{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "7",
    "document_number": "516",
    "date": "11/21/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 516 Filed 11/21/21 Page 7 of 17\n\nspecifically is inadmissible as a vehicle for factual narrative based on only limited written records. Id. at 17.\n\nThe Court first concludes that Dr. Dietz's general opinion on the existence of a phenomenon called “the halo effect” is admissible. The testimony may be relevant to the jury's determination of Ms. Maxwell's knowledge because it could explain how, for example, Ms. Maxwell took actions that resulted in sexual abuse but without any intent or knowledge of that result. The risk of improper sympathy or the suggestion of nullification can be addressed with a limiting instruction.\n\nThe Court will, however, without a further showing by the Defense, likely preclude Dr. Dietz from applying the halo effect to Epstein. In the notice, Dr. Dietz diagnoses Epstein with “antisocial, narcissistic, borderline, and histrionic personality disorders” that “allowed him to use his brilliance to manipulate people.” Notice at 6–7. Dr. Dietz never met or examined Epstein but instead bases this opinion on documents that he reviewed, including media interviews of Epstein, evidence from the Florida investigation of Epstein, and materials produced in this litigation. Id. at 6; Def. Br., Ex. 1 at 166–68. But neither Dr. Dietz nor the Defense has offered support for the claim that this is a reliable means by which an expert in Dr. Dietz's field would diagnose an individual. Typically, federal courts admit an expert diagnosis of a personality disorder only if the expert personally interviewed the diagnosed individual. E.g., Tchatat v. City of New York, 315 F.R.D. 441, 445–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. Falcon, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Tardif v. City of New York, 344 F. Supp. 3d 579, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); O'Loughlin v. USTA Player Dev. Inc., No. 14 CV 22194 (VB), 2016 WL 5416513, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016). In Tchatat v. City of New York, for example, the court precluded an expert's diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder reached only on written\n\n7\n\nDOJ-OGR-00008179",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 516 Filed 11/21/21 Page 7 of 17",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "specifically is inadmissible as a vehicle for factual narrative based on only limited written records. Id. at 17.\n\nThe Court first concludes that Dr. Dietz's general opinion on the existence of a phenomenon called “the halo effect” is admissible. The testimony may be relevant to the jury's determination of Ms. Maxwell's knowledge because it could explain how, for example, Ms. Maxwell took actions that resulted in sexual abuse but without any intent or knowledge of that result. The risk of improper sympathy or the suggestion of nullification can be addressed with a limiting instruction.\n\nThe Court will, however, without a further showing by the Defense, likely preclude Dr. Dietz from applying the halo effect to Epstein. In the notice, Dr. Dietz diagnoses Epstein with “antisocial, narcissistic, borderline, and histrionic personality disorders” that “allowed him to use his brilliance to manipulate people.” Notice at 6–7. Dr. Dietz never met or examined Epstein but instead bases this opinion on documents that he reviewed, including media interviews of Epstein, evidence from the Florida investigation of Epstein, and materials produced in this litigation. Id. at 6; Def. Br., Ex. 1 at 166–68. But neither Dr. Dietz nor the Defense has offered support for the claim that this is a reliable means by which an expert in Dr. Dietz's field would diagnose an individual. Typically, federal courts admit an expert diagnosis of a personality disorder only if the expert personally interviewed the diagnosed individual. E.g., Tchatat v. City of New York, 315 F.R.D. 441, 445–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. Falcon, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Tardif v. City of New York, 344 F. Supp. 3d 579, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); O'Loughlin v. USTA Player Dev. Inc., No. 14 CV 22194 (VB), 2016 WL 5416513, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016). In Tchatat v. City of New York, for example, the court precluded an expert's diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder reached only on written",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "7",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008179",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Dietz",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "USTA Player Dev. Inc."
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York",
      "Florida"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/21/21",
      "Sept. 28, 2016"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 516",
      "No. 14 CV 22194 (VB)"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case against Ghislaine Maxwell, with discussions on the admissibility of expert testimony regarding Jeffrey Epstein's personality disorders."
}