{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "9",
    "document_number": "2017-00330",
    "date": null,
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "as Mr. Julié's accompanying rebuttal report explains (see Ex. A), the MOJ letter ignores that the extradition provisions in French Code of Criminal Procedure apply only in the absence of an international agreement providing otherwise. (Id. at 1). This rule is necessitated by the French Constitution, which requires that international agreements prevail over national legislation. (Id.). Thus, extradition of a French national to the United States is legally permissible if the extradition treaty between the United States and France provides for it—which it does. (Id. at 3). The government's reliance on a 2006 case—in which France refused to extradite a French national who was also a U.S. citizen—provides no precedent as to how a French court would rule on an extradition request regarding Ms. Maxwell because, as Mr. Julié notes, the United States did not challenge the refusal in the French courts. (Id. at 2-3). Nor does it undermine Mr. Julié's opinion that, in the unusual circumstance where a citizen of both countries has executed an extradition waiver and then fled to France in violation of bail conditions set by a U.S. court, it is \"highly unlikely\" that an extradition decree would not be issued. (Id. at 3). The government offers no rebuttal to the opinion of Ms. Maxwell's U.K. extradition expert, David Perry. Nor does it dispute Mr. Perry's opinion that Ms. Maxwell would be \"highly unlikely\" to successfully resist extradition from the United Kingdom, that her waiver would be admissible in any extradition proceeding, and that—contrary to the government's representation at the initial bail hearing (Tr. 27)—bail would be \"extremely unlikely.\" (See Def. Mem. Ex. U at ¶ 39). Mr. Perry's addendum opinion (attached as Ex. B) reiterates these points, opining that the waiver would be \"a highly relevant factor\" in the U.K. proceeding, both to the likelihood of extradition and to the likelihood of bail while the proceeding is pending. (Id. ¶ 3).7 Nor, as the government suggests, does the Secretary of State have general \"discretion to deny extradition\" after a court has entered a final extradition order. (See Gov. Mem. at 19). That discretion is limited to a handful of exceptional circumstances that would likely be inapplicable to Ms. Maxwell's case. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5). 9 DOJ-OGR-00001198",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "as Mr. Julié's accompanying rebuttal report explains (see Ex. A), the MOJ letter ignores that the extradition provisions in French Code of Criminal Procedure apply only in the absence of an international agreement providing otherwise. (Id. at 1). This rule is necessitated by the French Constitution, which requires that international agreements prevail over national legislation. (Id.). Thus, extradition of a French national to the United States is legally permissible if the extradition treaty between the United States and France provides for it—which it does. (Id. at 3).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government's reliance on a 2006 case—in which France refused to extradite a French national who was also a U.S. citizen—provides no precedent as to how a French court would rule on an extradition request regarding Ms. Maxwell because, as Mr. Julié notes, the United States did not challenge the refusal in the French courts. (Id. at 2-3). Nor does it undermine Mr. Julié's opinion that, in the unusual circumstance where a citizen of both countries has executed an extradition waiver and then fled to France in violation of bail conditions set by a U.S. court, it is \"highly unlikely\" that an extradition decree would not be issued. (Id. at 3).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government offers no rebuttal to the opinion of Ms. Maxwell's U.K. extradition expert, David Perry. Nor does it dispute Mr. Perry's opinion that Ms. Maxwell would be \"highly unlikely\" to successfully resist extradition from the United Kingdom, that her waiver would be admissible in any extradition proceeding, and that—contrary to the government's representation at the initial bail hearing (Tr. 27)—bail would be \"extremely unlikely.\" (See Def. Mem. Ex. U at ¶ 39). Mr. Perry's addendum opinion (attached as Ex. B) reiterates these points, opining that the waiver would be \"a highly relevant factor\" in the U.K. proceeding, both to the likelihood of extradition and to the likelihood of bail while the proceeding is pending. (Id. ¶ 3).7",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Nor, as the government suggests, does the Secretary of State have general \"discretion to deny extradition\" after a court has entered a final extradition order. (See Gov. Mem. at 19). That discretion is limited to a handful of exceptional circumstances that would likely be inapplicable to Ms. Maxwell's case. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "9",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00001198",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Mr. Julié",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "David Perry",
      "Secretary of State"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "United States",
      "France",
      "United Kingdom"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "2006"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "2017-00330",
      "DOJ-OGR-00001198"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the extradition case of Ms. Maxwell. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 9 of 15."
}