{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "31",
    "document_number": "643",
    "date": "03/11/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 31 of 49\n\niii. Inferred Bias\n\nWhile the category of cases in which bias must be implied or presumed is limited to \"exceptional\" or \"extreme situations,\" the district court retains discretion to dismiss a juror for cause when \"a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 46-47. This doctrine of \"inferred bias\" is \"closely linked\" to the \"traditional categories\" of actual and implied bias, and a finding of inferred bias is permitted \"only after having received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively.\" Id. at 47. \"[A] finding of inferred bias is, by definition, within the discretion of the trial court.\" Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. And, as with actual bias, \"a district court's evaluation of the juror's impartiality is accorded deference.\" Id.; see also id. (\"There are few aspects of a jury trial where we would be less inclined to disturb a trial judge's exercise of discretion, absent clear abuse, than in ruling on challenges for cause in the empanelling of a jury.\" (quoting United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118-19 n.4 (2d Cir. 1972))).\n\nHere, the record refutes any suggestion that, had Juror 50 disclosed a history of sexual abuse, the Court would have struck him based on a finding of inferred bias. As set forth above, the record is clear that the Court would have in fact conducted targeted follow-up questioning and, absent some indication in such questioning that would have permitted an inference of bias, the Court would not have struck him. See Torres, 128 F.3d at 47 (finding of inferable bias \"must be grounded in facts developed at voir dire\").\n\nTorres, upon which the defendant exclusively relies, is not to the contrary. In that case, the district court struck a juror for cause where she had engaged in the structuring of cash deposits,",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 31 of 49",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "iii. Inferred Bias",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "While the category of cases in which bias must be implied or presumed is limited to \"exceptional\" or \"extreme situations,\" the district court retains discretion to dismiss a juror for cause when \"a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 46-47. This doctrine of \"inferred bias\" is \"closely linked\" to the \"traditional categories\" of actual and implied bias, and a finding of inferred bias is permitted \"only after having received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively.\" Id. at 47. \"[A] finding of inferred bias is, by definition, within the discretion of the trial court.\" Greer, 285 F.3d at 172. And, as with actual bias, \"a district court's evaluation of the juror's impartiality is accorded deference.\" Id.; see also id. (\"There are few aspects of a jury trial where we would be less inclined to disturb a trial judge's exercise of discretion, absent clear abuse, than in ruling on challenges for cause in the empanelling of a jury.\" (quoting United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118-19 n.4 (2d Cir. 1972))).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Here, the record refutes any suggestion that, had Juror 50 disclosed a history of sexual abuse, the Court would have struck him based on a finding of inferred bias. As set forth above, the record is clear that the Court would have in fact conducted targeted follow-up questioning and, absent some indication in such questioning that would have permitted an inference of bias, the Court would not have struck him. See Torres, 128 F.3d at 47 (finding of inferable bias \"must be grounded in facts developed at voir dire\").",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Torres, upon which the defendant exclusively relies, is not to the contrary. In that case, the district court struck a juror for cause where she had engaged in the structuring of cash deposits,",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009829",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "03/11/22",
      "1972"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 643",
      "128 F.3d",
      "285 F.3d",
      "464 F.2d",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009829"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 31 of 49."
}