{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "8",
    "document_number": "212",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 212 Filed 04/16/21 Page 8 of 20\n\nFirst, the Court recognized that\n\n[t]here is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers today. The Government thus is not asking for a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of information.\n\nId. at 2219. Second, the Court concluded that in “in no meaningful sense” did Carpenter voluntarily “assume the risk” of “turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.” Id. at 2220.\n\nThe same logic applies here. There is “world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive” and personal details about Maxwell that are contained in Boies Schiller’s 90,000 pages of confidential material.\n\nThese details include, for example, information about Maxwell’s sexual partners, sexual habits, finances, and much, much more.\n\nMoreover, “in no meaningful sense” did Maxwell voluntarily share this information with Boies Schiller. Giuffre sued Maxwell, not the other way around. And the defamation claim (the only claim Giuffre ever asserted against Maxwell, who did not file a counterclaim) had nothing to do with much of the confidential information Maxwell was forced, over objection, to provide.\n\nMaxwell’s motion to dismiss the perjury counts for lack of materiality and her motion for severance, and the replies in support thereof, explain this in more detail. Maxwell Pre-Trial Mot. Nos. 4 & 5.\n\nBut the point is this: The defamation case should have been extremely narrow, but Boies Schiller transformed it into something much broader—a proxy prosecution of Epstein and Maxwell for allegedly trafficking and abusing Giuffre, which then compelled Maxwell, over objection, to answer irrelevant and highly prejudicial personal questions. None of it was voluntary.\n\n3\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003782",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 212 Filed 04/16/21 Page 8 of 20",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "First, the Court recognized that\n\n[t]here is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers today. The Government thus is not asking for a straightforward application of the third-party doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of information.\n\nId. at 2219. Second, the Court concluded that in “in no meaningful sense” did Carpenter voluntarily “assume the risk” of “turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.” Id. at 2220.\n\nThe same logic applies here. There is “world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive” and personal details about Maxwell that are contained in Boies Schiller’s 90,000 pages of confidential material.\n\nThese details include, for example, information about Maxwell’s sexual partners, sexual habits, finances, and much, much more.\n\nMoreover, “in no meaningful sense” did Maxwell voluntarily share this information with Boies Schiller. Giuffre sued Maxwell, not the other way around. And the defamation claim (the only claim Giuffre ever asserted against Maxwell, who did not file a counterclaim) had nothing to do with much of the confidential information Maxwell was forced, over objection, to provide.\n\nMaxwell’s motion to dismiss the perjury counts for lack of materiality and her motion for severance, and the replies in support thereof, explain this in more detail. Maxwell Pre-Trial Mot. Nos. 4 & 5.\n\nBut the point is this: The defamation case should have been extremely narrow, but Boies Schiller transformed it into something much broader—a proxy prosecution of Epstein and Maxwell for allegedly trafficking and abusing Giuffre, which then compelled Maxwell, over objection, to answer irrelevant and highly prejudicial personal questions. None of it was voluntary.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003782",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Carpenter",
      "Maxwell",
      "Giuffre",
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Boies Schiller"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "212",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003782"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Maxwell, discussing the differences between the third-party doctrine and the exhaustive personal details contained in confidential material. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}