{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "32",
    "document_number": "382",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 382 Filed 10/29/21 Page 32 of 69\n\nchoosing to be admitted, in any quantity or as to any topic. That's not the law. Because a number of foundational prerequisites must be satisfied prior to determining that any given \"prior statement\" is admissible, the government's request for a pre-trial ruling on prior consistent statements calls for an inappropriate advisory opinion. Not one of the cases cited by the government in its Motion concerned a pretrial ruling as to the admissibility of a prior consistent statement, and with good reason. If the government had wanted the Court to rule pretrial on the admissibility of prior consistent statements, it could have told the Court exactly which statements they will seek to admit, the circumstances of those prior statements, whether they are in fact consistent with specific anticipated trial testimony, and whether the other foundational prerequisites, including Rule 403, will be satisfied and how. Having failed to provide the Court with these particulars, the government's motion in limine should be denied.\n\nA. The 2014 Amendments Did Not Change the Grounds for Which Prior Consistent Statements May Be Admitted\n\nFirst, the 2014 Amendments were not nearly as ground-breaking as the Motion suggests.\n\nThe Amendments did not, contrary to the government's implication, change the grounds for admissibility of prior consistent statements. See Mot. at 17-18. According to the Advisory Committee Notes:\n\n\"The [2014] amendment does not change the traditional and well-accepted limits on bringing prior consistent statements before the factfinder for credibility purposes. It does not allow impermissible bolstering of a witness.... The amendment does not make any consistent statement admissible that was not admissible previously — the only difference is that prior consistent statements otherwise admissible for rehabilitation are now admissible substantively as well.\"\n\nAs the government correctly notes, prior to 2014 the Second Circuit, like many other circuits, admitted prior consistent statements \"outside of the context of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in order to rehabilitate a witness after certain attacks on credibility.\" Mot. at 18 (citing United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986)). The effect of the 2014 Amendment then, as\n\n24\n\nDOJ-OGR-00005487",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "header",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 382 Filed 10/29/21 Page 32 of 69",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "choosing to be admitted, in any quantity or as to any topic. That's not the law. Because a number of foundational prerequisites must be satisfied prior to determining that any given \"prior statement\" is admissible, the government's request for a pre-trial ruling on prior consistent statements calls for an inappropriate advisory opinion. Not one of the cases cited by the government in its Motion concerned a pretrial ruling as to the admissibility of a prior consistent statement, and with good reason. If the government had wanted the Court to rule pretrial on the admissibility of prior consistent statements, it could have told the Court exactly which statements they will seek to admit, the circumstances of those prior statements, whether they are in fact consistent with specific anticipated trial testimony, and whether the other foundational prerequisites, including Rule 403, will be satisfied and how. Having failed to provide the Court with these particulars, the government's motion in limine should be denied.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A. The 2014 Amendments Did Not Change the Grounds for Which Prior Consistent Statements May Be Admitted",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "First, the 2014 Amendments were not nearly as ground-breaking as the Motion suggests.\n\nThe Amendments did not, contrary to the government's implication, change the grounds for admissibility of prior consistent statements. See Mot. at 17-18. According to the Advisory Committee Notes:\n\n\"The [2014] amendment does not change the traditional and well-accepted limits on bringing prior consistent statements before the factfinder for credibility purposes. It does not allow impermissible bolstering of a witness.... The amendment does not make any consistent statement admissible that was not admissible previously — the only difference is that prior consistent statements otherwise admissible for rehabilitation are now admissible substantively as well.\"\n\nAs the government correctly notes, prior to 2014 the Second Circuit, like many other circuits, admitted prior consistent statements \"outside of the context of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in order to rehabilitate a witness after certain attacks on credibility.\" Mot. at 18 (citing United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1986)). The effect of the 2014 Amendment then, as",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "24",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005487",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21",
      "2014"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "382",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005487"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the admissibility of prior consistent statements. The text is well-formatted and mostly clear, with some legal jargon and citations to case law."
}