{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "166",
    "document_number": "293-1",
    "date": "05/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 293-1 Filed 05/25/21 Page 166 of 349 authority to deviate from the Ashcroft Memo’s “most serious readily provable offense” requirement. Although Acosta could not recall specifically how or by whom the decision was made to allow Epstein to plead to only one of the three charges identified on the original term sheet, or how or by whom the decision was made to reduce the sentencing requirement from two years to 18 months, Acosta was aware of these changes. He reviewed and approved the final NPA before it was signed. Department policy gave him the discretion to approve the agreement, notwithstanding any arguable failure to comply with the “most serious readily provable offense” requirement. Furthermore, the Ashcroft Memo does not appear to preclude a U.S. Attorney from deferring to a state prosecution, so it is not clear that the Memo’s terms apply to a situation involving state charges. Accordingly, OPR concludes that the negotiation of an agreement that allowed Epstein to resolve the federal investigation in return for the imposition of an 18-month state sentence did not violate a clear and unambiguous standard and therefore does not constitute professional misconduct. 2. The USAO’s Agreement Not to Prosecute Unidentified “Potential Co-Conspirators” Did Not Violate a Clear and Unambiguous Department Policy Several witnesses told OPR that they believed the government’s agreement not to prosecute unidentified “potential co-conspirators” amounted to “transactional immunity,” which the witnesses asserted is prohibited by Department policy. Although “use immunity” protects a witness only against the government’s use of his or her immunized testimony in a prosecution of the witness, and is frequently used by prosecutors, transactional immunity protects a witness from prosecution altogether and is relatively rare. OPR found no policy prohibiting a U.S. Attorney from declining to prosecute third parties or providing transactional immunity. One section of the USAM related to immunity but applied only to the exchange of “use immunity” for the testimony of a witness who has asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege. See USAM § 9-23.100 et seq. Statutory provisions relating to immunity also address the same context. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002; 21 U.S.C. § 884. Moreover, apart from voluntariness or enforceability concerns, courts have not suggested that a prosecutor’s promise not to prosecute a third party amounts to an inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Marquez, 909 F.2d at 741-43; Kemp, 760 F.2d at 1248; Stinson, 839 So. 2d at 909; Frazier, 697 So. 2d 945. OPR found no clear and unambiguous standard that was violated by the USAO’s agreement not to prosecute “potential co-conspirators,” and therefore cannot conclude that negotiating or approving this provision violated a clear and unambiguous standard or constituted professional misconduct. Notwithstanding this finding, in Section IV of this Part, OPR includes in its criticism of Acosta’s decision to approve the NPA his approval of this provision without considering its potential consequences, including to whom it would apply. 139 DOJ-OGR-00004463",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 293-1 Filed 05/25/21 Page 166 of 349",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "authority to deviate from the Ashcroft Memo’s “most serious readily provable offense” requirement. Although Acosta could not recall specifically how or by whom the decision was made to allow Epstein to plead to only one of the three charges identified on the original term sheet, or how or by whom the decision was made to reduce the sentencing requirement from two years to 18 months, Acosta was aware of these changes. He reviewed and approved the final NPA before it was signed. Department policy gave him the discretion to approve the agreement, notwithstanding any arguable failure to comply with the “most serious readily provable offense” requirement. Furthermore, the Ashcroft Memo does not appear to preclude a U.S. Attorney from deferring to a state prosecution, so it is not clear that the Memo’s terms apply to a situation involving state charges. Accordingly, OPR concludes that the negotiation of an agreement that allowed Epstein to resolve the federal investigation in return for the imposition of an 18-month state sentence did not violate a clear and unambiguous standard and therefore does not constitute professional misconduct.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2. The USAO’s Agreement Not to Prosecute Unidentified “Potential Co-Conspirators” Did Not Violate a Clear and Unambiguous Department Policy",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Several witnesses told OPR that they believed the government’s agreement not to prosecute unidentified “potential co-conspirators” amounted to “transactional immunity,” which the witnesses asserted is prohibited by Department policy. Although “use immunity” protects a witness only against the government’s use of his or her immunized testimony in a prosecution of the witness, and is frequently used by prosecutors, transactional immunity protects a witness from prosecution altogether and is relatively rare. OPR found no policy prohibiting a U.S. Attorney from declining to prosecute third parties or providing transactional immunity. One section of the USAM related to immunity but applied only to the exchange of “use immunity” for the testimony of a witness who has asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege. See USAM § 9-23.100 et seq. Statutory provisions relating to immunity also address the same context. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002; 21 U.S.C. § 884. Moreover, apart from voluntariness or enforceability concerns, courts have not suggested that a prosecutor’s promise not to prosecute a third party amounts to an inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Marquez, 909 F.2d at 741-43; Kemp, 760 F.2d at 1248; Stinson, 839 So. 2d at 909; Frazier, 697 So. 2d 945. OPR found no clear and unambiguous standard that was violated by the USAO’s agreement not to prosecute “potential co-conspirators,” and therefore cannot conclude that negotiating or approving this provision violated a clear and unambiguous standard or constituted professional misconduct.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Notwithstanding this finding, in Section IV of this Part, OPR includes in its criticism of Acosta’s decision to approve the NPA his approval of this provision without considering its potential consequences, including to whom it would apply.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "139",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004463",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Acosta",
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Department",
      "USAM",
      "USAO",
      "OPR"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "05/25/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "293-1",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004463"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the Epstein case, discussing the USAO's agreement not to prosecute unidentified 'potential co-conspirators' and whether it violated Department policy. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}