{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "24",
    "document_number": "644",
    "date": "03/11/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 644 Filed 03/11/22 Page 24 of 32\n\nE. This Court should reject the government's attempt to manufacture a \"Show Hearing\"8.\n\nTo read the government's brief, one would think this Court could hold a meaningful hearing at which it (and not the parties) would pose two softball questions of Juror No. 50: were your false answers to Questions 25 and 48 merely inadvertent; and, even though you were a victim of child sexual abuse, isn't it true that you were a fair and impartial juror (even though you have admitted using your own experience to convince 10 other jurors to convict Ms. Maxwell)? The government implies that an affirmative to either question would end the hearing. Not so.\n\n1. The lawyers should conduct the questioning.\n\nFirst, the parties should be permitted to question Juror No. 50, as occurred recently in this judicial district.9 United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 306 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"We therefore caution district courts that, if any significant doubt as to a juror's impartiality remains in the wake of objective evidence of false voir dire responses, an evidentiary hearing generally should be held. Such a hearing is often the most reliable way for discerning the true motivations behind a juror's false replies.\") (citations omitted).\n\n8 \"[A] show trial can be defined by the presence of two elements. The first element is increased probability of the defendant's conviction resulting from the planning and control of the trial. The second element is a focus on the audience outside of the courtroom rather than on the accused—the extent to which the trial is designed or managed for the benefit of external observers rather than for securing justice for the defendant.\" Jeremy Peterson, Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein, 48 Harv. Int'l L.J. 257, 260 (2007); see also Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2010) (\"fundamentally biased process is not due process\"); Schacht v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1999) (\"sham procedures do not satisfy due process\").\n\n9 E.g., United States v. Daugerdas, Exhibit 3.\n\n19\nDOJ-OGR-00009893",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 644 Filed 03/11/22 Page 24 of 32",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "E. This Court should reject the government's attempt to manufacture a \"Show Hearing\"8.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To read the government's brief, one would think this Court could hold a meaningful hearing at which it (and not the parties) would pose two softball questions of Juror No. 50: were your false answers to Questions 25 and 48 merely inadvertent; and, even though you were a victim of child sexual abuse, isn't it true that you were a fair and impartial juror (even though you have admitted using your own experience to convince 10 other jurors to convict Ms. Maxwell)? The government implies that an affirmative to either question would end the hearing. Not so.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "1. The lawyers should conduct the questioning.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "First, the parties should be permitted to question Juror No. 50, as occurred recently in this judicial district.9 United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 306 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"We therefore caution district courts that, if any significant doubt as to a juror's impartiality remains in the wake of objective evidence of false voir dire responses, an evidentiary hearing generally should be held. Such a hearing is often the most reliable way for discerning the true motivations behind a juror's false replies.\") (citations omitted).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "8 \"[A] show trial can be defined by the presence of two elements. The first element is increased probability of the defendant's conviction resulting from the planning and control of the trial. The second element is a focus on the audience outside of the courtroom rather than on the accused—the extent to which the trial is designed or managed for the benefit of external observers rather than for securing justice for the defendant.\" Jeremy Peterson, Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein, 48 Harv. Int'l L.J. 257, 260 (2007); see also Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2010) (\"fundamentally biased process is not due process\"); Schacht v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1999) (\"sham procedures do not satisfy due process\").",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "9 E.g., United States v. Daugerdas, Exhibit 3.",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "19",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009893",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Jeremy Peterson",
      "Saddam Hussein",
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "03/11/22",
      "2006",
      "2007",
      "2010",
      "1999"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 644",
      "F.3d 273",
      "F.3d 713",
      "F.3d 497",
      "48 Harv. Int'l L.J. 257"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of United States v. Maxwell. The text discusses the government's attempt to manufacture a 'show hearing' and argues that the lawyers should conduct the questioning of Juror No. 50. The document includes citations to various court cases and legal references."
}