the law impartially.\" Id. at 44. The district court has \"broad discretion\" in such questioning and \"[t]here is no particular script 21 DOJ-OGR-00009142",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 23 of 49",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "would have truthfully affirmed that he could be fair and impartial, then the record is clear that the Court would not have struck him for cause, and the defendant's motion should be denied.",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "b. The Defendant's Arguments Regarding Bias Are Unpersuasive",
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      "content": "A party may challenge a juror for cause based only on \"narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable bases.\" United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotation and citation omitted). In the context of voir dire, challenges for cause generally fall into one of three \"limited\" categories: actual bias, implied bias, or inferable bias. Id. However, in the different context presented here—a post-trial allegation of juror bias, in a retrospective determination of a hypothetical challenge for cause—the Second Circuit has stated that it is an open question whether the second and third of these categories are applicable. See Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. That is, \"the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias,\" Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (emphasis added), and, as such, it is unclear that bias may be implied or inferred, see Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. The Government submits that actual bias is the only relevant inquiry in this context, see Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, but nevertheless addresses each category in turn.",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "i. Actual Bias",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"Actual bias is 'bias in fact'—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 43 (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)). \"[A] finding of actual bias is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province.\" Id. at 44 (quotation and citation omitted). Actual bias \"cannot be found unless a prospective juror is adequately questioned on voir dire with respect to his or her ability to apply the law impartially.\" Id. at 44. The district court has \"broad discretion\" in such questioning and \"[t]here is no particular script",
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      "content": "21",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009142",
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    "dates": [
      "02/24/22"
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      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 615",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009142"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a clear and legible format. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}