{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "26",
    "document_number": "653",
    "date": "04/01/22",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 26 of 40\nbased on the purported similarities between his personal history and the issues at trial. Because these arguments overlap, the Court addresses implied and inferred bias together.5\n\"Implied bias\" is \"a concept that is reserved for 'extreme situations,' warranting a conclusive presumption of bias as a matter of law.\" McCoy, 995 F.3d at 48 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Greer, 285 F.3d at 172). Such bias is \"attributed to a prospective juror regardless of actual partiality\" because the law presumes that \"an average person in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)); see also Haynes, 398 F.2d at 984. The category applies to \"certain highly limited situations where a juror discloses a fact that creates such a high risk of partiality that the law requires the judge to excuse the juror for cause.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 41. Namely, \"jurors who are related to the parties or who were victims\" or otherwise involved in the alleged crime itself are impliedly biased. Id. at 45; see also Greer, 285 F.3d at 172.\nOn the other hand, a finding of inferred bias is a determination within the trial court's discretion. Greer, 285 F.3d at 171; see also McCoy, 995 F.3d at 49. \"Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.\" Greer, 285 F.3d at 171 (quoting Torres, 128 F.3d at 47)). The inquiry is whether the juror's responses at voir dire \"permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 47. If such facts are elicited, \"then, just as in the situation of implied bias, the juror's statements as to his or her ability to be impartial become irrelevant.\" Id. However, \"a judge may—particularly when\n5 It is unsettled in the Second Circuit whether implied or inferred bias may serve as the basis for a post-trial allegation of juror partiality. See Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. Because the Court determines that Juror 50 is neither impliedly nor inferably biased, it need not resolve this issue.\n26\nDOJ-OGR-00010349",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 26 of 40",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "based on the purported similarities between his personal history and the issues at trial. Because these arguments overlap, the Court addresses implied and inferred bias together.5\n\"Implied bias\" is \"a concept that is reserved for 'extreme situations,' warranting a conclusive presumption of bias as a matter of law.\" McCoy, 995 F.3d at 48 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Greer, 285 F.3d at 172). Such bias is \"attributed to a prospective juror regardless of actual partiality\" because the law presumes that \"an average person in the position of the juror in controversy would be prejudiced.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 45 (citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)); see also Haynes, 398 F.2d at 984. The category applies to \"certain highly limited situations where a juror discloses a fact that creates such a high risk of partiality that the law requires the judge to excuse the juror for cause.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 41. Namely, \"jurors who are related to the parties or who were victims\" or otherwise involved in the alleged crime itself are impliedly biased. Id. at 45; see also Greer, 285 F.3d at 172.\nOn the other hand, a finding of inferred bias is a determination within the trial court's discretion. Greer, 285 F.3d at 171; see also McCoy, 995 F.3d at 49. \"Bias may be inferred when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.\" Greer, 285 F.3d at 171 (quoting Torres, 128 F.3d at 47)). The inquiry is whether the juror's responses at voir dire \"permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 47. If such facts are elicited, \"then, just as in the situation of implied bias, the juror's statements as to his or her ability to be impartial become irrelevant.\" Id. However, \"a judge may—particularly when",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5 It is unsettled in the Second Circuit whether implied or inferred bias may serve as the basis for a post-trial allegation of juror partiality. See Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. Because the Court determines that Juror 50 is neither impliedly nor inferably biased, it need not resolve this issue.",
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      "content": "26",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010349",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/01/22",
      "1936"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "653",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010349"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing discussing legal concepts related to juror bias. The text is mostly clear, with some legal jargon and citations to case law. There are no visible redactions or damage."
}