mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00004794.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "10",
    "document_number": "307",
    "date": "06/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 10 of 21\n\nSupreme Court has held that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in geographical information obtained from their cell phones, because that information provides a comprehensive account of a person's movements akin to invasive physical surveillance. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20.\n\nUnder this standard, Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents produced during the civil litigation. Those documents may not have been public, but they were hardly private. The protective order allowed them to be shared freely with each of the following categories of people:\n\n- The parties to the case.\n- Attorneys involved in the case.\n- People employed by or associated with attorneys involved in the case.\n- Expert witnesses.\n- Fact witnesses.\n- Potential witnesses.\n- Court personnel and stenographers.\n\nIt also allowed any documents to be publicly used at trial. This is not a case like Carpenter where new technology has allowed police to access heretofore “unknowable” information about a person's private life. Id. at 2218. This is a case where Maxwell shared information with third parties through the routine process of civil litigation and now objects that they shared it with the Government, too.\n\nSecond Circuit precedent makes clear that Maxwell had no reasonable expectation that documents covered by the protective order would remain shielded from view of the public or prosecutors. The Second Circuit has cautioned civil litigants that a civil protective order is no guarantee against the use of evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See Andover, 876 F.2d at 1083. Second Circuit precedent allows a court in a subsequent proceeding to modify a\n\n10\n\nDOJ-OGR-00004794",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 10 of 21",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Supreme Court has held that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in geographical information obtained from their cell phones, because that information provides a comprehensive account of a person's movements akin to invasive physical surveillance. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Under this standard, Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents produced during the civil litigation. Those documents may not have been public, but they were hardly private. The protective order allowed them to be shared freely with each of the following categories of people:",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "- The parties to the case.\n- Attorneys involved in the case.\n- People employed by or associated with attorneys involved in the case.\n- Expert witnesses.\n- Fact witnesses.\n- Potential witnesses.\n- Court personnel and stenographers.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "It also allowed any documents to be publicly used at trial. This is not a case like Carpenter where new technology has allowed police to access heretofore “unknowable” information about a person's private life. Id. at 2218. This is a case where Maxwell shared information with third parties through the routine process of civil litigation and now objects that they shared it with the Government, too.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second Circuit precedent makes clear that Maxwell had no reasonable expectation that documents covered by the protective order would remain shielded from view of the public or prosecutors. The Second Circuit has cautioned civil litigants that a civil protective order is no guarantee against the use of evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See Andover, 876 F.2d at 1083. Second Circuit precedent allows a court in a subsequent proceeding to modify a",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "10",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004794",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Carpenter"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "06/25/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 307",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004794"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Maxwell. The text discusses the expectation of privacy in documents produced during civil litigation and the use of protective orders. The document is well-formatted and free of handwritten notes or stamps."
}