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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "81",
- "document_number": "204",
- "date": "04/16/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 81 of 239\n\n2. Discussion\nEven if the defendant could establish any actual prejudice—which she cannot—such prejudice would be “necessary but not sufficient” to establish a due process claim. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790. The defendant’s motion fails because she has not demonstrated the other necessary element to prevail: that the claimed delay by the Government was intentional and deliberate to gain a strategic advantage. Here, as in Lovasco, any pre-indictment delay was the result of the Government’s continuing investigation of the case. The Lovasco Court held that the investigative delay did not deprive the defendant of his due process rights and noted that imposing a duty upon prosecutors to file charges as soon as probable cause exists “would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.” Id. at 791 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).\nThe same is true in the present case. The defendant has not shown—and cannot show—that the Government caused any pre-indictment delay in this case to gain a tactical advantage. The defendant argues that “[t]actual, reckless, and bad faith motives can reasonably be inferred from the way the government has ignored evidence, delayed any prosecution, enlisted partisan lawyers to do its bidding, circumvented established precedent to illegally obtain evidence, and misleadingly quoting banal testimony so that it could be labeled ‘perjury.’” (Def. Mot. 7 at 15).\nBut rhetoric aside, the defendant offers nothing beyond baseless speculation in support of her claims.\nThe defendant claims a twenty-six-year delay on the part of the Government in bringing Counts One through Four and a four-year delay as to Counts Five and Six. (Def. Mot. 7 at 4). That is not so. The USAO-SDNY opened its investigation into Epstein and his co-conspirators in late November 2018. See Section IV, infra. Epstein was charged by indictment on July 2, 2019. Thereafter, the Government continued its investigation, which included interviewing two victims\n54\nDOJ-OGR-00003015",
- "text_blocks": [
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- "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 81 of 239",
- "position": "header"
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- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "2. Discussion",
- "position": "top"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Even if the defendant could establish any actual prejudice—which she cannot—such prejudice would be “necessary but not sufficient” to establish a due process claim. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790. The defendant’s motion fails because she has not demonstrated the other necessary element to prevail: that the claimed delay by the Government was intentional and deliberate to gain a strategic advantage. Here, as in Lovasco, any pre-indictment delay was the result of the Government’s continuing investigation of the case. The Lovasco Court held that the investigative delay did not deprive the defendant of his due process rights and noted that imposing a duty upon prosecutors to file charges as soon as probable cause exists “would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.” Id. at 791 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "The same is true in the present case. The defendant has not shown—and cannot show—that the Government caused any pre-indictment delay in this case to gain a tactical advantage. The defendant argues that “[t]actual, reckless, and bad faith motives can reasonably be inferred from the way the government has ignored evidence, delayed any prosecution, enlisted partisan lawyers to do its bidding, circumvented established precedent to illegally obtain evidence, and misleadingly quoting banal testimony so that it could be labeled ‘perjury.’” (Def. Mot. 7 at 15).",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "But rhetoric aside, the defendant offers nothing beyond baseless speculation in support of her claims.",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "The defendant claims a twenty-six-year delay on the part of the Government in bringing Counts One through Four and a four-year delay as to Counts Five and Six. (Def. Mot. 7 at 4). That is not so. The USAO-SDNY opened its investigation into Epstein and his co-conspirators in late November 2018. See Section IV, infra. Epstein was charged by indictment on July 2, 2019. Thereafter, the Government continued its investigation, which included interviewing two victims",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "54",
- "position": "footer"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003015",
- "position": "footer"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Epstein"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "USAO-SDNY",
- "Government"
- ],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "November 2018",
- "July 2, 2019",
- "1966"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "Document 204",
- "DOJ-OGR-00003015"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving Epstein. The text discusses the defendant's claims of pre-indictment delay and the government's investigation. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
- }
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