{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "11",
    "document_number": "307",
    "date": "06/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 11 of 21\nprotective order. Id. And if confidential materials turn out to be relevant to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48 & n.22; Giuffre, 827 F. App'x at 145. It is “unrealistic” to believe that deposition testimony central to a civil case of high public interest will remain effectively sealed indefinitely. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1083.\nMaxwell claims that she did not expect the Government to be able to obtain her deposition testimony, and that if she knew it would, she never would have testified. If Maxwell subjectively harbored this belief, it was nonetheless unreasonable. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.\nThe Court further notes that Maxwell was ably represented by a number of attorneys during the civil litigation, who the Court is confident were familiar with the precedents governing protective orders and public access to judicial documents.\nBecause Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents shared with third parties during the civil case, the Government did not engage in a search when it obtained those documents from a third party by subpoena. Maxwell also makes a half-hearted argument that obtaining those documents was a seizure of her personal property. Copies of documents held by a law firm that represented Maxwell's adversary in a civil case were not Maxwell's personal property. Thus, the Government engaged in neither a search nor a seizure, and so it did not violate Maxwell's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.\nThe Government also contends that even if it improperly obtained documents pursuant to the grand jury subpoena, the Court should not suppress those documents because the Government acted in good faith and would have obtained the documents anyway. See Nix v.\n11\nDOJ-OGR-00004795",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 11 of 21",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "protective order. Id. And if confidential materials turn out to be relevant to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48 & n.22; Giuffre, 827 F. App'x at 145. It is “unrealistic” to believe that deposition testimony central to a civil case of high public interest will remain effectively sealed indefinitely. Andover, 876 F.2d at 1083.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell claims that she did not expect the Government to be able to obtain her deposition testimony, and that if she knew it would, she never would have testified. If Maxwell subjectively harbored this belief, it was nonetheless unreasonable. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court further notes that Maxwell was ably represented by a number of attorneys during the civil litigation, who the Court is confident were familiar with the precedents governing protective orders and public access to judicial documents.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Because Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents shared with third parties during the civil case, the Government did not engage in a search when it obtained those documents from a third party by subpoena. Maxwell also makes a half-hearted argument that obtaining those documents was a seizure of her personal property. Copies of documents held by a law firm that represented Maxwell's adversary in a civil case were not Maxwell's personal property. Thus, the Government engaged in neither a search nor a seizure, and so it did not violate Maxwell's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Government also contends that even if it improperly obtained documents pursuant to the grand jury subpoena, the Court should not suppress those documents because the Government acted in good faith and would have obtained the documents anyway. See Nix v.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "11",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004795",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "06/25/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 307",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004795"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving Maxwell. The text discusses the handling of confidential materials and the Government's actions in obtaining documents. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}