{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "33 of 40",
    "document_number": "383",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 383 Filed 10/29/21 Page 33 of 40\n\nVictim-4 on the substance of her earlier statements to the FBI. Whether those statements translated into a charging decision is irrelevant, among other reasons, because the decision relied on other factors and was based on different evidence than will be presented at this trial. (See Gov't Mot. at 24-28). Even at best, it is cumulative of cross-examination of the substance of Minor Victim-4's statements. See United States v. Borrero, No. 13 Cr. 58 (KBF), 2013 WL 6020773, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2013) (excluding evidence of charging different people for the same crime because \"the point will be made and can be duly 'hammered home' on cross-examination\" without using the charging decision, which \"implicate[s] a variety of additional considerations\").\n\nIn any event, introducing that charging decision would invite the jury to speculate—falsely—that the Florida investigation generated no other inculpatory evidence against the defendant. It would therefore open the door to testimony rebutting that speculation. For instance, the defense proposes to call a special agent to testify that the defendant was not named in a draft indictment that was never presented to a Florida grand jury. (Def. Opp. at 39). On cross, the Government would be entitled to elicit inculpatory information from the Florida investigation that it currently is not planning to offer. In combination, an examination along these lines would create a bizarre spectacle, largely based on discussions of hearsay and prosecutorial discretion. The Court should preclude this distracting and irrelevant line of questioning. The jury should decide this case based on the evidence or lack of evidence presented at trial, not the evidence or lack of evidence evaluated by prosecutors in another jurisdiction in 2007. As much as the defendant hopes to ask the jury to evaluate the prosecutorial discretion of multiple sets of prosecutors, in different jurisdictions, it is the defendant—and only the defendant—who will be on trial.\n\n32\n\nDOJ-OGR-00005587",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 383 Filed 10/29/21 Page 33 of 40",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Victim-4 on the substance of her earlier statements to the FBI. Whether those statements translated into a charging decision is irrelevant, among other reasons, because the decision relied on other factors and was based on different evidence than will be presented at this trial. (See Gov't Mot. at 24-28). Even at best, it is cumulative of cross-examination of the substance of Minor Victim-4's statements. See United States v. Borrero, No. 13 Cr. 58 (KBF), 2013 WL 6020773, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2013) (excluding evidence of charging different people for the same crime because \"the point will be made and can be duly 'hammered home' on cross-examination\" without using the charging decision, which \"implicate[s] a variety of additional considerations\").",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In any event, introducing that charging decision would invite the jury to speculate—falsely—that the Florida investigation generated no other inculpatory evidence against the defendant. It would therefore open the door to testimony rebutting that speculation. For instance, the defense proposes to call a special agent to testify that the defendant was not named in a draft indictment that was never presented to a Florida grand jury. (Def. Opp. at 39). On cross, the Government would be entitled to elicit inculpatory information from the Florida investigation that it currently is not planning to offer. In combination, an examination along these lines would create a bizarre spectacle, largely based on discussions of hearsay and prosecutorial discretion. The Court should preclude this distracting and irrelevant line of questioning. The jury should decide this case based on the evidence or lack of evidence presented at trial, not the evidence or lack of evidence evaluated by prosecutors in another jurisdiction in 2007. As much as the defendant hopes to ask the jury to evaluate the prosecutorial discretion of multiple sets of prosecutors, in different jurisdictions, it is the defendant—and only the defendant—who will be on trial.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "32",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005587",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Victim-4",
      "Minor Victim-4",
      "defendant"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "FBI",
      "Government",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Florida",
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21",
      "Nov. 1, 2013",
      "2007"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 383",
      "No. 13 Cr. 58 (KBF)",
      "2013 WL 6020773",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005587"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 33 of 40."
}