mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00010742.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "6",
    "document_number": "681-1",
    "date": "06/26/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 681-1 Filed 06/26/22 Page 6 of 7\n\nconsider at sentencing. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1240 (D. Utah 2004); United States v. Fennel, 65 F.3d 812, 813 (10th Cir. 1995).\n\nOf particular importance in confirming the broad power of courts at sentencing is a broad federal provision—18 U.S.C. § 3661—which states “no limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence” (emphasis added). The critical words “no limitation” grant a sentencing court extremely broad discretionary authority over what sentencing information will be considered. The Second Circuit, for example, has recognized the broad scope of this provision. See United States v. Morrison, 778 F.3d 396, 400–01 (2d Cir. 2015). The Second Circuit noted that § 3661 contains “emphatic language” which “preclude[s] categorical proscriptions on ‘any factor concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant, with the exception of invidious factors.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc)).\n\nIn view of these authorities, the court has discretionary to hear from anyone it believes would have useful information for sentencing. Kate respectfully submits that hearing from her will help the court in imposing a fair and just sentence and that she should be allowed to speak.\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court should allow Kate to deliver an oral victim impact statement at defendant Maxwell’s sentencing, or, at a minimum, provide her additional time to brief the issue.\n\nDated: June 22, 2022.\n\n6\n\nDOJ-OGR-00010742",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 681-1 Filed 06/26/22 Page 6 of 7",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "consider at sentencing. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1240 (D. Utah 2004); United States v. Fennel, 65 F.3d 812, 813 (10th Cir. 1995).\n\nOf particular importance in confirming the broad power of courts at sentencing is a broad federal provision—18 U.S.C. § 3661—which states “no limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence” (emphasis added). The critical words “no limitation” grant a sentencing court extremely broad discretionary authority over what sentencing information will be considered. The Second Circuit, for example, has recognized the broad scope of this provision. See United States v. Morrison, 778 F.3d 396, 400–01 (2d Cir. 2015). The Second Circuit noted that § 3661 contains “emphatic language” which “preclude[s] categorical proscriptions on ‘any factor concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant, with the exception of invidious factors.’” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc)).\n\nIn view of these authorities, the court has discretionary to hear from anyone it believes would have useful information for sentencing. Kate respectfully submits that hearing from her will help the court in imposing a fair and just sentence and that she should be allowed to speak.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "CONCLUSION",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "For all these reasons, the Court should allow Kate to deliver an oral victim impact statement at defendant Maxwell’s sentencing, or, at a minimum, provide her additional time to brief the issue.",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Dated: June 22, 2022.",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "6",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010742",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Kate",
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States Court",
      "Second Circuit",
      "Department of Justice"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Utah"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "June 22, 2022",
      "2004",
      "1995",
      "2015",
      "2008"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 681-1",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3661",
      "324 F. Supp. 2d 1230",
      "65 F.3d 812",
      "778 F.3d 396",
      "550 F.3d 180",
      "DOJ-OGR-00010742"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is well-formatted and easy to read. There are no visible redactions or damages."
}