{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "109-1",
    "date": "09/17/2024",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page10 of 26\n\ncontemplates a broader restriction.\"11 And while Maxwell contends that we cannot apply Annabi to an agreement negotiated and executed outside of this Circuit, we have previously done just that.12 Applying Annabi, we conclude that the NPA did not bar Maxwell's prosecution by USAO-SDNY. There is nothing in the NPA that affirmatively shows that the NPA was intended to bind multiple districts. Instead, where the NPA is not silent, the agreement's scope is expressly limited to the Southern District of Florida. The NPA makes clear that if Epstein fulfilled his obligations, he would no longer face charges in that district:\n\nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any\n\n11 United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985). We recognize that circuits have been split on this issue for decades. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 2002).\n\n12 See, e.g., United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920, 921 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (applying Annabi to plea agreement entered into in the District of New Jersey); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order) (same, to agreement entered into in the District of New Mexico). Nor does Annabi, as Maxwell contends, apply only where subsequent charges are \"sufficiently distinct\" from charges covered by an earlier agreement. In Annabi, this Court rejected an interpretation of a prior plea agreement that rested on the Double Jeopardy Clause, reasoning that even if the Double Jeopardy Clause applied, the subsequent charges were \"sufficiently distinct\" and therefore fell outside the Clause's protections. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. This Court did not, however, conclude that the rule of construction it announced depended on the similarities between earlier and subsequent charges.\n\n10\nDOJ-OGR-00000011",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page10 of 26",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "contemplates a broader restriction.\"11 And while Maxwell contends that we cannot apply Annabi to an agreement negotiated and executed outside of this Circuit, we have previously done just that.12 Applying Annabi, we conclude that the NPA did not bar Maxwell's prosecution by USAO-SDNY. There is nothing in the NPA that affirmatively shows that the NPA was intended to bind multiple districts. Instead, where the NPA is not silent, the agreement's scope is expressly limited to the Southern District of Florida. The NPA makes clear that if Epstein fulfilled his obligations, he would no longer face charges in that district:\n\nAfter timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "11 United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985). We recognize that circuits have been split on this issue for decades. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 2002).\n\n12 See, e.g., United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920, 921 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (applying Annabi to plea agreement entered into in the District of New Jersey); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order) (same, to agreement entered into in the District of New Mexico). Nor does Annabi, as Maxwell contends, apply only where subsequent charges are \"sufficiently distinct\" from charges covered by an earlier agreement. In Annabi, this Court rejected an interpretation of a prior plea agreement that rested on the Double Jeopardy Clause, reasoning that even if the Double Jeopardy Clause applied, the subsequent charges were \"sufficiently distinct\" and therefore fell outside the Clause's protections. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. This Court did not, however, conclude that the rule of construction it announced depended on the similarities between earlier and subsequent charges.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "10",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000011",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Epstein",
      "Annabi",
      "Harvey",
      "Gebbie",
      "Prisco",
      "Gonzalez"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "USAO-SDNY",
      "Federal Bureau of Investigation",
      "United States Attorney's Office"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Southern District of Florida",
      "District of New Jersey",
      "District of New Mexico"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "09/17/2024"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "22-1426",
      "109-1",
      "3634097",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000011"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Maxwell, discussing the applicability of a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) to her prosecution. The text includes citations to various court cases and references to specific legal concepts, such as the Double Jeopardy Clause."
}