{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "20",
    "document_number": "311-4",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 20 of 27\nTo Be Filed Under Seal\nabsence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury's scrutiny. As the court reasoned in EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 321, language stating that the party receiving designated confidential information “shall not use or disclose the information except . . . by such orders as may be issued by the Court during the course of this litigation” did “not lend itself to reasonable reliance that [the Protective Order] will afford permanent secrecy.”\nSee also Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), where, in view of a provision that said, “This Confidentiality Order shall not prevent anyone from applying to the Court for relief therefrom,” the Second Circuit held, “Given this provision, it is difficult to see how the defendants can reasonably argue that they produced documents in reliance on the fact that the documents would always be kept secret.”\nThird, there is no evidence before me indicating that the court undertook any sort of detailed inquiry prior to entering the Protective Order. (Hrg. Tr., 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 66 at 4:25–5:12.). Obviously, I was not there, but I have reviewed the transcript of the argument on the motion for a protective order, and it seems clear that the parties were given ample discretion to designate discovery materials as confidential, with virtually no oversight unless those materials were to be filed with the court—in which case a motion for sealing had to be made.5 (Protective Order ¶ 10); cf. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 122 F.R.D. 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (declining to enforce protective order where “the protective order did not adjudicate the appropriateness of confidentiality as to particular items of discovery”). The fact\n5 “The question about a protective order, of course there should be a protective order in this case. You are good lawyers, and you have been around this track more times than I have and so you can prepare consensually a better protective order than I can, and I urge you to do that. And, in fact, I will give you two weeks to do that. Should you fail, you can present whatever materials you wish to me and I will decide what the protective order is going to be. That's not a good idea because you know the case better than I do, obviously, and so I urge you to resolve it by your litigation skills and not leave it up to the ignorant district court judge who doesn't really get into this kind of thing very often. So you run a risk if you leave it to me.” (Hrg. Tr., 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 66 at 4:25–5:12.)\n19\nSDNY_GM_00000893\nDOJ-OGR-00004943",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 20 of 27",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To Be Filed Under Seal",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "absence of automatic permission for such disclosure to shield anything she said or produced from a grand jury's scrutiny. As the court reasoned in EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 321, language stating that the party receiving designated confidential information “shall not use or disclose the information except . . . by such orders as may be issued by the Court during the course of this litigation” did “not lend itself to reasonable reliance that [the Protective Order] will afford permanent secrecy.”",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "See also Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), where, in view of a provision that said, “This Confidentiality Order shall not prevent anyone from applying to the Court for relief therefrom,” the Second Circuit held, “Given this provision, it is difficult to see how the defendants can reasonably argue that they produced documents in reliance on the fact that the documents would always be kept secret.”",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Third, there is no evidence before me indicating that the court undertook any sort of detailed inquiry prior to entering the Protective Order. (Hrg. Tr., 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 66 at 4:25–5:12.). Obviously, I was not there, but I have reviewed the transcript of the argument on the motion for a protective order, and it seems clear that the parties were given ample discretion to designate discovery materials as confidential, with virtually no oversight unless those materials were to be filed with the court—in which case a motion for sealing had to be made.5 (Protective Order ¶ 10); cf. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 122 F.R.D. 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (declining to enforce protective order where “the protective order did not adjudicate the appropriateness of confidentiality as to particular items of discovery”). The fact",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5 “The question about a protective order, of course there should be a protective order in this case. You are good lawyers, and you have been around this track more times than I have and so you can prepare consensually a better protective order than I can, and I urge you to do that. And, in fact, I will give you two weeks to do that. Should you fail, you can present whatever materials you wish to me and I will decide what the protective order is going to be. That's not a good idea because you know the case better than I do, obviously, and so I urge you to resolve it by your litigation skills and not leave it up to the ignorant district court judge who doesn't really get into this kind of thing very often. So you run a risk if you leave it to me.” (Hrg. Tr., 15-cv-7433, Dkt. No. 66 at 4:25–5:12.)",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "19",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "SDNY_GM_00000893",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004943",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21",
      "1988"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "311-4",
      "15-cv-7433",
      "66",
      "SDNY_GM_00000893",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004943"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a case with the reference number 1:20-cr-00330-PAE. The text discusses the use of protective orders in legal proceedings and references several legal precedents."
}