{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "208",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 208 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 16\n\nAs expected, both depositions were hostile. The questions posed to Ms. Maxwell were poorly phrased without regard to the rules of evidence. Accordingly, counsel for Ms. Maxwell was required to object many times. As this court knows, civil litigants are limited to three types of objections: form, foundation, and privilege. When those objections are posed, the examiner has the opportunity to ask for the basis of the objection. It is not incumbent, indeed it is not permitted, for the objecting lawyer to expound on the basis for the objection unless asked.\n\nVirtually all of the questions that form the basis of Counts Five and Six were the subject of valid objections. A prerequisite to use of deposition testimony at trial is that the testimony must be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence as if the deponent were present and testifying. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(1)(b). The form and foundation of the questions asked were improper and largely not relevant in the context of the defamation action. It is unlikely that any of the answers would have been admitted at any trial.\n\nII. The Questions Were Fundamentally, and Fatally, Ambiguous\n\nIn addition to being poorly phrased, the questions were unquestionably ambiguous. \"[W]hen a line of questioning is so vague as to be 'fundamentally ambiguous,' the answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support [a] perjury conviction.\" United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976). \"Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury.\" Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). \"A question is fundamentally ambiguous when it is not a phrase with a meaning about which men of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual understanding by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and offered as testimony.\" Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (cleaned up). Here, the questions were \"fundamentally ambiguous,\" containing particular undefined terms, \"scheme\" and \"recruit\" for example.\n\n6\nDOJ-OGR-00003718",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 208 Filed 04/16/21 Page 10 of 16",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As expected, both depositions were hostile. The questions posed to Ms. Maxwell were poorly phrased without regard to the rules of evidence. Accordingly, counsel for Ms. Maxwell was required to object many times. As this court knows, civil litigants are limited to three types of objections: form, foundation, and privilege. When those objections are posed, the examiner has the opportunity to ask for the basis of the objection. It is not incumbent, indeed it is not permitted, for the objecting lawyer to expound on the basis for the objection unless asked.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Virtually all of the questions that form the basis of Counts Five and Six were the subject of valid objections. A prerequisite to use of deposition testimony at trial is that the testimony must be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence as if the deponent were present and testifying. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(1)(b). The form and foundation of the questions asked were improper and largely not relevant in the context of the defamation action. It is unlikely that any of the answers would have been admitted at any trial.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "II. The Questions Were Fundamentally, and Fatally, Ambiguous",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In addition to being poorly phrased, the questions were unquestionably ambiguous. \"[W]hen a line of questioning is so vague as to be 'fundamentally ambiguous,' the answers associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support [a] perjury conviction.\" United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976). \"Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury.\" Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). \"A question is fundamentally ambiguous when it is not a phrase with a meaning about which men of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual understanding by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and offered as testimony.\" Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (cleaned up). Here, the questions were \"fundamentally ambiguous,\" containing particular undefined terms, \"scheme\" and \"recruit\" for example.",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "6",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003718",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 208",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003718"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case against Ms. Maxwell. The text discusses the admissibility of deposition testimony and the ambiguity of certain questions posed during the deposition. The document includes citations to various court cases and legal references."
}