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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "11",
- "document_number": "208",
- "date": "04/16/21",
- "document_type": "court document",
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- "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 208 Filed 04/16/21 Page 11 of 16\n\nThe government complains that Ms. Maxwell has not cited any cases where a perjury count was dismissed pretrial for \"fundamental ambiguity.\" Resp. 120. Of course, the government must know that myriad examples exist. United States v. Cicalese, 863 F. Supp. 2d 231, 236-37 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), is instructive:\n\nSuccinctly, the prosecutor did not fulfill her obligation to \"pin the witness down to the specific object of [her] inquiry.\" Bronston, 409 U.S. at 360. Any number of straightforward follow-up questions could have clarified the object of inquiry. For example, in addition to the \"attempt\" question mentioned earlier, the government could have cured the ambiguity by supplying the date, time or location of the target meeting, focusing Cicalese's attention on the specific events at issue. See Razzaia, 370 F.Supp. at 578-79. Left naked, the government's imprecise question did not meet the standard set in Bronston. It cannot provide a jury with a sufficient basis to reasonably conclude that Cicalese willfully lied by answering as he did. Id. at 579. Asking simple follow-up questions could have resolved the imprecision and fulfilled the government's obligation under Bronston. Whether by strategy or inadvertence, the government did not do so.\n\nThe Court granted Cicalese's motion to dismiss the charges against him. Id. at 232.\n\nSimilarly, in United States v. Landau, 737 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court dismissed a perjury indictment, holding \"the context of all the preceding questions and Landau's grand jury testimony as a whole, the prosecutor's questions here are fundamentally ambiguous and cannot as a matter of law to support a perjury conviction. Landau's motion is therefore granted and the indictment is dismissed.\" Id. at 784-85 (emphasis added). The same is true here. In the context of the questions preceding the selectively quoted testimony in Counts Five and Six and the transcripts as a whole, the selected questions were fundamentally ambiguous.\n\nIn United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an acquittal on the grounds of fundamental ambiguity as a result of the content of the form that was the basis of the prosecution. There, the defendant applied for an Airman Medical Certificate to the Federal Aviation Administration. The application included a section entitled \"Medical History\" that contained twenty-four questions regarding \"conditions.\" The first twenty-\n\n7\n\nDOJ-OGR-00003719",
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- "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 208 Filed 04/16/21 Page 11 of 16",
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- "content": "The government complains that Ms. Maxwell has not cited any cases where a perjury count was dismissed pretrial for \"fundamental ambiguity.\" Resp. 120. Of course, the government must know that myriad examples exist. United States v. Cicalese, 863 F. Supp. 2d 231, 236-37 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), is instructive:",
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- "content": "Succinctly, the prosecutor did not fulfill her obligation to \"pin the witness down to the specific object of [her] inquiry.\" Bronston, 409 U.S. at 360. Any number of straightforward follow-up questions could have clarified the object of inquiry. For example, in addition to the \"attempt\" question mentioned earlier, the government could have cured the ambiguity by supplying the date, time or location of the target meeting, focusing Cicalese's attention on the specific events at issue. See Razzaia, 370 F.Supp. at 578-79. Left naked, the government's imprecise question did not meet the standard set in Bronston. It cannot provide a jury with a sufficient basis to reasonably conclude that Cicalese willfully lied by answering as he did. Id. at 579. Asking simple follow-up questions could have resolved the imprecision and fulfilled the government's obligation under Bronston. Whether by strategy or inadvertence, the government did not do so.",
- "position": "middle"
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "The Court granted Cicalese's motion to dismiss the charges against him. Id. at 232.",
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Similarly, in United States v. Landau, 737 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court dismissed a perjury indictment, holding \"the context of all the preceding questions and Landau's grand jury testimony as a whole, the prosecutor's questions here are fundamentally ambiguous and cannot as a matter of law to support a perjury conviction. Landau's motion is therefore granted and the indictment is dismissed.\" Id. at 784-85 (emphasis added). The same is true here. In the context of the questions preceding the selectively quoted testimony in Counts Five and Six and the transcripts as a whole, the selected questions were fundamentally ambiguous.",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "In United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed an acquittal on the grounds of fundamental ambiguity as a result of the content of the form that was the basis of the prosecution. There, the defendant applied for an Airman Medical Certificate to the Federal Aviation Administration. The application included a section entitled \"Medical History\" that contained twenty-four questions regarding \"conditions.\" The first twenty-",
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "7",
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- "type": "printed",
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- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Ms. Maxwell",
- "Cicalese",
- "Landau",
- "Manapat"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Federal Aviation Administration",
- "Eleventh Circuit"
- ],
- "locations": [
- "E.D.N.Y.",
- "S.D.N.Y."
- ],
- "dates": [
- "04/16/21",
- "2012",
- "1990",
- "1991"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
- "Document 208",
- "Resp. 120",
- "863 F. Supp. 2d 231",
- "409 U.S. 360",
- "370 F.Supp. 578",
- "737 F. Supp. 778",
- "928 F.2d 1097",
- "DOJ-OGR-00003719"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing discussing perjury counts and fundamental ambiguity. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible."
- }
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