{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "43",
    "document_number": "615",
    "date": "02/24/22",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 43 of 49\nto become a \"fishing expedition\" but rather must limit the scope of any inquiry \"to only what is absolutely necessary to determine the facts with precision.\" Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543-44. It is hard to imagine a request more likely to \"subject[] juries to harassment\" and \"inhibit juryroom deliberation,\" id. at 543, than the defendant's request to compel production of a juror's emails and other written communications, as well as content from his Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and other social media accounts. (Def. Mem. at 48-49). Not surprisingly, the defendant cites no precedent for this sweeping and invasive request. The Court should reject it.\nMoreover, each specific request is improper. Requests 1(b) and 1(c) call for communications between jurors and communications \"about Juror No. 50's jury service,\" and thus call for information that, if it exists, is almost certainly inadmissible under Rule 606(b). Moreover, the fact that Juror 50 made some public statements about his jury service does not give the defendant license to compel the production of any statements he may have made to anyone—such as a friend or loved one—about his jury service. This is a classic fishing expedition and should not be permitted. Request 1(a) calls for communications with victims and witnesses, but this too is a fishing expedition: Juror 50's public comment on a victim's public Twitter post after trial does not give the defense license to compel his private communications in the vague hope that, contrary to the Court's instructions, he had some improper communications before or during trial. And Request 1(d) calls for communications about any payment Juror 50 received for media interviews, but even if he received compensation for post-trial interviews that says nothing whatsoever about whether the Court would have struck him for cause before trial based on his alleged experience with sexual abuse.\nRequests 2(a) and 2(b) ask the Court to direct numerous social media companies to produce all communications to and from Juror 50 about his jury service and all posts or comments regarding\n41\nDOJ-OGR-00009162",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 43 of 49",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "to become a \"fishing expedition\" but rather must limit the scope of any inquiry \"to only what is absolutely necessary to determine the facts with precision.\" Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543-44. It is hard to imagine a request more likely to \"subject[] juries to harassment\" and \"inhibit juryroom deliberation,\" id. at 543, than the defendant's request to compel production of a juror's emails and other written communications, as well as content from his Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and other social media accounts. (Def. Mem. at 48-49). Not surprisingly, the defendant cites no precedent for this sweeping and invasive request. The Court should reject it.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Moreover, each specific request is improper. Requests 1(b) and 1(c) call for communications between jurors and communications \"about Juror No. 50's jury service,\" and thus call for information that, if it exists, is almost certainly inadmissible under Rule 606(b). Moreover, the fact that Juror 50 made some public statements about his jury service does not give the defendant license to compel the production of any statements he may have made to anyone—such as a friend or loved one—about his jury service. This is a classic fishing expedition and should not be permitted. Request 1(a) calls for communications with victims and witnesses, but this too is a fishing expedition: Juror 50's public comment on a victim's public Twitter post after trial does not give the defense license to compel his private communications in the vague hope that, contrary to the Court's instructions, he had some improper communications before or during trial. And Request 1(d) calls for communications about any payment Juror 50 received for media interviews, but even if he received compensation for post-trial interviews that says nothing whatsoever about whether the Court would have struck him for cause before trial based on his alleged experience with sexual abuse.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Requests 2(a) and 2(b) ask the Court to direct numerous social media companies to produce all communications to and from Juror 50 about his jury service and all posts or comments regarding",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "41",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009162",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Juror 50"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Facebook",
      "Twitter",
      "LinkedIn",
      "Instagram"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/24/22"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 615",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009162"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the defendant's request to compel production of a juror's communications and social media content, which the court is urged to reject as overly broad and invasive. The document is well-formatted and free of handwritten notes or stamps."
}