{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "25",
    "document_number": "643",
    "date": "03/11/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 25 of 49\nTwitter post by Annie Farmer. (Def. Mem. at 13, 15-16). But he did these things after trial, having heard all the evidence that proved that, as the Government argued, the defendant was in fact a predatory and that the victims, including Farmer, were credible. Juror 50's attitudes towards the defendant and the victims after he heard compelling evidence of the defendant's guilt and the victims' credible testimony says nothing about the relevant inquiry here: whether he was biased \"before he heard the evidence presented.\" United States v. Stewart, 317 F. Supp. 2d 432, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 433 F.3d 273, 306 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 439 n.4 (finding no bias where juror in Martha Stewart trial said the verdict was \"a victory for the little guy who loses money in the markets\" and that the defendant \"thought she was above everything\").\nSimilarly, the defendant gestures at an actual bias argument when she states that it is \"clear,\" based on Juror 50's statements to the media,13 that he was not fair and impartial \"because his personal experiences 'prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of his duties as a juror.'\" (Def. Mem. at 44 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985))). There and elsewhere, the defendant's brief seems to suggest that jurors are required to check their lived experiences at the jury room door. Not so:\nWe cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions of jurors, their additudinal expositions, or their philosophies. These involve the very human elements that constitute one of the strengths of our jury system, and we cannot and should not excommunicate them from jury deliberations.\nU.S. ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970); see also United States v. Bangiyev, No. 07 Cr. 331 (NG) (RLM), 2008 WL 4240005, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2008) (explaining\n13 As noted above, many if not all of the statements upon which the defendant relies describe deliberations and are thus inadmissible under Rule 606(b). And even if they were not, Juror 50's public statements about deliberations in fact demonstrate that he (and the jury more generally) was impartial. See infra n.5.",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 643 Filed 03/11/22 Page 25 of 49",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Twitter post by Annie Farmer. (Def. Mem. at 13, 15-16). But he did these things after trial, having heard all the evidence that proved that, as the Government argued, the defendant was in fact a predatory and that the victims, including Farmer, were credible. Juror 50's attitudes towards the defendant and the victims after he heard compelling evidence of the defendant's guilt and the victims' credible testimony says nothing about the relevant inquiry here: whether he was biased \"before he heard the evidence presented.\" United States v. Stewart, 317 F. Supp. 2d 432, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 433 F.3d 273, 306 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 439 n.4 (finding no bias where juror in Martha Stewart trial said the verdict was \"a victory for the little guy who loses money in the markets\" and that the defendant \"thought she was above everything\").",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Similarly, the defendant gestures at an actual bias argument when she states that it is \"clear,\" based on Juror 50's statements to the media,13 that he was not fair and impartial \"because his personal experiences 'prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of his duties as a juror.'\" (Def. Mem. at 44 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985))). There and elsewhere, the defendant's brief seems to suggest that jurors are required to check their lived experiences at the jury room door. Not so:",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "We cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions of jurors, their additudinal expositions, or their philosophies. These involve the very human elements that constitute one of the strengths of our jury system, and we cannot and should not excommunicate them from jury deliberations.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "U.S. ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1970); see also United States v. Bangiyev, No. 07 Cr. 331 (NG) (RLM), 2008 WL 4240005, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2008) (explaining",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "13 As noted above, many if not all of the statements upon which the defendant relies describe deliberations and are thus inadmissible under Rule 606(b). And even if they were not, Juror 50's public statements about deliberations in fact demonstrate that he (and the jury more generally) was impartial. See infra n.5.",
      "position": "footnote"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Annie Farmer",
      "Martha Stewart"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y.",
      "E.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "03/11/22",
      "Sept. 12, 2008"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 643",
      "07 Cr. 331 (NG) (RLM)"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 25 of 49."
}