mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00005489.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "34",
    "document_number": "382",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 382 Filed 10/29/21 Page 34 of 69\n\nmotive to fabricate arose immediately after the supposed child-abuse, and thus statements made to others, months or years later, were inadmissible under now-Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i). The same is true here. The improper influence and motive to fabricate occurred, in several instances, many years ago, shortly after the purported abuse occurred, and before the recently-disclosed \"consistent\" statements. Wright & Miller, 30B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6753 Consistent Premotive Statements (2021 ed.) (\"As in Tome, prior consistent statements will frequently be tainted by the same alleged motive to lie that is claimed to impugn the witness' trial testimony. If so, Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) does not permit their introduction. This result has favorable policy implications. As Tome stresses, the general exclusion of prior consistent statements ensures that 'the whole emphasis of the trial' does not \"shift to the out-of-court statements\" as opposed to 'the in-court ones.')\n\nIf the government instead offers prior consistent statements to rehabilitate their accusers or explain their faulty memory under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), the \"offered prior consistent statement must serve to rehabilitate the witness's credibility on the same ground upon which the witness's credibility was attacked.\" United States. v. Karl Roye, Crim. No. 3:15-cr-29 (JBA), 2016 WL 4147133 at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 4, 2016) (citing 1 McCormick On Evid. § 47 (7th ed.) (\"The general test of admissibility is whether evidence of the witness's ... consistent statements is logically relevant to explain the impeaching fact. The rehabilitating facts must meet the impeachment with relative directness. The wall, attacked at one point, may not be fortified at another, distinct point.\")) As was the case prior to the 2014 Amendments, \"a prior consistent statement may only be used for rehabilitation \"when the statement has a probative force bearing on credibility beyond merely showing repetition.\" United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d. Cir. 1986).\n\n26\nDOJ-OGR-00005489",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 382 Filed 10/29/21 Page 34 of 69",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "motive to fabricate arose immediately after the supposed child-abuse, and thus statements made to others, months or years later, were inadmissible under now-Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i). The same is true here. The improper influence and motive to fabricate occurred, in several instances, many years ago, shortly after the purported abuse occurred, and before the recently-disclosed \"consistent\" statements. Wright & Miller, 30B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6753 Consistent Premotive Statements (2021 ed.) (\"As in Tome, prior consistent statements will frequently be tainted by the same alleged motive to lie that is claimed to impugn the witness' trial testimony. If so, Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i) does not permit their introduction. This result has favorable policy implications. As Tome stresses, the general exclusion of prior consistent statements ensures that 'the whole emphasis of the trial' does not \"shift to the out-of-court statements\" as opposed to 'the in-court ones.')",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "If the government instead offers prior consistent statements to rehabilitate their accusers or explain their faulty memory under Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), the \"offered prior consistent statement must serve to rehabilitate the witness's credibility on the same ground upon which the witness's credibility was attacked.\" United States. v. Karl Roye, Crim. No. 3:15-cr-29 (JBA), 2016 WL 4147133 at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 4, 2016) (citing 1 McCormick On Evid. § 47 (7th ed.) (\"The general test of admissibility is whether evidence of the witness's ... consistent statements is logically relevant to explain the impeaching fact. The rehabilitating facts must meet the impeachment with relative directness. The wall, attacked at one point, may not be fortified at another, distinct point.\")) As was the case prior to the 2014 Amendments, \"a prior consistent statement may only be used for rehabilitation \"when the statement has a probative force bearing on credibility beyond merely showing repetition.\" United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d. Cir. 1986).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "26",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005489",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Tome",
      "Karl Roye",
      "Pierre"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "D. Conn"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21",
      "Aug. 4, 2016",
      "1986"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 382",
      "Crim. No. 3:15-cr-29 (JBA)",
      "2016 WL 4147133",
      "781 F.2d 329"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the admissibility of prior consistent statements under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}