{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "68 of 80",
    "document_number": "310-1",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 68 of 80\nhimself as well. Assuming that a person validly possesses the right to refrain from giving evidence against himself, he may invoke that right \"at any time.\" See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966); Commonwealth v. Dulaney, 295 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. 1972). The fact that Cosby did not assert any right to remain silent to the police or while sitting for the depositions is of no moment. Had his right to remain silent not been removed by D.A. Castor's decision, Cosby would have been at liberty to invoke that right at will. That Cosby did not do so at other junctures is not proof that he held the right but elected not to invoke it, as the trial court evidently reasoned. To assume an implicit waiver of the right violates a court's \"duty . . . to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,\" and to construe the existence of such rights broadly. Taylor, 230 A.3d at 1064 (quoting Boyd, supra). These legal commandments compel only one conclusion. Cosby did not invoke the Fifth Amendment before he incriminated himself because he was operating under the reasonable belief that D.A. Castor's decision not to prosecute him meant that \"the potential exposure to criminal punishment no longer exist[ed].\" Id. at 1065. Cosby could not invoke that which he no longer possessed, given the Commonwealth's assurances that he faced no risk of prosecution. Not only did D.A. Castor's unconditional decision not to prosecute Cosby strip Cosby of a fundamental constitutional right, but, because he was forced to testify, Cosby provided Constand's civil attorneys with evidence of Cosby's past use of drugs to facilitate his sexual exploits. Undoubtedly, this information hindered Cosby's ability to defend against the civil action, and led to a settlement for a significant amount of money. We are left with no doubt that Cosby relied to his detriment upon the district attorney's decision not to prosecute him. The question then becomes whether that reliance was reasonable. Unreasonable reliance warrants no legal remedy. [J-100-2020] - 67 DOJ-OGR-00004880",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 310-1 Filed 07/02/21 Page 68 of 80",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "himself as well. Assuming that a person validly possesses the right to refrain from giving evidence against himself, he may invoke that right \"at any time.\" See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966); Commonwealth v. Dulaney, 295 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. 1972). The fact that Cosby did not assert any right to remain silent to the police or while sitting for the depositions is of no moment. Had his right to remain silent not been removed by D.A. Castor's decision, Cosby would have been at liberty to invoke that right at will. That Cosby did not do so at other junctures is not proof that he held the right but elected not to invoke it, as the trial court evidently reasoned. To assume an implicit waiver of the right violates a court's \"duty . . . to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,\" and to construe the existence of such rights broadly. Taylor, 230 A.3d at 1064 (quoting Boyd, supra).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "These legal commandments compel only one conclusion. Cosby did not invoke the Fifth Amendment before he incriminated himself because he was operating under the reasonable belief that D.A. Castor's decision not to prosecute him meant that \"the potential exposure to criminal punishment no longer exist[ed].\" Id. at 1065. Cosby could not invoke that which he no longer possessed, given the Commonwealth's assurances that he faced no risk of prosecution. Not only did D.A. Castor's unconditional decision not to prosecute Cosby strip Cosby of a fundamental constitutional right, but, because he was forced to testify, Cosby provided Constand's civil attorneys with evidence of Cosby's past use of drugs to facilitate his sexual exploits. Undoubtedly, this information hindered Cosby's ability to defend against the civil action, and led to a settlement for a significant amount of money. We are left with no doubt that Cosby relied to his detriment upon the district attorney's decision not to prosecute him. The question then becomes whether that reliance was reasonable. Unreasonable reliance warrants no legal remedy.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[J-100-2020] - 67",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004880",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Cosby",
      "D.A. Castor",
      "Constand",
      "Miranda",
      "Arizona",
      "Dulaney",
      "Taylor",
      "Boyd"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Commonwealth"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Pa",
      "Arizona"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21",
      "1966",
      "1972"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "310-1",
      "384 U.S. 436",
      "295 A.2d 328",
      "230 A.3d 1064",
      "J-100-2020",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004880"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Bill Cosby, discussing his Fifth Amendment rights and the implications of D.A. Castor's decision not to prosecute him."
}