mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00002988.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "54 of 239",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 54 of 239\ndenied, 546 U.S. 1007 (2005)); United States v. Brown, 800 F. App'x 455, 461 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Because Congress evinced a clear intent to extend the statute of limitations for these types of crimes in its amendments, and because there is no ex post facto problem here, the prosecution was timely.”), cert. denied, No. 20-5064, -- S.Ct. -- , 2021 WL 78235 (Jan. 11, 2021); United States v. Pierre-Louis, No. 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018 WL 4043140, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss child exploitation charges as time-barred) (“Defendant's argument rests on the erroneous premise that the law requires the defendant to have committed the charged offense after the effective date of the extension of the statute of limitations for the charge to not be time-barred. As long as the original statute of limitations had not lapsed when the extension went into effect, the prosecution is not time-barred.”); United States v. Sensi, No. 08 Cr. 253, 2010 WL 2351484, at *2 (D. Conn. June 7, 2010) (holding that the 2003 amendment of Section 3283 applies to pre-enactment conduct, and rejecting the argument “that the lack of a savings clause in the 2003 version of section 3283 is fatal to extending the statute of limitations.”); United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619, 624-30 (E.D. Va. 2019) (holding that the 2003 amendment of Section 3283 applies to pre-enactment conduct. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part framework for determining whether a statute applies retroactively. At step one of the analysis, “if Congress ‘expressly prescribed’ that a statute applies retroactively to antecedent conduct, ‘the inquiry ends[] and the court enforces the statute as it is written,’ save for constitutional concerns.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55 (quoting In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. (“Enterprise”), 391 F.3d 401, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, “when a statute ‘is ambiguous or contains no express command’ regarding retroactivity, a reviewing court must determine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would create presumptively 27 DOJ-OGR-00002988",
  "text_blocks": [
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 54 of 239",
      "position": "header"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "denied, 546 U.S. 1007 (2005)); United States v. Brown, 800 F. App'x 455, 461 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Because Congress evinced a clear intent to extend the statute of limitations for these types of crimes in its amendments, and because there is no ex post facto problem here, the prosecution was timely.”), cert. denied, No. 20-5064, -- S.Ct. -- , 2021 WL 78235 (Jan. 11, 2021); United States v. Pierre-Louis, No. 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018 WL 4043140, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss child exploitation charges as time-barred) (“Defendant's argument rests on the erroneous premise that the law requires the defendant to have committed the charged offense after the effective date of the extension of the statute of limitations for the charge to not be time-barred. As long as the original statute of limitations had not lapsed when the extension went into effect, the prosecution is not time-barred.”); United States v. Sensi, No. 08 Cr. 253, 2010 WL 2351484, at *2 (D. Conn. June 7, 2010) (holding that the 2003 amendment of Section 3283 applies to pre-enactment conduct, and rejecting the argument “that the lack of a savings clause in the 2003 version of section 3283 is fatal to extending the statute of limitations.”); United State v. Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d 619, 624-30 (E.D. Va. 2019) (holding that the 2003 amendment of Section 3283 applies to pre-enactment conduct.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part framework for determining whether a statute applies retroactively. At step one of the analysis, “if Congress ‘expressly prescribed’ that a statute applies retroactively to antecedent conduct, ‘the inquiry ends[] and the court enforces the statute as it is written,’ save for constitutional concerns.” Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 54-55 (quoting In re Enter. Mort. Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig. (“Enterprise”), 391 F.3d 401, 405-06 (2d Cir. 2004)). However, “when a statute ‘is ambiguous or contains no express command’ regarding retroactivity, a reviewing court must determine whether applying the statute to antecedent conduct would create presumptively",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "27",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002988",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "USI Film Products",
      "Supreme Court",
      "Enterprise"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "2005",
      "2020",
      "Jan. 11, 2021",
      "Aug. 9, 2018",
      "June 7, 2010",
      "1994",
      "2004",
      "04/16/21"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "546 U.S. 1007",
      "800 F. App'x 455",
      "No. 20-5064",
      "No. 16 Cr. 541 (CM)",
      "No. 08 Cr. 253",
      "425 F. Supp. 3d 619",
      "511 U.S. 244",
      "865 F.3d",
      "391 F.3d 401",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002988"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with legal citations and references. The text is mostly printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}