{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "24",
    "document_number": "207",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 24 of 34 one.\" United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 929 (2d Cir. 1980). Though this standard is demanding, the Court concludes that, due to unique features of the perjury counts, Maxwell meets it here. Trying all counts together would compromise Maxwell's right to the counsel of her choice and risk an unfair trial. Trying the perjury counts together with the Mann Act counts would risk an unfair trial on each set of counts. First, it would introduce unrelated allegations of sexual abuse, which would potentially expose the jury to evidence that might otherwise not be admissible. In particular, a joint trial would potentially expose the jury to a wider swath of information regarding civil litigation against Epstein that is remote from Maxwell's charged conduct. This presents a significant risk that the jury will cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not do so. See United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 430 (2d Cir. 1978). Second, the evidence presented on the Mann Act counts may prejudice the jury's ability to fairly evaluate Maxwell's truthfulness in her deposition, a critical element of the perjury counts. The Court has concerns that a limiting instruction may be inadequate to mitigate these risks given the nature of the allegations involved. Importantly, a joint trial is also likely to require disqualification of at least one of Maxwell's attorneys from participating as an advocate on her behalf. The perjury counts likely implicate the performance and credibility of her lawyers in the civil action—two of whom represent her in this case. The New York Rules of Professional Conduct generally forbid a lawyer from representing a client in a proceeding in which the lawyer is likely also to be a witness. N.Y. R. Prof'l Conduct § 3.7(a). Maxwell's counsel in the civil action and the deposition may be important fact witnesses on the perjury counts. Even if counsel were not required to testify, trying all counts together could force Maxwell to choose between having her 24 DOJ-OGR-00003698",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 24 of 34",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "one.\" United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 929 (2d Cir. 1980). Though this standard is demanding, the Court concludes that, due to unique features of the perjury counts, Maxwell meets it here. Trying all counts together would compromise Maxwell's right to the counsel of her choice and risk an unfair trial. Trying the perjury counts together with the Mann Act counts would risk an unfair trial on each set of counts. First, it would introduce unrelated allegations of sexual abuse, which would potentially expose the jury to evidence that might otherwise not be admissible. In particular, a joint trial would potentially expose the jury to a wider swath of information regarding civil litigation against Epstein that is remote from Maxwell's charged conduct. This presents a significant risk that the jury will cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if considered separately, it would not do so. See United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 430 (2d Cir. 1978). Second, the evidence presented on the Mann Act counts may prejudice the jury's ability to fairly evaluate Maxwell's truthfulness in her deposition, a critical element of the perjury counts. The Court has concerns that a limiting instruction may be inadequate to mitigate these risks given the nature of the allegations involved. Importantly, a joint trial is also likely to require disqualification of at least one of Maxwell's attorneys from participating as an advocate on her behalf. The perjury counts likely implicate the performance and credibility of her lawyers in the civil action—two of whom represent her in this case. The New York Rules of Professional Conduct generally forbid a lawyer from representing a client in a proceeding in which the lawyer is likely also to be a witness. N.Y. R. Prof'l Conduct § 3.7(a). Maxwell's counsel in the civil action and the deposition may be important fact witnesses on the perjury counts. Even if counsel were not required to testify, trying all counts together could force Maxwell to choose between having her",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "24",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003698",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Epstein",
      "Werner",
      "Halper"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1980",
      "1978"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 207",
      "620 F.2d 922",
      "590 F.2d 422",
      "N.Y. R. Prof'l Conduct § 3.7(a)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003698"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case United States v. Maxwell. The text discusses the potential risks of trying multiple counts together in a joint trial, including the risk of prejudice to the defendant and the potential for juror confusion. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}