mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00001748.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "2",
    "document_number": "51",
    "date": "09/02/20",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 51 Filed 09/02/20 Page 2 of 5\nreference, but not file, other discovery material that the Government produced in this case. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's requests are DENIED.\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), a Court may enter a protective order only after it finds that good cause exists. Within this framework, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure leave it to the discretion of the Court to determine whether modification of an existing protective order is warranted.2 To make that decision, the Court takes into account all relevant factors, including the parties' reliance on the protective order and whether the moving party has sufficiently substantiated a request to deviate from the status quo in the instant matter.\nOn July 30, 2020, this Court entered a protective order in this case, having determined that good cause existed. Dkt. No. 36. The parties agreed that a protective order was warranted. See Dkt. No. 35 at 1 (“The parties have met and conferred, resolving nearly all the issues relating to the proposed protective order.”). The Defendant's Proposed Protective Order included a provision that stated that all discovery produced by the Government “[s]hall be used by the Defendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this criminal action, and not for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the defense of this action.” Dkt. No. 29, Ex. A ¶ 1(a). That language was included in the Court's July 30, 2020 protective order. See Dkt. No. 36 ¶¶ 1 (a), 10(a), 14(a). Shortly thereafter, the Government began to produce discovery. Upon receipt of some of the discovery, the Defendant filed the instant request, which seeks modification of the protective order in order to use documents produced in the criminal\n2 In the civil context, there is a “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order.” In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Courts in the Second Circuit have applied the standard of protective orders in the civil context to the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, No. 3:15-CR-25 (JCH), 2017 WL 6453344, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017) (applying the civil standard for the modification of a protective order in a criminal case); United States v. Kerik, No. 07-CR-1027 (LAP), 2014 WL 12710346 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (same). See also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the standard for “good cause” in the civil context when evaluating whether to modify a protective order entered in a criminal case); United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 211 (3rd Cir. 2007) (same).\n2\nDOJ-OGR-00001748",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 51 Filed 09/02/20 Page 2 of 5",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "reference, but not file, other discovery material that the Government produced in this case. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's requests are DENIED.\nUnder Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), a Court may enter a protective order only after it finds that good cause exists. Within this framework, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure leave it to the discretion of the Court to determine whether modification of an existing protective order is warranted.2 To make that decision, the Court takes into account all relevant factors, including the parties' reliance on the protective order and whether the moving party has sufficiently substantiated a request to deviate from the status quo in the instant matter.\nOn July 30, 2020, this Court entered a protective order in this case, having determined that good cause existed. Dkt. No. 36. The parties agreed that a protective order was warranted. See Dkt. No. 35 at 1 (“The parties have met and conferred, resolving nearly all the issues relating to the proposed protective order.”). The Defendant's Proposed Protective Order included a provision that stated that all discovery produced by the Government “[s]hall be used by the Defendant or her Defense Counsel solely for purposes of the defense of this criminal action, and not for any civil proceeding or any purpose other than the defense of this action.” Dkt. No. 29, Ex. A ¶ 1(a). That language was included in the Court's July 30, 2020 protective order. See Dkt. No. 36 ¶¶ 1 (a), 10(a), 14(a). Shortly thereafter, the Government began to produce discovery. Upon receipt of some of the discovery, the Defendant filed the instant request, which seeks modification of the protective order in order to use documents produced in the criminal",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 In the civil context, there is a “strong presumption against the modification of a protective order.” In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Courts in the Second Circuit have applied the standard of protective orders in the civil context to the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v. Calderon, No. 3:15-CR-25 (JCH), 2017 WL 6453344, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 1, 2017) (applying the civil standard for the modification of a protective order in a criminal case); United States v. Kerik, No. 07-CR-1027 (LAP), 2014 WL 12710346 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (same). See also United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the standard for “good cause” in the civil context when evaluating whether to modify a protective order entered in a criminal case); United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 211 (3rd Cir. 2007) (same).",
      "position": "footnote"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00001748",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "D. Conn.",
      "S.D.N.Y.",
      "5th Cir.",
      "3rd Cir."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "July 30, 2020",
      "Dec. 1, 2017",
      "July 23, 2014",
      "09/02/20",
      "2011",
      "2015",
      "2007"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 51",
      "Dkt. No. 36",
      "Dkt. No. 35",
      "Dkt. No. 29",
      "3:15-CR-25 (JCH)",
      "07-CR-1027 (LAP)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00001748"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the modification of a protective order. The text is mostly printed, with a footnote and page numbers. There are no visible stamps or handwritten text."
}