mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00005799.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "16",
    "document_number": "397",
    "date": "10/29/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 16 of 84\restablished pattern of victimization—attachment and coercion—experienced by victims of sexual abuse.\nThe defense would read Raymond to stand for the proposition that expert testimony is unreliable if it does not explain “what testing was involved, what data she considered, or how her conclusions can be verified.” (Def. Mot. 3 at 8). For instance, the defense criticizes Dr. Rocchio for opining that sexual abuse of minors occurs “frequently,” without specifying whether it occurs “half the time” or “two-thirds of the time.” (Id. at 7; see id. at 8 (quoting Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49)). That is not what is required by Daubert in the context of qualitative social science, and it is not what many courts have held in the context of precisely this form of testimony, as explained above. To the extent Raymond stands for such a broad proposition, it is contrary to the law of this Circuit. See United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 276 n.14 (2d Cir. 2011) (recognizing that social science research “cannot have the exactness of hard science methodologies, and expert testimony need not be based on statistical analysis in order to be probative” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).2\nThe defendant’s remaining critiques of Dr. Rocchio’s opinion miss the mark. First, the defendant asserts that Dr. Rocchio’s patients are uncorroborated, and she “simply assumes her\n2 Even in Raymond, the Court left open the possibility that the Government could call the expert in rebuttal to “counter a defense case that victim testimony in this case should not be believed because the victim delayed in reporting the abuse or did not report it consistently.” 700 F. Supp. 2d at 156. Even were the Court inclined to follow Raymond rather than the cases in this District, it should similarly revisit permitting Dr. Rocchio to testify about the opinion at issue if the defense attacks victim credibility.\n15\nDOJ-OGR-00005799",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 16 of 84",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "established pattern of victimization—attachment and coercion—experienced by victims of sexual abuse.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defense would read Raymond to stand for the proposition that expert testimony is unreliable if it does not explain “what testing was involved, what data she considered, or how her conclusions can be verified.” (Def. Mot. 3 at 8). For instance, the defense criticizes Dr. Rocchio for opining that sexual abuse of minors occurs “frequently,” without specifying whether it occurs “half the time” or “two-thirds of the time.” (Id. at 7; see id. at 8 (quoting Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 148-49)). That is not what is required by Daubert in the context of qualitative social science, and it is not what many courts have held in the context of precisely this form of testimony, as explained above. To the extent Raymond stands for such a broad proposition, it is contrary to the law of this Circuit. See United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 276 n.14 (2d Cir. 2011) (recognizing that social science research “cannot have the exactness of hard science methodologies, and expert testimony need not be based on statistical analysis in order to be probative” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The defendant’s remaining critiques of Dr. Rocchio’s opinion miss the mark. First, the defendant asserts that Dr. Rocchio’s patients are uncorroborated, and she “simply assumes her",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2 Even in Raymond, the Court left open the possibility that the Government could call the expert in rebuttal to “counter a defense case that victim testimony in this case should not be believed because the victim delayed in reporting the abuse or did not report it consistently.” 700 F. Supp. 2d at 156. Even were the Court inclined to follow Raymond rather than the cases in this District, it should similarly revisit permitting Dr. Rocchio to testify about the opinion at issue if the defense attacks victim credibility.",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "15",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00005799",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Dr. Rocchio"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/29/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "397",
      "DOJ-OGR-00005799"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, discussing the admissibility of expert testimony. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}