{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "13",
    "document_number": "212",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 212 Filed 04/16/21 Page 13 of 20\n\nmodification of the Protective Order in an ex parte hearing (chock full of misrepresentations) without first providing Maxwell notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mot. No. 11, at 11–15. The government offers no response to this fundamental point—Martindell demands notice and an opportunity to be heard; Maxwell received neither. Resp. at 76–81. Now, in an audacious request, the government argues this Court cannot evaluate the propriety of Chief Judge McMahon’s analysis of Martindell, because Judge McMahon is a co-equal judge who exercised her sound discretion. Resp. at 81 & n.37. Were the government’s unsupported argument correct, though, it would mean that Maxwell will never have an opportunity to challenge the subpoena under Martindell, as that case and due process require. The government is not right. This Court does not owe deference to Judge McMahon’s decision, for at least three reasons. First, Maxwell never was given the chance to oppose the government’s request, so due process demands that she be given that chance now. Second, Chief Judge McMahon did not possess all the relevant facts because the government improperly concealed them from her. To the contrary, the government misled Judge McMahon about its contacts with Boies Schiller and the origins of its investigation, facts that were central to Judge McMahon’s decision to modify the Protective Order and authorize the subpoena. Mot. No. 3 & Reply in Support Thereof. Third, this Court is not tasked with deciding whether the Protective Order should be modified or even questioning the correctness of Judge McMahon’s modification. This Court is deciding a different question entirely—whether the government’s violation of Martindell requires suppression. As to remedy, the government says that no case addresses whether suppression is proper for a Martindell violation. Fair enough. Resp. at 81. 8 DOJ-OGR-00003787",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 212 Filed 04/16/21 Page 13 of 20",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "modification of the Protective Order in an ex parte hearing (chock full of misrepresentations) without first providing Maxwell notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mot. No. 11, at 11–15. The government offers no response to this fundamental point—Martindell demands notice and an opportunity to be heard; Maxwell received neither. Resp. at 76–81. Now, in an audacious request, the government argues this Court cannot evaluate the propriety of Chief Judge McMahon’s analysis of Martindell, because Judge McMahon is a co-equal judge who exercised her sound discretion. Resp. at 81 & n.37. Were the government’s unsupported argument correct, though, it would mean that Maxwell will never have an opportunity to challenge the subpoena under Martindell, as that case and due process require. The government is not right. This Court does not owe deference to Judge McMahon’s decision, for at least three reasons. First, Maxwell never was given the chance to oppose the government’s request, so due process demands that she be given that chance now. Second, Chief Judge McMahon did not possess all the relevant facts because the government improperly concealed them from her. To the contrary, the government misled Judge McMahon about its contacts with Boies Schiller and the origins of its investigation, facts that were central to Judge McMahon’s decision to modify the Protective Order and authorize the subpoena. Mot. No. 3 & Reply in Support Thereof. Third, this Court is not tasked with deciding whether the Protective Order should be modified or even questioning the correctness of Judge McMahon’s modification. This Court is deciding a different question entirely—whether the government’s violation of Martindell requires suppression. As to remedy, the government says that no case addresses whether suppression is proper for a Martindell violation. Fair enough. Resp. at 81.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "8",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003787",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "McMahon"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Boies Schiller"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "212",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003787"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving Maxwell. The text discusses the government's actions and the court's decisions regarding a Protective Order and a subpoena. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}