{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "27",
    "document_number": "615",
    "date": "02/24/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 27 of 49\n\nKeeping with that \"narrow\" view of implied bias, the Second Circuit has \"consistently refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 46 (quotations and citations omitted). For example, the Second Circuit has declined to follow a Ninth Circuit precedent stating that it was error not to excuse two bank tellers as jurors in a bank robbery case. United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1981) (declining to follow United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970) (similar). And it has held that a juror's prior service at a trial involving similar but unrelated offenses which involved the testimony of a common witness does not give rise to implied bias. See United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App'x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that a juror had implied bias because he owned a printing business that did business with defense counsel).\n\nHere, there is no suggestion that Juror 50 is related to a party in this case, or that he is a victim of or has any personal knowledge of the defendant's crimes. Accordingly, the circumstances of this case do not fall within the narrow categories of implied bias that the Second Circuit has recognized. This is not one of the rare, extreme circumstances where a mandatory presumption of bias may be applied. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45; Greer, 285 F.3d at 172.\n\nThe defendant principally argues that implied bias should be found based on alleged similarities between the personal experiences of Juror 50 and the issues being litigated. (Def. Mem. at 30-35). But the Second Circuit has not recognized this as a proper basis to make a finding of mandatory, presumed bias. Indeed, it has specifically rejected such a notion:\n\nJust as we have refused to carve out an overly broad category of presumed bias based on occupational or status relationships, so we\n\n25\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009146",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 615 Filed 02/24/22 Page 27 of 49",
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      "content": "Keeping with that \"narrow\" view of implied bias, the Second Circuit has \"consistently refused to create a set of unreasonably constricting presumptions that jurors be excused for cause due to certain occupational or other special relationships which might bear directly or indirectly on the circumstances of a given case, where . . . there is no showing of actual bias or prejudice.\" Torres, 128 F.3d at 46 (quotations and citations omitted). For example, the Second Circuit has declined to follow a Ninth Circuit precedent stating that it was error not to excuse two bank tellers as jurors in a bank robbery case. United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1981) (declining to follow United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1970) (similar). And it has held that a juror's prior service at a trial involving similar but unrelated offenses which involved the testimony of a common witness does not give rise to implied bias. See United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Curry v. Lynch, 323 F. App'x 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that a juror had implied bias because he owned a printing business that did business with defense counsel).",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Here, there is no suggestion that Juror 50 is related to a party in this case, or that he is a victim of or has any personal knowledge of the defendant's crimes. Accordingly, the circumstances of this case do not fall within the narrow categories of implied bias that the Second Circuit has recognized. This is not one of the rare, extreme circumstances where a mandatory presumption of bias may be applied. See, e.g., Torres, 128 F.3d at 45; Greer, 285 F.3d at 172.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant principally argues that implied bias should be found based on alleged similarities between the personal experiences of Juror 50 and the issues being litigated. (Def. Mem. at 30-35). But the Second Circuit has not recognized this as a proper basis to make a finding of mandatory, presumed bias. Indeed, it has specifically rejected such a notion:",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Just as we have refused to carve out an overly broad category of presumed bias based on occupational or status relationships, so we",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009146",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Ninth Circuit",
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    "dates": [
      "02/24/22",
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 615",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009146"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the concept of implied bias in the context of juror selection. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}