{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "63",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 63 of 239\n\nToussie to the Landgraf analysis, see United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649, 655 (D.N.J. 2017), and that case, which did not concern Section 3283, relied extensively on a pre-Landgraf opinion requiring a clear statement of congressional intent in favor of retroactivity. See id. at 655 (citing United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975)). That clear-statement rule is inconsistent with the analysis required by Landgraf step two. See Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (rejecting an identical argument relying on Toussie and Gentile).\n***\nThe defendant asks this Court to break new ground and become the first court to hold that Section 3283 applies only prospectively. The Court should reject this invitation. For the reasons set forth above, the weight of authority holds that Section 3283 applies retroactively, in keeping with Congress's express intent to expand prosecutions of individuals who sexually exploit children. The Indictment is timely, and the motion should be denied.\nC. The Defendant's Crimes Involved the Sexual Abuse of Minors\nThe defendant next argues that Section 3283 does not apply at all, and she asks the Court to conclude that the crimes of sexual abuse alleged in the Indictment did not involve sexual abuse. Her argument runs contrary to both the case law and common sense. Her motion is meritless and should be denied.\nBy its terms, Section 3283 applies to any “offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 3283. As discussed above, when the statute was first enacted, it was located at 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). The definition of the term “sexual abuse” is located in a neighboring provision within that same section:\nFor purposes of this section . . . the term ‘sexual abuse’ includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 63 of 239",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Toussie to the Landgraf analysis, see United States v. Gentile, 235 F. Supp. 3d 649, 655 (D.N.J. 2017), and that case, which did not concern Section 3283, relied extensively on a pre-Landgraf opinion requiring a clear statement of congressional intent in favor of retroactivity. See id. at 655 (citing United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975)). That clear-statement rule is inconsistent with the analysis required by Landgraf step two. See Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (rejecting an identical argument relying on Toussie and Gentile).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "***",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant asks this Court to break new ground and become the first court to hold that Section 3283 applies only prospectively. The Court should reject this invitation. For the reasons set forth above, the weight of authority holds that Section 3283 applies retroactively, in keeping with Congress's express intent to expand prosecutions of individuals who sexually exploit children. The Indictment is timely, and the motion should be denied.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "C. The Defendant's Crimes Involved the Sexual Abuse of Minors",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant next argues that Section 3283 does not apply at all, and she asks the Court to conclude that the crimes of sexual abuse alleged in the Indictment did not involve sexual abuse. Her argument runs contrary to both the case law and common sense. Her motion is meritless and should be denied.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "By its terms, Section 3283 applies to any “offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 3283. As discussed above, when the statute was first enacted, it was located at 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). The definition of the term “sexual abuse” is located in a neighboring provision within that same section:",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "For purposes of this section . . . the term ‘sexual abuse’ includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "36",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002997",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3283",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3509(k)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002997"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}