{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "49",
    "document_number": "310-1",
    "date": "07/02/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "credibility issues, and the absence of direct or corroborative proof by which to substantiate her claim, led the district attorney to believe that the case presented \"insufficient, credible, and admissible evidence upon which any charge could be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt.\" Press Release, 2/17/2005 (cleaned up). Given his \"conclu[sion] that a conviction under the circumstances of this case would be unattainable,\" D.A. Castor \"decline[d] to authorize the filing of criminal charges in connection with this matter.\" Id. In light of the non-prosecution decision, Cosby no longer was exposed to criminal liability relating to the Constand allegations and thus could no longer invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in that regard. With no legal mechanism available to avoid testifying in Constand's civil suit, Cosby sat for depositions and, therein, made a number of statements incriminating himself.\n\nD.A. Castor's declination decision stood fast throughout his tenure in office. When he moved on, however, his successor decided to revive the investigation and to prosecute Cosby. Ruling upon Cosby's challenge to this belated prosecution, the trial court concluded that the former district attorney's promise did not constitute a binding, enforceable agreement. To determine whether Cosby permanently was shielded from prosecution by D.A. Castor's 2005 declination decision, we first must ascertain the legal relationship between D.A. Castor and Cosby. We begin with the trial court's findings.\n\nIt is hornbook law that reviewing courts are not fact-finding bodies. O'Rourke v. Commonwealth, 778 A.2d 1194, 1199 (Pa. 2001). Appellate courts are limited to determining \"whether there is evidence in the record to justify the trial court's findings.\" Id. at 1199 n.6. \"If so, this Court is bound by them.\" Id. However, while \"we accord deference to a trial court with regard to factual findings, our review of legal conclusions is de novo.\" Id. at n.7 (citation omitted). Indeed, it is a long-standing appellate principle that, \"[w]ith respect to [] inferences and deductions from facts and [] conclusions of",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "credibility issues, and the absence of direct or corroborative proof by which to substantiate her claim, led the district attorney to believe that the case presented \"insufficient, credible, and admissible evidence upon which any charge could be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt.\" Press Release, 2/17/2005 (cleaned up). Given his \"conclu[sion] that a conviction under the circumstances of this case would be unattainable,\" D.A. Castor \"decline[d] to authorize the filing of criminal charges in connection with this matter.\" Id. In light of the non-prosecution decision, Cosby no longer was exposed to criminal liability relating to the Constand allegations and thus could no longer invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in that regard. With no legal mechanism available to avoid testifying in Constand's civil suit, Cosby sat for depositions and, therein, made a number of statements incriminating himself.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "D.A. Castor's declination decision stood fast throughout his tenure in office. When he moved on, however, his successor decided to revive the investigation and to prosecute Cosby. Ruling upon Cosby's challenge to this belated prosecution, the trial court concluded that the former district attorney's promise did not constitute a binding, enforceable agreement. To determine whether Cosby permanently was shielded from prosecution by D.A. Castor's 2005 declination decision, we first must ascertain the legal relationship between D.A. Castor and Cosby. We begin with the trial court's findings.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It is hornbook law that reviewing courts are not fact-finding bodies. O'Rourke v. Commonwealth, 778 A.2d 1194, 1199 (Pa. 2001). Appellate courts are limited to determining \"whether there is evidence in the record to justify the trial court's findings.\" Id. at 1199 n.6. \"If so, this Court is bound by them.\" Id. However, while \"we accord deference to a trial court with regard to factual findings, our review of legal conclusions is de novo.\" Id. at n.7 (citation omitted). Indeed, it is a long-standing appellate principle that, \"[w]ith respect to [] inferences and deductions from facts and [] conclusions of",
      "position": "bottom"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Cosby",
      "D.A. Castor",
      "Constand",
      "O'Rourke"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Commonwealth"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Pa"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "2/17/2005",
      "07/02/21",
      "2001",
      "2005"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 310-1",
      "778 A.2d 1194",
      "J-100-2020",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004861"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case against Bill Cosby. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}