mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00000773.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "3",
    "document_number": "73",
    "date": "08/05/25",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 73 Filed 08/05/25 Page 3 of 4\n\nHonorable Richard M. Berman\nCase No: 19 CR 490 (RMB)\nPage 3\n\nII. Rule 6(e) and Eleventh Circuit Authority Require Heightened Caution and Narrow Tailoring.\n\nGrand jury secrecy is a \"long-established policy\" safeguarded by Rule 6(e). Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219-23 (1979). Even where disclosure may be considered, the movant must establish a particularized need that outweighs the countervailing interests in secrecy, and any disclosure should be no broader than necessary. Id. at 222-23. The Eleventh Circuit has further held that district courts lack inherent authority to order grand jury disclosure outside the exceptions in Rule 6(e). Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc); see also McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 845-46 (D.C. Cir. 2019).\n\nHere, even if the Court were to find a Rule 6(e) path to limited disclosure, victims' CVRA rights and the traditional interests protected by grand jury secrecy converge in favor of extraordinary care: rigorous judicial screening, robust redactions, minimization of any risk of re-identification, and meaningful victim participation before anything is made public. Related privacy provisions reinforce this approach. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(2) (authorizing protective orders to shield child-victims' identities and \"other information concerning a child\"); Fed. R. Crim. P. 49.1 (privacy redactions). Many Epstein victims were minors at the time of the abuse; even for those now adults, § 3771(a)(8) and the Court's protective authority warrant safeguards that functionally align with § 3509(d) principles.\n\nIII. Requested Relief\n\nIn light of the foregoing, the victims respectfully request that the Court:\n\n1) Require Conferral and Notice (CVRA §§ 3771(a)(5), (c)(1)): Direct the Government to confer with victims' counsel and provide reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before any ruling on unsealing or public release of grand jury materials.\n\n2) Judicial In Camera Review: Conduct a comprehensive in camera review of the grand jury materials to determine whether the proponent has shown a Rule 6(e)-compliant basis for any disclosure and, if so, the narrowest scope of disclosure consistent with Douglas Oil.\n\n3) Victims' Counsel Pre-Release Review (Under Protective Order): Permit designated victims' counsel to review the government's proposed redactions and any index of materials under a strict protective order, to allow victims' counsel to identify and prevent: (a) direct identifiers, (b) combinations of data points that could reasonably lead to re-identification or harassment of victims, and (c) to propose all additional redactions necessary.\n\n4) Dispute Resolution before Unsealing or Release: If the government does not agree with additional proposed redactions from victims' counsel, provide victims' counsel the opportunity to be heard on any dispute before ruling on unsealing or public release.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00000773",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB Document 73 Filed 08/05/25 Page 3 of 4",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Honorable Richard M. Berman\nCase No: 19 CR 490 (RMB)\nPage 3",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "II. Rule 6(e) and Eleventh Circuit Authority Require Heightened Caution and Narrow Tailoring.",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Grand jury secrecy is a \"long-established policy\" safeguarded by Rule 6(e). Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219-23 (1979). Even where disclosure may be considered, the movant must establish a particularized need that outweighs the countervailing interests in secrecy, and any disclosure should be no broader than necessary. Id. at 222-23. The Eleventh Circuit has further held that district courts lack inherent authority to order grand jury disclosure outside the exceptions in Rule 6(e). Pitch v. United States, 953 F.3d 1226, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc); see also McKeever v. Barr, 920 F.3d 842, 845-46 (D.C. Cir. 2019).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Here, even if the Court were to find a Rule 6(e) path to limited disclosure, victims' CVRA rights and the traditional interests protected by grand jury secrecy converge in favor of extraordinary care: rigorous judicial screening, robust redactions, minimization of any risk of re-identification, and meaningful victim participation before anything is made public. Related privacy provisions reinforce this approach. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(2) (authorizing protective orders to shield child-victims' identities and \"other information concerning a child\"); Fed. R. Crim. P. 49.1 (privacy redactions). Many Epstein victims were minors at the time of the abuse; even for those now adults, § 3771(a)(8) and the Court's protective authority warrant safeguards that functionally align with § 3509(d) principles.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "III. Requested Relief",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In light of the foregoing, the victims respectfully request that the Court:",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "1) Require Conferral and Notice (CVRA §§ 3771(a)(5), (c)(1)): Direct the Government to confer with victims' counsel and provide reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before any ruling on unsealing or public release of grand jury materials.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "2) Judicial In Camera Review: Conduct a comprehensive in camera review of the grand jury materials to determine whether the proponent has shown a Rule 6(e)-compliant basis for any disclosure and, if so, the narrowest scope of disclosure consistent with Douglas Oil.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "3) Victims' Counsel Pre-Release Review (Under Protective Order): Permit designated victims' counsel to review the government's proposed redactions and any index of materials under a strict protective order, to allow victims' counsel to identify and prevent: (a) direct identifiers, (b) combinations of data points that could reasonably lead to re-identification or harassment of victims, and (c) to propose all additional redactions necessary.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4) Dispute Resolution before Unsealing or Release: If the government does not agree with additional proposed redactions from victims' counsel, provide victims' counsel the opportunity to be heard on any dispute before ruling on unsealing or public release.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00000773",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Richard M. Berman"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Eleventh Circuit",
      "Department of Justice"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "08/05/25",
      "1979",
      "2020",
      "2019"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 1:19-cr-00490-RMB",
      "Document 73",
      "19 CR 490 (RMB)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00000773"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of United States v. [defendant], with a focus on the handling of grand jury materials and the rights of victims under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA). The document is well-formatted and free of significant damage or redactions."
}