{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "29",
    "document_number": "142",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 142 Filed 02/04/21 Page 29 of 38\ndrafted and executed by the government's agents in the SDFL, and because Epstein performed under the contract by entering a plea in a Florida court, any conflict of laws between the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit should be resolved in favor of the application of Eleventh Circuit law to the NPA.\nThe Eleventh Circuit has not directly addressed whether a plea agreement or non-prosecution agreement signed by one USAO is binding on a USAO in another district. But it may be presumed, as it frequently is when predicting how a state's highest court would rule in a case of first impression, that the Eleventh Circuit would follow the weight of authority. See, e.g., Crutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. Kan. 1976) (\"if state law is silent and there is a conflict of authority in other jurisdictions, the federal court construing the law of the state will assume that the state court would follow the weight of authority\").\nHere, the weight of authority holds that, at least when a plea agreement refers to \"the United States\" or \"the Government,\" it binds USAOs in all districts absent a provision to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 547-49 (3d Cir. 2002) (characterizing the Second Circuit's statement in Annabi as an \"illogical posture\" unsupported by the prior Second Circuit cases on which it relied); United States v. Van Thornout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996) (\"Absent an express limitation, any promises made by an Assistant United States Attorney in one district will bind an Assistant United States Attorney in another district.\"); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986) (\"It is the Government at large--not just specific United States Attorneys or United States 'Districts'--that is bound by plea agreements negotiated by agents of Government.\"). In Gebbie, the Third Circuit analyzed Annabi and its predecessor Second Circuit cases in detail, concluding that the statement\n24\nDOJ-OGR-00002601",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 142 Filed 02/04/21 Page 29 of 38",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "drafted and executed by the government's agents in the SDFL, and because Epstein performed under the contract by entering a plea in a Florida court, any conflict of laws between the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit should be resolved in favor of the application of Eleventh Circuit law to the NPA.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Eleventh Circuit has not directly addressed whether a plea agreement or non-prosecution agreement signed by one USAO is binding on a USAO in another district. But it may be presumed, as it frequently is when predicting how a state's highest court would rule in a case of first impression, that the Eleventh Circuit would follow the weight of authority. See, e.g., Crutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. Kan. 1976) (\"if state law is silent and there is a conflict of authority in other jurisdictions, the federal court construing the law of the state will assume that the state court would follow the weight of authority\").",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Here, the weight of authority holds that, at least when a plea agreement refers to \"the United States\" or \"the Government,\" it binds USAOs in all districts absent a provision to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 547-49 (3d Cir. 2002) (characterizing the Second Circuit's statement in Annabi as an \"illogical posture\" unsupported by the prior Second Circuit cases on which it relied); United States v. Van Thornout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996) (\"Absent an express limitation, any promises made by an Assistant United States Attorney in one district will bind an Assistant United States Attorney in another district.\"); United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986) (\"It is the Government at large--not just specific United States Attorneys or United States 'Districts'--that is bound by plea agreements negotiated by agents of Government.\"). In Gebbie, the Third Circuit analyzed Annabi and its predecessor Second Circuit cases in detail, concluding that the statement",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "24",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002601",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Epstein",
      "Hess",
      "Gebbie",
      "Annabi",
      "Van Thornout",
      "Harvey"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Eleventh Circuit",
      "Third Circuit",
      "Fourth Circuit",
      "Eighth Circuit",
      "United States Attorney's Office",
      "Department of Justice"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Florida",
      "SDFL",
      "Kansas"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "1976",
      "2002",
      "1996",
      "1986"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "142",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002601",
      "408 F. Supp. 548",
      "294 F.3d 540",
      "100 F.3d 590",
      "791 F.2d 294"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 29 of 38."
}