{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "26 of 34",
    "document_number": "285",
    "date": "05/20/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 285 Filed 05/20/21 Page 26 of 34\nreports were replete with misrepresentations and outright lies about the conversations he had with, and information provided by, a confidential informant. Id. at 1212–13. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order suppressing the evidence obtained from the search conducted under the warrant. Id. at 1213. “This search,” said the Court, “never should have taken place.” Id.\nThe Court offered two bases for its decision. It first invoked the Franks analysis to affirm the district court's conclusion that Agent Brown intentionally or recklessly misrepresented material information in Agent Stewart's affidavit. Id. But the Court went further, concluding that suppression was independently required as a matter of inherent authority. Id. at 1214–17. Because Agent Brown lied in the affidavit (in addition to lying at the Franks hearing), “[t]he call for the court's supervisory power under the[] circumstances is at its strongest and most defensible.” Id. at 1214.\nThe Court recognized that the inherent authority doctrine is not a free pass for courts to suppress evidence or “merely [to] disagree with the method[s] of law enforcement.” Id. “[T]he federal supervisory power does not give ‘the federal judiciary a ‘chancellor's foot’ veto over law enforcement practices of which it (does) not approve.” Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)). Even so, inherent authority is properly invoked to “prevent[] the court from condoning a fraud perpetrated upon it.” Id. Suppression serves both to deter unlawful governmental conduct and to protect judicial integrity. Id. (weighing “the deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated . . . and the need to protect the integrity of the federal courts against the cost to society of excluding ‘probative but tainted evidence”).\n21\nDOJ-OGR-00004161",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 285 Filed 05/20/21 Page 26 of 34",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "reports were replete with misrepresentations and outright lies about the conversations he had with, and information provided by, a confidential informant. Id. at 1212–13. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order suppressing the evidence obtained from the search conducted under the warrant. Id. at 1213. “This search,” said the Court, “never should have taken place.” Id.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court offered two bases for its decision. It first invoked the Franks analysis to affirm the district court's conclusion that Agent Brown intentionally or recklessly misrepresented material information in Agent Stewart's affidavit. Id. But the Court went further, concluding that suppression was independently required as a matter of inherent authority. Id. at 1214–17. Because Agent Brown lied in the affidavit (in addition to lying at the Franks hearing), “[t]he call for the court's supervisory power under the[] circumstances is at its strongest and most defensible.” Id. at 1214.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court recognized that the inherent authority doctrine is not a free pass for courts to suppress evidence or “merely [to] disagree with the method[s] of law enforcement.” Id. “[T]he federal supervisory power does not give ‘the federal judiciary a ‘chancellor's foot’ veto over law enforcement practices of which it (does) not approve.” Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)). Even so, inherent authority is properly invoked to “prevent[] the court from condoning a fraud perpetrated upon it.” Id. Suppression serves both to deter unlawful governmental conduct and to protect judicial integrity. Id. (weighing “the deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights the police have violated . . . and the need to protect the integrity of the federal courts against the cost to society of excluding ‘probative but tainted evidence”).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "21",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004161",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Agent Brown",
      "Agent Stewart"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court of Appeals",
      "federal judiciary"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "05/20/21",
      "1973"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 285",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004161",
      "411 U.S. 423"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 26 of 34."
}