{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "17",
    "document_number": "140",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 140 Filed 02/04/21 Page 17 of 22\n\nId. at 294. Either avenue, explained the Court, would provide the real party in interest notice of the government's request and an opportunity to be heard, either by moving to quash the subpoena or opposing intervention and modification of the protective order. Id.\n\nThe Court also rejected the government's argument that the district court was too solicitous of the witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 295. According to the Government, the witnesses were under no compulsion to testify, and having given testimony, they voluntarily waived any Fifth Amendment right they may have had. Id. But as the Second Circuit explained, the government's argument ignored the reality of civil litigation:\n\nUnless a valid Rule 26(c) protective order is to be fully and fairly enforceable, witnesses relying upon such orders will be inhibited from giving essential testimony in civil litigation, thus undermining a procedural system that has been successfully developed over the years for disposition of civil differences. In short, witnesses might be expected frequently to refuse to testify pursuant to protective orders if their testimony were to be made available to the government for criminal investigatory purposes in disregard of those orders.\n\nId. at 295–96. The Court thus held:\n\n[A]bsent a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, none of which appear here, a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government, and that such an order should not be vacated or modified merely to accommodate the government's desire to inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal investigation, either as evidence or as the subject of a possible perjury charge.\n\nId. at 296.\n\n\n\n\n\n\nMaxwell did not even know the government had her until after she was\n\n13\nDOJ-OGR-00002565",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 140 Filed 02/04/21 Page 17 of 22",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Id. at 294. Either avenue, explained the Court, would provide the real party in interest notice of the government's request and an opportunity to be heard, either by moving to quash the subpoena or opposing intervention and modification of the protective order. Id.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court also rejected the government's argument that the district court was too solicitous of the witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 295. According to the Government, the witnesses were under no compulsion to testify, and having given testimony, they voluntarily waived any Fifth Amendment right they may have had. Id. But as the Second Circuit explained, the government's argument ignored the reality of civil litigation:",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Unless a valid Rule 26(c) protective order is to be fully and fairly enforceable, witnesses relying upon such orders will be inhibited from giving essential testimony in civil litigation, thus undermining a procedural system that has been successfully developed over the years for disposition of civil differences. In short, witnesses might be expected frequently to refuse to testify pursuant to protective orders if their testimony were to be made available to the government for criminal investigatory purposes in disregard of those orders.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Id. at 295–96. The Court thus held:",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[A]bsent a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, none of which appear here, a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government, and that such an order should not be vacated or modified merely to accommodate the government's desire to inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal investigation, either as evidence or as the subject of a possible perjury charge.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Id. at 296.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell did not even know the government had her until after she was",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "13",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002565",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 140",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002565"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with redactions."
}