{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "15",
    "document_number": "109-1",
    "date": "09/17/2024",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page15 of 26\n\napproach as opposed to a \"categorical approach.\"22 We see no reason to depart from our reasoning in Weingarten. Accordingly, the question presented here is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual abuse of a minor for the purposes of § 3283 based on the facts of the case. Jane, one of the women who testified at trial, gave evidence that she had been sexually abused when transported across state lines as a minor. Counts Three and Four thus qualify as offenses, and § 3283 applies to those offenses.\n\nSecond, Maxwell argues that Counts Three, Four, and Six of the Indictment are barred by the statute of limitations because the extended statute of limitations provided by the 2003 amendment to § 3283 does not apply to pre-enactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court held that a court, in deciding whether a statute applies retroactively, must first \"determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach.\"23 If Congress has done so, \"the inquiry ends, and the court enforces the\n\n22 The \"categorical approach\" is a method of statutory interpretation that requires courts to look \"only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions\" for sentencing and immigration purposes. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). We properly reasoned in Weingarten that § 3283 met none of the conditions listed by Taylor that might require application of the categorical approach. See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. First, \"[t]he language of § 3283[] . . . reaches beyond the offense and its legal elements to the conduct 'involv[ed]' in the offense.\" Id. at 59-60. Second, legislative history suggests that Congress intended § 3283 to be applied broadly. Id. at 60. Third, a case-specific approach would not produce practical difficulties or potential unfairness. Id.\n\n23 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994); see also Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55.\n\n15\nDOJ-OGR-00000016",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 109-1, 09/17/2024, 3634097, Page15 of 26",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "approach as opposed to a \"categorical approach.\"22 We see no reason to depart from our reasoning in Weingarten. Accordingly, the question presented here is whether the charged offenses involved the sexual abuse of a minor for the purposes of § 3283 based on the facts of the case. Jane, one of the women who testified at trial, gave evidence that she had been sexually abused when transported across state lines as a minor. Counts Three and Four thus qualify as offenses, and § 3283 applies to those offenses.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, Maxwell argues that Counts Three, Four, and Six of the Indictment are barred by the statute of limitations because the extended statute of limitations provided by the 2003 amendment to § 3283 does not apply to pre-enactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the Supreme Court held that a court, in deciding whether a statute applies retroactively, must first \"determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach.\"23 If Congress has done so, \"the inquiry ends, and the court enforces the",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "22 The \"categorical approach\" is a method of statutory interpretation that requires courts to look \"only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions\" for sentencing and immigration purposes. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). We properly reasoned in Weingarten that § 3283 met none of the conditions listed by Taylor that might require application of the categorical approach. See Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. First, \"[t]he language of § 3283[] . . . reaches beyond the offense and its legal elements to the conduct 'involv[ed]' in the offense.\" Id. at 59-60. Second, legislative history suggests that Congress intended § 3283 to be applied broadly. Id. at 60. Third, a case-specific approach would not produce practical difficulties or potential unfairness. Id.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "23 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994); see also Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "15",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000016",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Jane",
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Congress"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "09/17/2024",
      "2003",
      "1990",
      "1994"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "22-1426",
      "109-1",
      "3634097",
      "§ 3283",
      "511 U.S. 244",
      "495 U.S. 575",
      "865 F.3d",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000016"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, likely a legal brief or opinion, discussing the application of § 3283 to certain offenses. The text includes citations to legal precedents and references to specific court cases."
}