{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "29",
    "document_number": "410-1",
    "date": "11/04/21",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 29 of 93\nCount Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity - First Element: Consent Irrelevant\nWith regard to Count Four, whether or not the individual consented to being transported or to traveling interstate for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or the individual otherwise voluntarily participated, is irrelevant, as the consent or voluntary participation of the individual is not a defense.\nAdapted from the charge of the Hon. Thomas P. Griesa in United States v. Gilliam, 11 Cr. 1032 (TPG), aff'd, 842 F.3d 801, 805 (2d Cir. 2016). See also United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 1998) (\"Consent is a defense to kidnapping but not to a Mann Act charge.\"); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 712 (8th Cir. 1978); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1932).\nCommented [CE43]: The defense objects to this instruction. It is not found in Sand. Moreover, it confuses the issue of consent. To be sure, consent is not a defense to engaging in sexual activity with an individual who is under the age of consent in the relevant jurisdiction. But that point is already addressed in the instruction on New York Penal Law, Section 130.55 in Count Two. And the defense expects that there will be testimony of alleged sexual acts that took place after Jane Doe-1 and other alleged victims were above the relevant age of consent.\nCommented [RA(44R43]: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: The defense objection confuses consent to engage in sexual activity, which is addressed elsewhere, with consent to being transported. Consent to the transportation is not a defense under the Mann Act. Absent an instruction like this, the jury may be confused that a Minor Victim who travels willingly has consented to her transportation and has not been transported.\nDOJ-OGR-00006095",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 410-1 Filed 11/04/21 Page 29 of 93",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Count Four: Transportation of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity - First Element: Consent Irrelevant",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "With regard to Count Four, whether or not the individual consented to being transported or to traveling interstate for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or the individual otherwise voluntarily participated, is irrelevant, as the consent or voluntary participation of the individual is not a defense.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Thomas P. Griesa in United States v. Gilliam, 11 Cr. 1032 (TPG), aff'd, 842 F.3d 801, 805 (2d Cir. 2016). See also United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 52 (1st Cir. 1998) (\"Consent is a defense to kidnapping but not to a Mann Act charge.\"); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 712 (8th Cir. 1978); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1932).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "Commented [CE43]: The defense objects to this instruction. It is not found in Sand. Moreover, it confuses the issue of consent. To be sure, consent is not a defense to engaging in sexual activity with an individual who is under the age of consent in the relevant jurisdiction. But that point is already addressed in the instruction on New York Penal Law, Section 130.55 in Count Two. And the defense expects that there will be testimony of alleged sexual acts that took place after Jane Doe-1 and other alleged victims were above the relevant age of consent.",
      "position": "margin"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "Commented [RA(44R43]: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: The defense objection confuses consent to engage in sexual activity, which is addressed elsewhere, with consent to being transported. Consent to the transportation is not a defense under the Mann Act. Absent an instruction like this, the jury may be confused that a Minor Victim who travels willingly has consented to her transportation and has not been transported.",
      "position": "margin"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006095",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Thomas P. Griesa",
      "Jane Doe-1"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/04/21",
      "1932"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "410-1",
      "11 Cr. 1032 (TPG)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006095"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text includes legal citations and references to specific court cases. There are handwritten comments in the margin, indicating that the document has been reviewed and annotated by someone."
}