{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "16",
    "document_number": "616",
    "date": "02/24/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 616 Filed 02/24/22 Page 16 of 32\n\ntrial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.\" McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 215-16; id. at 220-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).\n\nThis is the only fair reading of McDonough and Langford, and it is only conclusion the Sixth Amendment permits. Imagine the counterfactual scenario in which Juror No. 50 truthfully answered Questions 25 and 48. If Ms. Maxwell had challenged Juror No. 50 for cause and this Court had denied that challenge, Ms. Maxwell would be able to raise the issue in a new trial motion and, if that were denied, on appeal. In the new trial motion or on appeal, Ms. Maxwell's only burden would be to prove that Juror No. 50 was impliedly, inferably, or actually biased. E.g., United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 983 (2d Cir. 1968) (new trial required when a deliberating juror is actually or impliedly biased). She would not have to prove any inadvertent falschoods or deceit by Juror No. 50.\n\nIn the government's view, however, Ms. Maxwell must carry a heavier burden than she otherwise would because Juror No. 50 did not tell the truth. That neither makes sense nor is fair. Ms. Maxwell should not be punished because Juror No. 50 did not tell the truth, particularly when Ms. Maxwell could not have challenged Juror No. 50 for cause at the time precisely because he did not tell the truth and she lacked any ability to question the juror.\n\nFortunately, the government's view is wrong, as five justices in McDonough made clear and the Second Circuit held in Langford. Under Second Circuit law, as the Court held in United States v. Stewart, \"[A] party alleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must demonstrate first, that the juror's voir dire response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.\" United States v. Stewart,\n\n11\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009206",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 616 Filed 02/24/22 Page 16 of 32",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred.\" McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 215-16; id. at 220-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).\n\nThis is the only fair reading of McDonough and Langford, and it is only conclusion the Sixth Amendment permits. Imagine the counterfactual scenario in which Juror No. 50 truthfully answered Questions 25 and 48. If Ms. Maxwell had challenged Juror No. 50 for cause and this Court had denied that challenge, Ms. Maxwell would be able to raise the issue in a new trial motion and, if that were denied, on appeal. In the new trial motion or on appeal, Ms. Maxwell's only burden would be to prove that Juror No. 50 was impliedly, inferably, or actually biased. E.g., United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 983 (2d Cir. 1968) (new trial required when a deliberating juror is actually or impliedly biased). She would not have to prove any inadvertent falschoods or deceit by Juror No. 50.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In the government's view, however, Ms. Maxwell must carry a heavier burden than she otherwise would because Juror No. 50 did not tell the truth. That neither makes sense nor is fair. Ms. Maxwell should not be punished because Juror No. 50 did not tell the truth, particularly when Ms. Maxwell could not have challenged Juror No. 50 for cause at the time precisely because he did not tell the truth and she lacked any ability to question the juror.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Fortunately, the government's view is wrong, as five justices in McDonough made clear and the Second Circuit held in Langford. Under Second Circuit law, as the Court held in United States v. Stewart, \"[A] party alleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must demonstrate first, that the juror's voir dire response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.\" United States v. Stewart,",
      "position": "main"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "11",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009206",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Blackmun",
      "O'Connor",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Juror No. 50"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "U.S. Supreme Court",
      "Second Circuit Court"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/24/22"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 616",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009206"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten annotations or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}