{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "11",
    "document_number": "140",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 140 Filed 02/04/21 Page 11 of 22\n\nMaxwell had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her because she reasonably sought to preserve them as private. Both of her were confidential under the Protective Order, which prohibited from sharing them with third parties, including law enforcement. The Protective Order deliberately excluded a law enforcement exception. While the Protective Order did not apply to evidence produced at trial, the parties settled the defamation action before trial, conclusively establishing the privacy of Maxwell's deposition testimony. Indeed, under the plain terms of the Protective Order, were required to return or destroy all confidential information at the conclusion of the case, including Maxwell's deposition transcripts. refused to do so although ordered to do so by Judge Sweet.3\n\nIn its application to , the government . Not only did the government misunderstand how the Protective Order worked, but its argument also supports rather than undermines Maxwell's legitimate expectation of privacy in her deposition transcripts.\n\nTo be sure, the Protective Order did not apply to evidence produced at trial. That is entirely unremarkable, however, because trials are open to the public and the press. What matters is that the civil case did not go to trial; it settled before trial, and under the Protective Order's terms, 2 Not to mention all the other material she designated as \"Confidential\" under the Protective Order.\n3 Ascribing a legitimate expectation of privacy to Maxwell's also fits Martindell's admonition that the government may not \"insinuate itself into a private civil lawsuit between others.\" 594 F.2d at 294.\n\n7\nDOJ-OGR-00002559",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 140 Filed 02/04/21 Page 11 of 22",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Maxwell had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her because she reasonably sought to preserve them as private. Both of her were confidential under the Protective Order, which prohibited from sharing them with third parties, including law enforcement. The Protective Order deliberately excluded a law enforcement exception. While the Protective Order did not apply to evidence produced at trial, the parties settled the defamation action before trial, conclusively establishing the privacy of Maxwell's deposition testimony. Indeed, under the plain terms of the Protective Order, were required to return or destroy all confidential information at the conclusion of the case, including Maxwell's deposition transcripts. refused to do so although ordered to do so by Judge Sweet.3",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In its application to , the government . Not only did the government misunderstand how the Protective Order worked, but its argument also supports rather than undermines Maxwell's legitimate expectation of privacy in her deposition transcripts.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To be sure, the Protective Order did not apply to evidence produced at trial. That is entirely unremarkable, however, because trials are open to the public and the press. What matters is that the civil case did not go to trial; it settled before trial, and under the Protective Order's terms,",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 Not to mention all the other material she designated as \"Confidential\" under the Protective Order.",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3 Ascribing a legitimate expectation of privacy to Maxwell's also fits Martindell's admonition that the government may not \"insinuate itself into a private civil lawsuit between others.\" 594 F.2d at 294.",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "7",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002559",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Judge Sweet"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 140",
      "594 F.2d at 294",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002559"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with redactions. The text is mostly intact, but some sections are blacked out."
}