{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "14",
    "document_number": "616",
    "date": "02/24/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 616 Filed 02/24/22 Page 14 of 32\n\nin a \"documentary.\" Inquiring into the false answers Juror No. 50 has publicly admitted making risks nothing that Juror No. 50 hasn't already brought on himself.\n\nMs. Maxwell's motion has nothing to do with her innocence or guilt. It involves no strategy or artifice by the defense. And it risks no unauthorized inquiry into the jury room. The motion is about one thing, and one thing only: Every person's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. The government hopes to deprive Ms. Maxwell of that right in the name of \"finality.\"\n\nThis Court should disregard the government's policy arguments, which address arguments and claims Ms. Maxwell is not making. In turn, the government's policy arguments betray the weakness of its legal position. And they cast significant doubt on the United States solemn duty to seek justice and not merely to convict. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65-66 (2011) (\"Prosecutors have a special \"duty to seek justice, not merely to convict.\").\n\nB. Ms. Maxwell does not have to prove that Juror No. 50's voir dire answers were deliberately false.\n\nThe government insists that Ms. Maxwell is entitled to a new trial only if she can prove that Juror No. 50 deliberately provided false answers during voir dire. Not so.\n\nContrary to the government's argument, the decision McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, \"does not entirely foreclose a party from seeking a new trial on the basis of a prospective juror's honest, though mistaken, response.\" Zerka v. Green, 49 F.3d 1181, 1186 n.7 (6th Cir. 1995); accord Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (\"In extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.\"); Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (1st Cir. 1992) (\"[T]he majority vote in McDonough... require[s] a further determination on the question of juror bias even where a juror is found to have been honest. . . .\"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000; Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir.\n\n9\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009204",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 616 Filed 02/24/22 Page 14 of 32",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "in a \"documentary.\" Inquiring into the false answers Juror No. 50 has publicly admitted making risks nothing that Juror No. 50 hasn't already brought on himself.\n\nMs. Maxwell's motion has nothing to do with her innocence or guilt. It involves no strategy or artifice by the defense. And it risks no unauthorized inquiry into the jury room. The motion is about one thing, and one thing only: Every person's constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. The government hopes to deprive Ms. Maxwell of that right in the name of \"finality.\"\n\nThis Court should disregard the government's policy arguments, which address arguments and claims Ms. Maxwell is not making. In turn, the government's policy arguments betray the weakness of its legal position. And they cast significant doubt on the United States solemn duty to seek justice and not merely to convict. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65-66 (2011) (\"Prosecutors have a special \"duty to seek justice, not merely to convict.\").",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "B. Ms. Maxwell does not have to prove that Juror No. 50's voir dire answers were deliberately false.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government insists that Ms. Maxwell is entitled to a new trial only if she can prove that Juror No. 50 deliberately provided false answers during voir dire. Not so.\n\nContrary to the government's argument, the decision McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, \"does not entirely foreclose a party from seeking a new trial on the basis of a prospective juror's honest, though mistaken, response.\" Zerka v. Green, 49 F.3d 1181, 1186 n.7 (6th Cir. 1995); accord Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (\"In extraordinary cases, courts may presume bias based on the circumstances.\"); Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404, 1405-06 (1st Cir. 1992) (\"[T]he majority vote in McDonough... require[s] a further determination on the question of juror bias even where a juror is found to have been honest. . . .\"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000; Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 440 (8th Cir.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "9",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009204",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Thompson",
      "Greenwood",
      "Zerka",
      "Green",
      "Dyer",
      "Calderon",
      "Amirault",
      "Fair",
      "Cannon",
      "Lockhart"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/24/22",
      "2011",
      "1995",
      "1998",
      "1992"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 616",
      "563 U.S. 51",
      "49 F.3d 1181",
      "151 F.3d 970",
      "968 F.2d 1404",
      "850 F.2d 437",
      "506 U.S. 1000"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 14 of 32."
}