{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "338",
    "date": "10/12/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": true,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 338 Filed 10/12/21 Page 10 of 22 5 simply put, there was never any In Pari materia between courtroom procedural rules and the Statute of limitations Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (in general). See United States v. McElaney, 54 F.3d 120, 126 (539(k) stands alone). The second major problem with the Fifth Circuit's non-principled interpretation is that it is not \"holistic.\" The fact §3283 defines child itself (instead of using §3501(a)), and §3509(a) doesn't include either physical abuse or kidnapping was just ignored entirely. Also ignored was the misfiling, and the fact that §3283 has the odd quality of superceeding other statutes of limitations. The Fifth Circuit found a definition of sexual abuse they felt could pass as including 18 U.S.C. §2251(a), and that was the end of the analysis. To top it off the Fifth Circuit had previously found, in an in banc hearing, §3509(a)(8) was not acceptable as a definition of sexual abuse. See Contreras v. Holder, 754 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2014) (§3509 is \"directly contrary to the definitional method mandated in our Circuit.\" Citing United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541, 550 (5th Cir. 2013)). Biden's S. 1965 (1990) combined stay language with limitation",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 338 Filed 10/12/21 Page 10 of 22 5",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "simply put, there was never any In Pari materia between courtroom procedural rules and the Statute of limitations Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (in general). See United States v. McElaney, 54 F.3d 120, 126 (539(k) stands alone). The second major problem with the Fifth Circuit's non-principled interpretation is that it is not \"holistic.\" The fact §3283 defines child itself (instead of using §3501(a)), and §3509(a) doesn't include either physical abuse or kidnapping was just ignored entirely. Also ignored was the misfiling, and the fact that §3283 has the odd quality of superceeding other statutes of limitations. The Fifth Circuit found a definition of sexual abuse they felt could pass as including 18 U.S.C. §2251(a), and that was the end of the analysis. To top it off the Fifth Circuit had previously found, in an in banc hearing, §3509(a)(8) was not acceptable as a definition of sexual abuse. See Contreras v. Holder, 754 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2014) (§3509 is \"directly contrary to the definitional method mandated in our Circuit.\" Citing United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541, 550 (5th Cir. 2013)). Biden's S. 1965 (1990) combined stay language with limitation",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "handwritten",
      "content": "2. Biden's S. 1965 (1990) combined stay language with limitation",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005188",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Biden"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Fifth Circuit",
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/12/21",
      "1990"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "338",
      "S. 1965"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with handwritten notes. The handwriting is generally legible, but there are some instances of unclear or ambiguous text. There are no visible stamps or redactions."
}