{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "7",
    "document_number": "286",
    "date": "05/20/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 286 Filed 05/20/21 Page 7 of 14 consider such a proffer in the context of a motion to strike,2 the proffered testimony, even if credited, adds nothing to the analysis. By the government's own admission, Accuser-3 will not testify, and the government cannot prove, that Accuser-3 Thus, even if Accuser-3 testifies in accordance with the proffer, the government will be unable to establish that she was transported or enticed to travel for the purpose of engaging in unlawful sexual activity.4 The government argues that it \"does not matter\" whether Accuser-3 was an adult when invited to travel (Opp. 162), because even evidence that she was invited to travel as an adult would be \"probative\" of Ms. Maxwell's \"intent, in her initial interactions with [Accuser-3], to entice [Accuser-3] to travel and be transported for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts.\" Opp. 163. But there is nothing unlawful about \"entic[ing]\" an adult to \"travel and be transported for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts\" if those acts themselves are entirely lawful. Nor does Ms. Maxwell's alleged role in Accuser-3's purported lawful sexual activity with Epstein in England, while Accuser-3 was allegedly under age 18, evince an intent to entice Accuser-3 to travel before she turned 18. 2 In addressing the sufficiency of allegations in the similar context of a motion to dismiss, courts have recognized that they are limited to consideration of the language of the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006) (\"a district court is limited to reviewing the face of the indictment\") (emphasis in original); United States v. Hitt, 249 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (\"Adherence to the language of the indictment is essential because the Fifth Amendment requires that criminal prosecutions be limited to the unique allegations of the indictments returned by the grand jury.\") 3 The government concedes that it cannot establish that Accuser-3 Opp. 163 n.58 (admitting that Accuser-3 is ). 4 It bears mention that Accuser-3's proffered testimony appears to be uncorroborated by documentary evidence. 4 DOJ-OGR-00004220",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 286 Filed 05/20/21 Page 7 of 14",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "consider such a proffer in the context of a motion to strike,2 the proffered testimony, even if credited, adds nothing to the analysis. By the government's own admission, Accuser-3 will not testify, and the government cannot prove, that Accuser-3 Thus, even if Accuser-3 testifies in accordance with the proffer, the government will be unable to establish that she was transported or enticed to travel for the purpose of engaging in unlawful sexual activity.4",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government argues that it \"does not matter\" whether Accuser-3 was an adult when invited to travel (Opp. 162), because even evidence that she was invited to travel as an adult would be \"probative\" of Ms. Maxwell's \"intent, in her initial interactions with [Accuser-3], to entice [Accuser-3] to travel and be transported for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts.\" Opp. 163. But there is nothing unlawful about \"entic[ing]\" an adult to \"travel and be transported for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts\" if those acts themselves are entirely lawful. Nor does Ms. Maxwell's alleged role in Accuser-3's purported lawful sexual activity with Epstein in England, while Accuser-3 was allegedly under age 18, evince an intent to entice Accuser-3 to travel before she turned 18.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 In addressing the sufficiency of allegations in the similar context of a motion to dismiss, courts have recognized that they are limited to consideration of the language of the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2006) (\"a district court is limited to reviewing the face of the indictment\") (emphasis in original); United States v. Hitt, 249 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (\"Adherence to the language of the indictment is essential because the Fifth Amendment requires that criminal prosecutions be limited to the unique allegations of the indictments returned by the grand jury.\")",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3 The government concedes that it cannot establish that Accuser-3 Opp. 163 n.58 (admitting that Accuser-3 is ).",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4 It bears mention that Accuser-3's proffered testimony appears to be uncorroborated by documentary evidence.",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4 DOJ-OGR-00004220",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Accuser-3",
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Epstein"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "England"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "05/20/21",
      "18"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "286",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004220"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with redactions. The text is mostly printed, with some footnotes and citations. The document is related to a criminal case involving Ms. Maxwell and Accuser-3."
}