{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "233",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 233 of 239\n\nappearing around the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that \"the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant.\" Id. at 1568. In that case, the claimed defects were in the construction of the qualified wheel and, therefore, the \"relevant jury pool\" was the \"qualified wheel over the life of the wheel.\" Id. at 1575.\n\nAffirming that decision, the Second Circuit did not hold that the qualified wheel is necessarily the \"relevant jury pool.\" Rather, after stating that the relevant jury pool \"may be defined by: (1) the master list; (2) the qualified wheel; (3) the venires; or (4) a combination of the three,\" the Circuit noted that the parties had agreed that the district court properly used the qualified wheel over the life of the wheel as the \"relevant jury pool.\" Rioux, 97 F.3d at 657. The court's acceptance of the qualified jury wheel as the \"relevant jury pool\" for that case—an issue which was not in dispute—does not mean it necessarily must be applied in all cases. Id. Indeed, in other cases where the claim of error was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different \"relevant jury pools\" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans and Hispanics from jury service—a claim which is directed at the composition of the master wheel—and the Second Circuit identified the district's master wheel as the relevant jury pool. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 677 (2d Cir. 1990).\n\nHere, the defendant claims that \"the primary reason\" for the alleged underrepresentation is the Government's \"choice to pursue an indictment from a grand jury drawn from the White Plains Division, as opposed to the Manhattan Division . . .\" (Def. Mot. 9 at 7). Even if this argument described a function of the jury selection process – though it does not – it would be directed at the\n\n206\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003167",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 233 of 239",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "appearing around the time of the defendant's trial, or some combination thereof. Id. Ultimately, the district court in Rioux found that the teaching of Duren and the Second Circuit's subsequent cases is that \"the court must assess representativeness in the context of the systematic defect identified by the defendant.\" Id. at 1568. In that case, the claimed defects were in the construction of the qualified wheel and, therefore, the \"relevant jury pool\" was the \"qualified wheel over the life of the wheel.\" Id. at 1575.\n\nAffirming that decision, the Second Circuit did not hold that the qualified wheel is necessarily the \"relevant jury pool.\" Rather, after stating that the relevant jury pool \"may be defined by: (1) the master list; (2) the qualified wheel; (3) the venires; or (4) a combination of the three,\" the Circuit noted that the parties had agreed that the district court properly used the qualified wheel over the life of the wheel as the \"relevant jury pool.\" Rioux, 97 F.3d at 657. The court's acceptance of the qualified jury wheel as the \"relevant jury pool\" for that case—an issue which was not in dispute—does not mean it necessarily must be applied in all cases. Id. Indeed, in other cases where the claim of error was not focused on the construction of the qualified wheel, different \"relevant jury pools\" have been used by the Second Circuit. Most notably, in Biaggi, the main thrust of the defendant's fair cross-section claim was that reliance on voter registration lists systemically excluded African-Americans and Hispanics from jury service—a claim which is directed at the composition of the master wheel—and the Second Circuit identified the district's master wheel as the relevant jury pool. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 677 (2d Cir. 1990).\n\nHere, the defendant claims that \"the primary reason\" for the alleged underrepresentation is the Government's \"choice to pursue an indictment from a grand jury drawn from the White Plains Division, as opposed to the Manhattan Division . . .\" (Def. Mot. 9 at 7). Even if this argument described a function of the jury selection process – though it does not – it would be directed at the",
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      "content": "206",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003167",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "White Plains Division",
      "Manhattan Division"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1990"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003167"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}