mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00010350.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "27",
    "document_number": "653",
    "date": "04/01/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 27 of 40\n\nconsidering whether some marginal types of disclosed facts are enough to show inferable bias—ask about a juror's impartiality and might be persuaded by the force of the juror's assurance.\" Id. at 47 n.12. For example, in Torres, the Second Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded during voir dire that a juror was inferably biased because she had engaged in money-structuring activities that were highly similar to the conduct charged in the case. But the Second Circuit made clear that the district court would not have erred if it had kept the juror. Id. at 46–48.\n\nThe Court concludes that Juror 50 is neither impliedly nor inferably biased. First, none of the \"extreme situations\" in which the Court must conclusively presume bias as a matter of law apply here. McCoy, 995 F.3d at 48. Juror 50 was not a victim of the charged crime itself, nor is he related to any of the attorneys, witnesses, victims, or other case participants. See Nix, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 451. Thus, the Court would not have granted a hypothetical challenge for cause based on implied bias even if Juror 50 had provided correct answers to the questionnaire.\n\nSecond, Juror 50's personal experience of sexual abuse does not evidence partiality sufficient to infer that Juror 50 was biased against the Defendant. The Court need not imagine a wholly hypothetical universe for this conclusion. That is because the voir dire provides highly relevant indications of how the parties and Court would have reacted had Juror 50 provided accurate answers during jury selection. A review of the voir dire of jurors who responded \"yes (self)\" to Question 48 reveals that it is unlikely that the Defendant would have challenged Juror 50 for cause. It also reveals that the Court would not have granted a for-cause challenge had one been raised. See McCoy, 995 F.3d at 49.\n\nEight prospective jurors who answered \"yes (self)\" to Question 48 proceeded to voir dire.\n\nThe Court asked every follow-up question requested by the Defendant with regard to a juror's\n\n27\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010350",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 653 Filed 04/01/22 Page 27 of 40",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "considering whether some marginal types of disclosed facts are enough to show inferable bias—ask about a juror's impartiality and might be persuaded by the force of the juror's assurance.\" Id. at 47 n.12. For example, in Torres, the Second Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded during voir dire that a juror was inferably biased because she had engaged in money-structuring activities that were highly similar to the conduct charged in the case. But the Second Circuit made clear that the district court would not have erred if it had kept the juror. Id. at 46–48.",
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      "content": "The Court concludes that Juror 50 is neither impliedly nor inferably biased. First, none of the \"extreme situations\" in which the Court must conclusively presume bias as a matter of law apply here. McCoy, 995 F.3d at 48. Juror 50 was not a victim of the charged crime itself, nor is he related to any of the attorneys, witnesses, victims, or other case participants. See Nix, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 451. Thus, the Court would not have granted a hypothetical challenge for cause based on implied bias even if Juror 50 had provided correct answers to the questionnaire.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Second, Juror 50's personal experience of sexual abuse does not evidence partiality sufficient to infer that Juror 50 was biased against the Defendant. The Court need not imagine a wholly hypothetical universe for this conclusion. That is because the voir dire provides highly relevant indications of how the parties and Court would have reacted had Juror 50 provided accurate answers during jury selection. A review of the voir dire of jurors who responded \"yes (self)\" to Question 48 reveals that it is unlikely that the Defendant would have challenged Juror 50 for cause. It also reveals that the Court would not have granted a for-cause challenge had one been raised. See McCoy, 995 F.3d at 49.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Eight prospective jurors who answered \"yes (self)\" to Question 48 proceeded to voir dire.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court asked every follow-up question requested by the Defendant with regard to a juror's",
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    {
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      "content": "27",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010350",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Second Circuit",
      "Court",
      "Defendant"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/01/22"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "653",
      "27",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010350"
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text discusses the impartiality of a juror and the court's decision regarding the juror's bias. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}