mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00010282.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "16 of 24",
    "document_number": "647",
    "date": "03/11/22",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 647 Filed 03/11/22 Page 16 of 24\nF.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), Count Three and Count Five are multiplicitous. The Court should therefore enter judgment only on Count Three.5\nA. The Criminal Offenses Charged\nThe government argues that the differences between the offenses charged in Count Three and Count Five are fatal to the defense's multiplicity argument. Not so.6 Count Five is not a distinct conspiracy simply because it alleged a different statutory object than Count Three, as the government claims. (Opp. at 27). If that were the case, the government would never have conceded that Counts One and Three were multiplicitous because they, too, alleged different statutory objects. Count One alleged a conspiracy to violate the enticement statute (18 U.S.C. § 2422), while Count Three alleged a conspiracy to violate the transportation statute (18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)). (Ind. ¶¶ 11-12, 17-18). Moreover, each of these statutory objects has different elements. For example, enticement does not require actual travel in interstate commerce, whereas transportation does. (Compare Instr. 14 with Instr. 19). Enticement requires persuasion or inducement to travel, whereas transportation does not. (Id.) Transportation (in this case) requires that the defendant know that the individual transported was under the age of seventeen, whereas enticement does not. (Id.) These legal distinctions are no less significant than the distinctions between Count Three and Count Five that were highlighted by the government – e.g., the age of consent was seventeen for Count Three and eighteen for Count Five, and Count\n5 As discussed further below, the conspiracy charged in Count Five is a smaller subset of the larger conspiracy charged in Count Three. The Court should therefore enter judgment on Count Three.\n6 The government suggests that the defense deliberately asked the Court to ignore this factor to avoid the Court's consideration of it. That is absolutely incorrect. The first Korfant factor, as set forth in the Korfant case itself, is \"the criminal offenses charged in successive indictments.\" Korfant, 771 F.2d at 662 (emphasis added). Hence, it was not evident that this factor applied in cases where the multiplicitous counts were in the same indictment. The defense accepts that the Second Circuit has applied this factor in such cases and the Court may consider it here. See United States v. Guzman, 7 F. App'x 45, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001). But this factor is by no means fatal to the defense's multiplicity argument.\n12\nDOJ-OGR-00010282",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 647 Filed 03/11/22 Page 16 of 24",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam), Count Three and Count Five are multiplicitous. The Court should therefore enter judgment only on Count Three.5",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A. The Criminal Offenses Charged",
      "position": "top"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The government argues that the differences between the offenses charged in Count Three and Count Five are fatal to the defense's multiplicity argument. Not so.6 Count Five is not a distinct conspiracy simply because it alleged a different statutory object than Count Three, as the government claims. (Opp. at 27). If that were the case, the government would never have conceded that Counts One and Three were multiplicitous because they, too, alleged different statutory objects. Count One alleged a conspiracy to violate the enticement statute (18 U.S.C. § 2422), while Count Three alleged a conspiracy to violate the transportation statute (18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)). (Ind. ¶¶ 11-12, 17-18). Moreover, each of these statutory objects has different elements. For example, enticement does not require actual travel in interstate commerce, whereas transportation does. (Compare Instr. 14 with Instr. 19). Enticement requires persuasion or inducement to travel, whereas transportation does not. (Id.) Transportation (in this case) requires that the defendant know that the individual transported was under the age of seventeen, whereas enticement does not. (Id.) These legal distinctions are no less significant than the distinctions between Count Three and Count Five that were highlighted by the government – e.g., the age of consent was seventeen for Count Three and eighteen for Count Five, and Count",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "5 As discussed further below, the conspiracy charged in Count Five is a smaller subset of the larger conspiracy charged in Count Three. The Court should therefore enter judgment on Count Three.\n6 The government suggests that the defense deliberately asked the Court to ignore this factor to avoid the Court's consideration of it. That is absolutely incorrect. The first Korfant factor, as set forth in the Korfant case itself, is \"the criminal offenses charged in successive indictments.\" Korfant, 771 F.2d at 662 (emphasis added). Hence, it was not evident that this factor applied in cases where the multiplicitous counts were in the same indictment. The defense accepts that the Second Circuit has applied this factor in such cases and the Court may consider it here. See United States v. Guzman, 7 F. App'x 45, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001). But this factor is by no means fatal to the defense's multiplicity argument.",
      "position": "bottom"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "12",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010282",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "03/11/22"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "647",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010282"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 16 of 24."
}