{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "40",
    "document_number": "438",
    "date": "11/12/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 438 Filed 11/12/21 Page 40 of 54\nthe evidence in support of such a defense would be legally insufficient.\" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1990) (\"This procedure enabled [the Court], upon finding that the defense failed as a matter of law, to preclude the evidence and thereby avoid unnecessary jury confusion.\"). If there is a question of whether a defense is sufficient as a matter of law, the Court may conduct a hearing. See Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d at 1057. But if the Court finds a defense insufficient as a matter of law, the Court is under no duty to allow the defendant to present the evidence, or advance the defense, to the jury. See Miles, 748 F.3d at 489; United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 871 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416-17 (1980)).\nConsent is not a valid defense to any of the counts in the Indictment. It is not a valid defense to sex trafficking of minors. See United States v. Corley, 679 F. App'x 1, 4 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (\"Further, the victims could not consent because they were minors.\"); United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (\"Because the victims were minors and could not legally consent, the government did not need to prove the elements of fraud, force, or coercion, which are required for adult victims.\"); United States v. Kidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). It is not a defense to the Mann Act counts. See United State v. Holland, 381 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) \"makes no distinction between victims and coconspirators for purposes of imposing liability on the person who transports another; the defendant need only have transported an 'individual' . . . to be guilty under the Act.\"); United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (\"[C]onsent is not a defense to a prosecution under section 2423(a).”); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565 (7th\n39\nDOJ-OGR-00006400",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 438 Filed 11/12/21 Page 40 of 54",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the evidence in support of such a defense would be legally insufficient.\" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1990) (\"This procedure enabled [the Court], upon finding that the defense failed as a matter of law, to preclude the evidence and thereby avoid unnecessary jury confusion.\"). If there is a question of whether a defense is sufficient as a matter of law, the Court may conduct a hearing. See Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d at 1057. But if the Court finds a defense insufficient as a matter of law, the Court is under no duty to allow the defendant to present the evidence, or advance the defense, to the jury. See Miles, 748 F.3d at 489; United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 871 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416-17 (1980)).\nConsent is not a valid defense to any of the counts in the Indictment. It is not a valid defense to sex trafficking of minors. See United States v. Corley, 679 F. App'x 1, 4 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (\"Further, the victims could not consent because they were minors.\"); United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (\"Because the victims were minors and could not legally consent, the government did not need to prove the elements of fraud, force, or coercion, which are required for adult victims.\"); United States v. Kidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). It is not a defense to the Mann Act counts. See United State v. Holland, 381 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) \"makes no distinction between victims and coconspirators for purposes of imposing liability on the person who transports another; the defendant need only have transported an 'individual' . . . to be guilty under the Act.\"); United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (\"[C]onsent is not a defense to a prosecution under section 2423(a).”); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565 (7th",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "39",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006400",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "United States",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/12/21",
      "1990",
      "1980",
      "2017",
      "2009",
      "2019",
      "2004",
      "2008"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 438",
      "913 F.2d 1053",
      "748 F.3d 489",
      "110 F.3d 869",
      "444 U.S. 394",
      "679 F. App'x 1",
      "561 F.3d 771",
      "385 F. Supp. 3d 250",
      "381 F.3d 80",
      "18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)",
      "529 F.3d 1",
      "808 F.2d 561"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, specifically discussing the validity of certain defenses in the context of sex trafficking and Mann Act counts. The text is dense with legal citations and references to various court cases."
}