mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES003/DOJ-OGR-00006242.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "31",
    "document_number": "424",
    "date": "11/08/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 31 of 41 (affirming district court's exclusion of expert testimony on memory and perception, including the impact of stress on memory, in context of eyewitness reliability because proposed testimony would not assist the jury); United States v. Labansat, 94 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1996) (\"It is common knowledge that memory fades with time.\"); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1050-53 (7th Cir. 1992) (\"[S]uch testimony may be properly excluded where the testimony addresses an issue of which the jury is generally aware.\"); United States v. Shiraishi, No. 17 Cr. 582 (JMS) (RLP), 2019 WL 1386365, at *5 n.7 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2019) (where testimony \"falls within the common knowledge of the average layman, [it] is improper testimony under Rule 702\"); United States v. Heine, No. 15 Cr. 238 (SI), 2017 WL 5260784, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2017) (finding expert testimony concluding that memories are fallible and may deteriorate over time to be \"within the ken of the ordinary juror\"); United States v. Redwood, 216 F. Supp. 3d 890, 897-99 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (excluding memory expert under Rules 702 and 403, and noting that \"[w]hile in unique circumstances expert testimony regarding memory and perception may be warranted, this is not one of those cases\"); United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 12 (D.D.C. 2006) (\"[J]urors inevitably encounter the frailties of memory as a commonplace matter of course.\") Federal courts—typically in the context of proposed expert testimony regarding witness identifications—have historically evinced skepticism of so-called memory expert testimony and have routinely excluded such testimony as unhelpful and because it invades the province of the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir. 1986) (\"Until recently, courts were uniformly skeptical about admitting expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications,\" discussing United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973), 27 DOJ-OGR-00006242",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 31 of 41",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "(affirming district court's exclusion of expert testimony on memory and perception, including the impact of stress on memory, in context of eyewitness reliability because proposed testimony would not assist the jury); United States v. Labansat, 94 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1996) (\"It is common knowledge that memory fades with time.\"); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1050-53 (7th Cir. 1992) (\"[S]uch testimony may be properly excluded where the testimony addresses an issue of which the jury is generally aware.\"); United States v. Shiraishi, No. 17 Cr. 582 (JMS) (RLP), 2019 WL 1386365, at *5 n.7 (D. Haw. Mar. 27, 2019) (where testimony \"falls within the common knowledge of the average layman, [it] is improper testimony under Rule 702\"); United States v. Heine, No. 15 Cr. 238 (SI), 2017 WL 5260784, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2017) (finding expert testimony concluding that memories are fallible and may deteriorate over time to be \"within the ken of the ordinary juror\"); United States v. Redwood, 216 F. Supp. 3d 890, 897-99 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (excluding memory expert under Rules 702 and 403, and noting that \"[w]hile in unique circumstances expert testimony regarding memory and perception may be warranted, this is not one of those cases\"); United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d 3, 12 (D.D.C. 2006) (\"[J]urors inevitably encounter the frailties of memory as a commonplace matter of course.\")",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Federal courts—typically in the context of proposed expert testimony regarding witness identifications—have historically evinced skepticism of so-called memory expert testimony and have routinely excluded such testimony as unhelpful and because it invades the province of the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1311-13 (5th Cir. 1986) (\"Until recently, courts were uniformly skeptical about admitting expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications,\" discussing United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973),",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "27",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00006242",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "United States",
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Hawaii",
      "Oregon",
      "Illinois",
      "District of Columbia"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "11/08/21",
      "Mar. 27, 2019",
      "Nov. 13, 2017",
      "1986",
      "1973"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 424",
      "17 Cr. 582 (JMS) (RLP)",
      "15 Cr. 238 (SI)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00006242"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing discussing the admissibility of expert testimony on memory and perception in the context of eyewitness reliability. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes."
}