{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "138",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 138 of 239\n\nThe law is clear that a district court's supervisory authority does not extend to suppressing evidence absent some violation of the Constitution or other governing law. See Payner, 447 U.S. at 737 (holding that \"the supervisory power does not extend\" to \"disregard[ing] the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing\"); United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992) (\"Absent a violation of a recognized right under the Constitution, a statute, or a procedural rule, a district court is not entitled to exclude evidence as a sanction against government practices disapproved of by the court.\") The requirements established by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit for suppressing evidence would have little effect if district courts were free to disregard them and suppress evidence by invoking their supervisory authority. Consistent with that principle, and given that this power is \"sparingly exercised,\" Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401, (emphasis in original), this Court should not elect to do so here where the defendant has not established a violation of her Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, or due process rights. See, e.g., id. at 401-02 (\"We can appreciate the district court's frustration at careless government representations that may impact the integrity of judicial decisions, especially proffers in support of ex parte applications that an adversary has no opportunity to dispute[,]\" but finding that the district court erred in suppressing evidence by invoking its inherent authority); Coke, 2011 WL 3738969, at *6 (declining to exercise its supervisory powers to suppress wiretap evidence and finding defendant \"has no Fourth Amendment right, and the novel substantive due process right he asks this Court to create cannot be described as a recognized right.\" (internal citations omitted)).\n\n6. The Defendant Is Not Entitled to a Hearing\n\nThe defendant argues that if the Court is \"disinclined\" to grant the extraordinary relief of suppression she seeks, she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to probe the Government's",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 138 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The law is clear that a district court's supervisory authority does not extend to suppressing evidence absent some violation of the Constitution or other governing law. See Payner, 447 U.S. at 737 (holding that \"the supervisory power does not extend\" to \"disregard[ing] the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing\"); United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1491 (9th Cir. 1992) (\"Absent a violation of a recognized right under the Constitution, a statute, or a procedural rule, a district court is not entitled to exclude evidence as a sanction against government practices disapproved of by the court.\") The requirements established by the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit for suppressing evidence would have little effect if district courts were free to disregard them and suppress evidence by invoking their supervisory authority. Consistent with that principle, and given that this power is \"sparingly exercised,\" Lambus, 897 F.3d at 401, (emphasis in original), this Court should not elect to do so here where the defendant has not established a violation of her Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, or due process rights. See, e.g., id. at 401-02 (\"We can appreciate the district court's frustration at careless government representations that may impact the integrity of judicial decisions, especially proffers in support of ex parte applications that an adversary has no opportunity to dispute[,]\" but finding that the district court erred in suppressing evidence by invoking its inherent authority); Coke, 2011 WL 3738969, at *6 (declining to exercise its supervisory powers to suppress wiretap evidence and finding defendant \"has no Fourth Amendment right, and the novel substantive due process right he asks this Court to create cannot be described as a recognized right.\" (internal citations omitted)).",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "6. The Defendant Is Not Entitled to a Hearing",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant argues that if the Court is \"disinclined\" to grant the extraordinary relief of suppression she seeks, she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to probe the Government's",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "111",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003072",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "447 U.S. at 737",
      "772 F.3d 969",
      "960 F.2d 1488",
      "897 F.3d at 401",
      "2011 WL 3738969"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing, likely a memorandum or brief, discussing the limits of a district court's supervisory authority in suppressing evidence. The text is well-formatted and free of handwritten notes or stamps."
}