{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "681-1",
    "date": "06/26/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 681-1 Filed 06/26/22 Page 4 of 7\n\nUnder the CVRA's plain language, \"a party may qualify as a victim, even though [she] may not have been the target of the crime, as long as [she] suffers harm as a result of the crime's commission.\" In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2011) (\"Fisher I\"). Thus, the CVRA \"instructs the district court to look at the offense itself only to determine the harmful effects the offense has on parties.\" In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Because of this requirement to identify an offense's \"harmful effects,\" numerous CVRA \"victim\" cases have found it necessary to look beyond the narrow \"record\" of the charges themselves. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 649 F.3d 401, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases) (\"Fisher II\").\n\nAn instructive case comes from the D.C. Circuit, which reversed a district court decision denying \"victim\" status in a drug trafficking case. The Circuit explained that in determining whether a decedent's family had CVRA \"victim\" status, the district court erred by \"limit[ing] its evaluation to the indictment and the statement of facts submitted by [the defendant] as part of his negotiated plea agreement.\" In re de Henriquez, No. 15-3054, 2015 WL 10692637, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Circuit noted that \"[u]nder the CVRA, victims may participate in proceedings even when there has been no formal charge.\" Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (victims have the right to timely notice of a deferred prosecution agreement)). Moreover, \"[b]ecause victim status can be argued for even prior to the filing of an indictment, it is clear that Congress intended courts to look beyond the four corners of an indictment or plea agreement. For example, in the context of the [drug trafficking] conspiracy here, neither the indictment nor the statement of facts included in the plea agreement mention violence of any kind. And yet, logic allows for the inference . . . that [the defendant's] paramilitary organization . . . employed violence and force as part of its method of operation.\" Id.\n\n4\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010740",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 681-1 Filed 06/26/22 Page 4 of 7",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Under the CVRA's plain language, \"a party may qualify as a victim, even though [she] may not have been the target of the crime, as long as [she] suffers harm as a result of the crime's commission.\" In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2011) (\"Fisher I\"). Thus, the CVRA \"instructs the district court to look at the offense itself only to determine the harmful effects the offense has on parties.\" In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Because of this requirement to identify an offense's \"harmful effects,\" numerous CVRA \"victim\" cases have found it necessary to look beyond the narrow \"record\" of the charges themselves. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 649 F.3d 401, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases) (\"Fisher II\").",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "An instructive case comes from the D.C. Circuit, which reversed a district court decision denying \"victim\" status in a drug trafficking case. The Circuit explained that in determining whether a decedent's family had CVRA \"victim\" status, the district court erred by \"limit[ing] its evaluation to the indictment and the statement of facts submitted by [the defendant] as part of his negotiated plea agreement.\" In re de Henriquez, No. 15-3054, 2015 WL 10692637, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Circuit noted that \"[u]nder the CVRA, victims may participate in proceedings even when there has been no formal charge.\" Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (victims have the right to timely notice of a deferred prosecution agreement)). Moreover, \"[b]ecause victim status can be argued for even prior to the filing of an indictment, it is clear that Congress intended courts to look beyond the four corners of an indictment or plea agreement. For example, in the context of the [drug trafficking] conspiracy here, neither the indictment nor the statement of facts included in the plea agreement mention violence of any kind. And yet, logic allows for the inference . . . that [the defendant's] paramilitary organization . . . employed violence and force as part of its method of operation.\" Id.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010740",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "CVRA",
      "D.C. Circuit",
      "Congress",
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "06/26/22",
      "2011",
      "2014",
      "2015"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "681-1",
      "15-3054",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010740"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the definition of a 'victim' under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA). The text is well-formatted and legible, with no visible redactions or damage."
}