mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00003000.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "66",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 66 of 239\n\nrather, has evinced a general intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.”\n\nSchneider, 801 F.3d at 197 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)); see Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 n.10 (distinguishing Bridges because the “essential ingredient” test there “effectuated Congress’s specific intent to limit the WSLA’s extended limitations period to only a few offenses,” while “Congress had the opposite intention for Section 3283”); see also Vickers, 2014 WL 1838255, at *11-12 (“[T]he defendant argues that the charged offense does not “involve” the sexual abuse of a child, as reflected in the elements of the offense. Defendant’s argument is illogical and clearly misinterprets the use of the term ‘involving’ in section 3283.”).\n\nAlthough the Second Circuit has not yet reached this issue, it examined this question in Weingarten v. United States, in the context of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. Rejecting the claim, the Second Circuit observed that none of the criteria for applying the categorical approach are met in the context of Section 3283. Id. The categorical approach—which focuses on the elements of the offense—is generally only used in settings like sentencing and immigration, where a court is asked to evaluate the conduct from a prior conviction. Id. at 59. In such a context, a court attempting to examine the facts of the prior conviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequences would encounter logistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and “daunting practical difficulties and potential unfairness”). None of those concerns is present here, where the relevant facts will be proved at trial.\n\nThe Weingarten court also specifically rejected the argument Maxwell now asserts: that the words “offense involving” require a categorical approach. “[T]hat Congress used the word ‘involving’ in § 3283 does not necessarily mean it intended to trigger the categorical approach.\n\n39\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003000",
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    {
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 66 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "rather, has evinced a general intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible.”",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Schneider, 801 F.3d at 197 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)); see Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 59 n.10 (distinguishing Bridges because the “essential ingredient” test there “effectuated Congress’s specific intent to limit the WSLA’s extended limitations period to only a few offenses,” while “Congress had the opposite intention for Section 3283”); see also Vickers, 2014 WL 1838255, at *11-12 (“[T]he defendant argues that the charged offense does not “involve” the sexual abuse of a child, as reflected in the elements of the offense. Defendant’s argument is illogical and clearly misinterprets the use of the term ‘involving’ in section 3283.”).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Although the Second Circuit has not yet reached this issue, it examined this question in Weingarten v. United States, in the context of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 58-60. Rejecting the claim, the Second Circuit observed that none of the criteria for applying the categorical approach are met in the context of Section 3283. Id. The categorical approach—which focuses on the elements of the offense—is generally only used in settings like sentencing and immigration, where a court is asked to evaluate the conduct from a prior conviction. Id. at 59. In such a context, a court attempting to examine the facts of the prior conviction to determine the present punishment or immigration consequences would encounter logistical and constitutional obstacles. Id. (noting an Apprendi problem and “daunting practical difficulties and potential unfairness”). None of those concerns is present here, where the relevant facts will be proved at trial.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Weingarten court also specifically rejected the argument Maxwell now asserts: that the words “offense involving” require a categorical approach. “[T]hat Congress used the word ‘involving’ in § 3283 does not necessarily mean it intended to trigger the categorical approach.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "39",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003000",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Congress"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003000"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a clear and legible text. There are no visible redactions or damage."
}