{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "8",
    "document_number": "295",
    "date": "05/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 8 of 26\nthis phrase is entirely misplaced. That phrase appears in a specific portion of the Second Circuit's opinion, in which the panel rejected the defendants' attempt to distinguish Abbamonte and Alessi by saying that they were only seeking the same protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, while Abbamonte and Alessi involved protections greater than the Double Jeopardy Clause. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. In rejecting that argument, the Court explained:\nThe argument fails for two reasons. First, since appellants were never in jeopardy on the charges dismissed in the Eastern District, the protection they now seek under the plea agreement is necessarily broader than that accorded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, to the extent that the appellants rely on a claim that the Clause, if applicable, would protect them from prosecution on charges identical to those dismissed, the short answer is that the pending charges, covering conduct extending more than two years beyond the date of the period covered by the dismissed charges, are not the same as the charges that were dismissed. Even if, as appellants contend, the Southern District charges result from the same conspiratorial agreement that underlay the charges dismissed in the Eastern District, the allegation that the conspiracy extended for an additional two years suffices to show that the new charges are not identical to the dismissed charges.\nId. As the foregoing makes clear, the Second Circuit did not in any way qualify the plain-statement rule set forth in its opinion. Rather, the Second Circuit addressed the defendant's efforts to distinguish precedent based on the Double Jeopardy Clause and explained why the Clause did not preclude a prosecution in that case. In other words, this language in Annabi was cabined to an analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause. As discussed in greater detail below, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a prosecution in this case because Maxwell has not previously been prosecuted for the offenses in the S2 Indictment.\nIgnoring the Double Jeopardy language in Annabi, the defendant argues that the phrase \"identical to the dismissed charges\" somehow creates a different rule of interpretation for plea agreements, under which the Court must first analyze the similarity between the NPA and the S2 agreements,\n4\nDOJ-OGR-00004715",
  "text_blocks": [
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 8 of 26",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "this phrase is entirely misplaced. That phrase appears in a specific portion of the Second Circuit's opinion, in which the panel rejected the defendants' attempt to distinguish Abbamonte and Alessi by saying that they were only seeking the same protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, while Abbamonte and Alessi involved protections greater than the Double Jeopardy Clause. Annabi, 771 F.2d at 672. In rejecting that argument, the Court explained:",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The argument fails for two reasons. First, since appellants were never in jeopardy on the charges dismissed in the Eastern District, the protection they now seek under the plea agreement is necessarily broader than that accorded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, to the extent that the appellants rely on a claim that the Clause, if applicable, would protect them from prosecution on charges identical to those dismissed, the short answer is that the pending charges, covering conduct extending more than two years beyond the date of the period covered by the dismissed charges, are not the same as the charges that were dismissed. Even if, as appellants contend, the Southern District charges result from the same conspiratorial agreement that underlay the charges dismissed in the Eastern District, the allegation that the conspiracy extended for an additional two years suffices to show that the new charges are not identical to the dismissed charges.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Id. As the foregoing makes clear, the Second Circuit did not in any way qualify the plain-statement rule set forth in its opinion. Rather, the Second Circuit addressed the defendant's efforts to distinguish precedent based on the Double Jeopardy Clause and explained why the Clause did not preclude a prosecution in that case. In other words, this language in Annabi was cabined to an analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause. As discussed in greater detail below, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a prosecution in this case because Maxwell has not previously been prosecuted for the offenses in the S2 Indictment.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Ignoring the Double Jeopardy language in Annabi, the defendant argues that the phrase \"identical to the dismissed charges\" somehow creates a different rule of interpretation for plea agreements, under which the Court must first analyze the similarity between the NPA and the S2 agreements,",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004715",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Abbamonte",
      "Alessi",
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Court",
      "Eastern District",
      "Southern District"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "05/25/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 295",
      "771 F.2d at 672",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004715"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 8 of 26."
}