{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "8 of 22",
    "document_number": "338",
    "date": "10/12/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": true,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 338 Filed 10/12/21 Page 8 of 22\nPlain Language\nwhen Congress wants to include exploitation they say so. see Patterson v. Schirlc 12009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 87501 (Dist AZ 2009) (treating 'sexual or physical abuse' seperate from exploitation); western Platinum Btrtels Ins. Co. ... 624 F. Supp 2d 1292 (W.D. WA 2009) (same); united states V. Pharis , 176 F. 3d 434, 436 (5th cirl 1999) (Same). Also see 18 usc §1101 (CA) (43)(a) versus (1). \"To determine the meaning of a statute, we first look to the text of the statute itself, if the statute is unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written ... If the language is ambiguous, legislative history can be helpful to determine congressional intent. 'Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor' we cannot read a single word of provision of the statute in isolation.\" united States V. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2010).\nThis guidance was ignored entirely by the Fifth Circuit. First, the court ignored the fact that the statute of limitation was mistiled for complitly unknown reasons as the first sentence of civil stay language at 33509(6) in 1990. Several proposals targetted the limitations, Chapter (213) from the start. see Lavine H.R. 4882, may 4, 1990, Dewine No. R 3752 Feb 6, 1990.\nDOJ-OGR-00005186",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 338 Filed 10/12/21 Page 8 of 22",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "Plain Language\nwhen Congress wants to include exploitation they say so. see Patterson v. Schirlc 12009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 87501 (Dist AZ 2009) (treating 'sexual or physical abuse' seperate from exploitation); western Platinum Btrtels Ins. Co. ... 624 F. Supp 2d 1292 (W.D. WA 2009) (same); united states V. Pharis , 176 F. 3d 434, 436 (5th cirl 1999) (Same). Also see 18 usc §1101 (CA) (43)(a) versus (1). \"To determine the meaning of a statute, we first look to the text of the statute itself, if the statute is unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written ... If the language is ambiguous, legislative history can be helpful to determine congressional intent. 'Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor' we cannot read a single word of provision of the statute in isolation.\" united States V. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2010).\nThis guidance was ignored entirely by the Fifth Circuit. First, the court ignored the fact that the statute of limitation was mistiled for complitly unknown reasons as the first sentence of civil stay language at 33509(6) in 1990. Several proposals targetted the limitations, Chapter (213) from the start. see Lavine H.R. 4882, may 4, 1990, Dewine No. R 3752 Feb 6, 1990.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005186",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Patterson",
      "Schirlc",
      "Pharis",
      "Dodge",
      "Lavine",
      "Dewine"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Congress",
      "Fifth Circuit",
      "Eleventh Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "AZ",
      "WA"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "2009",
      "1999",
      "2010",
      "1990",
      "10/12/21",
      "May 4, 1990",
      "Feb 6, 1990"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "338",
      "18 usc §1101",
      "33509(6)",
      "H.R. 4882",
      "R 3752",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005186"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with handwritten notes. The handwriting is generally legible, but there are some minor errors in transcription due to the quality of the image."
}