{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "9",
    "document_number": "138",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 138 Filed 02/04/21 Page 9 of 26\ncharges alleged in Counts One through Four, 18 U.S.C. § 3283, which as amended in 2006, authorizes the prosecution of certain specific crimes during \"the life of the child, or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.\" As a practical matter, this is tantamount to no statute of limitation and allows for substantial abuse by the government, particularly in a case with no forensic or other evidence to corroborate \"she said\" allegations.\n\nMs. Maxwell agrees that Counts Five and Six were brought within five years of her deposition and therefore are within the applicable statute of limitation, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3282.\n\nHowever, as with Counts One through Four, the government's delay in charging Counts Five and Six resulted in substantial prejudice because the questions at issue, along with the resulting answers, are ill defined, ambiguous, and could relate to almost any time. The capricious questioning about 26-year-old claims presents the same practical problems for the defense, evidence that would exculpate Ms. Maxwell has been lost or destroyed.\n\nThis Indictment should be dismissed because Counts One through Four are time barred and the 26-year delay in bringing the charges violates Ms. Maxwell's Fifth Amendment right to due process. Counts Five and Six should be dismissed for the variety of reasons as catalogued in other pleadings and the four-year prejudicial preindictment delay also violates due process.\n\nAPPLICABLE LAW\n\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires dismissal of an indictment for delay which results in a violation of the fundamental concepts of justice or the community's sense of fair play and decency. To determine whether a due process violation has occurred, the government's reasons for the delay must be weighed against the prejudicial effects of the delay on the defendant. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). The showing of prejudice, however, does not end a preindictment delay inquiry because \"proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim ... [T]he due process inquiry must",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 138 Filed 02/04/21 Page 9 of 26",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "charges alleged in Counts One through Four, 18 U.S.C. § 3283, which as amended in 2006, authorizes the prosecution of certain specific crimes during \"the life of the child, or for ten years after the offense, whichever is longer.\" As a practical matter, this is tantamount to no statute of limitation and allows for substantial abuse by the government, particularly in a case with no forensic or other evidence to corroborate \"she said\" allegations.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Ms. Maxwell agrees that Counts Five and Six were brought within five years of her deposition and therefore are within the applicable statute of limitation, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3282.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "However, as with Counts One through Four, the government's delay in charging Counts Five and Six resulted in substantial prejudice because the questions at issue, along with the resulting answers, are ill defined, ambiguous, and could relate to almost any time. The capricious questioning about 26-year-old claims presents the same practical problems for the defense, evidence that would exculpate Ms. Maxwell has been lost or destroyed.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "This Indictment should be dismissed because Counts One through Four are time barred and the 26-year delay in bringing the charges violates Ms. Maxwell's Fifth Amendment right to due process. Counts Five and Six should be dismissed for the variety of reasons as catalogued in other pleadings and the four-year prejudicial preindictment delay also violates due process.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "APPLICABLE LAW",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires dismissal of an indictment for delay which results in a violation of the fundamental concepts of justice or the community's sense of fair play and decency. To determine whether a due process violation has occurred, the government's reasons for the delay must be weighed against the prejudicial effects of the delay on the defendant. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). The showing of prejudice, however, does not end a preindictment delay inquiry because \"proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim ... [T]he due process inquiry must",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002512",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "2006",
      "1971",
      "02/04/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 138",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3283",
      "18 U.S.C.A. § 3282",
      "404 U.S. 307",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002512"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell, discussing the statute of limitations and due process concerns. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}