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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "55",
- "document_number": "204",
- "date": "04/16/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 55 of 239 impermissible retroactive effects.\" Id. For the reasons set forth below, the 2003 amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 3283 satisfies both steps of Landgraf, and should be applied to pre-enactment conduct. 1. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step One of Landgraf At step one of the Landgraf analysis, the question is whether Congress has \"expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. When evaluating Congress's intent at step one of the Landgraf inquiry, the Second Circuit has considered both the text of the statute and the legislative history. Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 406-08. In this case, the amended versions of Section 3283 evince Congress's express intent to extend the statute of limitations. The text and history of Section 3283 firmly establish that, with each amendment of the statute of limitations, Congress intended to repeal and replace the prior version of the statute and thereby extend the time to bring live charges of child sexual abuse. The 2003 amendment, like the 1994 version of the statute, specifically states that \"[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution\" of a child sexual offense \"shall preclude\" prosecution of such offense during the life of the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003). Claims that were live in 2003 were, at the time, subject to the then-existing statute of limitations, which ran until the victims reached the age of 25. Whenever that statute of limitations ran, it would \"otherwise preclude prosecution.\" Instead, that statute of limitations was replaced by the 2003 amendment. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have both held that Congress intended to extend the statute of limitations for live claims of sexual abuse. In United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit reasoned that \"both the title and wording of § 3509(k) indicate that Congress intended by it to extend the general statute of limitations. . . . § 3509(k) was later recodified at § 3283 and continued to extend the statute of limitations in child abuse cases.\" Id. at 684 (citing United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that an earlier version",
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 55 of 239",
- "position": "header"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "impermissible retroactive effects.\" Id. For the reasons set forth below, the 2003 amendment of 18 U.S.C. § 3283 satisfies both steps of Landgraf, and should be applied to pre-enactment conduct. 1. The 2003 Amendment Satisfies Step One of Landgraf At step one of the Landgraf analysis, the question is whether Congress has \"expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach.\" Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. When evaluating Congress's intent at step one of the Landgraf inquiry, the Second Circuit has considered both the text of the statute and the legislative history. Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 406-08. In this case, the amended versions of Section 3283 evince Congress's express intent to extend the statute of limitations. The text and history of Section 3283 firmly establish that, with each amendment of the statute of limitations, Congress intended to repeal and replace the prior version of the statute and thereby extend the time to bring live charges of child sexual abuse. The 2003 amendment, like the 1994 version of the statute, specifically states that \"[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution\" of a child sexual offense \"shall preclude\" prosecution of such offense during the life of the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003). Claims that were live in 2003 were, at the time, subject to the then-existing statute of limitations, which ran until the victims reached the age of 25. Whenever that statute of limitations ran, it would \"otherwise preclude prosecution.\" Instead, that statute of limitations was replaced by the 2003 amendment. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have both held that Congress intended to extend the statute of limitations for live claims of sexual abuse. In United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit reasoned that \"both the title and wording of § 3509(k) indicate that Congress intended by it to extend the general statute of limitations. . . . § 3509(k) was later recodified at § 3283 and continued to extend the statute of limitations in child abuse cases.\" Id. at 684 (citing United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that an earlier version",
- "position": "main content"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "28",
- "position": "footer"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002989",
- "position": "footer"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [],
- "organizations": [
- "Second Circuit",
- "Eighth Circuit",
- "Ninth Circuit"
- ],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "2003",
- "1994",
- "04/16/21",
- "2005"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "Document 204",
- "18 U.S.C. § 3283",
- "511 U.S. at 280",
- "391 F.3d at 406-08",
- "405 F.3d 682",
- "15 F.3d 740"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a child sexual abuse case, discussing the application of the statute of limitations. The text is printed and clear, with no visible handwriting or stamps."
- }
|