mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES007/DOJ-OGR-00019628.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "21",
    "document_number": "82",
    "date": "10/02/2020",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page21 of 37\n\n15\ntype of protective order at issue here. To the contrary, the Protective Order in this case expressly provides that its provisions “shall not be construed as preventing disclosure of any information, with the exception of victim or witness identifying information, that is publicly available or obtained by the Defendant or her Defense Counsel form a source other than the Government.” (A. 84-85). Instead, the Protective Order “imposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materials exchanged in the course of pending litigation” and, like the similar provision in the Pappas protective order, is therefore “not subject to appeal” prior to entry of final judgment. Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798.\n\nCaparros is similarly analogous. That case declined to find jurisdiction over a similar order for several reasons, including because “[t]he purported right at issue is not related to any right to stand trial.” Caparros, 800 F.2d at 26. The Court also concluded that the protective order in that case would be reviewable on appeal after final judgment and emphasized that the defendant would not suffer any “grave harm . . . if the order is not immediately reviewed.” Id. So too here. Maxwell has not articulated any serious injury she will suffer if this Court dismisses her appeal. The only theoretical harm might be prejudicial pretrial publicity arising from the unsealing of filings in a civil case. Should any prejudicial publicity arise, though, Maxwell will be fully able to raise that issue on appeal after the entry of final judgment in her criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 232-34 (2d Cir. 2010) (evaluating on post-judgment appeal whether publicity biased the venire); United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 128-31 (2d Cir. 2008) (evaluating on post-\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019628",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page21 of 37",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "15",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "type of protective order at issue here. To the contrary, the Protective Order in this case expressly provides that its provisions “shall not be construed as preventing disclosure of any information, with the exception of victim or witness identifying information, that is publicly available or obtained by the Defendant or her Defense Counsel form a source other than the Government.” (A. 84-85). Instead, the Protective Order “imposed restrictions on the parties’ disclosure of materials exchanged in the course of pending litigation” and, like the similar provision in the Pappas protective order, is therefore “not subject to appeal” prior to entry of final judgment. Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Caparros is similarly analogous. That case declined to find jurisdiction over a similar order for several reasons, including because “[t]he purported right at issue is not related to any right to stand trial.” Caparros, 800 F.2d at 26. The Court also concluded that the protective order in that case would be reviewable on appeal after final judgment and emphasized that the defendant would not suffer any “grave harm . . . if the order is not immediately reviewed.” Id. So too here. Maxwell has not articulated any serious injury she will suffer if this Court dismisses her appeal. The only theoretical harm might be prejudicial pretrial publicity arising from the unsealing of filings in a civil case. Should any prejudicial publicity arise, though, Maxwell will be fully able to raise that issue on appeal after the entry of final judgment in her criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 232-34 (2d Cir. 2010) (evaluating on post-judgment appeal whether publicity biased the venire); United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 128-31 (2d Cir. 2008) (evaluating on post-",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00019628",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Court"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "10/02/2020"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 20-3061",
      "Document 82",
      "2944267",
      "DOJ-OGR-00019628"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a case involving Maxwell. The text discusses the protective order in the case and its implications for the defendant's appeal. The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}