{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "111",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 111 of 239\nii. Discussion\nMaxwell cannot assert a Fourth Amendment claim because she had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the deposition transcripts or other materials she designated as confidential under the protective order. The materials were held by a third party law firm that represented her adversary in the civil suit. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (\"a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties\"); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (no legitimate expectation of privacy in materials held by a third party \"even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose\"); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (\"We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller . . .\"). Maxwell cites no authority for the proposition that she has standing to challenge a judicially approved grand jury subpoena directed at a third party law firm, because there is none.\nMaxwell points to the fact that the materials were designated as confidential under the protective order, but that reliance is misplaced. (Def. Mot. 11 at 6-8). Martindell by its own terms contemplates the modification of a protective order in a civil action. See, e.g., Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (\"It is well-settled here and elsewhere . . . that a Rule 26(c) protective order may be overturned or modified based on a finding of improvidenc, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need.\"). And with respect to the specific protective order at issue, Chief Judge McMahon found that because the order \"plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the absence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury's scrutiny.\" (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. G at 18-19); see also Def. Mot. 3, Ex. A at ¶ 5 (\"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION[] shall not, without the consent of the party producing it or further Order of the Court, be disclosed[.]\") (internal quotation marks omitted).\n84\nDOJ-OGR-00003045",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 111 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "ii. Discussion",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell cannot assert a Fourth Amendment claim because she had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the deposition transcripts or other materials she designated as confidential under the protective order. The materials were held by a third party law firm that represented her adversary in the civil suit. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (\"a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties\"); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (no legitimate expectation of privacy in materials held by a third party \"even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose\"); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (\"We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller . . .\"). Maxwell cites no authority for the proposition that she has standing to challenge a judicially approved grand jury subpoena directed at a third party law firm, because there is none.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell points to the fact that the materials were designated as confidential under the protective order, but that reliance is misplaced. (Def. Mot. 11 at 6-8). Martindell by its own terms contemplates the modification of a protective order in a civil action. See, e.g., Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (\"It is well-settled here and elsewhere . . . that a Rule 26(c) protective order may be overturned or modified based on a finding of improvidenc, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need.\"). And with respect to the specific protective order at issue, Chief Judge McMahon found that because the order \"plainly gives the court the power to enter an order compelling disclosure to anyone—law enforcement included—Maxwell could not reasonably have relied on the absence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury's scrutiny.\" (Def. Mot. 3, Ex. G at 18-19); see also Def. Mot. 3, Ex. A at ¶ 5 (\"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION[] shall not, without the consent of the party producing it or further Order of the Court, be disclosed[.]\") (internal quotation marks omitted).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "84",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003045",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Smith",
      "Miller",
      "Carpenter",
      "Martindell",
      "McMahon"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "U.S.",
      "Andover Data Servs."
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003045"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Maxwell. The text discusses the Fourth Amendment and the expectation of privacy in materials held by third-party law firms. The document includes citations to various court cases and references to specific exhibits and motions."
}