{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "12",
    "document_number": "223",
    "date": "04/20/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 223 Filed 04/20/21 Page 12 of 23\ndemonstrated that the NPA, as a whole, gives rise to such an appearance—and the government offers no reasonable alternative interpretation.\n\nUnlike Annabi and its progeny, the NPA here contains significant evidence of the parties' intent to apply the co-conspirator immunity provision outside the SDFL. While the provision granting immunity to Epstein himself expressly limits his immunity to prosecutions \"in this District,\" NPA at 2, the co-conspirator immunity provision contains no such limitation. \"[W]here contract provisions use different language, courts must assume the parties intended different meanings.\" Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., 821 F.3d 297, 309 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Collins v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 929 F.3d 830, 841 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting \"common, if not automatic presumption\" that \"when parties to the same contract use such different language to address parallel issues, it is reasonable to infer that they intend this language to mean different things\") (internal punctuation and citation omitted); Penncro Assocs., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 499 F.3d 1151, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2007) (same). Thus, the appropriate inference here is that the parties intended to limit Epstein's immunity, but not immunity for potential co-conspirators, to prosecutions in the Southern District of Florida (\"SDFL\").\n\nThe government offers no reasonable alternative explanation for the contrasting language in the two provisions. Instead, it argues that because the parties limited Epstein's immunity to the SDFL, they must have meant to limit co-conspirators' immunity to the SDFL as well, but must have forgotten to include the appropriate language. This argument—that the use of different language in parallel provisions compels an inference that identical, rather than different meanings, are intended—turns fundamental contract interpretation on its head. See, e.g., Bank of 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations and emphasis omitted).\n8\nDOJ-OGR-00003885",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 223 Filed 04/20/21 Page 12 of 23",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "demonstrated that the NPA, as a whole, gives rise to such an appearance—and the government offers no reasonable alternative interpretation.\n\nUnlike Annabi and its progeny, the NPA here contains significant evidence of the parties' intent to apply the co-conspirator immunity provision outside the SDFL. While the provision granting immunity to Epstein himself expressly limits his immunity to prosecutions \"in this District,\" NPA at 2, the co-conspirator immunity provision contains no such limitation. \"[W]here contract provisions use different language, courts must assume the parties intended different meanings.\" Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., 821 F.3d 297, 309 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Collins v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 929 F.3d 830, 841 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting \"common, if not automatic presumption\" that \"when parties to the same contract use such different language to address parallel issues, it is reasonable to infer that they intend this language to mean different things\") (internal punctuation and citation omitted); Penncro Assocs., Inc. v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 499 F.3d 1151, 1156–57 (10th Cir. 2007) (same). Thus, the appropriate inference here is that the parties intended to limit Epstein's immunity, but not immunity for potential co-conspirators, to prosecutions in the Southern District of Florida (\"SDFL\").",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government offers no reasonable alternative explanation for the contrasting language in the two provisions. Instead, it argues that because the parties limited Epstein's immunity to the SDFL, they must have meant to limit co-conspirators' immunity to the SDFL as well, but must have forgotten to include the appropriate language. This argument—that the use of different language in parallel provisions compels an inference that identical, rather than different meanings, are intended—turns fundamental contract interpretation on its head. See, e.g., Bank of 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal citations and emphasis omitted).",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "8",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003885",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co.",
      "Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc.",
      "Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac",
      "Penncro Assocs., Inc.",
      "Sprint Spectrum, L.P."
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Southern District of Florida"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/20/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 223",
      "821 F.3d 297",
      "929 F.3d 830",
      "499 F.3d 1151",
      "93 F. App'x 268"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of United States v. [defendant], with the page number indicating it is part of a larger document. The text discusses the interpretation of a Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA) and its implications for Epstein's immunity and that of potential co-conspirators."
}