{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "20",
    "document_number": "144",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 20 of 25\n\nId. Similarly, an \"offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years\" is an offense in which such sexual abuse, physical abuse, or kidnapping is an element of the offense.\n\nThe Eighth Circuit concluded as much in United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011). There, the court held that § 3283 did not apply to a charge of possession of child pornography. Id. at 817-18. The court clearly looked to the elements of the statute, as the facts of the case did involve the sexual abuse of a child, including the production and possession of child pornography. Id. at 813-14. Yet the court held that, on the same set of facts, the offense of possession of child pornography did not involve sexual abuse and thus was subject to the general statute of limitations, but the offense of production of child pornography did involve sexual abuse and was subject to § 3283: \"That a producer of child pornography will possess it at the time of the abuse is insufficient to change our view that the offense of possessing child pornography itself does not involve an act against a child, i.e., the sexual abuse of a child.\" Id. at 817.\n\nCoutentos demonstrates that the \"offense involving\" language of § 3283, as with other statutes, requires the court to look to the elements of the offense, rather than the facts of a particular case, to determine whether a particular offense \"involves\" the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child. Id. at 817. This approach makes practical sense: If the applicability of § 3283 depended on the facts of a particular case, rather than the elements of the offense, the government would effectively be required to prove conduct beyond the elements of the offense-i.e., that sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping occurred-in order to prove that its charges are not time-barred.\n\n14\nDOJ-OGR-00002668",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 20 of 25",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Id. Similarly, an \"offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18 years\" is an offense in which such sexual abuse, physical abuse, or kidnapping is an element of the offense.\n\nThe Eighth Circuit concluded as much in United States v. Coutentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011). There, the court held that § 3283 did not apply to a charge of possession of child pornography. Id. at 817-18. The court clearly looked to the elements of the statute, as the facts of the case did involve the sexual abuse of a child, including the production and possession of child pornography. Id. at 813-14. Yet the court held that, on the same set of facts, the offense of possession of child pornography did not involve sexual abuse and thus was subject to the general statute of limitations, but the offense of production of child pornography did involve sexual abuse and was subject to § 3283: \"That a producer of child pornography will possess it at the time of the abuse is insufficient to change our view that the offense of possessing child pornography itself does not involve an act against a child, i.e., the sexual abuse of a child.\" Id. at 817.\n\nCoutentos demonstrates that the \"offense involving\" language of § 3283, as with other statutes, requires the court to look to the elements of the offense, rather than the facts of a particular case, to determine whether a particular offense \"involves\" the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child. Id. at 817. This approach makes practical sense: If the applicability of § 3283 depended on the facts of a particular case, rather than the elements of the offense, the government would effectively be required to prove conduct beyond the elements of the offense-i.e., that sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping occurred-in order to prove that its charges are not time-barred.",
      "position": "main content"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "14",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002668",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
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    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "2011"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 144",
      "651 F.3d 809",
      "§ 3283",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002668"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the interpretation of a specific statute (§ 3283) and its application to offenses involving child abuse or pornography. The text is well-formatted and legible, with no visible redactions or damage."
}