{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "6",
    "date": "07/11/19",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 5 of 16\n\nThough the Bail Reform Act contains a rebuttable presumption in favor of detention based on the crimes charged, the presumption shifts only the burden of production, not persuasion. See United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the statutory demand on defendants \"is fairly easily met.\" United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756, 2011 WL 3421321, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011). To rebut the presumption, a defendant need only \"show that the specific nature of the crimes charged, or that something about their individual circumstances, suggests that 'what is true in general is not true in the particular case . . .'\" United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 384 (1st Cir.1985)). \"The quantum of evidence required to rebut the presumption is not high.\" United States v. Thompson, No. 16-CR-00019, 2018 WL 447331, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2018) (citation omitted). \"Any evidence favorable to a defendant that comes within a category listed in § 3142(g) can affect the operation of [the presumption], including evidence of their marital, family and employment status, ties to and role in the community, clean criminal record and other types of evidence encompassed in § 3142(g)(3).\" Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 707 (clean record plus socioeconomic stability sufficed to rebut presumption).\n\nIn short, evidence that the defendant is unlikely to flee or commit crimes rebuts the presumption, forcing the government to persuade the court that detention is warranted. See Conway, 2011 WL 3421321, at *5 (§ 1591 defendant released pending trial). While not disappearing entirely, the presumption thus recedes to one factor among many in determining whether there are sufficient conditions to \"reasonably assure\" both presence and safety. See Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144; see also United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 (8th Cir. 1985) (\"[R]easonably assure\" doesn't mean \"guarantee.\") Even in a presumption case, then, \"the government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant presents a danger to the community,\" and by a \"preponderance\" that he poses a flight \"risk.\" United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nII. Mr. Epstein's 14-year record of law-abiding behavior rebuts any presumption in favor of pretrial detention\n\nIn this case, any danger presumption attending the § 1591 charges evaporates against Mr. Epstein's meticulous obedience, from 2005 to date, to both the law's commands and his rigorous registration and reporting obligations as a convicted sex offender. The indictment does not allege that Mr. Epstein committed any crime in the 14-year interval between the end of the alleged conduct and the initiation of this case. The dangerousness prong of the Bail Reform Act is predictive, asking whether it's likely that Mr. Epstein will reoffend if released. A spotless 14-year record of walking the straight and narrow, complemented by an exemplary 10-year history of diligent sex offender registration and reporting, is compelling proof he was able, once the prior investigation commenced, to conform his conduct to the law's dictates. The time lag between the offenses charged and today is particularly compelling in terms of a prediction of",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 5 of 16",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Though the Bail Reform Act contains a rebuttable presumption in favor of detention based on the crimes charged, the presumption shifts only the burden of production, not persuasion. See United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the statutory demand on defendants \"is fairly easily met.\" United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756, 2011 WL 3421321, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011). To rebut the presumption, a defendant need only \"show that the specific nature of the crimes charged, or that something about their individual circumstances, suggests that 'what is true in general is not true in the particular case . . .'\" United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 384 (1st Cir.1985)). \"The quantum of evidence required to rebut the presumption is not high.\" United States v. Thompson, No. 16-CR-00019, 2018 WL 447331, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2018) (citation omitted). \"Any evidence favorable to a defendant that comes within a category listed in § 3142(g) can affect the operation of [the presumption], including evidence of their marital, family and employment status, ties to and role in the community, clean criminal record and other types of evidence encompassed in § 3142(g)(3).\" Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 707 (clean record plus socioeconomic stability sufficed to rebut presumption).\n\nIn short, evidence that the defendant is unlikely to flee or commit crimes rebuts the presumption, forcing the government to persuade the court that detention is warranted. See Conway, 2011 WL 3421321, at *5 (§ 1591 defendant released pending trial). While not disappearing entirely, the presumption thus recedes to one factor among many in determining whether there are sufficient conditions to \"reasonably assure\" both presence and safety. See Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144; see also United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 (8th Cir. 1985) (\"[R]easonably assure\" doesn't mean \"guarantee.\") Even in a presumption case, then, \"the government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant presents a danger to the community,\" and by a \"preponderance\" that he poses a flight \"risk.\" United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nII. Mr. Epstein's 14-year record of law-abiding behavior rebuts any presumption in favor of pretrial detention\n\nIn this case, any danger presumption attending the § 1591 charges evaporates against Mr. Epstein's meticulous obedience, from 2005 to date, to both the law's commands and his rigorous registration and reporting obligations as a convicted sex offender. The indictment does not allege that Mr. Epstein committed any crime in the 14-year interval between the end of the alleged conduct and the initiation of this case. The dangerousness prong of the Bail Reform Act is predictive, asking whether it's likely that Mr. Epstein will reoffend if released. A spotless 14-year record of walking the straight and narrow, complemented by an exemplary 10-year history of diligent sex offender registration and reporting, is compelling proof he was able, once the prior investigation commenced, to conform his conduct to the law's dictates. The time lag between the offenses charged and today is particularly compelling in terms of a prediction of",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000278",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Mr. Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "N.D. Cal.",
      "M.D. Pa."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/11/19",
      "2005"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:19-cr-00490-RMB",
      "Document 6",
      "§ 1591",
      "§ 3142(g)",
      "No. 4-11-70756",
      "No. 16-CR-00019",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000278"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Mr. Epstein, discussing the Bail Reform Act and pretrial detention. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 5 of 16."
}