{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "5",
    "document_number": "246",
    "date": "04/23/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 246 Filed 04/23/21 Page 5 of 13\nThe Hon. Alison J. Nathan\nApril 22, 2021\nPage 5\nwould mandate a continuance. Ms. Maxwell must now: search various records (to the extent they are available) and track down numerous witnesses to determine her locations and activities during this expanded period. She must also identify employees who worked for Mr. Epstein during this time period to determine the scope of their knowledge about the allegations. These are time consuming and difficult tasks and Ms. Maxwell respectfully submits that denial of a continuance under these circumstances would constitute an abuse of discretion.\nIn United States v. Guzman, 754 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit reversed the defendant's conspiracy conviction, noting that:\n[W]e cannot agree with the government's contentions that the changes in Guzman's superseding indictment were insubstantial and that Guzman was therefore not prejudiced because forced to proceed immediately to trial on the conspiracy count. Even though the same evidence may have been presented to prove the existence of a two-year conspiracy as would have been used on the indictment charging a conspiracy of only two days, it cannot be disputed that in the proper preparation of a defense to the charge of a two-year conspiracy, counsel was required to review a far longer period of activity with his client.\nBy focusing on the prosecution's case and the fact that the evidence introduced at trial on the superseding indictment was the same as that which the government had expected to use at the first trial, the district court neglected to take into account the impact that the second indictment might have had on defense theories of the case, and the resultant need for a more extended preparation. Guzman's counsel had specifically indicated to Judge Platt that he needed more time to obtain proof that Guzman was not in the country until after the enlarged conspiracy period began. Regardless of the government's representation that it would offer no new evidence at the second trial, Guzman was entitled to the opportunity to pursue this new line of defense, which would not have been available to him under the original indictment. The district court abused its discretion in not granting defendant Guzman a reasonable continuance to prepare his defense to the charge of participation in a two-year conspiracy. Guzman's conviction on the conspiracy count is, accordingly, reversed.\nId. In the Guzman case, the conspiracy was expanded from two days to two years, and the Second Circuit found that the refusal to grant a continuance was an abuse of discretion. By contrast, the denial of a continuance may be upheld in cases where the changes to the indictment\n5\nDOJ-OGR-00003992",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 246 Filed 04/23/21 Page 5 of 13",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Hon. Alison J. Nathan\nApril 22, 2021\nPage 5",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "would mandate a continuance. Ms. Maxwell must now: search various records (to the extent they are available) and track down numerous witnesses to determine her locations and activities during this expanded period. She must also identify employees who worked for Mr. Epstein during this time period to determine the scope of their knowledge about the allegations. These are time consuming and difficult tasks and Ms. Maxwell respectfully submits that denial of a continuance under these circumstances would constitute an abuse of discretion.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In United States v. Guzman, 754 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit reversed the defendant's conspiracy conviction, noting that:",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[W]e cannot agree with the government's contentions that the changes in Guzman's superseding indictment were insubstantial and that Guzman was therefore not prejudiced because forced to proceed immediately to trial on the conspiracy count. Even though the same evidence may have been presented to prove the existence of a two-year conspiracy as would have been used on the indictment charging a conspiracy of only two days, it cannot be disputed that in the proper preparation of a defense to the charge of a two-year conspiracy, counsel was required to review a far longer period of activity with his client.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "By focusing on the prosecution's case and the fact that the evidence introduced at trial on the superseding indictment was the same as that which the government had expected to use at the first trial, the district court neglected to take into account the impact that the second indictment might have had on defense theories of the case, and the resultant need for a more extended preparation. Guzman's counsel had specifically indicated to Judge Platt that he needed more time to obtain proof that Guzman was not in the country until after the enlarged conspiracy period began. Regardless of the government's representation that it would offer no new evidence at the second trial, Guzman was entitled to the opportunity to pursue this new line of defense, which would not have been available to him under the original indictment. The district court abused its discretion in not granting defendant Guzman a reasonable continuance to prepare his defense to the charge of participation in a two-year conspiracy. Guzman's conviction on the conspiracy count is, accordingly, reversed.",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Id. In the Guzman case, the conspiracy was expanded from two days to two years, and the Second Circuit found that the refusal to grant a continuance was an abuse of discretion. By contrast, the denial of a continuance may be upheld in cases where the changes to the indictment",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003992",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Mr. Epstein",
      "Guzman",
      "Judge Platt"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "April 22, 2021",
      "04/23/21",
      "1985"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 246",
      "754 F.2d 482",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003992"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell, with references to a previous case involving Guzman. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}