mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00003699.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "25",
    "document_number": "207",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 25 of 34\n\ncounsel testify on her behalf on the perjury charges and having them assist her in defending the Mann Act charges.\n\nThe Second Circuit has recognized that witness testimony offered by a party's attorney presents serious risks to the fairness of a trial. See Murray v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 2009). The lawyer might appear to vouch for their own credibility, jurors might perceive the lawyer as distorting the truth to benefit their client, and blurred lines between argument and evidence might confuse the jury. Id. Disqualification of counsel also implicates Maxwell's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by the counsel of her choice. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, No. 15-cr-00071 (JAD) (GWF), 2016 WL 6154901, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 21, 2016). The prejudice to Maxwell is especially pronounced because the attorneys who represented her in the civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982).\n\nThe Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But much of the proof relevant to the perjury counts and the Mann Act counts does not overlap. In particular, materiality for statements made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the scope of the trial far beyond the narrower issues presented. And while the Court agrees with the Government that at least some of Maxwell's concerns are overstated, there is little question that the jury's consideration of the nature of the defamation action will require a significant investment of time and resources to provide the requisite context.\n\n25\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003699",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 207 Filed 04/16/21 Page 25 of 34",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "counsel testify on her behalf on the perjury charges and having them assist her in defending the Mann Act charges.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Second Circuit has recognized that witness testimony offered by a party's attorney presents serious risks to the fairness of a trial. See Murray v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 2009). The lawyer might appear to vouch for their own credibility, jurors might perceive the lawyer as distorting the truth to benefit their client, and blurred lines between argument and evidence might confuse the jury. Id. Disqualification of counsel also implicates Maxwell's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by the counsel of her choice. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, No. 15-cr-00071 (JAD) (GWF), 2016 WL 6154901, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 21, 2016). The prejudice to Maxwell is especially pronounced because the attorneys who represented her in the civil case have worked with her for years and are particularly familiar with the facts surrounding the criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1982).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court is of course cognizant of the burden separate trials may impose on all trial participants. But much of the proof relevant to the perjury counts and the Mann Act counts does not overlap. In particular, materiality for statements made in a civil deposition is broad, and evidence on that question is unlikely to bear on the other charges here. See Kross, 14 F.3d at 753-54; Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. Although some allegations of sexual abuse are relevant to both sets of charges, many are not. At a minimum, this will expand the scope of the trial far beyond the narrower issues presented. And while the Court agrees with the Government that at least some of Maxwell's concerns are overstated, there is little question that the jury's consideration of the nature of the defamation action will require a significant investment of time and resources to provide the requisite context.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "25",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003699",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Nevada"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "Oct. 21, 2016"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 207",
      "15-cr-00071 (JAD) (GWF)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003699"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of United States v. Maxwell. The text discusses the potential risks and implications of having the defendant's counsel testify on her behalf and the potential for separate trials. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}