{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "130",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 130 of 239\n\nThe defendant argues that Martindell \"authorized her to give deposition testimony under the shield of the Protective Order without worrying whether the government could 'insinuate itself' into the case and use her own words against her.\" (Def. Mot. 11 at 15-16). That is not the law, and the defendant cannot use the protective order to cloak her testimony. The Second Circuit has recognized that because \"[i]t is well-settled here and elsewhere . . . that a Rule 26(c) protective order may be overturned or modified based on a finding of impropriety, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need[,]\" \"as a practical matter it is clear that the protections afforded by a Rule 26(c) order are not as extensive as those afforded by the fifth amendment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights.\" Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 (\"'Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponent may always effectively rely on a protective order to secure his right against self-incrimination.'\") (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988))); Davis, 702 F.2d at 421-22 (\"Absent applicable grounds for exception, such as a previously asserted Fifth Amendment privilege, no shield protects the civil evidence [ ] from compellable production before the grand jury which subpoenaed it\").\n\n4. The Government Did Not Violate Maxwell's Due Process Rights\n\nThe defendant also claims that the Government's conduct \"cannot be squared with elemental due process.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 14 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V)). This claim is meritless. Because there was no Government misconduct—let alone the type of outrageous Government DOJ-OGR-00003064",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 130 of 239",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant argues that Martindell \"authorized her to give deposition testimony under the shield of the Protective Order without worrying whether the government could 'insinuate itself' into the case and use her own words against her.\" (Def. Mot. 11 at 15-16). That is not the law, and the defendant cannot use the protective order to cloak her testimony. The Second Circuit has recognized that because \"[i]t is well-settled here and elsewhere . . . that a Rule 26(c) protective order may be overturned or modified based on a finding of impropriety, extraordinary circumstances or compelling need[,]\" \"as a practical matter it is clear that the protections afforded by a Rule 26(c) order are not as extensive as those afforded by the fifth amendment, or by a statutory grant of use immunity, and that a protective order therefore cannot be used to abridge a witness' fifth amendment rights.\" Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1084 (\"'Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponent may always effectively rely on a protective order to secure his right against self-incrimination.'\") (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988))); Davis, 702 F.2d at 421-22 (\"Absent applicable grounds for exception, such as a previously asserted Fifth Amendment privilege, no shield protects the civil evidence [ ] from compellable production before the grand jury which subpoenaed it\").",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4. The Government Did Not Violate Maxwell's Due Process Rights",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant also claims that the Government's conduct \"cannot be squared with elemental due process.\" (Def. Mot. 3 at 14 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V)). This claim is meritless. Because there was no Government misconduct—let alone the type of outrageous Government",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "103",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003064",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Martindell",
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003064"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}