DOJ-OGR-00021709.json 4.2 KB

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657
  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "62",
  4. "document_number": "79",
  5. "date": "06/29/2023",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page62 of 93\n\n49\ncontact with a child. Counts Three and Four each have an \"essential ingredient\" that fits within that broad definition. See supra Point II.B.2.a.\n\nFinally, neither Diehl nor United States v. Countentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011), supports the use of a categorical approach. (Br.51-52). In each decision, the court concluded that Section 3283 applied to the subject offenses without considering the specific facts of the crime, but in neither case did the court consider whether a categorical approach was required—let alone hold that it was.\n\nAs noted above, it is undisputed that the evidence at trial established that Maxwell's commission of Counts Three and Four involved completed sex acts abusing one or more minor victims: Jane testified that she was in fact sexually abused when transported across state lines, including to New York, as a minor. Accordingly, Counts Three and Four qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of a child both by their statutory terms and based on the specific facts of this case.\n\nPOINT III\n\nThe District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Concluding that Juror 50 Could Be Fair and Impartial Notwithstanding His Inadvertent Mistakes on His Juror Questionnaire\n\nMaxwell contends that she was denied her right to a fair and impartial jury because a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that he was sexually abused as a child, and therefore incorrectly answered three\n\nDOJ-OGR-00021709",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page62 of 93",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "49\ncontact with a child. Counts Three and Four each have an \"essential ingredient\" that fits within that broad definition. See supra Point II.B.2.a.\n\nFinally, neither Diehl nor United States v. Countentos, 651 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2011), supports the use of a categorical approach. (Br.51-52). In each decision, the court concluded that Section 3283 applied to the subject offenses without considering the specific facts of the crime, but in neither case did the court consider whether a categorical approach was required—let alone hold that it was.\n\nAs noted above, it is undisputed that the evidence at trial established that Maxwell's commission of Counts Three and Four involved completed sex acts abusing one or more minor victims: Jane testified that she was in fact sexually abused when transported across state lines, including to New York, as a minor. Accordingly, Counts Three and Four qualify as offenses involving the sexual abuse of a child both by their statutory terms and based on the specific facts of this case.",
  20. "position": "main content"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "POINT III\n\nThe District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Concluding that Juror 50 Could Be Fair and Impartial Notwithstanding His Inadvertent Mistakes on His Juror Questionnaire\n\nMaxwell contends that she was denied her right to a fair and impartial jury because a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that he was sexually abused as a child, and therefore incorrectly answered three",
  25. "position": "main content"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021709",
  30. "position": "footer"
  31. }
  32. ],
  33. "entities": {
  34. "people": [
  35. "Maxwell",
  36. "Jane",
  37. "Diehl"
  38. ],
  39. "organizations": [
  40. "United States"
  41. ],
  42. "locations": [
  43. "New York"
  44. ],
  45. "dates": [
  46. "06/29/2023"
  47. ],
  48. "reference_numbers": [
  49. "22-1426",
  50. "79",
  51. "3536060",
  52. "DOJ-OGR-00021709",
  53. "651 F.3d 809"
  54. ]
  55. },
  56. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, likely a legal brief or opinion, discussing a case involving sexual abuse and the fairness of a juror. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
  57. }