{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "493",
    "date": "11/22/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 493 Filed 11/22/21 Page 4 of 6\nPage 4\nnot be satisfied as to that business. But the harms to the business would be directly and proximately caused by actions taken in furtherance of the scheme, qualifying the business as a victim. So too here.\nIt is no answer to say, as the defense has argued, that Epstein's conduct with respect to Minor Victim-3 was legal. For the purposes of setting forth the elements of the charged crime, the Court must of course draw a clear line at the age of consent.2 But the definition in the CVRA and VWPA “is certainly broad,” Battista, 575 F.3d at 231, and is broader than the elements of the offense. Thus, in assessing whether Minor Victim-3 is a “victim” under these definitions—and in assessing the admissibility of her testimony—such a clear line is neither required nor proper. Epstein and the defendant were not checking victims' identifications at the door to ensure they were above the age of consent in whichever location they were at the time. Just as Epstein's prurient interest in girls did not switch off at midnight of their 17th birthday, neither did it toggle on and off as his plane crossed into jurisdictions with different ages of consent. Rather, Epstein and the defendant were engaged in a wide-ranging conspiracy to recruit girls for sexual abuse in multiple jurisdictions with differing ages of consent. The core of the conspiracy was the agreement to engage in the criminal conduct, and it does not matter whether the elements of the substantive crimes of transportation or enticement were completed or attempted to be completed as to Minor Victim-3. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997). That is why Epstein's abuse of Minor Victim-3 is properly included in the indictment and why Epstein's abuse of Minor Victim-3's testimony is direct evidence of the conspiracy. If Minor Victim-3 was directly and proximately\n2 It bears noting that the Mann Act contemplates that children under the age of 18 are victims of the offense, though in this case that is limited by the New York object charged in the Indictment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (criminalizing the transportation of an individual “who has not attained the age of 18” for purposes of illegal sexual activity).\nDOJ-OGR-00007434",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 493 Filed 11/22/21 Page 4 of 6",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Page 4",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "not be satisfied as to that business. But the harms to the business would be directly and proximately caused by actions taken in furtherance of the scheme, qualifying the business as a victim. So too here.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It is no answer to say, as the defense has argued, that Epstein's conduct with respect to Minor Victim-3 was legal. For the purposes of setting forth the elements of the charged crime, the Court must of course draw a clear line at the age of consent.2 But the definition in the CVRA and VWPA “is certainly broad,” Battista, 575 F.3d at 231, and is broader than the elements of the offense. Thus, in assessing whether Minor Victim-3 is a “victim” under these definitions—and in assessing the admissibility of her testimony—such a clear line is neither required nor proper. Epstein and the defendant were not checking victims' identifications at the door to ensure they were above the age of consent in whichever location they were at the time. Just as Epstein's prurient interest in girls did not switch off at midnight of their 17th birthday, neither did it toggle on and off as his plane crossed into jurisdictions with different ages of consent. Rather, Epstein and the defendant were engaged in a wide-ranging conspiracy to recruit girls for sexual abuse in multiple jurisdictions with differing ages of consent. The core of the conspiracy was the agreement to engage in the criminal conduct, and it does not matter whether the elements of the substantive crimes of transportation or enticement were completed or attempted to be completed as to Minor Victim-3. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997). That is why Epstein's abuse of Minor Victim-3 is properly included in the indictment and why Epstein's abuse of Minor Victim-3's testimony is direct evidence of the conspiracy. If Minor Victim-3 was directly and proximately",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 It bears noting that the Mann Act contemplates that children under the age of 18 are victims of the offense, though in this case that is limited by the New York object charged in the Indictment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (criminalizing the transportation of an individual “who has not attained the age of 18” for purposes of illegal sexual activity).",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00007434",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Epstein",
      "Battista",
      "Salinas"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/22/21",
      "1997"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 493",
      "18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00007434",
      "522 U.S. 52",
      "575 F.3d"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case against Epstein. The text discusses the definition of a victim under the CVRA and VWPA and how it applies to Minor Victim-3. The document includes citations to legal precedents and statutes."
}