mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES004/DOJ-OGR-00009590.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "28 of 51",
    "document_number": "621",
    "date": "02/25/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 621 Filed 02/25/22 Page 28 of 51\n\n1. Offenses Charged\n\nTurning to the first Korfant factor, the \"criminal offenses charged,\" Counts Three and Five plainly charge different criminal offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 371. In particular, Count Three is predicated on 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), a provision of the Mann Act that makes it a crime to transport minors for illegal sexual activity, whereas Count Five is predicated on 18 U.S.C. § 1591, a provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act that makes it a crime to traffic minors for commercial sex acts. As charged in the S2 Indictment, these counts have different legal objects: Count Three concerned transporting girls under the age of seventeen to New York for purposes of sexual abuse in violation of New York Penal Law § 130.55, and Count Five concerned commercial sex acts with girls under the age of eighteen.\n\nWhen two counts charge conspiracies under § 371, \"[s]imilarity at this general level . . . is of limited import,\" where the objects of the conspiracies differ. United States v. Villa, No. 12 Cr. 40 (JBA), 2014 WL 252013, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2014), aff'd, 744 F. App'x 716 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669). For example, in Villa, the district court concluded that, under the first Korfant factor, two § 371 offenses were distinct, because the aim of one count was \"to commit theft from an interstate shipment and to transport stolen property across state lines,\" whereas the other conspiracy was \"to sell stolen property.\" Id. Similarly, in United States v. Sattar, Judge Koeltl concluded that two conspiracies charged under § 371 were distinct under Korfant, in part because the two counts \"charge a separate conspiracy under the defraud clause and the offense clause of § 371, respectively.\" United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009).\n\n27\n\nDOJ-OGR-00009590",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 621 Filed 02/25/22 Page 28 of 51",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "1. Offenses Charged",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Turning to the first Korfant factor, the \"criminal offenses charged,\" Counts Three and Five plainly charge different criminal offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 371. In particular, Count Three is predicated on 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), a provision of the Mann Act that makes it a crime to transport minors for illegal sexual activity, whereas Count Five is predicated on 18 U.S.C. § 1591, a provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act that makes it a crime to traffic minors for commercial sex acts. As charged in the S2 Indictment, these counts have different legal objects: Count Three concerned transporting girls under the age of seventeen to New York for purposes of sexual abuse in violation of New York Penal Law § 130.55, and Count Five concerned commercial sex acts with girls under the age of eighteen.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "When two counts charge conspiracies under § 371, \"[s]imilarity at this general level . . . is of limited import,\" where the objects of the conspiracies differ. United States v. Villa, No. 12 Cr. 40 (JBA), 2014 WL 252013, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2014), aff'd, 744 F. App'x 716 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Macchia, 35 F.3d at 669). For example, in Villa, the district court concluded that, under the first Korfant factor, two § 371 offenses were distinct, because the aim of one count was \"to commit theft from an interstate shipment and to transport stolen property across state lines,\" whereas the other conspiracy was \"to sell stolen property.\" Id. Similarly, in United States v. Sattar, Judge Koeltl concluded that two conspiracies charged under § 371 were distinct under Korfant, in part because the two counts \"charge a separate conspiracy under the defraud clause and the offense clause of § 371, respectively.\" United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009).",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "27",
      "position": "bottom"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00009590",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "DOJ"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/25/22",
      "Jan. 22, 2014",
      "2004",
      "2009"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "621",
      "12 Cr. 40 (JBA)",
      "744 F. App'x 716",
      "35 F.3d 669",
      "314 F. Supp. 2d 279",
      "590 F.3d 93",
      "DOJ-OGR-00009590"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is page 28 of 51."
}