mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES008/DOJ-OGR-00021694.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "47",
    "document_number": "79",
    "date": "06/29/2023",
    "document_type": "Court Document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page47 of 93\n\n34\n\nCourt has considered both statutory text and legislative history. In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. (“Enterprise”), 391 F.3d 401, 406-08 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, the text and history of Section 3283 establish that Congress intended to extend the time to bring charges of child sexual abuse in cases where the limitations period had not yet expired.\n\nPrior to 2003, any child sex abuse offense could be prosecuted until the victim reached the age of 25 years, at which point the statute of limitations then in effect would bar prosecution. In the 2003 amendment, which was titled, “No Statute of Limitations for Child Abduction and Sex Crimes,” Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 660, Congress explicitly provided that “[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for [such an offense] shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.” 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003). The amendment draws no distinction between pre-enactment and post-enactment conduct. Instead, as Judge Nathan explained, by stating that “no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply,” the amendment’s “plain language unambiguously requires that it apply to prosecutions for offenses committed before the date of enactment.” (A.151). Thus, the breadth of the text shows that Congress intended “to extend the . . . statute of limitations,” even for pre-enactment conduct. United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2005) (reaching same conclusion as to § 3283’s predecessor based on similar “title and . . . wording” of statute); cf. Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 407 (describing provision that “no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed” as example of statute\n\nDOJ-OGR-00021694",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page47 of 93",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "34",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Court has considered both statutory text and legislative history. In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. (“Enterprise”), 391 F.3d 401, 406-08 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, the text and history of Section 3283 establish that Congress intended to extend the time to bring charges of child sexual abuse in cases where the limitations period had not yet expired.\n\nPrior to 2003, any child sex abuse offense could be prosecuted until the victim reached the age of 25 years, at which point the statute of limitations then in effect would bar prosecution. In the 2003 amendment, which was titled, “No Statute of Limitations for Child Abduction and Sex Crimes,” Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 202, 117 Stat. 660, Congress explicitly provided that “[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for [such an offense] shall preclude such prosecution during the life of the child.” 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003). The amendment draws no distinction between pre-enactment and post-enactment conduct. Instead, as Judge Nathan explained, by stating that “no statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution of these offenses will apply,” the amendment’s “plain language unambiguously requires that it apply to prosecutions for offenses committed before the date of enactment.” (A.151). Thus, the breadth of the text shows that Congress intended “to extend the . . . statute of limitations,” even for pre-enactment conduct. United States v. Jeffries, 405 F.3d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 2005) (reaching same conclusion as to § 3283’s predecessor based on similar “title and . . . wording” of statute); cf. Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 407 (describing provision that “no limitation shall terminate the period within which suit may be filed” as example of statute",
      "position": "middle"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021694",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Judge Nathan"
    ],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "06/29/2023",
      "2003",
      "2005"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 22-1426",
      "Document 79",
      "3536060",
      "DOJ-OGR-00021694",
      "Pub. L. No. 108-21",
      "§ 202",
      "117 Stat. 660",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3283"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, likely a legal brief or opinion, discussing the statute of limitations for child sex abuse offenses. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}