{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "199",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 199 of 239\n\nthe Court will enter judgment on only one of the multiplicitous convictions.\" (citations omitted));\nUnited States v. Rivera, No. 09 Cr. 619 (SJF), 2011 WL 1429125, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011)\n(\"Since it is possible that the jury will convict defendants on only one (1) of the respective counts that they allege are multiplicitous, and acquit defendants on all of the counts with which they allege that count is multiplicitous, the issue of whether the counts are multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause is premature at the pretrial stage.\")\n\nC. Discussion\n\nThe defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One or Three of the Indictment as multiplicitous is, at best, premature. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit, this Court should defer ruling on this motion until after the completion of trial. The additional time will ensure that the full factual record is developed before the Court conducts the multiplicity analysis, and the motion may become moot depending on the jury's verdict.\n\nFirst, the Court cannot conduct the multiplicity analysis before hearing all of the evidence regarding the charges contained in the Indictment. Prior to trial, the record will not be fully developed, and the Court cannot conduct the necessary analysis to determine whether the counts are in fact multiplicitous. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit and the consistent practice in this District, the Court should defer conducting any multiplicity analysis until after hearing all of the evidence at trial. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355.\n\nSecond, the motion may become moot because it is possible that the jury could conclude that the defendant is guilty of one of the charged conspiracies but not guilty of the other. That is because each charged conspiracy alleges that the defendant agreed to violate a different criminal statute. Count One alleges that the defendant agreed to transport minors with the intent that they engage in illegal sex acts. Count Three alleges that the defendant agreed to entice minors to travel\n\n172\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003133",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 199 of 239",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the Court will enter judgment on only one of the multiplicitous convictions.\" (citations omitted));\nUnited States v. Rivera, No. 09 Cr. 619 (SJF), 2011 WL 1429125, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2011)\n(\"Since it is possible that the jury will convict defendants on only one (1) of the respective counts that they allege are multiplicitous, and acquit defendants on all of the counts with which they allege that count is multiplicitous, the issue of whether the counts are multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause is premature at the pretrial stage.\")",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "C. Discussion",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant's motion to dismiss Counts One or Three of the Indictment as multiplicitous is, at best, premature. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit, this Court should defer ruling on this motion until after the completion of trial. The additional time will ensure that the full factual record is developed before the Court conducts the multiplicity analysis, and the motion may become moot depending on the jury's verdict.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "First, the Court cannot conduct the multiplicity analysis before hearing all of the evidence regarding the charges contained in the Indictment. Prior to trial, the record will not be fully developed, and the Court cannot conduct the necessary analysis to determine whether the counts are in fact multiplicitous. Consistent with the directive of the Second Circuit and the consistent practice in this District, the Court should defer conducting any multiplicity analysis until after hearing all of the evidence at trial. See Josephberg, 459 F.3d at 355.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, the motion may become moot because it is possible that the jury could conclude that the defendant is guilty of one of the charged conspiracies but not guilty of the other. That is because each charged conspiracy alleges that the defendant agreed to violate a different criminal statute. Count One alleges that the defendant agreed to transport minors with the intent that they engage in illegal sex acts. Count Three alleges that the defendant agreed to entice minors to travel",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "172",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003133",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "E.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "Apr. 13, 2011"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "09 Cr. 619",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003133"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}