{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "230",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 230 of 239\nit is inapposite as well: both cases appear to concern instances in which the grand jury and trial jury sat in the same courthouse, and thus there was no cause to consider whether the same \"community\" was relevant to separate challenges to the grand and petit juries. See United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, neither case supports the proposition that where a defendant is challenging the selection of the grand jury, the relevant \"community\" is the population of the location in which her trial will be held. Such a comparison is unjustified, as Bahna makes clear: That case appears to involve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the \"Long Island Division.\" Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise.\nThe defendant's proposed rule—comparing the composition of the grand jury venire to the population of the expected trial location—makes little legal or practical sense. Where, as here, the defendant's challenge is to the indictment, the proceeding for which the defendant is entitled to expect a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is not the trial, but the grand jury proceeding itself. Indeed, that must be the case, as it is not yet determined where the trial in this matter will in fact occur. The defendant assumes that her trial will ultimately be held at the Manhattan courthouse. While that is likely to be the case, it is not necessarily so. Bahna again illustrates the point, as a case originally tried in Brooklyn was reassigned to Uniondale for the retrial \"to accommodate trial congestion in the court's calendar during a period of judicial emergency . . .\" United States v. Soares, 66 F. Supp. 2d 391, 397 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). In the\n203\nDOJ-OGR-00003164",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 230 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "it is inapposite as well: both cases appear to concern instances in which the grand jury and trial jury sat in the same courthouse, and thus there was no cause to consider whether the same \"community\" was relevant to separate challenges to the grand and petit juries. See United States v. Johnson, 21 F. Supp. 2d 329, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Kenny, 883 F. Supp. 869, 874-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). As such, neither case supports the proposition that where a defendant is challenging the selection of the grand jury, the relevant \"community\" is the population of the location in which her trial will be held. Such a comparison is unjustified, as Bahna makes clear: That case appears to involve conduct that occurred in Brooklyn, appears to have been indicted in Brooklyn, was originally tried in Brooklyn, and was later transferred to Uniondale, where it was tried with a jury drawn from the \"Long Island Division.\" Yet the Second Circuit rejected the defendant's claimed entitlement to a jury drawn from Kings, Queens and Richmond counties, or the entire Eastern District, because that argument—like the defendant's here—was based on a flawed premise.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant's proposed rule—comparing the composition of the grand jury venire to the population of the expected trial location—makes little legal or practical sense. Where, as here, the defendant's challenge is to the indictment, the proceeding for which the defendant is entitled to expect a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is not the trial, but the grand jury proceeding itself. Indeed, that must be the case, as it is not yet determined where the trial in this matter will in fact occur. The defendant assumes that her trial will ultimately be held at the Manhattan courthouse. While that is likely to be the case, it is not necessarily so. Bahna again illustrates the point, as a case originally tried in Brooklyn was reassigned to Uniondale for the retrial \"to accommodate trial congestion in the court's calendar during a period of judicial emergency . . .\" United States v. Soares, 66 F. Supp. 2d 391, 397 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). In the",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "203",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003164",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "United States",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Brooklyn",
      "Uniondale",
      "Manhattan",
      "Kings",
      "Queens",
      "Richmond counties",
      "Eastern District",
      "Long Island Division"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1998",
      "1995",
      "1999"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "21 F. Supp. 2d 329",
      "883 F. Supp. 869",
      "66 F. Supp. 2d 391",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003164"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is likely a page from a larger filing, as indicated by the page number and document number in the header."
}