{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "6",
    "document_number": "620",
    "date": "02/25/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 6 of 21\n\nBaker, 899 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983)). Mere \"[g]ossip and anonymous tips do not satisfy this standard.\"\nUnited States v. Stewart, 317 F. Supp. 2d 432, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Rather, \"[a]llegations of impropriety must be 'concrete allegations of inappropriate conduct that constitute competent and relevant evidence.'\" Baker, 899 F.3d at 130 (quoting United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1989)).\n\nThe Defendant argues that this is the wrong standard. Maxwell Reply, Feb. 9, 2022, at 8 n.4. But the Defendant does not identify an alternative standard. And the Second Circuit has applied precisely this standard to determine whether a district court should hold a McDonough hearing on the basis of a juror's nondisclosure during voir dire. Stewart, 433 F.3d at 302–03.\nThe Court is bound to apply this demanding standard.\n\nThis high standard for an evidentiary hearing intentionally raises an \"exacting hurdle\" for defendants because \"motions to set aside a jury verdict are disfavored.\" United States v. Ventura, No. 09-CR-1015 (JGK), 2014 WL 259655, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2014). As the Second Circuit has repeatedly warned, \"post-verdict inquiries may lead to evil consequences: subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting juryroom deliberation, burdening courts with meritless applications, increasing temptation for jury tampering and creating uncertainty in jury verdicts.\" Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119–20 (1987) (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1915)). And an evidentiary hearing \"is not held to afford a convicted defendant the opportunity 'to conduct a fishing expedition.'\" Stewart, 433 F.3d at 306 (quoting Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234).\n\nThe Defendant argues that the considerations in Tanner and Ianniello are inapplicable to her motion because those cases \"involved alleged conduct during trial and, crucially, during",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 620 Filed 02/25/22 Page 6 of 21",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983)). Mere \"[g]ossip and anonymous tips do not satisfy this standard.\"\nUnited States v. Stewart, 317 F. Supp. 2d 432, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Rather, \"[a]llegations of impropriety must be 'concrete allegations of inappropriate conduct that constitute competent and relevant evidence.'\" Baker, 899 F.3d at 130 (quoting United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1989)).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Defendant argues that this is the wrong standard. Maxwell Reply, Feb. 9, 2022, at 8 n.4. But the Defendant does not identify an alternative standard. And the Second Circuit has applied precisely this standard to determine whether a district court should hold a McDonough hearing on the basis of a juror's nondisclosure during voir dire. Stewart, 433 F.3d at 302–03.\nThe Court is bound to apply this demanding standard.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "This high standard for an evidentiary hearing intentionally raises an \"exacting hurdle\" for defendants because \"motions to set aside a jury verdict are disfavored.\" United States v. Ventura, No. 09-CR-1015 (JGK), 2014 WL 259655, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2014). As the Second Circuit has repeatedly warned, \"post-verdict inquiries may lead to evil consequences: subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting juryroom deliberation, burdening courts with meritless applications, increasing temptation for jury tampering and creating uncertainty in jury verdicts.\" Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543; see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119–20 (1987) (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 (1915)). And an evidentiary hearing \"is not held to afford a convicted defendant the opportunity 'to conduct a fishing expedition.'\" Stewart, 433 F.3d at 306 (quoting Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Defendant argues that the considerations in Tanner and Ianniello are inapplicable to her motion because those cases \"involved alleged conduct during trial and, crucially, during",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "6",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009547",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "Feb. 9, 2022",
      "Jan. 21, 2014"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 620",
      "899 F.3d 123",
      "718 F.2d 1210",
      "317 F. Supp. 2d 432",
      "866 F.2d 540",
      "433 F.3d 302",
      "09-CR-1015 (JGK)",
      "2014 WL 259655",
      "483 U.S. 107",
      "238 U.S. 264"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing, likely a memorandum or brief, discussing legal standards and precedents related to evidentiary hearings and jury verdicts. The text is dense and technical, suggesting it is intended for a legal audience."
}