{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "732",
    "date": "07/14/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 4 of 25\nThe Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 4\naccusers, this Court should resolve each of these disagreements in favor of Ms. Maxwell and\ndeny the motions to quash.\n\nARGUMENT\n\nThis Court evaluates a Rule 17(c) subpoena under Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700. See\nUnited States v. Pena, No. 15-CR-551 (AJN), 2016 WL 8735699, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12,\n2016).2 Under Nixon, Ms. Maxwell \"must make a preponderance showing that the materials\nrequested are relevant, specifically identified, admissible, and not otherwise procurable by the\nexercise of due diligence.\" Pena, 2006 WL 8735699, at *2 (quoting Barnes, 560 Fed. Appx. at\n39-40). If Ms. Maxwell satisfies this standard, the Court may quash the subpoena only \"if\ncompliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c).\n\n2 In United States v. Pena, this Court declined to follow the more liberal standard for\ndefense subpoenas to third parties articulated in United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58\n(S.D.N.Y. 2008). The Second Circuit has not resolved this debate. See United States v. Barnes,\n560 Fed. Appx. 36, 40 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (declining to address the defendant's\nargument that the court \"forego the Nixon standard for the more permissive standard employed in\n[Tucker]\").\n\nMs. Maxwell contends that Tucker articulates the correct standard. See Nachamie, 91 F.\nSupp. 2d at 562-63 (\"A real question remains as to whether it makes sense to require a\ndefendant's Rule 17(c) to obtain material from a non-party to meet [the Nixon] standard.\nUnlike the Government, the defendant has not had an earlier opportunity to obtain material by\nmeans of a grand jury subpoena. Because the Rule states only that a court may quash a subpoena\n'if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive,' the judicial gloss that the material sought\nmust be evidentiary—defined as relevant, admissible and specific—may be inappropriate in the\ncontext of a defense subpoena of documents from third parties.\" (citing Tomison, 969 F. Supp. at\n593 n.14)).\n\nEven so, this Court need not reconsider its decision in Pena, because Ms. Maxwell's\nsubpoena is enforceable under Nixon. Should this Court disagree, however, Ms. Maxwell makes\nthis argument to preserve the record for potential appellate review.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00011427",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 732 Filed 07/14/22 Page 4 of 25",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nNovember 22, 2021\nPage 4",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "accusers, this Court should resolve each of these disagreements in favor of Ms. Maxwell and\ndeny the motions to quash.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "ARGUMENT",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
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      "content": "This Court evaluates a Rule 17(c) subpoena under Nixon, 418 U.S. at 699-700. See\nUnited States v. Pena, No. 15-CR-551 (AJN), 2016 WL 8735699, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12,\n2016).2 Under Nixon, Ms. Maxwell \"must make a preponderance showing that the materials\nrequested are relevant, specifically identified, admissible, and not otherwise procurable by the\nexercise of due diligence.\" Pena, 2006 WL 8735699, at *2 (quoting Barnes, 560 Fed. Appx. at\n39-40). If Ms. Maxwell satisfies this standard, the Court may quash the subpoena only \"if\ncompliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 In United States v. Pena, this Court declined to follow the more liberal standard for\ndefense subpoenas to third parties articulated in United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58\n(S.D.N.Y. 2008). The Second Circuit has not resolved this debate. See United States v. Barnes,\n560 Fed. Appx. 36, 40 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (declining to address the defendant's\nargument that the court \"forego the Nixon standard for the more permissive standard employed in\n[Tucker]\").",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Ms. Maxwell contends that Tucker articulates the correct standard. See Nachamie, 91 F.\nSupp. 2d at 562-63 (\"A real question remains as to whether it makes sense to require a\ndefendant's Rule 17(c) to obtain material from a non-party to meet [the Nixon] standard.\nUnlike the Government, the defendant has not had an earlier opportunity to obtain material by\nmeans of a grand jury subpoena. Because the Rule states only that a court may quash a subpoena\n'if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive,' the judicial gloss that the material sought\nmust be evidentiary—defined as relevant, admissible and specific—may be inappropriate in the\ncontext of a defense subpoena of documents from third parties.\" (citing Tomison, 969 F. Supp. at\n593 n.14)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Even so, this Court need not reconsider its decision in Pena, because Ms. Maxwell's\nsubpoena is enforceable under Nixon. Should this Court disagree, however, Ms. Maxwell makes\nthis argument to preserve the record for potential appellate review.",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00011427",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States Court",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/14/22",
      "November 22, 2021",
      "Feb. 12, 2016",
      "2008",
      "2014"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 732",
      "15-CR-551 (AJN)",
      "249 F.R.D. 58",
      "560 Fed. Appx. 36",
      "91 F. Supp. 2d",
      "969 F. Supp.",
      "DOJ-OGR-00011427"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a formal tone and legal language. There are no visible redactions or damage."
}