{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "25",
    "document_number": "499",
    "date": "11/23/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 25 of 28\n\nconsidering the whole picture, not the part that the government believes will serve to help convict Ms. Maxwell. The helpfulness of this type of testimony is well recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting, in criminal case involving the reliability of memory and its impact on the reliability of eyewitness identifications, per se rule excluding such expert testimony); Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.2d 766, 782-83 (Pa. 2014) (collecting cases and noting that 44 states now permit trial courts, in their discretion, to admit expert testimony on factors that affect memory and the reliability of eyewitness testimony, and that “all federal circuits that have considered the issue, with the possible exception of the 11th Circuit, have embraced this approach”). See also Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991) (reversing trial court decision that used improper test to exclude expert testimony “on how certain factors, such as ... post-event information, can affect memory and perception”); United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1124 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that, if warranted in a particular case, expert testimony may be admissible on “[such] psychological phenomena as the feedback factor” in which “witnesses who discuss a case with each other may unconsciously reinforce mistaken identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 336-38 (3d. Cir. 2001) (holding that district court abused discretion in excluding expert testimony on factors affecting memory, such as witnesses’ exposure to “post-event information” that may have distorted witnesses’ recollection of prior events); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 312 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (describing “assimilation factor, which concerns a witness’s incorporation of information gained subsequent to an event into his or her memory of that event”); United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp.2d 1207, 1216-17 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (ruling that expert testimony was admissible to show how “post event information” can influence memory, noting that “[r]esearch regarding post-event information shows that access to facts after an\n\n21\n\nDOJ-OGR-00007490",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 25 of 28",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "considering the whole picture, not the part that the government believes will serve to help convict Ms. Maxwell. The helpfulness of this type of testimony is well recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting, in criminal case involving the reliability of memory and its impact on the reliability of eyewitness identifications, per se rule excluding such expert testimony); Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.2d 766, 782-83 (Pa. 2014) (collecting cases and noting that 44 states now permit trial courts, in their discretion, to admit expert testimony on factors that affect memory and the reliability of eyewitness testimony, and that “all federal circuits that have considered the issue, with the possible exception of the 11th Circuit, have embraced this approach”). See also Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1991) (reversing trial court decision that used improper test to exclude expert testimony “on how certain factors, such as ... post-event information, can affect memory and perception”); United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1124 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that, if warranted in a particular case, expert testimony may be admissible on “[such] psychological phenomena as the feedback factor” in which “witnesses who discuss a case with each other may unconsciously reinforce mistaken identifications”); United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 336-38 (3d. Cir. 2001) (holding that district court abused discretion in excluding expert testimony on factors affecting memory, such as witnesses’ exposure to “post-event information” that may have distorted witnesses’ recollection of prior events); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 312 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (describing “assimilation factor, which concerns a witness’s incorporation of information gained subsequent to an event into his or her memory of that event”); United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp.2d 1207, 1216-17 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (ruling that expert testimony was admissible to show how “post event information” can influence memory, noting that “[r]esearch regarding post-event information shows that access to facts after an",
      "position": "main content"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "21",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00007490",
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    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "Pa",
      "Colo",
      "Ala"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/23/21",
      "1998",
      "2014",
      "1991",
      "2006",
      "2001",
      "2000",
      "2009"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "499",
      "DOJ-OGR-00007490"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case United States v. Maxwell. The text discusses the admissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications and memory reliability. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}