{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "548",
    "date": "12/15/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 548 Filed 12/15/21 Page 4 of 6\n\nbreaking nature of the Defense's request, which was made not pre-trial, as was the Government's request for the use of pseudonyms, but instead two days after the Government rested its case.\nThe Defense could and should have anticipated potential witnesses' concerns. If the Defense anticipated calling a witness who refuses to testify, the Defense would have the same tools at its disposal as does the Government to compel that witness's attendance at trial. The Defense could have, for example, subpoenaed a witness under Rule 17. If the witness resides abroad, the Defense could have sought a letter rogatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1781, which is a mechanism that the Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized. See, e.g., United States v. Brennerman, 818 F. App'x 25, 30 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing § 1781 as a mechanism for a criminal defendant to \"secure testimony from the United Kingdom\"); United States v. Lee, 723 F.3d 134, 142 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013). These mechanisms ensure that pseudonyms are not necessary to secure a reluctant witness's testimony and the Court therefore rejects this basis for permitting pseudonyms.\nThird, the Defense argues that a pseudonym is justified for a witness that works as a plain clothes law enforcement officer, citing in support a large body of case law in which anonymity was granted for testifying law enforcement officers. Def. Letter at 5. But as the Government notes, the cases relied on by the Defense uniformly involve officers that work undercover such that revealing their true name to the public would subject them to violent retaliation by the defendant or other individuals, or would frustrate their ability to remain undercover. E.g., United States v. Alimehmeti, 284 F. Supp. 3d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); United States v. Hernandez, No. S1 12 CR 809 PKC, 2013 WL 3936185 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013). Even further afield, the Defense cites in support a case in which a covert CIA officer testified under a pseudonym. United States v. Schulte, 436 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). These cases are inapplicable to the present request as proffered to the Court.\n4\nDOJ-OGR-00008390",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 548 Filed 12/15/21 Page 4 of 6",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "breaking nature of the Defense's request, which was made not pre-trial, as was the Government's request for the use of pseudonyms, but instead two days after the Government rested its case.\nThe Defense could and should have anticipated potential witnesses' concerns. If the Defense anticipated calling a witness who refuses to testify, the Defense would have the same tools at its disposal as does the Government to compel that witness's attendance at trial. The Defense could have, for example, subpoenaed a witness under Rule 17. If the witness resides abroad, the Defense could have sought a letter rogatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1781, which is a mechanism that the Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized. See, e.g., United States v. Brennerman, 818 F. App'x 25, 30 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing § 1781 as a mechanism for a criminal defendant to \"secure testimony from the United Kingdom\"); United States v. Lee, 723 F.3d 134, 142 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013). These mechanisms ensure that pseudonyms are not necessary to secure a reluctant witness's testimony and the Court therefore rejects this basis for permitting pseudonyms.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Third, the Defense argues that a pseudonym is justified for a witness that works as a plain clothes law enforcement officer, citing in support a large body of case law in which anonymity was granted for testifying law enforcement officers. Def. Letter at 5. But as the Government notes, the cases relied on by the Defense uniformly involve officers that work undercover such that revealing their true name to the public would subject them to violent retaliation by the defendant or other individuals, or would frustrate their ability to remain undercover. E.g., United States v. Alimehmeti, 284 F. Supp. 3d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); United States v. Hernandez, No. S1 12 CR 809 PKC, 2013 WL 3936185 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013). Even further afield, the Defense cites in support a case in which a covert CIA officer testified under a pseudonym. United States v. Schulte, 436 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). These cases are inapplicable to the present request as proffered to the Court.",
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    {
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      "content": "4",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00008390",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "CIA"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "United Kingdom"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "July 29, 2013",
      "12/15/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "548",
      "28 U.S.C. § 1781",
      "818 F. App'x 25",
      "30 (2d Cir. 2020)",
      "723 F.3d 134",
      "142 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013)",
      "284 F. Supp. 3d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)",
      "No. S1 12 CR 809 PKC",
      "2013 WL 3936185 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013)",
      "436 F. Supp. 3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00008390"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 4 of 6."
}