{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "15",
    "document_number": "338",
    "date": "10/12/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": true,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 338 Filed 10/12/21 Page 15 of 22\n\nSchneider failed to examine §3283's legislative history and thus concluded, \"§3283 has no restrictive language or legislative history suggesting Congressional intent to limit its application to specific subset of circumstances. Congress rather has evinced a general intention to 'cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.'\" citing Dodge (supra) at 1355. The purpose of this finding was to avoid the essential ingredient test laid out in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953). Bridges evaluates the language \"offense involving fraud\" in the context of a statute of limitation, and is thus directly on point. Note that the Dodge Court was evaluating SORNA which has nothing to do with §3283. There is no legitimate reason to distinguish Bridges, because as shown there is legislative history limiting §3283 to a specific subset of circumstances. Dodges also is based on a categorical test not an essential element test. A categorical approach would have required the Schneider court to create a \"common\" definition of sexual abuse, which for good reason the Schneider court failed to do. The court in Schneider\n\n2 Sexual Offender Registration Notification Act\n\nDOJ-OGR-00005193",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 338 Filed 10/12/21 Page 15 of 22",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "Schneider failed to examine §3283's legislative history and thus concluded, \"§3283 has no restrictive language or legislative history suggesting Congressional intent to limit its application to specific subset of circumstances. Congress rather has evinced a general intention to 'cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.'\" citing Dodge (supra) at 1355. The purpose of this finding was to avoid the essential ingredient test laid out in Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953). Bridges evaluates the language \"offense involving fraud\" in the context of a statute of limitation, and is thus directly on point. Note that the Dodge Court was evaluating SORNA which has nothing to do with §3283. There is no legitimate reason to distinguish Bridges, because as shown there is legislative history limiting §3283 to a specific subset of circumstances. Dodges also is based on a categorical test not an essential element test. A categorical approach would have required the Schneider court to create a \"common\" definition of sexual abuse, which for good reason the Schneider court failed to do. The court in Schneider",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "2 Sexual Offender Registration Notification Act",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005193",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Congress",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "10/12/21",
      "1953"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "338",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005193"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with handwritten notes. The handwriting is generally legible, but there are some minor instances of unclear or ambiguous text. The document includes citations to legal cases and statutes."
}