{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10 of 41",
    "document_number": "424",
    "date": "11/08/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 10 of 41\n\nthe traumatic event(s); and avoidance of or efforts to avoid external reminders (people, places, conversations, activities, objects, situations) that arouse distressing memories, thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with the traumatic events(s).\" (Id.)\n\n- Individuals with this subset of post-traumatic stress symptoms \"are particularly unlikely to engage in continued communication or friendly gestures with an alleged perpetrator, to wear clothing provided by an alleged perpetrator, or to unnecessarily recreate a sexual assault event, any of which would be expected to elicit intense distress.\" (Id.).\n\nAs discussed below, the Government objects that these opinions are either irrelevant or—to the extent intended to be applied to the context of this case—unreliable.\n\nB. Legal Standard\n\nRule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:\n\nA witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:\n\n(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;\n\n(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;\n\n(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and\n\n(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.\n\nThe party that proffers the testimony bears the burden of showing that it is admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 & n.10 (1993) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)). A district court's exclusion of expert testimony will be affirmed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).\n\n6\n\nDOJ-OGR-00006221",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 10 of 41",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the traumatic event(s); and avoidance of or efforts to avoid external reminders (people, places, conversations, activities, objects, situations) that arouse distressing memories, thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with the traumatic events(s).\" (Id.)\n\n- Individuals with this subset of post-traumatic stress symptoms \"are particularly unlikely to engage in continued communication or friendly gestures with an alleged perpetrator, to wear clothing provided by an alleged perpetrator, or to unnecessarily recreate a sexual assault event, any of which would be expected to elicit intense distress.\" (Id.).\n\nAs discussed below, the Government objects that these opinions are either irrelevant or—to the extent intended to be applied to the context of this case—unreliable.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "B. Legal Standard",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:\n\nA witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:\n\n(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;\n\n(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;\n\n(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and\n\n(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The party that proffers the testimony bears the burden of showing that it is admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 & n.10 (1993) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)). A district court's exclusion of expert testimony will be affirmed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).",
      "position": "bottom"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "6",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006221",
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  "entities": {
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    "dates": [
      "11/08/21",
      "1993",
      "1987",
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "424",
      "10 of 41",
      "702",
      "509 U.S. 579",
      "592 & n.10",
      "483 U.S. 171",
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      "142",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006221"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The text is well-formatted and clear, with no visible redactions or damage."
}