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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 13 of 25\nretroactivity provision. PROTECT Act, S. 151, 108th Cong. (as engrossed in the Senate, Feb. 24. 2003). When the House and Senate conferenced to resolve differences between the bills, the retroactivity provision was omitted. As Senator Leahy, one of the bill's original co-sponsors and a former chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated on the Senate floor, the omission was intentional: \"I am pleased that the conference agreed to drop language from the original House-passed bill that would have extended the limitations period retroactively.\" Senator Leahy, Amber Legislation, Cong. Rec. 149:50, S5147 (2003).\n\nSuch a clear expression of congressional intent should end the Landgraf analysis at the first step. In applying Landgraf, the Supreme Court has made clear that the \"expressly prescribed\" analysis is not limited to the text of the statute, but may look to legislative history. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 355-57 (1999) (examining \"structure and legislative history\" as part of first Landgraf step); see also Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F. 3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (\"our inquiry is not limited to the statutory text but may include an examination of standard ensigns of statutory construction, such as the statute's structure and legislative history\"). Indeed, Landgraf itself included a legislative history analysis. 511 U.S. at 264. In Landgraf, however, the Court concluded that the legislative history at issue did not clearly evidence Congress' intent regarding retroactivity. Id. That is not the case here.\n\nAs Judge Katzmann of the Second Circuit has recognized, unambiguous legislative history should not be disregarded:\n\nWhen courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators consider their work product, the judiciary not only is more likely to reach the correct result, but also promotes comity with the first branch of government. It is a bipartisan institutional perspective within Congress that courts should consider reliable legislative history and that failing to do so impugns Congress' workways.\n\nRobert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014), at 36. Consideration and rejection by Congress of a legislative proposal is one of the clearest expressions of congressional intent, and courts\n7\nDOJ-OGR-00002661",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "retroactivity provision. PROTECT Act, S. 151, 108th Cong. (as engrossed in the Senate, Feb. 24. 2003). When the House and Senate conferenced to resolve differences between the bills, the retroactivity provision was omitted. As Senator Leahy, one of the bill's original co-sponsors and a former chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated on the Senate floor, the omission was intentional: \"I am pleased that the conference agreed to drop language from the original House-passed bill that would have extended the limitations period retroactively.\" Senator Leahy, Amber Legislation, Cong. Rec. 149:50, S5147 (2003).\n\nSuch a clear expression of congressional intent should end the Landgraf analysis at the first step. In applying Landgraf, the Supreme Court has made clear that the \"expressly prescribed\" analysis is not limited to the text of the statute, but may look to legislative history. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 355-57 (1999) (examining \"structure and legislative history\" as part of first Landgraf step); see also Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F. 3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (\"our inquiry is not limited to the statutory text but may include an examination of standard ensigns of statutory construction, such as the statute's structure and legislative history\"). Indeed, Landgraf itself included a legislative history analysis. 511 U.S. at 264. In Landgraf, however, the Court concluded that the legislative history at issue did not clearly evidence Congress' intent regarding retroactivity. Id. That is not the case here.\n\nAs Judge Katzmann of the Second Circuit has recognized, unambiguous legislative history should not be disregarded:\n\nWhen courts construe statutes in ways that respect what legislators consider their work product, the judiciary not only is more likely to reach the correct result, but also promotes comity with the first branch of government. It is a bipartisan institutional perspective within Congress that courts should consider reliable legislative history and that failing to do so impugns Congress' workways.\n\nRobert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014), at 36. Consideration and rejection by Congress of a legislative proposal is one of the clearest expressions of congressional intent, and courts",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Senator Leahy",
      "Robert A. Katzmann",
      "Martin",
      "Hadix",
      "Lattab",
      "Ashcroft"
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    "organizations": [
      "Senate Judiciary Committee",
      "Supreme Court",
      "Second Circuit",
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    "dates": [
      "Feb. 24, 2003",
      "2014"
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      "S. 151",
      "Cong. Rec. 149:50, S5147",
      "527 U.S. 343",
      "384 F. 3d 8",
      "511 U.S. at 264",
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 144"
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