{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "34 of 38",
    "document_number": "142",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 142 Filed 02/04/21 Page 34 of 38\n\nambiguities are construed, as they must be, against the government as drafter. In the alternative, however, the NPA and the circumstances of its execution merit discovery and an evidentiary hearing regarding the parties' intent.\n\nTo the extent that extrinsic materials do not make the parties' intent clear, the Court is obligated to make a finding as to the parties' \"reasonable understanding,\" with ambiguities resolved in Ms. Maxwell's favor. See Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x at 270 (emphasis and citation omitted). Courts in this circuit have routinely recognized the need for evidentiary hearings where the existence or scope of a plea agreement or non-prosecution agreement is in genuine dispute. See, e.g., id. at 270 (noting testimony from defendant's attorney); United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2002) (remanding where \"the district court failed to make a record that allows us to determine the existence, scope and effect of an immunity agreement\"); Annabi, 771 F.2d at 671 (noting that district court heard testimony from two prosecutors, defendant, and defendant's counsel as of the time the plea agreement was reached); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing \"two evidentiary hearings\"); United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 WL 22510398, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) (noting conclusion that \"an evidentiary hearing was warranted . . . to determine whether an agreement existed, what its terms were, and whether there was compliance with those terms\").\n\nMs. Maxwell's request for an evidentiary hearing, and for discovery, is at least as strong as that in Feldman. There, the district court denied discovery to a defendant who claimed that the government had served a writ of execution in violation of oral representations made in connection with the defendant's plea agreement, holding that the agreement's merger provision barred the consideration of any oral agreements or representations. The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that \"while the district court's analysis might have been compelling with respect to a\n\n29\n\nDOJ-OGR-00002606",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 142 Filed 02/04/21 Page 34 of 38",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "ambiguities are construed, as they must be, against the government as drafter. In the alternative, however, the NPA and the circumstances of its execution merit discovery and an evidentiary hearing regarding the parties' intent.",
      "position": "top"
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      "content": "To the extent that extrinsic materials do not make the parties' intent clear, the Court is obligated to make a finding as to the parties' \"reasonable understanding,\" with ambiguities resolved in Ms. Maxwell's favor. See Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x at 270 (emphasis and citation omitted). Courts in this circuit have routinely recognized the need for evidentiary hearings where the existence or scope of a plea agreement or non-prosecution agreement is in genuine dispute. See, e.g., id. at 270 (noting testimony from defendant's attorney); United States v. Aleman, 286 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2002) (remanding where \"the district court failed to make a record that allows us to determine the existence, scope and effect of an immunity agreement\"); Annabi, 771 F.2d at 671 (noting that district court heard testimony from two prosecutors, defendant, and defendant's counsel as of the time the plea agreement was reached); United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing \"two evidentiary hearings\"); United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 WL 22510398, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) (noting conclusion that \"an evidentiary hearing was warranted . . . to determine whether an agreement existed, what its terms were, and whether there was compliance with those terms\").",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Ms. Maxwell's request for an evidentiary hearing, and for discovery, is at least as strong as that in Feldman. There, the district court denied discovery to a defendant who claimed that the government had served a writ of execution in violation of oral representations made in connection with the defendant's plea agreement, holding that the agreement's merger provision barred the consideration of any oral agreements or representations. The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that \"while the district court's analysis might have been compelling with respect to a",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002606",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Department of Justice"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "Nov. 5, 2003"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 142",
      "02 Cr. 395 (JGK)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002606"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a clear and legible format. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}