{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "3",
    "document_number": "692",
    "date": "11/22/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 692 Filed 11/22/21 Page 3 of 17\n\nCrim. P. 16(b)(1)(C). The purpose of this rule is to “minimize surprise that often results from unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert’s testimony through focused cross-examination.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. Thus, to satisfy Rule 16, a notice must not merely describe the “general topics” on which experts will testify but actually “summarize the experts’ opinions about those topics” and “describe the bases for the experts’ opinions.” United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 115 (2d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added); United States v. Valle, No. 12-CR-847 (PGG), 2013 WL 440687, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2013) (“Merely identifying the general topics about which the expert will testify is insufficient; rather, the summary must reveal the expert’s actual opinions.”). If the Defense’s disclosure of an expert witness does not satisfy Rule 16, the Court has “broad discretion” to fashion an appropriate remedy. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 115. That discretion is guided by factors including “why disclosure was not made, the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2016)). When a disclosure merely lists general topics on which the expert might testify, the Second Circuit has several times held that the district court has discretion to exclude the expert entirely. See id. at 118; United States v. Vaccarelli, No. 20-3768-CR, 2021 WL 4805218, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 15, 2021). II. Discussion As a preliminary matter, the Defense argues that the Government’s motion is “premature” because the Government’s arguments are about the relevance and prejudice of the witnesses’ testimony, not their qualifications or the reliability of their methods under Rule 702. 3 DOJ-OGR-00011141",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 692 Filed 11/22/21 Page 3 of 17",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Crim. P. 16(b)(1)(C). The purpose of this rule is to “minimize surprise that often results from unexpected expert testimony, reduce the need for continuances, and to provide the opponent with a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert’s testimony through focused cross-examination.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1)(C) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. Thus, to satisfy Rule 16, a notice must not merely describe the “general topics” on which experts will testify but actually “summarize the experts’ opinions about those topics” and “describe the bases for the experts’ opinions.” United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 115 (2d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added); United States v. Valle, No. 12-CR-847 (PGG), 2013 WL 440687, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2013) (“Merely identifying the general topics about which the expert will testify is insufficient; rather, the summary must reveal the expert’s actual opinions.”). If the Defense’s disclosure of an expert witness does not satisfy Rule 16, the Court has “broad discretion” to fashion an appropriate remedy. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 115. That discretion is guided by factors including “why disclosure was not made, the extent of the prejudice, if any, to the opposing party, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2016)). When a disclosure merely lists general topics on which the expert might testify, the Second Circuit has several times held that the district court has discretion to exclude the expert entirely. See id. at 118; United States v. Vaccarelli, No. 20-3768-CR, 2021 WL 4805218, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 15, 2021).",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "II. Discussion",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As a preliminary matter, the Defense argues that the Government’s motion is “premature” because the Government’s arguments are about the relevance and prejudice of the witnesses’ testimony, not their qualifications or the reliability of their methods under Rule 702.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00011141",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Defense",
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/22/21",
      "Feb. 2, 2013",
      "Oct. 15, 2021"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 692",
      "12-CR-847 (PGG)",
      "20-3768-CR"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the rules regarding expert testimony and the discretion of the court in handling disclosures."
}