{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10 of 51",
    "document_number": "621",
    "date": "02/25/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 621 Filed 02/25/22 Page 10 of 51\n\nThe Court's Mann Act jury instructions also permitted the jury to determine only whether the defendant had intended that Jane (for the substantive counts) or the conspiracy victims were intended to engage in sexual activity in New York. During trial, the Court granted defense requests for limiting instructions at the time evidence came in to avoid the precise concern the defendant now articulates. (Tr. 1167-68 (Kate); 2048-49 (Annie)). See Gross, 2017 WL 4685111, at *27 (explaining that the Court identified no case \"in which the Second Circuit has ever found a constructive amendment when a district court issued limiting instructions properly defining the scope of the alleged crime\"). And at the conclusion of trial, the Court explained that Count Two alleged that the defendant \"enticed Jane to travel across state lines with the intent that she would engage in sexual activity for which a person could be charged with a crime under the penal law of New York State.\" (Tr. 3034; see Tr. 3031 (describing the third element of Count Two to require proof of an intent to violate \"New York law as alleged in the indictment\")). Similarly, the Court explained that Count Four alleged that the defendant knowingly transported Jane \"with the intent that Jane engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense in violation of New York law.\" (Tr. 3037; see Tr. 3035 (describing the second element of Count Four to require proof of an intent to violate \"New York law as alleged in the indictment\")). For both Counts, the Court specifically instructed the jury on one and only one predicate state offense: a violation of New York Penal Law Section 130.55. (Tr. 3034, 3037). The instructions on Counts One and Three incorporated this discussion of the elements of Counts Two and Four, and the only statute the Court identified in its discussion of the relevant overt acts was New York Penal Law Section 130.55. (Tr. 3049-50, 3056-57).\n\n9\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009572",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 621 Filed 02/25/22 Page 10 of 51",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court's Mann Act jury instructions also permitted the jury to determine only whether the defendant had intended that Jane (for the substantive counts) or the conspiracy victims were intended to engage in sexual activity in New York. During trial, the Court granted defense requests for limiting instructions at the time evidence came in to avoid the precise concern the defendant now articulates. (Tr. 1167-68 (Kate); 2048-49 (Annie)). See Gross, 2017 WL 4685111, at *27 (explaining that the Court identified no case \"in which the Second Circuit has ever found a constructive amendment when a district court issued limiting instructions properly defining the scope of the alleged crime\"). And at the conclusion of trial, the Court explained that Count Two alleged that the defendant \"enticed Jane to travel across state lines with the intent that she would engage in sexual activity for which a person could be charged with a crime under the penal law of New York State.\" (Tr. 3034; see Tr. 3031 (describing the third element of Count Two to require proof of an intent to violate \"New York law as alleged in the indictment\")). Similarly, the Court explained that Count Four alleged that the defendant knowingly transported Jane \"with the intent that Jane engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense in violation of New York law.\" (Tr. 3037; see Tr. 3035 (describing the second element of Count Four to require proof of an intent to violate \"New York law as alleged in the indictment\")). For both Counts, the Court specifically instructed the jury on one and only one predicate state offense: a violation of New York Penal Law Section 130.55. (Tr. 3034, 3037). The instructions on Counts One and Three incorporated this discussion of the elements of Counts Two and Four, and the only statute the Court identified in its discussion of the relevant overt acts was New York Penal Law Section 130.55. (Tr. 3049-50, 3056-57).",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "9",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009572",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Jane",
      "Kate",
      "Annie"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/25/22"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 621",
      "2017 WL 4685111",
      "Tr. 1167-68",
      "Tr. 2048-49",
      "Tr. 3034",
      "Tr. 3031",
      "Tr. 3037",
      "Tr. 3035",
      "Tr. 3049-50",
      "Tr. 3056-57",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009572"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 10 of 51."
}