{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "11",
    "document_number": "295",
    "date": "05/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 11 of 26\ncrimes listed in the NPA overlap with some (but not all)3 of the offenses in the S2 Indictment. But at this stage of the litigation, in which the Court has already concluded that the NPA has no force in this District, it makes no difference what the precise terms of the NPA were. The NPA has no bearing on this case.\nThe balance of the defendant's motion seeks to relitigate the Court's rulings in this case, asserting that the history of the negotiations of the NPA indicate that the parties intended broader coverage. (Def. Mot. at 16). This Court has firmly rejected that argument and has concluded that \"[n]o evidence suggests anyone promised Epstein that the NPA would bar the prosecution of his coconspirators in other districts.\" (Apr. Op. at 6). The motion should be denied for precisely this reason.\nII. Counts Five and Six Are Not Barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause\nIt is axiomatic that \"an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy.\" Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975). Here, the S2 Indictment is the first time the defendant has been charged with sex trafficking and sex trafficking conspiracy, and the Double Jeopardy Clause therefore does not prohibit prosecution of those offenses. The defendant's argument to the contrary fundamentally misunderstands that Clause's protections.\n\"[A]t its core,\" the Double Jeopardy Clause \"means that those acquitted or convicted of a particular 'offence' cannot be tried a second time for the same 'offence.'\" Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1963 (2019). Accordingly, \"[a] defendant may only raise a Double Jeopardy claim if he has been put in jeopardy (i.e. jeopardy has 'attached') sometime before the alleged 'second' prosecution.\" United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1997). As the Second\n3 At most, the scope of the NPA's coverage would appear to encompass Counts Five and Six. The remaining counts encompass conduct that both postdates and predates the temporal limitations in the NPA, which was expressly limited to offenses between 2001 and 2007. (Apr. Op. at 6-7).\n7\nDOJ-OGR-00004718",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 11 of 26",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "crimes listed in the NPA overlap with some (but not all)3 of the offenses in the S2 Indictment. But at this stage of the litigation, in which the Court has already concluded that the NPA has no force in this District, it makes no difference what the precise terms of the NPA were. The NPA has no bearing on this case.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The balance of the defendant's motion seeks to relitigate the Court's rulings in this case, asserting that the history of the negotiations of the NPA indicate that the parties intended broader coverage. (Def. Mot. at 16). This Court has firmly rejected that argument and has concluded that \"[n]o evidence suggests anyone promised Epstein that the NPA would bar the prosecution of his coconspirators in other districts.\" (Apr. Op. at 6). The motion should be denied for precisely this reason.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "II. Counts Five and Six Are Not Barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It is axiomatic that \"an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy.\" Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975). Here, the S2 Indictment is the first time the defendant has been charged with sex trafficking and sex trafficking conspiracy, and the Double Jeopardy Clause therefore does not prohibit prosecution of those offenses. The defendant's argument to the contrary fundamentally misunderstands that Clause's protections.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"[A]t its core,\" the Double Jeopardy Clause \"means that those acquitted or convicted of a particular 'offence' cannot be tried a second time for the same 'offence.'\" Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1963 (2019). Accordingly, \"[a] defendant may only raise a Double Jeopardy claim if he has been put in jeopardy (i.e. jeopardy has 'attached') sometime before the alleged 'second' prosecution.\" United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1997). As the Second",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3 At most, the scope of the NPA's coverage would appear to encompass Counts Five and Six. The remaining counts encompass conduct that both postdates and predates the temporal limitations in the NPA, which was expressly limited to offenses between 2001 and 2007. (Apr. Op. at 6-7).",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "7",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004718",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "05/25/21",
      "2001",
      "2007"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 295"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}