{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "11",
    "document_number": "144",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 11 of 25\n\nthe law.\" Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). This presumption against retroactivity carries particular force with respect to statutes of limitations in the criminal context. \"[C]riminal limitations statutes are 'to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.'\" Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (quoting United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932)). This principle transcends any particular statute or any particular defendant: \"The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions.\" Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114. \"Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.\" Id. at 114-15.\n\nIn Landgraf, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step framework to evaluate the proposed retroactive application of a statute to a particular case:\n\n[T]he court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.\n\nLandgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. Thus, if Congress has \"expressly prescribed\" that a statute will or will not apply retroactively, the inquiry ends; if not, the court proceeds to the second step to determine whether the application of the statute would have impermissible \"retroactive effect.\" Id.\n\nAs shown below, retroactive application of the 2003 Amendment fails both steps of the Landgraf analysis. Regarding step one, not only did Congress fail to include an express\n\n5\n\nDOJ-OGR-00002659",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 11 of 25",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the law.\" Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). This presumption against retroactivity carries particular force with respect to statutes of limitations in the criminal context. \"[C]riminal limitations statutes are 'to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.'\" Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (quoting United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932)). This principle transcends any particular statute or any particular defendant: \"The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions.\" Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114. \"Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.\" Id. at 114-15.",
      "position": "top"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In Landgraf, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step framework to evaluate the proposed retroactive application of a statute to a particular case:",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[T]he court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. Thus, if Congress has \"expressly prescribed\" that a statute will or will not apply retroactively, the inquiry ends; if not, the court proceeds to the second step to determine whether the application of the statute would have impermissible \"retroactive effect.\" Id.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "As shown below, retroactive application of the 2003 Amendment fails both steps of the Landgraf analysis. Regarding step one, not only did Congress fail to include an express",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5",
      "position": "footer"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002659",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Congress"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "1988",
      "1970",
      "1932",
      "2003"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 144",
      "488 U.S. 204",
      "397 U.S. 112",
      "285 U.S. 518",
      "511 U.S. at 280",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002659"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the retroactive application of statutes of limitations. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is paginated, with this being page 11 of 25."
}