{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "516",
    "date": "11/21/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 516 Filed 11/21/21 Page 5 of 17\n\nFifth, Dr. Dietz states that Dr. Rocchio's opinion about grooming for a third party—so-called grooming-by-proxy—is not accepted in the field. Notice at 4. The Court has excluded Dr. Rocchio's testimony on this issue. Dkt. No. 435 at 10. The Defense apparently admits that Dr. Dietz's testimony on this point would be admissible only if it responds to Dr. Rocchio's testimony. Def. Br. at 5 n.2, 7 n.3. The Court therefore excludes Dr. Dietz's testimony on grooming for a third party or “grooming-by-proxy” because it is not relevant to the jury's determination.\n\nNext, Dr. Dietz offers an opinion about hindsight bias. Specifically, he says that behaviors can be labeled as “grooming” only in hindsight once the event of sexual abuse is known. Notice at 4–5. Dr. Dietz's notice cites to a series of articles that examine hindsight bias in a variety of contexts and he concludes that an awareness of hindsight bias “should temper any claims that so called ‘grooming’ behaviors should have been noticed and either reported or avoided.” Id. at 5. The Government argues that this opinion improperly instructs the jury on how to assess evidence and that hindsight bias is a common-sense concept that does not require expert testimony. Gov't Br. at 12–14. The Defense responds that this opinion on hindsight bias is another basis to criticize Dr. Rocchio's definition of grooming, as a determination of grooming can be made only after the fact. Def. Br. at 8–9.\n\nThe Court will admit Dr. Dietz's hindsight-bias opinion insofar as it is a criticism of Dr. Rocchio's grooming opinion. Much like Dr. Dietz's opinion on intent and grooming, this opinion states that behavior can be labelled as grooming only if the outcome is known. For the same reasons the Court admits Dr. Dietz's opinion that a determination of grooming imputes intent, the Court admits this opinion.\n\n5\n\nDOJ-OGR-00008177",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 516 Filed 11/21/21 Page 5 of 17",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Fifth, Dr. Dietz states that Dr. Rocchio's opinion about grooming for a third party—so-called grooming-by-proxy—is not accepted in the field. Notice at 4. The Court has excluded Dr. Rocchio's testimony on this issue. Dkt. No. 435 at 10. The Defense apparently admits that Dr. Dietz's testimony on this point would be admissible only if it responds to Dr. Rocchio's testimony. Def. Br. at 5 n.2, 7 n.3. The Court therefore excludes Dr. Dietz's testimony on grooming for a third party or “grooming-by-proxy” because it is not relevant to the jury's determination.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Next, Dr. Dietz offers an opinion about hindsight bias. Specifically, he says that behaviors can be labeled as “grooming” only in hindsight once the event of sexual abuse is known. Notice at 4–5. Dr. Dietz's notice cites to a series of articles that examine hindsight bias in a variety of contexts and he concludes that an awareness of hindsight bias “should temper any claims that so called ‘grooming’ behaviors should have been noticed and either reported or avoided.” Id. at 5. The Government argues that this opinion improperly instructs the jury on how to assess evidence and that hindsight bias is a common-sense concept that does not require expert testimony. Gov't Br. at 12–14. The Defense responds that this opinion on hindsight bias is another basis to criticize Dr. Rocchio's definition of grooming, as a determination of grooming can be made only after the fact. Def. Br. at 8–9.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court will admit Dr. Dietz's hindsight-bias opinion insofar as it is a criticism of Dr. Rocchio's grooming opinion. Much like Dr. Dietz's opinion on intent and grooming, this opinion states that behavior can be labelled as grooming only if the outcome is known. For the same reasons the Court admits Dr. Dietz's opinion that a determination of grooming imputes intent, the Court admits this opinion.",
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      "content": "5",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008177",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Dietz",
      "Dr. Rocchio"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "11/21/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "516",
      "435",
      "DOJ-OGR-00008177"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the admissibility of expert testimony regarding grooming and hindsight bias. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}