DOJ-OGR-00021697.json 4.7 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "50",
  4. "document_number": "79",
  5. "date": "06/29/2023",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page50 of 93\n\n37\n\nThe reach of the 2003 amendment to Section 3283 is clear. Because Congress has expressly extended the statute of limitations to pre-enactment conduct, Judge Nathan correctly resolved this analysis at Landgraf step one. In the alternative, however, the statute is-at worst-ambiguous. If the Court takes that view, it should proceed to Landgraf step two, which examines the retroactive effects of the statute.\n\nii. Landgraf Step Two\n\nAs the Supreme Court explained in Landgraf, \"[e]ven absent specific legislative authorization,\" applying a statute to pre-enactment conduct \"is unquestionably proper in many situations.\" 511 U.S. at 273. \"A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law.\" Id. at 269. Instead, the question is whether the statute \"would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.\" Id. at 280. Importantly, \"the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive,\" because parties have \"diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure\" and \"[b]ecause rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct.\" Id. at 275.\n\nIn Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist., 49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995), this Court considered a new statute of limitations that shortened the time to file\n\nDOJ-OGR-00021697",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page50 of 93",
  15. "position": "header"
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  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "37",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
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  24. "content": "The reach of the 2003 amendment to Section 3283 is clear. Because Congress has expressly extended the statute of limitations to pre-enactment conduct, Judge Nathan correctly resolved this analysis at Landgraf step one. In the alternative, however, the statute is-at worst-ambiguous. If the Court takes that view, it should proceed to Landgraf step two, which examines the retroactive effects of the statute.",
  25. "position": "middle"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "ii. Landgraf Step Two",
  30. "position": "middle"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "As the Supreme Court explained in Landgraf, \"[e]ven absent specific legislative authorization,\" applying a statute to pre-enactment conduct \"is unquestionably proper in many situations.\" 511 U.S. at 273. \"A statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based in prior law.\" Id. at 269. Instead, the question is whether the statute \"would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.\" Id. at 280. Importantly, \"the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive,\" because parties have \"diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure\" and \"[b]ecause rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct.\" Id. at 275.",
  35. "position": "middle"
  36. },
  37. {
  38. "type": "printed",
  39. "content": "In Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. School Dist., 49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995), this Court considered a new statute of limitations that shortened the time to file",
  40. "position": "middle"
  41. },
  42. {
  43. "type": "printed",
  44. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021697",
  45. "position": "footer"
  46. }
  47. ],
  48. "entities": {
  49. "people": [
  50. "Nathan"
  51. ],
  52. "organizations": [
  53. "Congress",
  54. "Supreme Court",
  55. "Court"
  56. ],
  57. "locations": [],
  58. "dates": [
  59. "2003",
  60. "06/29/2023",
  61. "1995"
  62. ],
  63. "reference_numbers": [
  64. "22-1426",
  65. "79",
  66. "3536060",
  67. "511 U.S.",
  68. "49 F.3d 886",
  69. "DOJ-OGR-00021697"
  70. ]
  71. },
  72. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, likely a brief or memorandum, discussing the application of a statute of limitations to pre-enactment conduct. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten annotations."
  73. }