{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "2",
    "document_number": "20-6033",
    "date": null,
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Alison J. Nathan, Judge).\nUPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to consolidate is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.\nDefendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell seeks interlocutory relief from a September 2, 2020 denial of her motion to modify a protective order entered on July 30, 2020. In the alternative, she argues that this Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to modify the protective order. She also moves to consolidate the instant appeal with the appeal pending in Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413. Meanwhile, the Government moves this Court to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and opposes Maxwell's motion to consolidate on the grounds that the issues presented on appeal are both factually and legally distinct. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.\nThis Court has jurisdiction over the \"final decisions of the district courts.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1291. \"Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.\" Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940). The \"final judgment rule requires that a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits.\" Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"This insistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal cases.\" Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (citing Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 324–26). The final judgment rule is therefore \"at its strongest in the field of criminal law.\" United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982). In criminal cases, \"finality generally is defined by a judgment of conviction and the imposition of a sentence.\" Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 777 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).\nThere is a \"narrow\" exception to the final judgment rule that permits appeals from \"decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as final.\" Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867–68 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has described the \"conditions for collateral order appeal as stringent\" in general, Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added), and, with respect to criminal cases, it has \"interpreted the collateral order exception with the utmost strictness.\" Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). To fall within this limited category of appealable collateral orders, a decision must \"(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Alison J. Nathan, Judge).\nUPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the motion to consolidate is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Defendant-Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell seeks interlocutory relief from a September 2, 2020 denial of her motion to modify a protective order entered on July 30, 2020. In the alternative, she argues that this Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to modify the protective order. She also moves to consolidate the instant appeal with the appeal pending in Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 20-2413. Meanwhile, the Government moves this Court to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and opposes Maxwell's motion to consolidate on the grounds that the issues presented on appeal are both factually and legally distinct. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "This Court has jurisdiction over the \"final decisions of the district courts.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1291. \"Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure.\" Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940). The \"final judgment rule requires that a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits.\" Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"This insistence on finality and prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of criminal cases.\" Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) (citing Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 324–26). The final judgment rule is therefore \"at its strongest in the field of criminal law.\" United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 265 (1982). In criminal cases, \"finality generally is defined by a judgment of conviction and the imposition of a sentence.\" Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 777 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "There is a \"narrow\" exception to the final judgment rule that permits appeals from \"decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as final.\" Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867–68 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has described the \"conditions for collateral order appeal as stringent\" in general, Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added), and, with respect to criminal cases, it has \"interpreted the collateral order exception with the utmost strictness.\" Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). To fall within this limited category of appealable collateral orders, a decision must \"(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00001825",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "Ghislaine Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States District Court for the Southern District of New York",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "September 2, 2020",
      "July 30, 2020",
      "1940",
      "1984",
      "1962",
      "1982",
      "2001",
      "1994",
      "1989"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "20-6033",
      "20-2413",
      "28 U.S.C. § 1291",
      "309 U.S. 323",
      "465 U.S. 259",
      "369 U.S. 121",
      "458 U.S. 263",
      "532 U.S. 774",
      "511 U.S. 863",
      "489 U.S. 794"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, specifically a page from a legal brief or opinion. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and easy to read."
}