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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 33 of 66 appeals' statement that the good faith of a potential juror was \"irrelevant\" to the inquiry. Id. at 553-56. There were two concurring opinions in McDonough, joined by a total of five justices, which make clear that an intentionally false answer is not a prerequisite to obtaining a new trial. Writing for himself and Justices Stevens and O'Connor, Justice Blackmun said: I agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the defendant had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in most cases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror's response is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the Court's opinion, but I write separately to state that I understand the Court's holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regardless of whether a juror's answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring (emphasis added)). This was the entirety of Justice Blackmun's dissent. Id. For his part, Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall recognized that \"the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, 'partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it.'\" Id. at 558 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting majority opinion). \"Necessarily,\" then, Justice Brennan explained, bias \"must be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances.\" Id. \"Whether the juror answered a particular question on voir dire honestly or dishonestly, or whether an inaccurate answer was inadvertent or 26 DOJ-OGR-00009725",
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      "content": "appeals' statement that the good faith of a potential juror was \"irrelevant\" to the inquiry. Id. at 553-56. There were two concurring opinions in McDonough, joined by a total of five justices, which make clear that an intentionally false answer is not a prerequisite to obtaining a new trial. Writing for himself and Justices Stevens and O'Connor, Justice Blackmun said: I agree with the Court that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the defendant had the benefit of an impartial trier of fact. I also agree that, in most cases, the honesty or dishonesty of a juror's response is the best initial indicator of whether the juror in fact was impartial. I therefore join the Court's opinion, but I write separately to state that I understand the Court's holding not to foreclose the normal avenue of relief available to a party who is asserting that he did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. Thus, regardless of whether a juror's answer is honest or dishonest, it remains within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demonstrate actual bias or, in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that bias is to be inferred. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Id. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring (emphasis added)). This was the entirety of Justice Blackmun's dissent. Id. For his part, Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall recognized that \"the bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, 'partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it.'\" Id. at 558 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting majority opinion). \"Necessarily,\" then, Justice Brennan explained, bias \"must be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances.\" Id. \"Whether the juror answered a particular question on voir dire honestly or dishonestly, or whether an inaccurate answer was inadvertent or",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Blackmun",
      "Stevens",
      "O'Connor",
      "Brennan",
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      "Phillips"
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    "dates": [
      "03/11/22"
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      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 642",
      "455 U.S. 209",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009725"
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