DOJ-OGR-00004946.json 5.3 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "23",
  4. "document_number": "311-4",
  5. "date": "07/02/21",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 23 of 27\nTo Be Filed Under Seal\n\nThis decision accords with those of other courts in this Circuit. \"Where a protective order contains express language that limits the time period for enforcement, anticipates the potential for modification, or contains specific procedures for disclosing confidential materials to non-parties, it is not reasonable for a party to rely on an assumption that it will never be modified.\" EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 320. More to the point, \"Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponent may always effectively rely on a protective order to secure his right against self-incrimination.\" Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1084 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988)).\n\nBecause Maxwell's reliance on the Protective Order to shield her from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application. \"Where a litigant or deponent could not reasonably have relied on the continuation of a protective order, a court may properly permit modification of the order. In such a case, whether to lift or modify a protective order is a decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.\" TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 231 (internal quotation omitted); accord Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) (\"If reliance would be unreasonable, it is within the discretion of the court to vacate or modify a protective order.\")\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that modification of the Protective Order is appropriate to aid law enforcement.\n\nE. The Government Has Shown \"Extraordinary Circumstances\" That Warrant Modification of the Protective Order\n\nThe Government has persuasively demonstrated extraordinary circumstances, which would entitle it to modification in any event.\n\n22\nSDNY_GM_00000896\nDOJ-OGR-00004946",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 311-4 Filed 07/02/21 Page 23 of 27",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "To Be Filed Under Seal",
  20. "position": "header"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "This decision accords with those of other courts in this Circuit. \"Where a protective order contains express language that limits the time period for enforcement, anticipates the potential for modification, or contains specific procedures for disclosing confidential materials to non-parties, it is not reasonable for a party to rely on an assumption that it will never be modified.\" EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 320. More to the point, \"Uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of a protective order will mean that no deponent may always effectively rely on a protective order to secure his right against self-incrimination.\" Andover Data Servs., 876 F.2d at 1084 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988)).\n\nBecause Maxwell's reliance on the Protective Order to shield her from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application. \"Where a litigant or deponent could not reasonably have relied on the continuation of a protective order, a court may properly permit modification of the order. In such a case, whether to lift or modify a protective order is a decision committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.\" TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 231 (internal quotation omitted); accord Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 142 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) (\"If reliance would be unreasonable, it is within the discretion of the court to vacate or modify a protective order.\")\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that modification of the Protective Order is appropriate to aid law enforcement.\n\nE. The Government Has Shown \"Extraordinary Circumstances\" That Warrant Modification of the Protective Order\n\nThe Government has persuasively demonstrated extraordinary circumstances, which would entitle it to modification in any event.",
  25. "position": "main content"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "22",
  30. "position": "footer"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "SDNY_GM_00000896",
  35. "position": "footer"
  36. },
  37. {
  38. "type": "printed",
  39. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004946",
  40. "position": "footer"
  41. }
  42. ],
  43. "entities": {
  44. "people": [
  45. "Maxwell"
  46. ],
  47. "organizations": [
  48. "EPDM",
  49. "Andover Data Servs.",
  50. "TheStreet.Com",
  51. "Deutsche Bank AG"
  52. ],
  53. "locations": [],
  54. "dates": [
  55. "07/02/21"
  56. ],
  57. "reference_numbers": [
  58. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  59. "311-4",
  60. "SDNY_GM_00000896",
  61. "DOJ-OGR-00004946"
  62. ]
  63. },
  64. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is marked 'To Be Filed Under Seal'."
  65. }