{
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    "page_number": "16",
    "document_number": "657",
    "date": "04/29/22",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 16 of 45\noverturn any of the factual findings made by the jury” —it means only that, “as a matter of law, the jury found the same thing twice.” Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 125. Or, in this case, three times.\n\nII. The Court denies the Defendant’s Rule 29 motion.\n\nThe Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support any of her five counts of conviction, and, therefore, the Court should enter a judgment of acquittal as to all counts under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 29 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a); United States v. Pugh, 945 F.3d 9, 19 (2d Cir. 2019). “[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be . . . to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). “The court must make that determination with the evidence against a particular defendant, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and with all reasonable inferences resolved in favor of the government.” Pugh, 945 F.3d at 19 (cleaned up) (quoting Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 45). Under this inquiry, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th 536, 560 (2d Cir. 2022).\n\nAt the close of the Government’s case, the Defendant made her Rule 29 application “with respect to every count in the S2 indictment,” but “confine[d] [her] comments to address specifically Counts One and Two.” Trial Tr. at 2266. The Court denied the motion. Id. at 2274.\n\n16\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010382",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 16 of 45",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "overturn any of the factual findings made by the jury” —it means only that, “as a matter of law, the jury found the same thing twice.” Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 125. Or, in this case, three times.\n\nII. The Court denies the Defendant’s Rule 29 motion.\n\nThe Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support any of her five counts of conviction, and, therefore, the Court should enter a judgment of acquittal as to all counts under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 29 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]fter the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a); United States v. Pugh, 945 F.3d 9, 19 (2d Cir. 2019). “[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be . . . to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). “The court must make that determination with the evidence against a particular defendant, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and with all reasonable inferences resolved in favor of the government.” Pugh, 945 F.3d at 19 (cleaned up) (quoting Eppolito, 543 F.3d at 45). Under this inquiry, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972)); United States v. Zhong, 26 F.4th 536, 560 (2d Cir. 2022).\n\nAt the close of the Government’s case, the Defendant made her Rule 29 application “with respect to every count in the S2 indictment,” but “confine[d] [her] comments to address specifically Counts One and Two.” Trial Tr. at 2266. The Court denied the motion. Id. at 2274.",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010382",
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    "organizations": [
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    "dates": [
      "04/29/22",
      "1979",
      "1972",
      "2022",
      "2019"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "657",
      "372 F.3d",
      "945 F.3d 9",
      "443 U.S. 307",
      "543 F.3d",
      "406 U.S. 356",
      "26 F.4th 536",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010382"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}