{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "54",
    "document_number": "310-1",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "to prosecute a case\"); Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295 (noting that “the ultimate discretion to file criminal charges lies in the district attorney”). Clancy, 192 A.3d at 53 (cleaned up). As prosecutors are vested with such “tremendous” discretion and authority, our law has long recognized the special weight that must be accorded to their assurances. For instance, in the context of statements made during guilty plea negotiations, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that, as a matter of constitutional due process and as compelled by the principle of fundamental fairness, a defendant generally is entitled to the benefit of assurances made by the prosecutor. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).21 Santobello holds that, “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement by the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Id. at 262 (emphasis added). This Court has followed suit with regard to prosecutorial inducements made during the guilty plea process, insisting that such inducements comport with the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness. In Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976), during plea negotiations in a murder case, the prosecutor agreed to recommend to the sentencing court that Rickey Zuber receive a sentence of seven to fourteen years in prison if he pleaded guilty. Id. at 442-43. The prosecutor also agreed to consent to a request that Zuber's sentence be served concurrently with “back time” that Zuber was required to serve for a parole violation. Id. at 443. The prosecutor stated the terms of the agreement on the record, and the trial court accepted the terms of Zuber's guilty plea and 21 In Santobello, the Supreme Court of the United States did not state explicitly that it was premising its holding on due process guarantees. Nevertheless, it is only sensible to read Santobello's holding as resting upon due process principles because—as Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion—without a constitutional basis the Court would have lacked jurisdiction over what was otherwise a state law matter. See Santobello, 404 U.S., at 266-67 (Douglas, J. concurring). [J-100-2020] - 53 DOJ-OGR-00004866",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "to prosecute a case\"); Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295 (noting that “the ultimate discretion to file criminal charges lies in the district attorney”). Clancy, 192 A.3d at 53 (cleaned up). As prosecutors are vested with such “tremendous” discretion and authority, our law has long recognized the special weight that must be accorded to their assurances. For instance, in the context of statements made during guilty plea negotiations, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that, as a matter of constitutional due process and as compelled by the principle of fundamental fairness, a defendant generally is entitled to the benefit of assurances made by the prosecutor. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).21 Santobello holds that, “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement by the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Id. at 262 (emphasis added). This Court has followed suit with regard to prosecutorial inducements made during the guilty plea process, insisting that such inducements comport with the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness. In Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976), during plea negotiations in a murder case, the prosecutor agreed to recommend to the sentencing court that Rickey Zuber receive a sentence of seven to fourteen years in prison if he pleaded guilty. Id. at 442-43. The prosecutor also agreed to consent to a request that Zuber's sentence be served concurrently with “back time” that Zuber was required to serve for a parole violation. Id. at 443. The prosecutor stated the terms of the agreement on the record, and the trial court accepted the terms of Zuber's guilty plea and",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "21 In Santobello, the Supreme Court of the United States did not state explicitly that it was premising its holding on due process guarantees. Nevertheless, it is only sensible to read Santobello's holding as resting upon due process principles because—as Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion—without a constitutional basis the Court would have lacked jurisdiction over what was otherwise a state law matter. See Santobello, 404 U.S., at 266-67 (Douglas, J. concurring).",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[J-100-2020] - 53",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004866",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Justice Douglas",
      "Rickey Zuber"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court of the United States"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York",
      "Pennsylvania"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "1971",
      "1976",
      "07/02/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 310-1",
      "Page 54 of 80",
      "404 U.S. 257",
      "353 A.2d 441",
      "J-100-2020",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004866"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}