{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "67",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 67 of 239\n\n'Involving' . . . is equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach.\" 865 F.3d at 60 n.11 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach to a statute containing the word \"involves\")). Moreover, as the Weingarten court observed, the Supreme Court has applied the categorical approach to statutes containing the word \"involving\" where the statutes at issue also referenced \"elements\" of offenses, or specific prior \"convictions,\" in a manner that referred to specific convictions, as opposed to particular offense conduct. 865 F.3d at 59 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004)). By contrast, the phrase \"sexual abuse\" in Section 3283 refers to specific conduct, and not the statutory offenses charged in the Indictment.\n\nIn Weingarten, the Second Circuit further noted that applying the categorical approach to Section 3283 would run contrary to Congress's intention to \"cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.\" 865 F.3d at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196). On this point, it bears emphasizing that the interpretation the defendant advances would lead to absurd outcomes, as many federal crimes involving the sexual abuse of minors do not contain, as an element, a requirement that the defendant commit a sex act with a minor. It would run contrary to Congress's intent to interpret Section 3283 in a manner that would exclude many—if not most—sexual offenses against children.\n\nThe lone Section 3283 case the defendant cites, United States v. Countentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011), is easily distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the Eighth Circuit considered, among other issues, whether the crime of possessing child pornography involved sexual abuse within the meaning of Section 3283. Id. at 816-18. In analyzing that question, the court discussed, among a variety of factors, the elements of the crime. But it did not consider the categorical approach, or purport to apply an \"essential ingredients\" test, as the defendant implies. Instead, the\n\n40\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003001",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 67 of 239",
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      "content": "'Involving' . . . is equally consistent with applying a fact-based approach.\" 865 F.3d at 60 n.11 (citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38 (2009) (applying the circumstances-specific approach to a statute containing the word \"involves\")). Moreover, as the Weingarten court observed, the Supreme Court has applied the categorical approach to statutes containing the word \"involving\" where the statutes at issue also referenced \"elements\" of offenses, or specific prior \"convictions,\" in a manner that referred to specific convictions, as opposed to particular offense conduct. 865 F.3d at 59 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004)). By contrast, the phrase \"sexual abuse\" in Section 3283 refers to specific conduct, and not the statutory offenses charged in the Indictment.",
      "position": "main content"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In Weingarten, the Second Circuit further noted that applying the categorical approach to Section 3283 would run contrary to Congress's intention to \"cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.\" 865 F.3d at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196). On this point, it bears emphasizing that the interpretation the defendant advances would lead to absurd outcomes, as many federal crimes involving the sexual abuse of minors do not contain, as an element, a requirement that the defendant commit a sex act with a minor. It would run contrary to Congress's intent to interpret Section 3283 in a manner that would exclude many—if not most—sexual offenses against children.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The lone Section 3283 case the defendant cites, United States v. Countentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011), is easily distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the Eighth Circuit considered, among other issues, whether the crime of possessing child pornography involved sexual abuse within the meaning of Section 3283. Id. at 816-18. In analyzing that question, the court discussed, among a variety of factors, the elements of the crime. But it did not consider the categorical approach, or purport to apply an \"essential ingredients\" test, as the defendant implies. Instead, the",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003001",
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  "entities": {
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    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Eighth Circuit"
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    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
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      "Section 3283",
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and the text is clear."
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