{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "675",
    "date": "06/25/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 5 of 21\na deferred prosecution agreement)) \"Congress crafted the CVRA to recognize the harm and\nanguish suffered by victims of crime. This is why Congress made the statutory rights under the\nCVRA permissively accessible. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).\" Id. Moreover, \"[b]ecause victim status can\nbe argued for even prior to the filing of an indictment, it is clear that Congress intended courts to\nlook beyond the four corners of an indictment or plea agreement. For example, in the context of the\n[drug trafficking] conspiracy here, neither the indictment nor the statement of facts included in the\nplea agreement mention violence of any kind. And yet, logic allows for the inference...that [the\ndefendant's] paramilitary organization...employed violence and force as part of its method of\noperation.\" Id.\nIt is also important to understand that this case has now moved to a different phase than the\ntrial phase where, of course, a defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and is protected\nby the requirement that the government prove guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in\ndetermining the \"crime victim\" issue at sentencing, the relevant standard of proof is the conventional\nstandard for proceedings in criminal cases outside of trial—preponderance of the evidence. See\nUnited States v. Giraldo-Serna, 118 F.Supp.3d 377, 382 (D.D.C. 2015) (\"Purported victims under\nthe CVRA must prove their victim status by a preponderance of the evidence.\") (citing In re\nMcNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612\nF.Supp.2d 453, 486, 495, 508 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195\n(2d Cir. 2013) (applying preponderance of the evidence standard to victim restitution issue); United\nStates v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 2021)(same).\n5\nDOJ-OGR-00010696",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 5 of 21",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "a deferred prosecution agreement)) \"Congress crafted the CVRA to recognize the harm and\nanguish suffered by victims of crime. This is why Congress made the statutory rights under the\nCVRA permissively accessible. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).\" Id. Moreover, \"[b]ecause victim status can\nbe argued for even prior to the filing of an indictment, it is clear that Congress intended courts to\nlook beyond the four corners of an indictment or plea agreement. For example, in the context of the\n[drug trafficking] conspiracy here, neither the indictment nor the statement of facts included in the\nplea agreement mention violence of any kind. And yet, logic allows for the inference...that [the\ndefendant's] paramilitary organization...employed violence and force as part of its method of\noperation.\" Id.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It is also important to understand that this case has now moved to a different phase than the\ntrial phase where, of course, a defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and is protected\nby the requirement that the government prove guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But, in\ndetermining the \"crime victim\" issue at sentencing, the relevant standard of proof is the conventional\nstandard for proceedings in criminal cases outside of trial—preponderance of the evidence. See\nUnited States v. Giraldo-Serna, 118 F.Supp.3d 377, 382 (D.D.C. 2015) (\"Purported victims under\nthe CVRA must prove their victim status by a preponderance of the evidence.\") (citing In re\nMcNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612\nF.Supp.2d 453, 486, 495, 508 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195\n(2d Cir. 2013) (applying preponderance of the evidence standard to victim restitution issue); United\nStates v. Kim, 988 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 2021)(same).",
      "position": "main"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5",
      "position": "footer"
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010696",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Congress"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "D.D.C.",
      "D.N.J."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "06/25/22",
      "2015",
      "2010",
      "2009",
      "2013",
      "2021"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "675",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010696"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}