mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00004793.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "9",
    "document_number": "307",
    "date": "06/25/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 9 of 21\n396 U.S. at 82. In these circumstances, the Fifth Amendment does not bar the Government's use of her testimony in a prosecution for perjury.\nThe Court thus concludes that Maxwell is not entitled to suppress her deposition transcripts based on her right against compelled self-incrimination.\nB. Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents produced in civil litigation\n“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment only if it involves a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected space or the violation of a person's “reasonable expectation of privacy.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Thus, government agents need a warrant to rummage through someone's home, listen in on their phone calls, or search through their phones seized incident to arrest. The Fourth Amendment imposes no limitation on their ability to gather evidence of public activity or review public records.\nA person has a reasonable expectation of privacy only if they seek to keep something private and have an objectively reasonable expectation that it will remain private. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). The Supreme Court has held that people generally lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily disclose to others. See id. at 743–44; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976). This is true even if they expect that information to be safeguarded and used only for specific purposes. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that police may obtain bank records or a list of phone numbers a person has dialed without a warrant. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. In a lone exception to this rule, the\n9\nDOJ-OGR-00004793",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 307 Filed 06/25/21 Page 9 of 21",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "396 U.S. at 82. In these circumstances, the Fifth Amendment does not bar the Government's use of her testimony in a prosecution for perjury.\nThe Court thus concludes that Maxwell is not entitled to suppress her deposition transcripts based on her right against compelled self-incrimination.\nB. Maxwell had no reasonable expectation of privacy in documents produced in civil litigation",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment only if it involves a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected space or the violation of a person's “reasonable expectation of privacy.” United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Thus, government agents need a warrant to rummage through someone's home, listen in on their phone calls, or search through their phones seized incident to arrest. The Fourth Amendment imposes no limitation on their ability to gather evidence of public activity or review public records.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A person has a reasonable expectation of privacy only if they seek to keep something private and have an objectively reasonable expectation that it will remain private. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). The Supreme Court has held that people generally lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily disclose to others. See id. at 743–44; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976). This is true even if they expect that information to be safeguarded and used only for specific purposes. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that police may obtain bank records or a list of phone numbers a person has dialed without a warrant. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. In a lone exception to this rule, the",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "9",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00004793",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Carpenter",
      "Jones",
      "Katz",
      "Harlan, J.",
      "Smith",
      "Miller"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government",
      "Supreme Court"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "United States",
      "Maryland"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "06/25/21",
      "2018",
      "1967",
      "1979",
      "1976"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 307",
      "396 U.S. at 82",
      "138 S. Ct. 2206",
      "565 U.S. 400",
      "389 U.S. 347",
      "442 U.S. 735",
      "425 U.S. 435",
      "DOJ-OGR-00004793"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Maxwell, discussing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the context of privacy expectations and self-incrimination. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}