{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "675",
    "date": "06/25/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 4 of 21\n\nCVRA, Congress used \"an intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve to have their rights protected.\" 150 Cong. Rec. S4270 (Apr. 22, 2004) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Kyl, agreed to by Sen. Feinstein). Congress understood that it was extending rights to \"literally millions of people\"—victims who were being denied rights in the federal criminal justice system. 150 Cong. Rec. S42604 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). \"The wisdom of Congress' action...is not within our province to second guess.\" Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). Under the CVRA's plain language, \"a party may qualify as a victim, even though [she] may not have been the target of the crime, as long as [she] suffers harm as a result of the crime's commission.\" In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2011) (\"Fisher I\"). Thus, the CVRA \"instructs the district court to look at the offense itself only to determine the harmful effects the offense has on parties.\" In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). Because of this requirement to identify an offense's \"harmful effects,\" numerous CVRA cases look beyond the narrow \"record\" of the charges themselves. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 649 F.3d 401, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases) (\"Fisher II\"). One instructive case comes from the D.C. Circuit which reversed a district court decision denying victim status in a drug trafficking case. The Circuit explained that in determining whether a decedent's family had CVRA victim status, the district court erred by \"limit[ing] its evaluation to the indictment and the statement of facts submitted by [the defendant] as part of his negotiated plea agreement.\" In re de Henriquez, No. 15-3054, 2015 WL 10692637, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Circuit noted that \"[u]nder the CVRA, victims may participate in proceedings even when there has been no formal charge.\" Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (victims have the right to timely notice of\n\n4\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010695",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 4 of 21",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "CVRA, Congress used \"an intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve to have their rights protected.\" 150 Cong. Rec. S4270 (Apr. 22, 2004) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Kyl, agreed to by Sen. Feinstein). Congress understood that it was extending rights to \"literally millions of people\"—victims who were being denied rights in the federal criminal justice system. 150 Cong. Rec. S42604 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). \"The wisdom of Congress' action...is not within our province to second guess.\" Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). Under the CVRA's plain language, \"a party may qualify as a victim, even though [she] may not have been the target of the crime, as long as [she] suffers harm as a result of the crime's commission.\" In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2011) (\"Fisher I\"). Thus, the CVRA \"instructs the district court to look at the offense itself only to determine the harmful effects the offense has on parties.\" In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). Because of this requirement to identify an offense's \"harmful effects,\" numerous CVRA cases look beyond the narrow \"record\" of the charges themselves. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 649 F.3d 401, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases) (\"Fisher II\"). One instructive case comes from the D.C. Circuit which reversed a district court decision denying victim status in a drug trafficking case. The Circuit explained that in determining whether a decedent's family had CVRA victim status, the district court erred by \"limit[ing] its evaluation to the indictment and the statement of facts submitted by [the defendant] as part of his negotiated plea agreement.\" In re de Henriquez, No. 15-3054, 2015 WL 10692637, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Circuit noted that \"[u]nder the CVRA, victims may participate in proceedings even when there has been no formal charge.\" Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9) (victims have the right to timely notice of",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010695",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Sen. Kyl",
      "Sen. Feinstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Congress",
      "D.C. Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "Apr. 22, 2004",
      "06/25/22"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 675",
      "150 Cong. Rec. S4270",
      "150 Cong. Rec. S42604",
      "537 U.S. 186",
      "640 F.3d 645",
      "754 F.3d 1234",
      "649 F.3d 401",
      "No. 15-3054",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9)"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the CVRA (Crime Victims' Rights Act). The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 4 of 21."
}