{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "14",
    "document_number": "207",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 14 of 34\n\nSection 3283, as amended by the PROTECT Act, broadly states that \"[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.\" The statute lacks an express retroactivity clause, but courts have held that no such clause is necessary, including for this particular statute. See Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d at 923. The statute's plain language unambiguously requires that it apply to prosecutions for offenses committed before the date of enactment. Instead of simply providing a new limitations period for future conduct, Congress stated that no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply. That is, it prevents the application of any statute of limitations that would otherwise apply to past conduct.\n\nCourts have reached the same conclusion for other statutes employing similar language. The Eighth Circuit has held that the 1994 amendments to § 3283, which allowed prosecution of sex crimes against children until the victim reached age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684–85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. That statute eliminated the statute of limitations for claims on defaulted student loans by stating that \"no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed.\" Id. The PROTECT Act's language is quite similar.\n\nThe history of § 3283 confirms Congress's intent to apply the extended limitations period as broadly as the Constitution allows. With each successive amendment to the statute, Congress further extended the limitations period, recognizing that sex crimes against children “may be difficult to detect quickly” because children often delay or decline to report sexual abuse.\n\n14\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003688",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 14 of 34",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Section 3283, as amended by the PROTECT Act, broadly states that \"[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.\" The statute lacks an express retroactivity clause, but courts have held that no such clause is necessary, including for this particular statute. See Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d at 923. The statute's plain language unambiguously requires that it apply to prosecutions for offenses committed before the date of enactment. Instead of simply providing a new limitations period for future conduct, Congress stated that no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply. That is, it prevents the application of any statute of limitations that would otherwise apply to past conduct.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Courts have reached the same conclusion for other statutes employing similar language. The Eighth Circuit has held that the 1994 amendments to § 3283, which allowed prosecution of sex crimes against children until the victim reached age twenty-five, applied to past conduct. See United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684–85 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit has observed that the Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26, 105 Stat. 123, illustrates language that requires a statute's application to past conduct. See Enter. Mortg. Acceptance Co., LLC, Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d at 407. That statute eliminated the statute of limitations for claims on defaulted student loans by stating that \"no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed.\" Id. The PROTECT Act's language is quite similar.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The history of § 3283 confirms Congress's intent to apply the extended limitations period as broadly as the Constitution allows. With each successive amendment to the statute, Congress further extended the limitations period, recognizing that sex crimes against children “may be difficult to detect quickly” because children often delay or decline to report sexual abuse.",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "14",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003688",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Congress",
      "Eighth Circuit",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1991",
      "2005"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 207",
      "§ 3283",
      "438 F.3d",
      "405 F.3d 682",
      "391 F.3d",
      "Pub. L. No. 102-26",
      "105 Stat. 123",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003688"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the application of the PROTECT Act to past conduct. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}