{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "7",
    "document_number": "295",
    "date": "05/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 7 of 26\ndistrict bringing the second prosecution charges offenses different from the offenses resolved by the plea agreement in the first prosecution.\" (Def. Mot. at 11) (emphasis in original). The defendant is wrong. Annabi contains no such exception, and the Government is not aware of any court in this Circuit to apply such a rule.\n\nIn Annabi, the Second Circuit articulated a universal principle for interpreting whether a plea agreement is binding outside the district where it was executed. Annabi explained that, although it \"might be thought\" that a U.S. Attorney's Office's agreement which provided that \"'the Government' will dismiss counts of an indictment\" would bind the United States in every judicial district, \"the law has evolved to the contrary.\" 771 F.2d at 672. Relying on several of its precedents, the Court explained that the default rule in this Circuit is that plea agreements bind only the district involved, absent an affirmative appearance to the contrary. Id. In particular, the Second Circuit relied on its opinions in United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir. 1985), and United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139, 1154 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976). Nothing about the reasoning of Annabi turned on whether the new case charged the same offenses that were at issue in the original plea agreement or other offenses that might still be covered by the plea agreement. The holding of Annabi is clear and straightforward, and this Court has already concluded that, under Annabi, there is no affirmative appearance that the NPA binds entities aside from the USAO-SDFL.\n\nThe defendant now claims that when the Government brings charges that are similar to those contained in a plea agreement, Annabi is silent, and that the Court is therefore free to apply the opposite presumption, namely, that the plea agreement is universally binding on the Government. The defendant's argument rests exclusively on the phrase \"identical to the dismissed charges,\" which appears in a paragraph in Annabi. (Def. Mot. at 11). The defendant's reliance on",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 295 Filed 05/25/21 Page 7 of 26",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "district bringing the second prosecution charges offenses different from the offenses resolved by the plea agreement in the first prosecution.\" (Def. Mot. at 11) (emphasis in original). The defendant is wrong. Annabi contains no such exception, and the Government is not aware of any court in this Circuit to apply such a rule.\n\nIn Annabi, the Second Circuit articulated a universal principle for interpreting whether a plea agreement is binding outside the district where it was executed. Annabi explained that, although it \"might be thought\" that a U.S. Attorney's Office's agreement which provided that \"'the Government' will dismiss counts of an indictment\" would bind the United States in every judicial district, \"the law has evolved to the contrary.\" 771 F.2d at 672. Relying on several of its precedents, the Court explained that the default rule in this Circuit is that plea agreements bind only the district involved, absent an affirmative appearance to the contrary. Id. In particular, the Second Circuit relied on its opinions in United States v. Abbamonte, 759 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir. 1985), and United States v. Alessi, 544 F.2d 1139, 1154 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976). Nothing about the reasoning of Annabi turned on whether the new case charged the same offenses that were at issue in the original plea agreement or other offenses that might still be covered by the plea agreement. The holding of Annabi is clear and straightforward, and this Court has already concluded that, under Annabi, there is no affirmative appearance that the NPA binds entities aside from the USAO-SDFL.\n\nThe defendant now claims that when the Government brings charges that are similar to those contained in a plea agreement, Annabi is silent, and that the Court is therefore free to apply the opposite presumption, namely, that the plea agreement is universally binding on the Government. The defendant's argument rests exclusively on the phrase \"identical to the dismissed charges,\" which appears in a paragraph in Annabi. (Def. Mot. at 11). The defendant's reliance on",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004714",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "U.S. Attorney's Office",
      "USAO-SDFL",
      "Second Circuit",
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "05/25/21",
      "1985",
      "1976"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 295",
      "771 F.2d",
      "759 F.2d 1065",
      "544 F.2d 1139",
      "429 U.S. 960",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004714"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 7 of 26."
}