{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "14 of 16",
    "document_number": "6",
    "date": "07/11/19",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 14 of 16\n\nthe alleged conduct at issue here do not apply retroactively to Mr. Epstein's case (including a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years). Mr. Epstein would, moreover, be subject to prosecution if he fled, which he now knows carries a maximum penalty of up to 10 additional years of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(l)(A)(l), and/or the real risk of an enhanced sentence by the Court in this matter if not acquitted.\n\nIt must further be emphasized that the allegations outlined within the indictment are just that - allegations - and the defendant anticipates substantial factual and legal challenges to the government case. For one thing, Epstein has potent legal defenses to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the sex trafficking statute driving the pending indictment. We front and briefly outline one of those defenses for the limited purpose of seeking bail. We will amplify it later, along with various other arguments, in full-blown dismissal motions.\n\nSection 1591 was passed as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (\"TVPA\"), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (October 28, 2000). In enacting the TVPA, Congress recognized that human trafficking, particularly of women and children in the sex industry, \"is a modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today.\" 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1); see also id. at § 7101(b)(2), (4). \"The TVPA criminalizes and attempts to prevent slavery, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for commercial gain.\" United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007). Importantly, \"the entire language and design of the statute as a whole indicates that it is meant to punish those who are the providers or pimps of children, not the purchasers or the johns.\" Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11-CV8573, 2012 WL 13042630, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012) (quoting United States v. Bonestroo, No. 11-CR-40016, 2012 WL 13704, at *4 (D.S.D. Jan. 4, 2012)) (emphasis added). In Fierro, the district court found § 1591 inapplicable to consumers or purchasers of sex acts. Here, the principal conduct underlying the indictment is Mr. Epstein's payment of money for massages that purportedly escalated to alleged sex acts. Mr. Epstein's conduct, however, is akin to consumer or purchaser behavior and should be outside the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. See Fierro, 2012 WL 13042630, at *4 (\"[T]he TVPA is inapplicable to individual purchasers of sex from trafficking victims...\").10\n\n10 While Fierro represents the law in this district, Mr. Epstein notes that there is a division of authority on the scope of § 1591. See United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 2013). The defense respectfully submits that the Fierro court's approach to this issue is more persuasive and more consistent with the Congressional purpose to target commercial sex trafficking.\n\n14\nDOJ-OGR-00000287",
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      "content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 6 Filed 07/11/19 Page 14 of 16",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the alleged conduct at issue here do not apply retroactively to Mr. Epstein's case (including a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years). Mr. Epstein would, moreover, be subject to prosecution if he fled, which he now knows carries a maximum penalty of up to 10 additional years of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(l)(A)(l), and/or the real risk of an enhanced sentence by the Court in this matter if not acquitted.",
      "position": "top"
    },
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      "content": "It must further be emphasized that the allegations outlined within the indictment are just that - allegations - and the defendant anticipates substantial factual and legal challenges to the government case. For one thing, Epstein has potent legal defenses to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the sex trafficking statute driving the pending indictment. We front and briefly outline one of those defenses for the limited purpose of seeking bail. We will amplify it later, along with various other arguments, in full-blown dismissal motions.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Section 1591 was passed as part of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (\"TVPA\"), Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (October 28, 2000). In enacting the TVPA, Congress recognized that human trafficking, particularly of women and children in the sex industry, \"is a modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today.\" 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1); see also id. at § 7101(b)(2), (4). \"The TVPA criminalizes and attempts to prevent slavery, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking for commercial gain.\" United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007). Importantly, \"the entire language and design of the statute as a whole indicates that it is meant to punish those who are the providers or pimps of children, not the purchasers or the johns.\" Fierro v. Taylor, No. 11-CV8573, 2012 WL 13042630, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2012) (quoting United States v. Bonestroo, No. 11-CR-40016, 2012 WL 13704, at *4 (D.S.D. Jan. 4, 2012)) (emphasis added). In Fierro, the district court found § 1591 inapplicable to consumers or purchasers of sex acts. Here, the principal conduct underlying the indictment is Mr. Epstein's payment of money for massages that purportedly escalated to alleged sex acts. Mr. Epstein's conduct, however, is akin to consumer or purchaser behavior and should be outside the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. See Fierro, 2012 WL 13042630, at *4 (\"[T]he TVPA is inapplicable to individual purchasers of sex from trafficking victims...\").10",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "10 While Fierro represents the law in this district, Mr. Epstein notes that there is a division of authority on the scope of § 1591. See United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 2013). The defense respectfully submits that the Fierro court's approach to this issue is more persuasive and more consistent with the Congressional purpose to target commercial sex trafficking.",
      "position": "bottom"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "14",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000287",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Mr. Epstein",
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Congress"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y.",
      "D.S.D."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "October 28, 2000",
      "July 2, 2012",
      "Jan. 4, 2012",
      "07/11/19"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB",
      "Document 6",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3146(b)(l)(A)(l)",
      "18 U.S.C. § 1591",
      "22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1)",
      "Pub. L. No. 106-386",
      "114 Stat. 1464",
      "No. 11-CV8573",
      "No. 11-CR-40016",
      "702 F.3d 1066",
      "476 F.3d 1176",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000287"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Mr. Epstein, discussing legal defenses and challenges to the indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}