{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "8",
    "document_number": "106",
    "date": "12/30/20",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 8 of 22\nabrogated on other grounds by United States v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990). That burden is \"limited.\" United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). The Defendant's proffer of evidence and information—including information relating to her financial conditions and her family ties to the United States, among other things—satisfies this limited burden. As the Court discussed at the July 14, 2020 hearing, these factors bear on the question of whether the Defendant poses a flight risk. And the evidence she advances in her renewed motion for bail reasonably disputes the presumption that she poses a flight risk. In that sense, this evidence is relevant to the ultimate determination and satisfies the relatively low threshold imposed by the burden of production.\nThe presumption of flight does not disappear entirely, however, and it \"remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court.\" United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, \"[a] judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal evidence, continue to give the presumption of flight some weight by keeping in mind that Congress has found that these offenders pose special risks of flight, and that 'a strong probability arises' that no form of conditional release will be adequate to secure their appearance.\" Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144 (citation omitted).\nB. The new information does not alter the Court's initial determination\nWhen determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required, courts are required to consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Thus, the Court considers (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense involves a minor victim, (2) the weight of the evidence, (3) the defendant's history and characteristics, and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to\n8\nDOJ-OGR-00002240",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 106 Filed 12/30/20 Page 8 of 22",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "abrogated on other grounds by United States v. O'Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990). That burden is \"limited.\" United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). The Defendant's proffer of evidence and information—including information relating to her financial conditions and her family ties to the United States, among other things—satisfies this limited burden. As the Court discussed at the July 14, 2020 hearing, these factors bear on the question of whether the Defendant poses a flight risk. And the evidence she advances in her renewed motion for bail reasonably disputes the presumption that she poses a flight risk. In that sense, this evidence is relevant to the ultimate determination and satisfies the relatively low threshold imposed by the burden of production.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The presumption of flight does not disappear entirely, however, and it \"remains a factor to be considered among those weighed by the district court.\" United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144). As a result, \"[a] judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal evidence, continue to give the presumption of flight some weight by keeping in mind that Congress has found that these offenders pose special risks of flight, and that 'a strong probability arises' that no form of conditional release will be adequate to secure their appearance.\" Martir, 782 F.2d at 1144 (citation omitted).",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "B. The new information does not alter the Court's initial determination",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "When determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required, courts are required to consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Thus, the Court considers (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense involves a minor victim, (2) the weight of the evidence, (3) the defendant's history and characteristics, and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to",
      "position": "main body"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "8",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002240",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "O'Brien",
      "Mercedes",
      "Martir"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States",
      "Congress",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "July 14, 2020",
      "12/30/20"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 106",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002240"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 8 of 22."
}