{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "21",
    "document_number": "311-4",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 21 of 27\nTo Be Filed Under Seal\nthat confidentiality originated with the consent of the parties, and not with a judicial\ndetermination that the materials at issue were deserving of protection, militates against a finding\nof reasonable reliance. \"[C]ourts have been reluctant to find reliance, or that reliance was\nreasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the\nparties.\" In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).\nAs for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh\nagainst modification. \"The classic situation in which a party 'relies' on a protective order is\nwhere the party creates material during the course of the litigation on the understanding that it\nwill be kept confidential—for example, by . . . giving confidential testimony.\" Allen v. City of\nN.Y., 420 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The record shows that Giuffre likely could\nnot have secured Maxwell's deposition—at least in the absence of substantial court\ninvolvement—without the Protective Order.6 Maxwell specifically mentioned \"the specter of\nsome theoretical prosecution\" when arguing in support of the entry of her version of the\nProtective Order. Although, as noted above, she discounted the likelihood of any such\nprosecution (see supra, at 18.), she argued that, \"A witness adverse to Plaintiff would be\nreluctant to testify and may be bullied into asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid the\npotential of information being forwarded to a prosecutor by the Plaintiff or her lawyers.\" (Def.'s\nReply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order, 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 49 at 5); cf. Minpeco\nS.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1987) (\"[O]ne of the primary\nreasons the protective order was originally entered was to prevent plaintiffs from using the threat\n6\nI cannot possibly second guess how Judge Sweet ran this litigation; he had far more experience than I and\nwas justly respected for it. Had the case been before me, Maxwell would have been required to testify, or she would\nhave been held in contempt or had issues resolved against her, Protective Order or no. And in every case in which I\nsign a protective order, I require the parties to agree to an addendum—the very terms of which would render blanket\nreliance on eternal confidentiality unreasonable. My practices make it difficult to put myself into Judge Sweet's\nshoes for purposes of this application. But do so I must.\n20\nSDNY_GM_00000894\nDOJ-OGR-00004944",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 21 of 27",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To Be Filed Under Seal",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "that confidentiality originated with the consent of the parties, and not with a judicial\ndetermination that the materials at issue were deserving of protection, militates against a finding\nof reasonable reliance. \"[C]ourts have been reluctant to find reliance, or that reliance was\nreasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the\nparties.\" In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).\nAs for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh\nagainst modification. \"The classic situation in which a party 'relies' on a protective order is\nwhere the party creates material during the course of the litigation on the understanding that it\nwill be kept confidential—for example, by . . . giving confidential testimony.\" Allen v. City of\nN.Y., 420 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The record shows that Giuffre likely could\nnot have secured Maxwell's deposition—at least in the absence of substantial court\ninvolvement—without the Protective Order.6 Maxwell specifically mentioned \"the specter of\nsome theoretical prosecution\" when arguing in support of the entry of her version of the\nProtective Order. Although, as noted above, she discounted the likelihood of any such\nprosecution (see supra, at 18.), she argued that, \"A witness adverse to Plaintiff would be\nreluctant to testify and may be bullied into asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid the\npotential of information being forwarded to a prosecutor by the Plaintiff or her lawyers.\" (Def.'s\nReply in Further Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order, 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 49 at 5); cf. Minpeco\nS.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1987) (\"[O]ne of the primary\nreasons the protective order was originally entered was to prevent plaintiffs from using the threat",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "6",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "I cannot possibly second guess how Judge Sweet ran this litigation; he had far more experience than I and\nwas justly respected for it. Had the case been before me, Maxwell would have been required to testify, or she would\nhave been held in contempt or had issues resolved against her, Protective Order or no. And in every case in which I\nsign a protective order, I require the parties to agree to an addendum—the very terms of which would render blanket\nreliance on eternal confidentiality unreasonable. My practices make it difficult to put myself into Judge Sweet's\nshoes for purposes of this application. But do so I must.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "20",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "SDNY_GM_00000894",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004944",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Giuffre",
      "Maxwell",
      "Judge Sweet"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y.",
      "2d Cir."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21",
      "1996",
      "2006",
      "1987"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 311-4",
      "15-cv-7433",
      "Dkt. No. 49",
      "SDNY_GM_00000894",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004944"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with a header indicating it is to be filed under seal. The text discusses a protective order and references various court cases and documents. There are no visible stamps or handwritten text other than the footnote marker '6'."
}