{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "295",
    "date": "05/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 10 of 26\nthat Gonzalez could not have reasonably understood the plea agreement to restrict the Western District of New York.\"); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Here, Ajaj presents no evidence that the parties to the Eastern District plea agreement contemplated that it would bar the prosecution of Ajaj in any district other than the Eastern District.”). But they contain no analysis of overlap between immunized offenses and the offense charged—a question that can be analytically complicated—when evaluating whether the affirmative appearance rule applies at all. See, e.g., Prisco, 391 F. App’x at 931; United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851, 853-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (analyzing whether the Eastern District of New York was bound by a California plea agreement and then discussing the “unnecessary” question whether the new charges fell within the scope of the plea agreement), aff’d, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.) (tbl.); cf., e.g., United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 922-24 (2d Cir. 1988) (analyzing whether a narcotics conspiracy count, dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement with USAO-SDNY, was the same narcotics conspiracy later charged by USAO-SDNY).2\nAs the foregoing cases illustrate, the Second Circuit has repeatedly cited Annabi for a clear rule of interpretation: a plea agreement does not bind another district unless it affirmatively appears otherwise. Under this clear rule, this Court has already held that the NPA does not bind this District. To be sure, if the NPA applied in this District—and if Maxwell could invoke it—the\n2 In her motion, the defendant urges the Court to apply caselaw from the Third Circuit. This Court is, of course, bound by Annabi and not by the decisions of a circuit that expressly deviates from Annabi’s rule. See United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 546-50 (3rd Cir. 2002) (criticizing Annabi and holding that “that when a United States Attorney negotiates and contracts on behalf of ‘the United States’ or ‘the Government’ in a plea agreement for specific crimes, that attorney speaks for and binds all of his or her fellow United States Attorneys with respect to those same crimes and those same defendants”).\n6\nDOJ-OGR-00004717",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 10 of 26",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "that Gonzalez could not have reasonably understood the plea agreement to restrict the Western District of New York.\"); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Here, Ajaj presents no evidence that the parties to the Eastern District plea agreement contemplated that it would bar the prosecution of Ajaj in any district other than the Eastern District.”). But they contain no analysis of overlap between immunized offenses and the offense charged—a question that can be analytically complicated—when evaluating whether the affirmative appearance rule applies at all. See, e.g., Prisco, 391 F. App’x at 931; United States v. Laskow, 688 F. Supp. 851, 853-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (analyzing whether the Eastern District of New York was bound by a California plea agreement and then discussing the “unnecessary” question whether the new charges fell within the scope of the plea agreement), aff’d, 867 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir.) (tbl.); cf., e.g., United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 922-24 (2d Cir. 1988) (analyzing whether a narcotics conspiracy count, dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement with USAO-SDNY, was the same narcotics conspiracy later charged by USAO-SDNY).2",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As the foregoing cases illustrate, the Second Circuit has repeatedly cited Annabi for a clear rule of interpretation: a plea agreement does not bind another district unless it affirmatively appears otherwise. Under this clear rule, this Court has already held that the NPA does not bind this District. To be sure, if the NPA applied in this District—and if Maxwell could invoke it—the",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 In her motion, the defendant urges the Court to apply caselaw from the Third Circuit. This Court is, of course, bound by Annabi and not by the decisions of a circuit that expressly deviates from Annabi’s rule. See United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 546-50 (3rd Cir. 2002) (criticizing Annabi and holding that “that when a United States Attorney negotiates and contracts on behalf of ‘the United States’ or ‘the Government’ in a plea agreement for specific crimes, that attorney speaks for and binds all of his or her fellow United States Attorneys with respect to those same crimes and those same defendants”).",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "6",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004717",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Gonzalez",
      "Ajaj",
      "Maxwell",
      "Annabi",
      "Gebbie"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States Attorney",
      "USAO-SDNY"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Western District of New York",
      "Eastern District of New York",
      "California",
      "Third Circuit"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "05/25/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 295",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004717"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with a clear and legible text. There are no visible redactions or damage."
}