{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "110",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 110 of 239\nexpectation of privacy in the places and items that were searched; and (2) whether that expectation was one that society accepts as reasonable. Id. It is axiomatic that \"[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.\" Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).\n\nUnder the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment \"does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities.\" United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Supreme Court has long held that \"a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,\" Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979), \"even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose,\" Miller, 425 U.S. 435, at 443. Exceptions to the applicability of the third party doctrine are narrow. For example, in Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220, the Supreme Court declined to extend the third party doctrine to cell site location information, holding that \"a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.\" 138 S. Ct. at 2222. However, the Court stressed that its holding was \"a narrow one,\" with specific consideration given to \"the unique nature of cell phone location information,\" id. at 2220, which \"provides an intimate window into a person's life,\" id. at 2217.\n\n\"The law is clear that the burden on the defendant to establish [Fourth Amendment] standing is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge.\" United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.1.\n83\nDOJ-OGR-00003044",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 110 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "expectation of privacy in the places and items that were searched; and (2) whether that expectation was one that society accepts as reasonable. Id. It is axiomatic that \"[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.\" Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, n.1; see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).\n\nUnder the third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment \"does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities.\" United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Supreme Court has long held that \"a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,\" Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979), \"even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose,\" Miller, 425 U.S. 435, at 443. Exceptions to the applicability of the third party doctrine are narrow. For example, in Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220, the Supreme Court declined to extend the third party doctrine to cell site location information, holding that \"a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.\" 138 S. Ct. at 2222. However, the Court stressed that its holding was \"a narrow one,\" with specific consideration given to \"the unique nature of cell phone location information,\" id. at 2220, which \"provides an intimate window into a person's life,\" id. at 2217.\n\n\"The law is clear that the burden on the defendant to establish [Fourth Amendment] standing is met only by sworn evidence, in the form of affidavit or testimony, from the defendant or someone with personal knowledge.\" United States v. Montoya-Eschevarria, 892 F. Supp. 104, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Ulbricht, No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF), 2014 WL 5090039, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2014); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130 n.1.",
      "position": "main body"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "83",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003044",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Kentucky",
      "Maryland",
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1976",
      "1979",
      "1980",
      "1995",
      "2014",
      "Oct. 10, 2014"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "439 U.S. 130",
      "448 U.S. 98",
      "425 U.S. 435",
      "442 U.S. 735",
      "138 S. Ct. 2220",
      "892 F. Supp. 104",
      "No. 14 Cr. 68 (KBF)",
      "2014 WL 5090039"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the third-party doctrine and Fourth Amendment rights. The text is printed and legible, with no visible handwriting or stamps."
}