{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "11",
    "document_number": "223",
    "date": "04/20/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 223 Filed 04/20/21 Page 11 of 23\n\nIn sum, the Indictment itself establishes Ms. Maxwell as a “potential co-conspirator of Epstein,” and the clear weight of authority vests her with standing to enforce the co-conspirator immunity provision as a third-party beneficiary.\n\nII. The Co-Conspirator Immunity Provision is Not Limited to the SDFL.\n\nMs. Maxwell demonstrated in her opening brief that the NPA, read as a whole, creates an affirmative appearance that the parties intended the co-conspirator immunity provision—unlike Epstein’s immunity provision—to apply outside the Southern District of Florida (“SDFL”). In arguing that the NPA’s selective use of language limiting the scope of Epstein’s immunity applies to the entire NPA, the government inverts fundamental principles of contract law and asks the Court to read nonexistent limitations into the NPA. The government then, incredibly, proceeds to fault Ms. Maxwell—a nonparty to the NPA—for failing to possess and produce evidence regarding the parties’ intent in negotiating the agreement. While the text of the NPA, read using basic principles of contractual interpretation, unambiguously prohibits the government from prosecuting Epstein’s potential co-conspirators in any district, to the extent that the Court finds it necessary to consider extrinsic evidence, that evidence is in the hands of the government and Epstein’s attorneys—and thus Ms. Maxwell should be permitted to obtain it through discovery.\n\nThe government argues that application of the co-conspirator immunity provision beyond the SDFL is barred by United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), in which the Second Circuit stated that “[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.” Id. at 672.4 Ms. Maxwell’s opening brief\n\n4 Contrary to the government’s suggestion, no court has held that an “affirmative[] appear[ance]” requires an explicit “promise to bind other districts.” See Opp. 4. Rather, in interpreting a plea agreement, “[t]he court looks to the",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 223 Filed 04/20/21 Page 11 of 23",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In sum, the Indictment itself establishes Ms. Maxwell as a “potential co-conspirator of Epstein,” and the clear weight of authority vests her with standing to enforce the co-conspirator immunity provision as a third-party beneficiary.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "II. The Co-Conspirator Immunity Provision is Not Limited to the SDFL.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Ms. Maxwell demonstrated in her opening brief that the NPA, read as a whole, creates an affirmative appearance that the parties intended the co-conspirator immunity provision—unlike Epstein’s immunity provision—to apply outside the Southern District of Florida (“SDFL”). In arguing that the NPA’s selective use of language limiting the scope of Epstein’s immunity applies to the entire NPA, the government inverts fundamental principles of contract law and asks the Court to read nonexistent limitations into the NPA. The government then, incredibly, proceeds to fault Ms. Maxwell—a nonparty to the NPA—for failing to possess and produce evidence regarding the parties’ intent in negotiating the agreement. While the text of the NPA, read using basic principles of contractual interpretation, unambiguously prohibits the government from prosecuting Epstein’s potential co-conspirators in any district, to the extent that the Court finds it necessary to consider extrinsic evidence, that evidence is in the hands of the government and Epstein’s attorneys—and thus Ms. Maxwell should be permitted to obtain it through discovery.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government argues that application of the co-conspirator immunity provision beyond the SDFL is barred by United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), in which the Second Circuit stated that “[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction.” Id. at 672.4 Ms. Maxwell’s opening brief",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4 Contrary to the government’s suggestion, no court has held that an “affirmative[] appear[ance]” requires an explicit “promise to bind other districts.” See Opp. 4. Rather, in interpreting a plea agreement, “[t]he court looks to the",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "7",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003884",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States Attorney"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Southern District of Florida",
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/20/21",
      "1985"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 223",
      "771 F.2d 670"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Ms. Maxwell, discussing the interpretation of a co-conspirator immunity provision in a plea agreement. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}