{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "15",
    "document_number": "653",
    "date": "04/01/22",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 15 of 40\n\ncritical role in those extreme cases where dissatisfied litigants may be tempted to harass or tamper with jurors in an attempt to impeach the verdict. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120–21.\n\nFinally, what is not at issue in resolving this motion is whether the Defendant would have exercised a peremptory strike against this juror had he accurately disclosed his prior sexual abuse. Although the Defendant argues in her pre-hearing brief that she is also entitled to a new trial because Juror 50’s failure to disclose his history denied her the opportunity to exercise her peremptory challenges, that is not the law in federal court. Indeed, in making this argument she cites only decisions that relied on New Jersey state law. Maxwell Br. at 46–47. But the rule in New Jersey state courts is different than the rule that binds this Court. See State v. Scher, 650 A.2d 1012, 1019–20 (N.J. App. Div. 1994) (explaining that New Jersey’s “rule differs from its federal counterpart” of McDonough). Under McDonough, a defendant seeking a new trial must show that “a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” 464 U.S. at 555–56 (emphasis added). A desire to “wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process” is not enough. Id.; see also Shaoul, 41 F.3d at 816 (concluding that a defendant failed to satisfy the second prong of McDonough where the defendant “may certainly exclude such jurors by the use of peremptory challenges, but he has no basis for arguing that a district court is required to sustain such a challenge for cause”). That difference arises in part from the fact that “[u]nlike challenges for cause, peremptory strikes are not constitutionally required.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 43 n.4.\n\nIII. ANALYSIS\n\nA. McDonough Prong One\n\nThe Court begins with what Juror 50’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing makes plain: Juror 50 provided inaccurate answers to Questions 25, 48, and 49 of the questionnaire. For each",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 15 of 40",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "critical role in those extreme cases where dissatisfied litigants may be tempted to harass or tamper with jurors in an attempt to impeach the verdict. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120–21.\n\nFinally, what is not at issue in resolving this motion is whether the Defendant would have exercised a peremptory strike against this juror had he accurately disclosed his prior sexual abuse. Although the Defendant argues in her pre-hearing brief that she is also entitled to a new trial because Juror 50’s failure to disclose his history denied her the opportunity to exercise her peremptory challenges, that is not the law in federal court. Indeed, in making this argument she cites only decisions that relied on New Jersey state law. Maxwell Br. at 46–47. But the rule in New Jersey state courts is different than the rule that binds this Court. See State v. Scher, 650 A.2d 1012, 1019–20 (N.J. App. Div. 1994) (explaining that New Jersey’s “rule differs from its federal counterpart” of McDonough). Under McDonough, a defendant seeking a new trial must show that “a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” 464 U.S. at 555–56 (emphasis added). A desire to “wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process” is not enough. Id.; see also Shaoul, 41 F.3d at 816 (concluding that a defendant failed to satisfy the second prong of McDonough where the defendant “may certainly exclude such jurors by the use of peremptory challenges, but he has no basis for arguing that a district court is required to sustain such a challenge for cause”). That difference arises in part from the fact that “[u]nlike challenges for cause, peremptory strikes are not constitutionally required.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 43 n.4.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "III. ANALYSIS",
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      "content": "A. McDonough Prong One",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court begins with what Juror 50’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing makes plain: Juror 50 provided inaccurate answers to Questions 25, 48, and 49 of the questionnaire. For each",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010338",
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    "locations": [
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