{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "148",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 148 of 239\n\nnatural meaning in the context in which words were used they were materially untrue, perjury was established.\" United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976). Critically, and as noted with respect to Lighte above, courts generally evaluate whether a challenge to a perjury count on the basis that a question was fundamentally ambiguous after trial and following the development of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); Sarwari, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury count). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has dismissed a perjury count on the basis of \"fundamental ambiguity\" before trial.\n\nBecause perjury requires a knowing false statement, the law does not permit conviction based on answers that are literally true. See Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374. Nor can a conviction rest on answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore \"arguably misleading by negative implication.\" Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when \"the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial.\" United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976). Even statements that \"could be literally true in isolation\" can support a perjury conviction if they are \"materially untrue\" in \"the context in which the statements were made.\" United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1989). \"[U]nless the questioning is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue for the jury.\" Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers \"were literally true under any conceivable interpretation of the questions\").\n\n121\nDOJ-OGR-00003082",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 148 of 239",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "natural meaning in the context in which words were used they were materially untrue, perjury was established.\" United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976). Critically, and as noted with respect to Lighte above, courts generally evaluate whether a challenge to a perjury count on the basis that a question was fundamentally ambiguous after trial and following the development of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); Sarwari, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and partial Rule 29 dismissal) Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury count). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has dismissed a perjury count on the basis of \"fundamental ambiguity\" before trial.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Because perjury requires a knowing false statement, the law does not permit conviction based on answers that are literally true. See Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374. Nor can a conviction rest on answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore \"arguably misleading by negative implication.\" Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when \"the answer is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial.\" United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976). Even statements that \"could be literally true in isolation\" can support a perjury conviction if they are \"materially untrue\" in \"the context in which the statements were made.\" United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1989). \"[U]nless the questioning is fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue for the jury.\" Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers \"were literally true under any conceivable interpretation of the questions\").",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "121",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003082",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1976",
      "2010",
      "1973",
      "1989",
      "2018"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003082"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}