{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "7",
    "document_number": "616",
    "date": "02/24/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 616 Filed 02/24/22 Page 7 of 32\n\nresponse would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause”). That’s because, as the Supreme Court held in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, “the seating of any juror who should have been dismissed for cause . . . require[s] reversal.” 528 U.S. at 316. Thus, irrespective of whether Juror No. 50 deliberately provided false answers to Questions No. 25 and 48 (though the record shows he did), his presence on the jury requires reversal if he was impliedly, inferably, or actually biased.\n\nSecond, the government misunderstands this Court’s role during any evidentiary hearing. Ours is an adversarial system, not an inquisitorial system. Ms. Maxwell has a right to present her arguments to the Court, to call material witnesses in support of those arguments, and to confront and cross-examine those witnesses. The government’s request for a narrow and limited hearing in which only Juror No. 50 would testify and only the Court would ask questions flies in the face of this adversarial process. A hearing conducted on the government’s terms would violate Ms. Maxwell’s constitutional right to assistance of counsel, hamstring the search for the truth, and contravene the tradition and precedent of this judicial district. See, e.g., Exhibit 3, United States v. Daugerdas, Case No. 09 Cr. 581 (Hon. William H. Pauly III) (Trans. of Motion for New Trial). As the government itself argued in Daugerdas, a juror who “conceal[ed] personal background material so analogous to the case on trial” had “bias [] implied as a matter of law” and the affected defendant therefore would be entitled to a new trial. Doc. 487, p 21, United States v. Daugerdas, No. 1:09-cr-00581-DLC, Sept. 9, 2011. This is just such a case.\n\nThe government’s response to Ms. Maxwell’s motion for a new trial elides the stakes involved and the significance of the constitutional right at issue. Ms. Maxwell was on trial for her life. That trial required 12 fair and impartial jurors. While paying lip service to the requirement of a fair trial, the government incants the words “finality” and “disfavor” as a basis\n\n2\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009197",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 616 Filed 02/24/22 Page 7 of 32",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause”). That’s because, as the Supreme Court held in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, “the seating of any juror who should have been dismissed for cause . . . require[s] reversal.” 528 U.S. at 316. Thus, irrespective of whether Juror No. 50 deliberately provided false answers to Questions No. 25 and 48 (though the record shows he did), his presence on the jury requires reversal if he was impliedly, inferably, or actually biased.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, the government misunderstands this Court’s role during any evidentiary hearing. Ours is an adversarial system, not an inquisitorial system. Ms. Maxwell has a right to present her arguments to the Court, to call material witnesses in support of those arguments, and to confront and cross-examine those witnesses. The government’s request for a narrow and limited hearing in which only Juror No. 50 would testify and only the Court would ask questions flies in the face of this adversarial process. A hearing conducted on the government’s terms would violate Ms. Maxwell’s constitutional right to assistance of counsel, hamstring the search for the truth, and contravene the tradition and precedent of this judicial district. See, e.g., Exhibit 3, United States v. Daugerdas, Case No. 09 Cr. 581 (Hon. William H. Pauly III) (Trans. of Motion for New Trial). As the government itself argued in Daugerdas, a juror who “conceal[ed] personal background material so analogous to the case on trial” had “bias [] implied as a matter of law” and the affected defendant therefore would be entitled to a new trial. Doc. 487, p 21, United States v. Daugerdas, No. 1:09-cr-00581-DLC, Sept. 9, 2011. This is just such a case.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government’s response to Ms. Maxwell’s motion for a new trial elides the stakes involved and the significance of the constitutional right at issue. Ms. Maxwell was on trial for her life. That trial required 12 fair and impartial jurors. While paying lip service to the requirement of a fair trial, the government incants the words “finality” and “disfavor” as a basis",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009197",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Martinez-Salazar",
      "Daugerdas",
      "William H. Pauly III"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/24/22",
      "Sept. 9, 2011"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 616",
      "Case No. 09 Cr. 581",
      "No. 1:09-cr-00581-DLC",
      "Doc. 487"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell. The text discusses the government's response to a motion for a new trial and the importance of a fair and impartial jury. The document includes references to other court cases and legal precedents."
}