{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "63",
    "document_number": "397",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 63 of 84\n\nEven if the Government has misread the Court's order, the defense's claims of prejudice are exaggerated. Although the defense complains that the Government seized \"multiple electronic devices\" containing \"hundreds of thousands of statements spanning decades\" (Def. Mot. 1 at 3), any statements contained in emails or other documents that the Government plans to use at trial have been marked as Government exhibits and produced to the defense. The defense need look no further than the Government's exhibit list to discover what documents will be offered at trial.\n\nSimilarly, although the defense complains of \"document dumps\" (id. at 2) and the need to review \"thousands of pages of newly provided discovery material\" (id. at 7), any witness testimony containing co-conspirator statements is contained in the Government's Jencks Act production—and specifically, the Government's production of material for testifying witnesses. Although the Government produced as a courtesy prior statements of non-testifying witnesses, by definition the Government does not plan to call those individuals at trial. And the Government has informed the defense of the limited number of co-conspirators to whom it may refer at trial, so the defense knows exactly which declarants' statements are possibly subject to the co-conspirator exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).16\n\nFinally, and in any event, suppression is not a proper remedy. The defense relies principally on Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), in which the Supreme Court upheld an order\n\n16 To be clear, the defendant's motion concerns the admission of statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The majority of the statements made by co-conspirators that will be offered at trial have other bases for admissibility. For example, witnesses will testify regarding promises, offers, instructions, and directions they received from Epstein. Those statements are not factual assertions subject to hearsay rules. Rather, they are offered for the effect on the listener, among other reasons.\n\n62\n\nDOJ-OGR-00005846",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 63 of 84",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Even if the Government has misread the Court's order, the defense's claims of prejudice are exaggerated. Although the defense complains that the Government seized \"multiple electronic devices\" containing \"hundreds of thousands of statements spanning decades\" (Def. Mot. 1 at 3), any statements contained in emails or other documents that the Government plans to use at trial have been marked as Government exhibits and produced to the defense. The defense need look no further than the Government's exhibit list to discover what documents will be offered at trial.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Similarly, although the defense complains of \"document dumps\" (id. at 2) and the need to review \"thousands of pages of newly provided discovery material\" (id. at 7), any witness testimony containing co-conspirator statements is contained in the Government's Jencks Act production—and specifically, the Government's production of material for testifying witnesses. Although the Government produced as a courtesy prior statements of non-testifying witnesses, by definition the Government does not plan to call those individuals at trial. And the Government has informed the defense of the limited number of co-conspirators to whom it may refer at trial, so the defense knows exactly which declarants' statements are possibly subject to the co-conspirator exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).16",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Finally, and in any event, suppression is not a proper remedy. The defense relies principally on Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), in which the Supreme Court upheld an order",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "16 To be clear, the defendant's motion concerns the admission of statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The majority of the statements made by co-conspirators that will be offered at trial have other bases for admissibility. For example, witnesses will testify regarding promises, offers, instructions, and directions they received from Epstein. Those statements are not factual assertions subject to hearsay rules. Rather, they are offered for the effect on the listener, among other reasons.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "62",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005846",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Court",
      "Supreme Court"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21",
      "1988"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "397",
      "484 U.S. 400",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005846"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is likely a page from a larger filing, as indicated by the page number and document number in the header."
}