{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "44",
    "document_number": "642",
    "date": "03/11/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 44 of 66\n\n2. Inferable bias\n\n\"'Inferable' or 'inferred' bias exists 'when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.'\" Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (quoting United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002)). A court should dismiss a potential juror for inferable bias \"after having received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 47. \"[T]his is so even though the juror need not be asked the specific question of whether he or she could decide the case impartially.\" Id.\n\n\"Moreover, once facts are elicited that permit a finding of inferable bias, then, just as in the situation of implied bias, the juror's statements as to his or her ability to be impartial become irrelevant.\" Id. \"The crux of the implied bias analysis in a case like this one is found in an examination of the similarities between the juror's experiences and the incident giving rise to the trial.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 48 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 989 (10th Cir. 1996)). Assuming this Court does not imply bias, it should nevertheless infer bias.\n\nIn United States v. Torres, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to launder the proceeds of a heroin trafficking scheme by structuring financial transactions. 128 F.3d at 41. Over the defense's objection, the district court (Judge Preska) dismissed for cause a potential juror who admitted that she \"had at one time engaged in the 'structuring' of cash transactions.\" Id. at 42. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the 37 DOJ-OGR-00009736",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 44 of 66",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2. Inferable bias",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"'Inferable' or 'inferred' bias exists 'when a juror discloses a fact that bespeaks a risk of partiality sufficiently significant to warrant granting the trial judge discretion to excuse the juror for cause, but not so great as to make mandatory a presumption of bias.'\" Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (quoting United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002)). A court should dismiss a potential juror for inferable bias \"after having received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 47. \"[T]his is so even though the juror need not be asked the specific question of whether he or she could decide the case impartially.\" Id.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"Moreover, once facts are elicited that permit a finding of inferable bias, then, just as in the situation of implied bias, the juror's statements as to his or her ability to be impartial become irrelevant.\" Id. \"The crux of the implied bias analysis in a case like this one is found in an examination of the similarities between the juror's experiences and the incident giving rise to the trial.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 48 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 989 (10th Cir. 1996)). Assuming this Court does not imply bias, it should nevertheless infer bias.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In United States v. Torres, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to launder the proceeds of a heroin trafficking scheme by structuring financial transactions. 128 F.3d at 41. Over the defense's objection, the district court (Judge Preska) dismissed for cause a potential juror who admitted that she \"had at one time engaged in the 'structuring' of cash transactions.\" Id. at 42. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "37",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009736",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Greer",
      "Torres",
      "Gonzales",
      "Thomas",
      "Preska"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Tenth Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "03/11/22",
      "2002",
      "1996"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 642",
      "F. Supp. 2d",
      "F.3d",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009736"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the concept of 'inferable bias' in the context of juror selection. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}