mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00001721.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "3",
    "document_number": "41",
    "date": "August 13, 2020",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
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    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 41 Filed 08/13/20 Page 3 of 5\n\nHonorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 13, 2020\nPage 3\nordered disclosure of a certain victim identity shortly after the indictment, the Court noted that the Government had already confirmed to the defendant the identities of three of the four relevant victims, and that a fourth victim, whose identity was at issue, was the subject of a charge that failed to identify the date of her alleged rape or any prior encounters between the victim and the defendant. 2009 WL 42711, at *2. None of those facts are present here—by contrast, here, the Indictment particularly describes relevant time periods and events, including referring to the defendant's conversations with victims, interactions with victims, and specific relevant locations.3\n\nTo the extent the defendant is arguing that she cannot identify the nature of the charges against her, the proper vehicle for such an argument is a motion for a bill of particulars. Any such motion can be made in December with all other motions and following the completion of discovery. While the Government anticipates opposing such a motion as baseless on the facts of this case, the Government respectfully submits that in any event such a motion could not be meaningfully evaluated at this stage, prior to the completion of discovery. See United States v. Mahabub, 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) (denying a motion for a bill of particulars that sought, among other things, the “alleged victim and noting that “[a] bill of particulars is not required unless the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused. The government can also discharge its obligation to disclose this information by other means, such as by presenting evidence in discovery. . . . A bill of particulars is not meant to provide the details of the government’s evidence, or to be used as an investigative tool.”) (emphasis added, quotations and citations omitted); see also United States v. Thompson, 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying a motion for a bill of particulars and noting that such motions are not “a general investigative tool, a discovery device or a means to compel the government to disclose evidence or witnesses to be offered prior to trial”) (emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted); cf. United States v. Sindone, 01 Cr. 517 (MBM), 2002 WL 48604, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2002) (denying a motion for a bill of particulars to identify “the unnamed alleged victim(s)” but instructing the government to disclose the name of any victim it did not intend to call as a witness at trial by 14 days prior to the start of trial).\n\nAlternatively, to the extent defense counsel is unable to assess or comprehend the discovery produced by the Government, the Government is more than willing to discuss with the defense\n\n3 Defense counsel's invocation of the protective order in support of its argument, Def. Ltr. at 1, 3, should be of little comfort. The Government is deeply concerned by the recent actions of the defendant's counsel who represent her in both this criminal matter as well as in certain civil matters, and who in a recent public filing in a civil case referred to their receipt of sealed materials in discovery in this case. In particular, the defendant's counsel publicly claimed in a civil filing that they purportedly had received “critical new information” from the criminal case that it could not disclose “because it is subject to a protective order in the Criminal Action,” and further noting publicly a desire to seek modification of the protective order in this case to use such materials in the civil case, which the protective order expressly precludes. See Giuffre v. Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP) (Dkt. 1100). Moreover, even assuming the defendant intends to scrupulously adhere to the terms of the protective order, that would not change the relevant legal standards, which weigh heavily against granting the requested relief.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00001721",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 41 Filed 08/13/20 Page 3 of 5",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nAugust 13, 2020\nPage 3",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "ordered disclosure of a certain victim identity shortly after the indictment, the Court noted that the Government had already confirmed to the defendant the identities of three of the four relevant victims, and that a fourth victim, whose identity was at issue, was the subject of a charge that failed to identify the date of her alleged rape or any prior encounters between the victim and the defendant. 2009 WL 42711, at *2. None of those facts are present here—by contrast, here, the Indictment particularly describes relevant time periods and events, including referring to the defendant's conversations with victims, interactions with victims, and specific relevant locations.3",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "To the extent the defendant is arguing that she cannot identify the nature of the charges against her, the proper vehicle for such an argument is a motion for a bill of particulars. Any such motion can be made in December with all other motions and following the completion of discovery. While the Government anticipates opposing such a motion as baseless on the facts of this case, the Government respectfully submits that in any event such a motion could not be meaningfully evaluated at this stage, prior to the completion of discovery. See United States v. Mahabub, 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) (denying a motion for a bill of particulars that sought, among other things, the “alleged victim and noting that “[a] bill of particulars is not required unless the charges of the indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused. The government can also discharge its obligation to disclose this information by other means, such as by presenting evidence in discovery. . . . A bill of particulars is not meant to provide the details of the government’s evidence, or to be used as an investigative tool.”) (emphasis added, quotations and citations omitted); see also United States v. Thompson, 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying a motion for a bill of particulars and noting that such motions are not “a general investigative tool, a discovery device or a means to compel the government to disclose evidence or witnesses to be offered prior to trial”) (emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted); cf. United States v. Sindone, 01 Cr. 517 (MBM), 2002 WL 48604, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2002) (denying a motion for a bill of particulars to identify “the unnamed alleged victim(s)” but instructing the government to disclose the name of any victim it did not intend to call as a witness at trial by 14 days prior to the start of trial).",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Alternatively, to the extent defense counsel is unable to assess or comprehend the discovery produced by the Government, the Government is more than willing to discuss with the defense",
      "position": "body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3 Defense counsel's invocation of the protective order in support of its argument, Def. Ltr. at 1, 3, should be of little comfort. The Government is deeply concerned by the recent actions of the defendant's counsel who represent her in both this criminal matter as well as in certain civil matters, and who in a recent public filing in a civil case referred to their receipt of sealed materials in discovery in this case. In particular, the defendant's counsel publicly claimed in a civil filing that they purportedly had received “critical new information” from the criminal case that it could not disclose “because it is subject to a protective order in the Criminal Action,” and further noting publicly a desire to seek modification of the protective order in this case to use such materials in the civil case, which the protective order expressly precludes. See Giuffre v. Ghislaine Maxwell, No. 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP) (Dkt. 1100). Moreover, even assuming the defendant intends to scrupulously adhere to the terms of the protective order, that would not change the relevant legal standards, which weigh heavily against granting the requested relief.",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00001721",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Alison J. Nathan",
      "Ghislaine Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "August 13, 2020",
      "August 26, 2014",
      "December 3, 2013",
      "January 14, 2002"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 41",
      "13 Cr. 908 (AJN)",
      "13 Cr. 378 (AJN)",
      "01 Cr. 517 (MBM)",
      "No. 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP)",
      "Dkt. 1100",
      "DOJ-OGR-00001721"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}