{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "7",
    "document_number": "307",
    "date": "06/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "or modified by another court in another proceeding. Id. A civil protective order may (as here) be limited by its terms to pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that confidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13. A court may (as here) unseal documents covered by a civil protective order in the public interest. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 47; Giuffre v. Maxwell, 827 F. App'x 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2020); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor legal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against the use of their testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding.\n\nMaxwell thus has failed to establish the first and most fundamental element of a violation of her right against compelled self-incrimination: compulsion. Because the protection typically afforded by a civil protective order is both porous and ephemeral, the Second Circuit has held that \"a non-consenting witness may not be forced to answer potentially incriminating questions in reliance upon such an order.\" Andover, 876 F.2d at 1084. Maxwell was free to assert her Fifth Amendment rights in her civil case and refuse to offer incriminating testimony. Longstanding precedent made clear that if she did not do so, the Government could use any such testimony that it learned of against her in a later criminal case. Because the Government did not compel Maxwell to offer incriminating testimony, it did not violate her right against compelled self-incrimination.\n\nMaxwell's alternative argument that BSF's act of turning over her deposition transcripts was itself compelled testimony is likewise without merit. The Supreme Court has held that the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena implicates the Fifth Amendment only in narrow circumstances—when the existence of responsive documents, rather than their content, is",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "or modified by another court in another proceeding. Id. A civil protective order may (as here) be limited by its terms to pretrial proceedings, in which case the parties must expect that confidential documents will come to light as the case progresses. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 1987); Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13. A court may (as here) unseal documents covered by a civil protective order in the public interest. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 47; Giuffre v. Maxwell, 827 F. App'x 144, 145 (2d Cir. 2020); Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006). Civil litigants have neither a reasonable basis nor legal entitlement to rely on a civil protective order against the use of their testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell thus has failed to establish the first and most fundamental element of a violation of her right against compelled self-incrimination: compulsion. Because the protection typically afforded by a civil protective order is both porous and ephemeral, the Second Circuit has held that \"a non-consenting witness may not be forced to answer potentially incriminating questions in reliance upon such an order.\" Andover, 876 F.2d at 1084. Maxwell was free to assert her Fifth Amendment rights in her civil case and refuse to offer incriminating testimony. Longstanding precedent made clear that if she did not do so, the Government could use any such testimony that it learned of against her in a later criminal case. Because the Government did not compel Maxwell to offer incriminating testimony, it did not violate her right against compelled self-incrimination.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell's alternative argument that BSF's act of turning over her deposition transcripts was itself compelled testimony is likewise without merit. The Supreme Court has held that the act of producing documents in response to a subpoena implicates the Fifth Amendment only in narrow circumstances—when the existence of responsive documents, rather than their content, is",
      "position": "bottom"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "BSF",
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Supreme Court"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "06/25/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 307",
      "Dkt. No. 134-1 ¶ 13",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004791"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving Maxwell. The text discusses the use of civil protective orders and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}