{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "138",
    "date": "02/04/21",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 138 Filed 02/04/21 Page 10 of 26\nconsider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.\" United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977); United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1158 (11th Cir. 1983). A defendant's showing of prejudice triggers a \"sensitive balancing of the government's need for an investigative delay ... against the prejudice asserted by the defendant.\" United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977). For example, a delay caused by a good-faith ongoing investigation will generally not be considered a due process violation. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791. Governmental delay caused by \"sinister\" reasons that prejudice a defendant require dismissal of an indictment. \"Sinister\" motives include using the delay to gain tactical advantage over the accused or as a weapon to induce a defendant's cooperation. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324.\n\"Tactical\" delay causing actual prejudice to a defendant violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795 n.17. A tactical delay is one that the government employs as a \"deliberate device to gain an advantage over\" the accused. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984). A due process violation also occurs with prosecutorial delay incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances, known to the prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable risk that delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795 n.17. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 563 (1983), interpreted Lovasco as holding that claims of prejudicial pre-indictment delay can succeed \"upon a showing that the government delayed seeking an indictment in a deliberate attempt to gain an unfair tactical advantage over the defendant or in reckless disregard of its probable prejudicial impact upon the defendant's ability to defend against the charges.\" \"Reckless' conduct means acting in a way that is 'indifferent to\n5\nDOJ-OGR-00002513",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 138 Filed 02/04/21 Page 10 of 26",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.\" United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977); United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1158 (11th Cir. 1983). A defendant's showing of prejudice triggers a \"sensitive balancing of the government's need for an investigative delay ... against the prejudice asserted by the defendant.\" United States v. Brand, 556 F.2d 1312, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977). For example, a delay caused by a good-faith ongoing investigation will generally not be considered a due process violation. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791. Governmental delay caused by \"sinister\" reasons that prejudice a defendant require dismissal of an indictment. \"Sinister\" motives include using the delay to gain tactical advantage over the accused or as a weapon to induce a defendant's cooperation. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"Tactical\" delay causing actual prejudice to a defendant violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795 n.17. A tactical delay is one that the government employs as a \"deliberate device to gain an advantage over\" the accused. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984). A due process violation also occurs with prosecutorial delay incurred in reckless disregard of circumstances, known to the prosecution, suggesting that there existed an appreciable risk that delay would impair the ability to mount an effective defense. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795 n.17. The Supreme Court, in United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 563 (1983), interpreted Lovasco as holding that claims of prejudicial pre-indictment delay can succeed \"upon a showing that the government delayed seeking an indictment in a deliberate attempt to gain an unfair tactical advantage over the defendant or in reckless disregard of its probable prejudicial impact upon the defendant's ability to defend against the charges.\" \"Reckless' conduct means acting in a way that is 'indifferent to",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002513",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "United States Supreme Court",
      "Department of Justice"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "1977",
      "1983",
      "02/04/21",
      "1984"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 138",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002513"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with references to various legal precedents and statutes. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}