{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "172",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 172 of 239\nin each indictment—to his personal profit); United States v. Brown, No. 07-0296, 2008 WL 161146, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2008) (severing an “isolated” firearms possession charge on a certain day from other narcotics and firearms charges); United States v. Martinez, No. 92 Cr. 839 (SWK), 1993 WL 322768, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) (similar).\nThe defendant also contends that her false statements were not connected to the substantive offenses because they were made in a civil deposition, rather than “to the grand jury or the FBI to derail its investigation.” (Def. Mot. 5 at 8). As an initial matter, and as evidenced by the defendant’s own motions to suppress the fruits of the grand jury subpoena issued to Boies Schiller, the defendant herself professes to have been concerned about the prospect of a criminal investigation at the time of her depositions, which strongly suggests that, on these facts, the distinction is of little moment. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 3 at 3-4 (explaining that the defendant “flatly rejected” a law enforcement exception to the civil protective order); Def. Mot. 11 at 2 (arguing that the defendant “declined to invoke” her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the deposition after negotiating the protective order)). More important, and whatever moment that distinction may have in other contexts, it has little bearing on the severance analysis which turns instead on whether the substance of the false statement relates to the substantive offense, and is thereby provable through overlapping evidence and part of the speaker’s effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements “concern the substantive offenses” and citing cases where the perjury count’s proof overlapped with the evidence on the substantive counts). With respect to that analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement is made is significant, much less determinative. Cf. Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement\n145\nDOJ-OGR-00003106",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 172 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "in each indictment—to his personal profit); United States v. Brown, No. 07-0296, 2008 WL 161146, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2008) (severing an “isolated” firearms possession charge on a certain day from other narcotics and firearms charges); United States v. Martinez, No. 92 Cr. 839 (SWK), 1993 WL 322768, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) (similar).\nThe defendant also contends that her false statements were not connected to the substantive offenses because they were made in a civil deposition, rather than “to the grand jury or the FBI to derail its investigation.” (Def. Mot. 5 at 8). As an initial matter, and as evidenced by the defendant’s own motions to suppress the fruits of the grand jury subpoena issued to Boies Schiller, the defendant herself professes to have been concerned about the prospect of a criminal investigation at the time of her depositions, which strongly suggests that, on these facts, the distinction is of little moment. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 3 at 3-4 (explaining that the defendant “flatly rejected” a law enforcement exception to the civil protective order); Def. Mot. 11 at 2 (arguing that the defendant “declined to invoke” her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at the deposition after negotiating the protective order)). More important, and whatever moment that distinction may have in other contexts, it has little bearing on the severance analysis which turns instead on whether the substance of the false statement relates to the substantive offense, and is thereby provable through overlapping evidence and part of the speaker’s effort to conceal the offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance motion where the false statements “concern the substantive offenses” and citing cases where the perjury count’s proof overlapped with the evidence on the substantive counts). With respect to that analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement is made is significant, much less determinative. Cf. Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "145",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003106",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Boies Schiller",
      "FBI"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "E.D. Pa.",
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "Jan. 16, 2008",
      "Aug. 19, 1993",
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "No. 07-0296",
      "No. 92 Cr. 839",
      "2008 WL 161146",
      "1993 WL 322768",
      "894 F.2d 505",
      "739 F.2d 791",
      "464 F.2d 424",
      "441 F.2d 118-19",
      "797 F. Supp. 1190",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003106"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible in the provided image."
}