{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "8",
    "document_number": "701",
    "date": "07/12/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 701 Filed 07/12/22 Page 8 of 10\nthe lines of the defense expert notice.\nFourth, preclusion of any of Flatley's testimony is an improper remedy. As set forth above, Flatley's testimony does not constitute expert opinion, and thus no notice was required. But even if some aspect of Flatley's testimony were considered expert opinion, the Government's notice was sufficient, for the reasons set forth above. Furthermore, the purpose of Rule 16's expert notice requirement is to \"minimize surprise that often results from unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert's testimony through focused cross-examination.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G), (b)(1)(C), 1993 Amend. Here, the Government's notices have clearly served the purpose of the requirement. The defendant cannot seriously claim surprise: When the Government first provided notice of Flatley's testimony in September, the defendant did not object to its sufficiency or file a motion to preclude, but instead noticed her own counter-expert to Flatley on November 1, 2021, stating that he would testify about substantially the same subjects. Moreover, the first time the defendant raised any complaint about notice, the Government responded in great detail within three days, and the defense then chose to wait until the night before Flatley's testimony to raise any further complaint with the Court. Thus, any need for a continuance—and there is none—is the product of the defendant's gamesmanship. Preclusion is an extreme remedy, see Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 117; Canada, 858 F. App'x at 439; Ganier, 468 F.3d at 927 (\"District courts should embrace the 'least severe sanction necessary' doctrine, and hold that suppression of relevant evidence as a remedial device should be limited to circumstances in which it is necessary to serve remedial objectives.\"); United States v. Tuzman, No. 15 Cr. 536 (PGG), 2017 WL 6527261, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2017) (denying a motion to preclude a defense expert where the 8\nDOJ-OGR-00011187",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 701 Filed 07/12/22 Page 8 of 10",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the lines of the defense expert notice.\nFourth, preclusion of any of Flatley's testimony is an improper remedy. As set forth above, Flatley's testimony does not constitute expert opinion, and thus no notice was required. But even if some aspect of Flatley's testimony were considered expert opinion, the Government's notice was sufficient, for the reasons set forth above. Furthermore, the purpose of Rule 16's expert notice requirement is to \"minimize surprise that often results from unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert's testimony through focused cross-examination.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G), (b)(1)(C), 1993 Amend. Here, the Government's notices have clearly served the purpose of the requirement. The defendant cannot seriously claim surprise: When the Government first provided notice of Flatley's testimony in September, the defendant did not object to its sufficiency or file a motion to preclude, but instead noticed her own counter-expert to Flatley on November 1, 2021, stating that he would testify about substantially the same subjects. Moreover, the first time the defendant raised any complaint about notice, the Government responded in great detail within three days, and the defense then chose to wait until the night before Flatley's testimony to raise any further complaint with the Court. Thus, any need for a continuance—and there is none—is the product of the defendant's gamesmanship. Preclusion is an extreme remedy, see Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 117; Canada, 858 F. App'x at 439; Ganier, 468 F.3d at 927 (\"District courts should embrace the 'least severe sanction necessary' doctrine, and hold that suppression of relevant evidence as a remedial device should be limited to circumstances in which it is necessary to serve remedial objectives.\"); United States v. Tuzman, No. 15 Cr. 536 (PGG), 2017 WL 6527261, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2017) (denying a motion to preclude a defense expert where the",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00011187",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Flatley"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/12/22",
      "November 1, 2021",
      "Dec. 18, 2017"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 701",
      "15 Cr. 536 (PGG)"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 8 of 10."
}