{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "45",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 45 of 239\n\nlimitations. As the defendant's motion recognizes, the Second Circuit has emphasized that plea agreements differ from commercial contracts in meaningful respects. (Def. Mot. 1 at 30 (citing United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2019) (\"[W]hile the district court's analysis might have been compelling with respect to a contract arising out of commercial negotiations among private parties, we believe the court did not correctly apply the standards that govern the interpretation of plea agreements with the government. We have long recognized that plea agreements are significantly different from commercial contracts.\"))). Accordingly, although the third party beneficiary doctrine is a tenet of contract law, its application to plea agreements under federal law is a separate question.\n\nThe defendant correctly notes that plea agreements may address leniency for third parties. (Def. Mot. 1 at 15). However, it does not necessarily follow that a third party may enforce such a promise. Indeed, it is far from clear that, under federal law, a third party may enforce a plea agreement. At least one court in this Circuit has noted the absence of authority that a third party has standing to enforce another individual's plea agreement. See Santobello v. United States, No. 94 Cr. 119 (RPP), 1998 WL 113950, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1998) (\"Even if Santobello could establish the existence of plea agreements between the Government and his co-defendants, there is little known authority that would allow him to enforce the agreements as a third party beneficiary.\") (citing United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1991)).\n\nFollowing this logic, at least one court has concluded that third parties lack standing to enforce plea agreements. In United States v. Mariamma Viju, the defendant claimed that the Government had entered into a plea agreement with her husband, under which the Government had promised not to prosecute her. No. 15 Cr. 240, 2016 WL 107841, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016). Observing that the principles governing interpretation of plea agreements diverge in many\n\n18\n\nDOJ-OGR-00002979",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 45 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "limitations. As the defendant's motion recognizes, the Second Circuit has emphasized that plea agreements differ from commercial contracts in meaningful respects. (Def. Mot. 1 at 30 (citing United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2019) (\"[W]hile the district court's analysis might have been compelling with respect to a contract arising out of commercial negotiations among private parties, we believe the court did not correctly apply the standards that govern the interpretation of plea agreements with the government. We have long recognized that plea agreements are significantly different from commercial contracts.\"))). Accordingly, although the third party beneficiary doctrine is a tenet of contract law, its application to plea agreements under federal law is a separate question.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant correctly notes that plea agreements may address leniency for third parties. (Def. Mot. 1 at 15). However, it does not necessarily follow that a third party may enforce such a promise. Indeed, it is far from clear that, under federal law, a third party may enforce a plea agreement. At least one court in this Circuit has noted the absence of authority that a third party has standing to enforce another individual's plea agreement. See Santobello v. United States, No. 94 Cr. 119 (RPP), 1998 WL 113950, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1998) (\"Even if Santobello could establish the existence of plea agreements between the Government and his co-defendants, there is little known authority that would allow him to enforce the agreements as a third party beneficiary.\") (citing United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1991)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Following this logic, at least one court has concluded that third parties lack standing to enforce plea agreements. In United States v. Mariamma Viju, the defendant claimed that the Government had entered into a plea agreement with her husband, under which the Government had promised not to prosecute her. No. 15 Cr. 240, 2016 WL 107841, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016). Observing that the principles governing interpretation of plea agreements diverge in many",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "18",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002979",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y.",
      "N.D. Tex."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "Mar. 13, 1998",
      "Jan. 11, 2016"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "939 F.3d 182",
      "94 Cr. 119 (RPP)",
      "944 F.2d 33",
      "15 Cr. 240",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002979"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the interpretation of plea agreements and the rights of third-party beneficiaries. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}