{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "31",
    "document_number": "653",
    "date": "04/01/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 31 of 40\n\naspect of Questions 48 and 49. As he repeatedly explained, he never expected or even hoped to be selected. The Court finds Juror 50's testimony to be credible, forthright, and responsive and does not find as a factual matter that Juror 50 deliberately lied in order to be selected as a juror.\n\nThe Defendant's reliance on Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2013), is similarly unavailing. See Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 11. There, a juror failed to disclose that her husband had previously threatened her with a shotgun during jury selection for a bank robbery case in which the defendants threatened the bank tellers at gunpoint. However, the juror had told a \"litany of lies\" during voir dire bearing on a number of issues, including her daughter's incarceration and her own substance abuse issues. Id. at 161-62, 168. By contrast, Juror 50's inadvertent nondisclosure, while implicating multiple questions on the questionnaire, stems only from his experience of sexual abuse.\n\nSecond, the Defendant contends that Juror 50 was biased due to the \"similarities between [his] personal experiences . . . and the issues being litigated.\" Maxwell Br. at 30 (quoting Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 472). She expressly disavows arguing \"that every person who has been a victim of sexual assault or sexual abuse was subject to a 'mandatory' challenge for cause based on implied bias.\" Maxwell Reply at 17. Distancing from that position is necessary—again, it is not the law that an individual with a history of sexual abuse cannot serve as a fair and impartial juror. Rather, the Defendant finesses the argument by saying that Juror 50's personal history is sufficiently similar to the issues at trial so as to warrant a mandatory finding of implied bias, or alternatively, a discretionary finding of inferred bias, and points to Juror 50's testimony and post-trial statements as evidence that these purported similarities made him biased. Maxwell Br. at 31-32; Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 5-6.\n\n31\nDOJ-OGR-00010354",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 31 of 40",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "aspect of Questions 48 and 49. As he repeatedly explained, he never expected or even hoped to be selected. The Court finds Juror 50's testimony to be credible, forthright, and responsive and does not find as a factual matter that Juror 50 deliberately lied in order to be selected as a juror.",
      "position": "top"
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Defendant's reliance on Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2013), is similarly unavailing. See Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 11. There, a juror failed to disclose that her husband had previously threatened her with a shotgun during jury selection for a bank robbery case in which the defendants threatened the bank tellers at gunpoint. However, the juror had told a \"litany of lies\" during voir dire bearing on a number of issues, including her daughter's incarceration and her own substance abuse issues. Id. at 161-62, 168. By contrast, Juror 50's inadvertent nondisclosure, while implicating multiple questions on the questionnaire, stems only from his experience of sexual abuse.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, the Defendant contends that Juror 50 was biased due to the \"similarities between [his] personal experiences . . . and the issues being litigated.\" Maxwell Br. at 30 (quoting Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 472). She expressly disavows arguing \"that every person who has been a victim of sexual assault or sexual abuse was subject to a 'mandatory' challenge for cause based on implied bias.\" Maxwell Reply at 17. Distancing from that position is necessary—again, it is not the law that an individual with a history of sexual abuse cannot serve as a fair and impartial juror. Rather, the Defendant finesses the argument by saying that Juror 50's personal history is sufficiently similar to the issues at trial so as to warrant a mandatory finding of implied bias, or alternatively, a discretionary finding of inferred bias, and points to Juror 50's testimony and post-trial statements as evidence that these purported similarities made him biased. Maxwell Br. at 31-32; Maxwell Post-Hearing Br. at 5-6.",
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      "content": "31",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010354",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/01/22"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "653",
      "724 F.3d 150",
      "867 F. Supp. 2d",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010354"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 31 of 40."
}