{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "127",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 127 of 239\nlawsuit against the defendant or took her deposition years before the Government initiated its own investigation. The defendant offers no evidence to the contrary, and there is no reason to believe, on this record, that the Government in any way controlled Boies Schiller when it litigated a civil case against the defendant. As such, the Fifth Amendment does not apply.\nThe defendant's claim further fails because without coercion or compulsion, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (rejecting claim that a \"failure to inform [the defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession at trial\"); United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) (\"Inculpatory statements are not involuntary when they result from a desire to cooperate, or from a defendant's ignorance of, or inattention to, his right to remain silent.\"); United States v. Mast, 735 F.2d 745, 750 (2d Cir. 1984) (same). The defendant implicitly argues that she only testified under oath in the civil matter because she thought she would not be held to that oath. In other words, had she known that she would be subject to the penalties of perjury, she would have invoked her Fifth Amendment right. But the defendant's misguided expectation that she would face no consequences cannot be said to coerce speech. The defendant, represented by able counsel, voluntarily chose to waive her Fifth Amendment rights and testify under oath. And she chose to do so in connection with civil depositions that occurred over two years before the Government opened its investigation. The circumstances surrounding that decision come nowhere near the type of coercion that rises to the level of a Fifth Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 464 F. Supp. 3d 621, 627-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding suppression of defendant's phone unwarranted where defendant complied with former employer's request to return the phone because defendant was not coerced into doing so, and rejecting defendant's argument that the\n100\nDOJ-OGR-00003061",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "lawsuit against the defendant or took her deposition years before the Government initiated its own investigation. The defendant offers no evidence to the contrary, and there is no reason to believe, on this record, that the Government in any way controlled Boies Schiller when it litigated a civil case against the defendant. As such, the Fifth Amendment does not apply.",
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      "content": "The defendant's claim further fails because without coercion or compulsion, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984) (rejecting claim that a \"failure to inform [the defendant] of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred use of his confession at trial\"); United States v. Mitchell, 966 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1992) (\"Inculpatory statements are not involuntary when they result from a desire to cooperate, or from a defendant's ignorance of, or inattention to, his right to remain silent.\"); United States v. Mast, 735 F.2d 745, 750 (2d Cir. 1984) (same). The defendant implicitly argues that she only testified under oath in the civil matter because she thought she would not be held to that oath. In other words, had she known that she would be subject to the penalties of perjury, she would have invoked her Fifth Amendment right. But the defendant's misguided expectation that she would face no consequences cannot be said to coerce speech. The defendant, represented by able counsel, voluntarily chose to waive her Fifth Amendment rights and testify under oath. And she chose to do so in connection with civil depositions that occurred over two years before the Government opened its investigation. The circumstances surrounding that decision come nowhere near the type of coercion that rises to the level of a Fifth Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 464 F. Supp. 3d 621, 627-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding suppression of defendant's phone unwarranted where defendant complied with former employer's request to return the phone because defendant was not coerced into doing so, and rejecting defendant's argument that the",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003061",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Boies Schiller"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003061"
    ]
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and easy to read. There are no visible redactions or damages."
}