{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "12",
    "document_number": "11",
    "date": "July 12, 2019",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 12 of 14\n\nHonorable Richard M. Berman\nUnited States District Judge\nJuly 12, 2019\nPage 12\n\nIV. The Defendant Raises Legal Arguments Not Relevant Here\n\nFinally, the defendant raises certain legal arguments he contends he will litigate at the appropriate stage and which he further suggests mitigate in favor of bail. None is meritorious, and certainly none should give the Court any comfort whatsoever that the defendant would, if granted bail, refrain from fleeing so he could attempt to vindicate himself via dubious legal strategies. Nevertheless, the Government will address the defendant’s arguments briefly in turn.\n\nA. The Non-Prosecution Agreement Does Not Preclude Prosecution\n\nAs an initial matter, as the Court itself noted at the parties’ initial appearance earlier this week, and as the defendant appears to concede, the instant Indictment charges conduct well beyond the scope of the NPA – that is, alleged conduct that occurred here in New York and involving New York based victims. D. Tr. 6-8; Release Motion at 2. For present purposes, that alone is sufficient to put this issue to rest, because even assuming the defendant were to mount a meritorious challenge to the NPA, he would still have to stand trial on Count Two of the Indictment and additional charges brought based on New York conduct.\n\nBut more generally, the reasons the defendant can be prosecuted in the Southern District of New York—or anywhere else outside the SDFL—are manifold. The language of the NPA overwhelmingly refers to the SDFL, and the core terms and text of the agreement are limited to the SDFL. The prefatory language states: “THEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be deferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida.”7 The final paragraph of the prefatory language also states, among other things, that after fulfilling the terms of the agreement, “no prosecution for the [sex abuse] offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney’s Office, nor any offenses that arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this District.”\n\nIn its terms section, the NPA further states that Epstein’s signature “is not to be construed as an admission of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdictional or other defense” as to any victim whose identity was not disclosed by SDFL to Epstein, as provided for in the NPA, and additionally states that neither Epstein’s signature nor any resulting waivers or civil settlements “are to be construed as admissions or evidence of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdictional or other defense as to any person.” These provisions show the parties contemplated possible criminal prosecutions in other jurisdictions and/or based on victims not initially identified in the Florida investigations (whether in Florida or elsewhere). The final substantive paragraph of the NPA states that “Epstein hereby requests that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer […] prosecution.”\n\nIt is well settled in the Second Circuit that “a plea agreement in one U.S. Attorney’s office does not, unless otherwise stated, bind another.” United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App’x 920, 921\n\n7 All emphases relating to the NPA are added unless otherwise specified.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000340",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 11 Filed 07/12/19 Page 12 of 14",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Honorable Richard M. Berman\nUnited States District Judge\nJuly 12, 2019\nPage 12",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "IV. The Defendant Raises Legal Arguments Not Relevant Here\n\nFinally, the defendant raises certain legal arguments he contends he will litigate at the appropriate stage and which he further suggests mitigate in favor of bail. None is meritorious, and certainly none should give the Court any comfort whatsoever that the defendant would, if granted bail, refrain from fleeing so he could attempt to vindicate himself via dubious legal strategies. Nevertheless, the Government will address the defendant’s arguments briefly in turn.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A. The Non-Prosecution Agreement Does Not Preclude Prosecution",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As an initial matter, as the Court itself noted at the parties’ initial appearance earlier this week, and as the defendant appears to concede, the instant Indictment charges conduct well beyond the scope of the NPA – that is, alleged conduct that occurred here in New York and involving New York based victims. D. Tr. 6-8; Release Motion at 2. For present purposes, that alone is sufficient to put this issue to rest, because even assuming the defendant were to mount a meritorious challenge to the NPA, he would still have to stand trial on Count Two of the Indictment and additional charges brought based on New York conduct.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "But more generally, the reasons the defendant can be prosecuted in the Southern District of New York—or anywhere else outside the SDFL—are manifold. The language of the NPA overwhelmingly refers to the SDFL, and the core terms and text of the agreement are limited to the SDFL. The prefatory language states: “THEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be deferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida.”7 The final paragraph of the prefatory language also states, among other things, that after fulfilling the terms of the agreement, “no prosecution for the [sex abuse] offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney’s Office, nor any offenses that arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this District.”",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In its terms section, the NPA further states that Epstein’s signature “is not to be construed as an admission of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdictional or other defense” as to any victim whose identity was not disclosed by SDFL to Epstein, as provided for in the NPA, and additionally states that neither Epstein’s signature nor any resulting waivers or civil settlements “are to be construed as admissions or evidence of civil or criminal liability or a waiver of any jurisdictional or other defense as to any person.” These provisions show the parties contemplated possible criminal prosecutions in other jurisdictions and/or based on victims not initially identified in the Florida investigations (whether in Florida or elsewhere). The final substantive paragraph of the NPA states that “Epstein hereby requests that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida defer […] prosecution.”",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It is well settled in the Second Circuit that “a plea agreement in one U.S. Attorney’s office does not, unless otherwise stated, bind another.” United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App’x 920, 921",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "7 All emphases relating to the NPA are added unless otherwise specified.",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000340",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Richard M. Berman",
      "R. Alexander Acosta",
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States District Court",
      "Federal Bureau of Investigation",
      "United States Attorney's Office"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York",
      "Florida",
      "Southern District of Florida",
      "Southern District of New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "July 12, 2019"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:19-cr-00490-RMB",
      "Document 11",
      "391 F. App'x 920, 921",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000340"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}