mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00002660.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "12",
    "document_number": "144",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 12 of 25\nretroactivity provision in the 2003 Amendment; it actually considered and rejected such a provision, signaling its clear intent that the amendment not be retroactive. Accordingly, the Landgraf analysis should end at step one, with a determination that the 2003 Amendment is not retroactive and that Counts One through Four are therefore time-barred. However, even if the analysis advances to step two, application of the 2003 Amendment to Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct would create impermissible retroactive effects in violation of Landgraf by expanding a criminal statute of limitations.\n\nA. Step One: Congress did not expressly prescribe retroactivity and rejected a proposal to do so.\n\nThe first step of Landgraf asks whether Congress \"expressly prescribed\" the temporal reach of the 2003 Amendment. Here, Congress \"expressly prescribed\" that the 2003 Amendment was to apply prospectively only. Not only does the text of the 2003 Amendment omit any mention of retroactivity, but the legislative history makes it absolutely clear that Congress considered and rejected a retroactivity provision. Because such unambiguous congressional intent is sufficient to constitute an \"express prescription\" under the first step of Landgraf that the amendment not be retroactive, there is no need to proceed to the second Landgraf step.\n\n\"[W]here the congressional intent is clear, it governs.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990)). Here, the legislative history leaves no doubt as to congressional intent. The House version of the bill, which would have eliminated the statute of limitations entirely, included an express retroactivity provision. Child Abduction Prevention Act, H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. § 202 (2003) (\"The amendments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any offense committed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section.\"). The Senate version contained no",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 12 of 25",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "retroactivity provision in the 2003 Amendment; it actually considered and rejected such a provision, signaling its clear intent that the amendment not be retroactive. Accordingly, the Landgraf analysis should end at step one, with a determination that the 2003 Amendment is not retroactive and that Counts One through Four are therefore time-barred. However, even if the analysis advances to step two, application of the 2003 Amendment to Ms. Maxwell's alleged conduct would create impermissible retroactive effects in violation of Landgraf by expanding a criminal statute of limitations.",
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    {
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      "content": "A. Step One: Congress did not expressly prescribe retroactivity and rejected a proposal to do so.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The first step of Landgraf asks whether Congress \"expressly prescribed\" the temporal reach of the 2003 Amendment. Here, Congress \"expressly prescribed\" that the 2003 Amendment was to apply prospectively only. Not only does the text of the 2003 Amendment omit any mention of retroactivity, but the legislative history makes it absolutely clear that Congress considered and rejected a retroactivity provision. Because such unambiguous congressional intent is sufficient to constitute an \"express prescription\" under the first step of Landgraf that the amendment not be retroactive, there is no need to proceed to the second Landgraf step.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "\"[W]here the congressional intent is clear, it governs.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990)). Here, the legislative history leaves no doubt as to congressional intent. The House version of the bill, which would have eliminated the statute of limitations entirely, included an express retroactivity provision. Child Abduction Prevention Act, H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. § 202 (2003) (\"The amendments made by this section shall apply to the prosecution of any offense committed before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this section.\"). The Senate version contained no",
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      "content": "6",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002660",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Congress",
      "House",
      "Senate"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "2003"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 144",
      "H.R. 1104",
      "511 U.S. at 264",
      "494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990)"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and easy to read. There are no visible redactions or damage to the document."
}