{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "16",
    "document_number": "144",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 16 of 25\n\nIn the civil context, the Second Circuit has acknowledged a distinction between retroactively applying an extended limitations period to revive a stale claim, which has been held impermissible under Landgraf, and retroactively extending the limitations period for a live claim, which has been held permissible. See, e.g., Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57-58 (2d Cir. 2017) (collecting and comparing civil cases). The criminal context, however, is fundamentally different.\n\nAt a minimum, Toussie \"potentially alters the second step in the Landgraf approach\" in criminal cases. United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 645 (1st Cir. 2018) (evaluating 2003 Amendment in adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claim). \"In other words, when Congress has sounded an uncertain trumpet, a court ought to refrain from applying an enlarged criminal statute of limitations retrospectively.\" Id. As shown in the first step of Landgraf, the trumpet sounded by Congress in enacting the 2003 Amendment was anything but uncertain: congressional intent is clear.\n\nIn the criminal context, the retroactive application of an extended statute of limitations to revive a time-barred claim is not merely an impermissible effect under Landgraf; it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 618 (2003).4 As Landgraf itself recognized, however, the principle against retroactivity is not simply an application of the Ex Post Facto Clause; rather, it is a \"deeply rooted\" presumption based on \"[e]lementary considerations\" of fundamental \"fairness.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66. See also Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., writing for the majority but noting he was speaking for himself) (stating that anti-retroactivity presumption in Landgraf is \"triggered\n\n4 For this reason, the government would be barred from prosecuting Ms. Maxwell for any offense against the third accuser (identified in the indictment as Minor Victim-3) even if the 2003 Amendment otherwise applied, because the third accuser reached age 25 in , and thus the statute of limitations as to her had expired by the time of the 2003 Amendment.\n\n10\nDOJ-OGR-00002664",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 16 of 25",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In the civil context, the Second Circuit has acknowledged a distinction between retroactively applying an extended limitations period to revive a stale claim, which has been held impermissible under Landgraf, and retroactively extending the limitations period for a live claim, which has been held permissible. See, e.g., Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57-58 (2d Cir. 2017) (collecting and comparing civil cases). The criminal context, however, is fundamentally different.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "At a minimum, Toussie \"potentially alters the second step in the Landgraf approach\" in criminal cases. United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 645 (1st Cir. 2018) (evaluating 2003 Amendment in adjudicating ineffective assistance of counsel claim). \"In other words, when Congress has sounded an uncertain trumpet, a court ought to refrain from applying an enlarged criminal statute of limitations retrospectively.\" Id. As shown in the first step of Landgraf, the trumpet sounded by Congress in enacting the 2003 Amendment was anything but uncertain: congressional intent is clear.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In the criminal context, the retroactive application of an extended statute of limitations to revive a time-barred claim is not merely an impermissible effect under Landgraf; it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 618 (2003).4 As Landgraf itself recognized, however, the principle against retroactivity is not simply an application of the Ex Post Facto Clause; rather, it is a \"deeply rooted\" presumption based on \"[e]lementary considerations\" of fundamental \"fairness.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66. See also Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., writing for the majority but noting he was speaking for himself) (stating that anti-retroactivity presumption in Landgraf is \"triggered",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4 For this reason, the government would be barred from prosecuting Ms. Maxwell for any offense against the third accuser (identified in the indictment as Minor Victim-3) even if the 2003 Amendment otherwise applied, because the third accuser reached age 25 in , and thus the statute of limitations as to her had expired by the time of the 2003 Amendment.",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "10",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002664",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Toussie",
      "Miller",
      "Stogner",
      "Maxwell",
      "Thom",
      "Ashcroft",
      "Calabresi",
      "Minor Victim-3"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Congress",
      "Court",
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "California"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "2003"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 144",
      "Page 16 of 25",
      "865 F.3d",
      "911 F.3d 638",
      "539 U.S. 607",
      "511 U.S.",
      "369 F.3d 158",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002664"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the application of statutes of limitations and the Ex Post Facto Clause. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}