{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "32",
    "document_number": "670",
    "date": "06/22/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 670 Filed 06/22/22 Page 32 of 55\n\nbehavior was voluntary, the defendant argues that Carolyn did not do \"whatever [Epstein and Maxwell] asked of her\"—noting that Carolyn did not travel with them to Little Saint James. (Def. Mem. 21). But that shows only that their undue influence was not all-consuming, not that they lacked influence whatsoever. The standard is \"'undue influence,' not coercion.\" United States v. Montijo-Maysonet, 874 F.3d 34, 52 (1st Cir. 2020).\n\nThe defendant also argues that application of this enhancement would constitute double-counting because the base offense level for Counts Three, Four, and Six covers her conduct enticing and coercing minors. (Def. Mem. 20). This argument lacks merit. As the defendant correctly notes, \"[i]mpermissible double counting occurs when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase the defendant's sentence to reflect the kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by another part of the Guidelines.\" Watkins, 667 F.3d at 261. But \"when the challenged part of the Guidelines aim[s] at different harms emanating from the same conduct, there is no impermissible double counting,\" and \"[e]nhancements are not duplicative when they reflect different facets of the defendant's conduct.\" Id. at 261-62 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nThe relevant inquiry therefore is whether the base offense level is aimed at the same harm as the enhancement. Here, it is not: the base offense level (which refers to § 2G1.3) captures the category of sex offenses against minors, and § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) applies to the use of undue influence. See United States v. Kohlmeier, 858 F. App'x 444, 446-47 (2d Cir. 2021) (describing the focus of § 2B1.3(b)(2)(B)); United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F. 3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2020) (\"By its plain terms, § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) focuses on a different aggravating factor (undue influence) than § 2G1.3 (minor victims) . . . As such, subsection (b)(2)(B) does not 'consider' the same factor as these other Guideline provisions.\").\n\n30\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010567",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 670 Filed 06/22/22 Page 32 of 55",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "behavior was voluntary, the defendant argues that Carolyn did not do \"whatever [Epstein and Maxwell] asked of her\"—noting that Carolyn did not travel with them to Little Saint James. (Def. Mem. 21). But that shows only that their undue influence was not all-consuming, not that they lacked influence whatsoever. The standard is \"'undue influence,' not coercion.\" United States v. Montijo-Maysonet, 874 F.3d 34, 52 (1st Cir. 2020).\n\nThe defendant also argues that application of this enhancement would constitute double-counting because the base offense level for Counts Three, Four, and Six covers her conduct enticing and coercing minors. (Def. Mem. 20). This argument lacks merit. As the defendant correctly notes, \"[i]mpermissible double counting occurs when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase the defendant's sentence to reflect the kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by another part of the Guidelines.\" Watkins, 667 F.3d at 261. But \"when the challenged part of the Guidelines aim[s] at different harms emanating from the same conduct, there is no impermissible double counting,\" and \"[e]nhancements are not duplicative when they reflect different facets of the defendant's conduct.\" Id. at 261-62 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nThe relevant inquiry therefore is whether the base offense level is aimed at the same harm as the enhancement. Here, it is not: the base offense level (which refers to § 2G1.3) captures the category of sex offenses against minors, and § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) applies to the use of undue influence. See United States v. Kohlmeier, 858 F. App'x 444, 446-47 (2d Cir. 2021) (describing the focus of § 2B1.3(b)(2)(B)); United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F. 3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2020) (\"By its plain terms, § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) focuses on a different aggravating factor (undue influence) than § 2G1.3 (minor victims) . . . As such, subsection (b)(2)(B) does not 'consider' the same factor as these other Guideline provisions.\").",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "30",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010567",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Carolyn",
      "Epstein",
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Little Saint James"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "06/22/22"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 670",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010567"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving sex offenses against minors. The text discusses the application of sentencing guidelines and the concept of undue influence."
}