{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "50",
    "document_number": "310-1",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "law, . . . appellate courts have the power to draw their own inferences and make their own deductions and conclusions.\" In re Pruner's Est., 162 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 1960) (citations omitted).\n\nHere, the trial court presided over the habeas corpus hearing, viewing and hearing the witnesses and their testimonies first-hand. From that vantage point, the trial court determined that, as a matter of fact, D.A. Castor had not extended a formal promise to Cosby never to prosecute him, let alone consummated a formal non-prosecution agreement with Cosby. The factual basis for the court's findings was two-fold. First, the court characterized the interaction between the district attorney and Cosby as a failed attempt to reach a statutorily prescribed transactional immunity agreement. Second, the court concluded that the former district attorney's testimony regarding the legal relationship between him and Cosby was inconsistent and \"equivocal at best.\" T.C.O. at 63. Both findings are supported adequately by the record.\n\nPursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947, when a prosecutor wishes to formalize an immunity agreement, he or she \"may request an immunity order from any judge of a designated court.\" Id. § 5947(b). Presented with such a request, the petitioned court \"shall issue such an order,\" id., upon which a witness \"may not refuse to testify based on his privilege against self-incrimination.\" Id. § 5947(c). At the habeas hearing, former District Attorney Castor testified that he intended to provide Cosby with transactional immunity. He explained that this conferral was predicated upon the state's common-law authority as a sovereign rather than any statutory provisions or protocols. T.C.O. at 57 (citing N.T., 2/2/2016, at 232, 234, 236). The record does not contradict his testimony. There is no evidence, nor any real contention, that the parties even contemplated a grant of immunity under Section 5947. The trial court's finding that the interaction between D.A. Castor and",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "law, . . . appellate courts have the power to draw their own inferences and make their own deductions and conclusions.\" In re Pruner's Est., 162 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 1960) (citations omitted).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Here, the trial court presided over the habeas corpus hearing, viewing and hearing the witnesses and their testimonies first-hand. From that vantage point, the trial court determined that, as a matter of fact, D.A. Castor had not extended a formal promise to Cosby never to prosecute him, let alone consummated a formal non-prosecution agreement with Cosby. The factual basis for the court's findings was two-fold. First, the court characterized the interaction between the district attorney and Cosby as a failed attempt to reach a statutorily prescribed transactional immunity agreement. Second, the court concluded that the former district attorney's testimony regarding the legal relationship between him and Cosby was inconsistent and \"equivocal at best.\" T.C.O. at 63. Both findings are supported adequately by the record.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947, when a prosecutor wishes to formalize an immunity agreement, he or she \"may request an immunity order from any judge of a designated court.\" Id. § 5947(b). Presented with such a request, the petitioned court \"shall issue such an order,\" id., upon which a witness \"may not refuse to testify based on his privilege against self-incrimination.\" Id. § 5947(c). At the habeas hearing, former District Attorney Castor testified that he intended to provide Cosby with transactional immunity. He explained that this conferral was predicated upon the state's common-law authority as a sovereign rather than any statutory provisions or protocols. T.C.O. at 57 (citing N.T., 2/2/2016, at 232, 234, 236). The record does not contradict his testimony. There is no evidence, nor any real contention, that the parties even contemplated a grant of immunity under Section 5947. The trial court's finding that the interaction between D.A. Castor and",
      "position": "middle"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Cosby",
      "D.A. Castor",
      "Pruner"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "District Attorney's Office"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Pennsylvania"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "07/02/21",
      "2/2/2016",
      "1960"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 310-1",
      "42 Pa.C.S. § 5947",
      "162 A.2d 626"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court transcript or legal brief. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and easy to read."
}