{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "7",
    "document_number": "423",
    "date": "11/08/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 423 Filed 11/08/21 Page 7 of 11\nPage 7\nshowing.\" (Id. at 1). The Court also found that \"nothing in the record plausibly establishes that current protocols interfere with Maxwell's ability to prepare for her trial and communicate with her lawyers.\" (Id. at 2).\nThe defendant then filed another motion in the Second Circuit, seeking bail or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing regarding the conditions of her confinement. (See United States v. Maxwell, No. 21-58, Dkt. 89 (2d Cir. May 17, 2021)). In the motion, she renewed her claims that the \"horrific conditions [at MDC] make it impossible to prepare for trial.\" (Id. at 2; see also id. at 2-3 (listing alleged horrific conditions, such as sleep deprivation, brown water, surveillance of attorney-client meetings, overflowing sewage, computer without sufficient capacity to review discovery)). The Second Circuit denied her motion in a written order. (See United States v. Maxwell, No. 21-58, Dkt. 96 (2d Cir. June 2, 2021)).\nB. Applicable Law\nIn seeking pretrial detention, the Government bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant poses a risk of flight, and that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure her presence in court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007).\nHowever, where, as here, the defendant is charged with certain offenses, including offenses involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422 or 2423, a statutory presumption arises \"that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required . . . .\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In such a case, the defendant \"bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that [s]he does not pose a ... risk of flight.\" United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). Even where a defendant produces sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory\nDOJ-OGR-00006207",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 423 Filed 11/08/21 Page 7 of 11",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Page 7",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "showing.\" (Id. at 1). The Court also found that \"nothing in the record plausibly establishes that current protocols interfere with Maxwell's ability to prepare for her trial and communicate with her lawyers.\" (Id. at 2).\nThe defendant then filed another motion in the Second Circuit, seeking bail or, in the alternative, an evidentiary hearing regarding the conditions of her confinement. (See United States v. Maxwell, No. 21-58, Dkt. 89 (2d Cir. May 17, 2021)). In the motion, she renewed her claims that the \"horrific conditions [at MDC] make it impossible to prepare for trial.\" (Id. at 2; see also id. at 2-3 (listing alleged horrific conditions, such as sleep deprivation, brown water, surveillance of attorney-client meetings, overflowing sewage, computer without sufficient capacity to review discovery)). The Second Circuit denied her motion in a written order. (See United States v. Maxwell, No. 21-58, Dkt. 96 (2d Cir. June 2, 2021)).\nB. Applicable Law\nIn seeking pretrial detention, the Government bears the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant poses a risk of flight, and that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure her presence in court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007).\nHowever, where, as here, the defendant is charged with certain offenses, including offenses involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422 or 2423, a statutory presumption arises \"that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required . . . .\" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In such a case, the defendant \"bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that [s]he does not pose a ... risk of flight.\" United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). Even where a defendant produces sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006207",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "MDC"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "May 17, 2021",
      "June 2, 2021",
      "11/08/21",
      "2001",
      "2007"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 423",
      "No. 21-58",
      "Dkt. 89",
      "Dkt. 96",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)",
      "18 U.S.C. §§ 1591",
      "18 U.S.C. § 2422",
      "18 U.S.C. § 2423",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E)",
      "493 F.3d 63",
      "254 F.3d 433",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006207"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of United States v. Maxwell. The text is printed and legible, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is page 7 of 11."
}