{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "223",
    "date": "04/20/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "courts hold the government to an even higher standard than parties to a commercial contract. Feldman, 939 F.3d at 189 (describing \"meticulous standards of performance\" to which prosecutors are held in negotiating plea agreements). As the government acknowledges, at least three courts have applied the third-party beneficiary doctrine to confer standing on third parties to enforce immunity provisions in plea agreements. Florida West, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1228; El-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09; United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd, 749 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1984). The government's attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground that they did not \"analyze\" the applicability of the third-party beneficiary doctrine to plea agreements (Opp. 19) is utterly nonsensical. As demonstrated in Ms. Maxwell's opening memorandum (\"Mem.\"), all three courts expressly held that the doctrine applies. Mem. 16-17. The lone case cited by the government to the contrary does not suggest a different result here. In United States v. Mariamma Viju (01), the court held that a third party may not enforce rights under a plea agreement \"[w]here the defendant himself can obtain relief\" from a broken plea deal.\" No. 3:15-CR-0240-B, 2016 WL 107841, *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016). Here, Epstein cannot obtain relief for the government's breach of the NPA; not only is he deceased, but he served the sentence stemming from his guilty plea long before his death, paid millions of dollars to accusers under the NPA's claims provision, and thus would have had no occasion to enforce the NPA by withdrawing his guilty plea. Nor is it clear that Epstein could have withdrawn his plea had the NPA been breached while he was serving his sentence, given that the NPA—unlike a plea agreement—was not submitted to the state court in which Epstein entered his plea. 6 DOJ-OGR-00003883",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 223 Filed 04/20/21 Page 10 of 23",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "courts hold the government to an even higher standard than parties to a commercial contract. Feldman, 939 F.3d at 189 (describing \"meticulous standards of performance\" to which prosecutors are held in negotiating plea agreements). As the government acknowledges, at least three courts have applied the third-party beneficiary doctrine to confer standing on third parties to enforce immunity provisions in plea agreements. Florida West, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 1228; El-Sadig, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 608-09; United States v. CFW Const. Co., 583 F. Supp. 197, 203 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd, 749 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1984). The government's attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground that they did not \"analyze\" the applicability of the third-party beneficiary doctrine to plea agreements (Opp. 19) is utterly nonsensical. As demonstrated in Ms. Maxwell's opening memorandum (\"Mem.\"), all three courts expressly held that the doctrine applies. Mem. 16-17. The lone case cited by the government to the contrary does not suggest a different result here. In United States v. Mariamma Viju (01), the court held that a third party may not enforce rights under a plea agreement \"[w]here the defendant himself can obtain relief\" from a broken plea deal.\" No. 3:15-CR-0240-B, 2016 WL 107841, *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016). Here, Epstein cannot obtain relief for the government's breach of the NPA; not only is he deceased, but he served the sentence stemming from his guilty plea long before his death, paid millions of dollars to accusers under the NPA's claims provision, and thus would have had no occasion to enforce the NPA by withdrawing his guilty plea. Nor is it clear that Epstein could have withdrawn his plea had the NPA been breached while he was serving his sentence, given that the NPA—unlike a plea agreement—was not submitted to the state court in which Epstein entered his plea.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "6",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003883",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Feldman",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Epstein",
      "Mariamma Viju"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Florida West",
      "CFW Const. Co."
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Texas"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/20/21",
      "Jan. 11, 2016"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 223",
      "3:15-CR-0240-B",
      "2016 WL 107841",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003883"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a case involving Epstein and Ms. Maxwell. The text discusses the third-party beneficiary doctrine and its application to plea agreements. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}