{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "311-4",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 10 of 27\nTo Be Filed Under Seal\nneed. Here such a showing was amply demonstrated. To have refused access to these records in the face of a subpoena from a grand jury would have been an abuse of discretion.\" Id. at 423.\nI will, therefore, consider the Government's application.\nB. The Martindell Standard Applies\nOrdinarily, \"Where there has been reasonable reliance by a party or deponent, a District Court should not modify a protective order granted under Rule 26(c).\" S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2001). However, the Second Circuit established a limited exception to this rule in Martindell v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979).\nMartindell arose after the Government made an informal, telephonic request to the district court in a stockholder derivative suit for access to deposition transcripts, which were subject to a protective order and which the Government planned to use in a criminal investigation. Id. at 293. The district court denied the Government's request to modify the protective order to enable it to access the transcripts. Id. Affirming the lower court, the Second Circuit reasoned that, when the Government moves to modify a protective order, it is especially appropriate to require a higher showing, because the Government both (i) possesses extraordinary police powers that it can use to obtain the information in other ways, and (ii) typically seeks the information \"in the context of a public investigation in which the assertion of a privilege might be of critical importance.\" In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295). The court concluded, \"After balancing the interests at stake, we are satisfied that, absent a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, none of which appear here, a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government,\n9\nSDNY_GM_00000883\nDOJ-OGR-00004933",
  "text_blocks": [
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 10 of 27",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To Be Filed Under Seal",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "need. Here such a showing was amply demonstrated. To have refused access to these records in the face of a subpoena from a grand jury would have been an abuse of discretion.\" Id. at 423.\nI will, therefore, consider the Government's application.\nB. The Martindell Standard Applies\nOrdinarily, \"Where there has been reasonable reliance by a party or deponent, a District Court should not modify a protective order granted under Rule 26(c).\" S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2001). However, the Second Circuit established a limited exception to this rule in Martindell v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979).\nMartindell arose after the Government made an informal, telephonic request to the district court in a stockholder derivative suit for access to deposition transcripts, which were subject to a protective order and which the Government planned to use in a criminal investigation. Id. at 293. The district court denied the Government's request to modify the protective order to enable it to access the transcripts. Id. Affirming the lower court, the Second Circuit reasoned that, when the Government moves to modify a protective order, it is especially appropriate to require a higher showing, because the Government both (i) possesses extraordinary police powers that it can use to obtain the information in other ways, and (ii) typically seeks the information \"in the context of a public investigation in which the assertion of a privilege might be of critical importance.\" In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Martindell, 594 F.2d at 295). The court concluded, \"After balancing the interests at stake, we are satisfied that, absent a showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, none of which appear here, a witness should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, including the Government,",
      "position": "main body"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "9",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "SDNY_GM_00000883",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004933",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "S.E.C.",
      "TheStreet.Com",
      "International Tel. and Tel. Corp.",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "E.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21",
      "2001",
      "1979",
      "1985",
      "1987"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "311-4",
      "273 F.3d 222",
      "594 F.2d 291",
      "104 F.R.D. 559",
      "821 F.2d 139",
      "SDNY_GM_00000883",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004933"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a header indicating it should be filed under seal. The content discusses legal precedents and the application of the Martindell standard regarding protective orders. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}