DOJ-OGR-00010699.json 5.7 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "8",
  4. "document_number": "675",
  5. "date": "06/25/22",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 8 of 21\nauthority about such harm.\" Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 808 (1991). Speaking directly to\nMaxwell in this case is particularly important for these victims. Crime victims often want to speak\n\"to regain a sense of dignity and respect rather than feeling powerless and ashamed.\" Degenhardt, 405\nF.Supp.2d at 1348 (internal quotation omitted). Here, Sarah and Elizabeth believe it is important\nthat they be given an opportunity to speak as part of the process of overcoming the horrific impact of\nMaxwell's sex trafficking conspiracy on them and others.\n\nII. Regardless of Whether Sarah and Elizabeth are CVRA \"Victims,\" the Court Undoubtedly\nPossesses Discretion to Hear from them at Sentencing Under 18 U.S.C. § 3661\n\nFor all the reasons just explained, Sarah and Elizabeth have the right to speak at Maxwell's\nsentencing under the CVRA. Additionally, this Court also possesses broad discretionary power,\nderived from statute and common law, to hear from them when determining the appropriate\nsentence for Maxwell's crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also Degenhardt, 405 F.Supp.2d at 1343\n(discussing the court's discretionary powers to hear from victims).\n\nThe Court's discretion in this case is important not only because it provides an alternative\nbasis for considering Sarah's and Elizabeth's victim impact, but also because the Court may have\nother requests to speak at Maxwell's sentencing. Some of these other victims may not be able to\nafford legal counsel to present their arguments to this Court.1 Federal courts have wide discretion to\ngather information at sentencing subject to only a few constitutional or statutory restrictions. See\nUnited States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (\"[A] judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry\n\n1 Under the CVRA, the Justice Department is obligated to use its \"best efforts\" to protect the\nrights of \"crime victims.\" 18 U.S.C § 3771(c)(1). We trust that the Department will present factual\nand legal arguments in support of victims being heard at sentencing.\n\n8\nDOJ-OGR-00010699",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 675 Filed 06/25/22 Page 8 of 21",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "authority about such harm.\" Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 808 (1991). Speaking directly to\nMaxwell in this case is particularly important for these victims. Crime victims often want to speak\n\"to regain a sense of dignity and respect rather than feeling powerless and ashamed.\" Degenhardt, 405\nF.Supp.2d at 1348 (internal quotation omitted). Here, Sarah and Elizabeth believe it is important\nthat they be given an opportunity to speak as part of the process of overcoming the horrific impact of\nMaxwell's sex trafficking conspiracy on them and others.",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "II. Regardless of Whether Sarah and Elizabeth are CVRA \"Victims,\" the Court Undoubtedly\nPossesses Discretion to Hear from them at Sentencing Under 18 U.S.C. § 3661",
  25. "position": "middle"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "For all the reasons just explained, Sarah and Elizabeth have the right to speak at Maxwell's\nsentencing under the CVRA. Additionally, this Court also possesses broad discretionary power,\nderived from statute and common law, to hear from them when determining the appropriate\nsentence for Maxwell's crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also Degenhardt, 405 F.Supp.2d at 1343\n(discussing the court's discretionary powers to hear from victims).",
  30. "position": "middle"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "The Court's discretion in this case is important not only because it provides an alternative\nbasis for considering Sarah's and Elizabeth's victim impact, but also because the Court may have\nother requests to speak at Maxwell's sentencing. Some of these other victims may not be able to\nafford legal counsel to present their arguments to this Court.1 Federal courts have wide discretion to\ngather information at sentencing subject to only a few constitutional or statutory restrictions. See\nUnited States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (\"[A] judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry",
  35. "position": "middle"
  36. },
  37. {
  38. "type": "printed",
  39. "content": "1 Under the CVRA, the Justice Department is obligated to use its \"best efforts\" to protect the\nrights of \"crime victims.\" 18 U.S.C § 3771(c)(1). We trust that the Department will present factual\nand legal arguments in support of victims being heard at sentencing.",
  40. "position": "footer"
  41. },
  42. {
  43. "type": "printed",
  44. "content": "8",
  45. "position": "footer"
  46. },
  47. {
  48. "type": "printed",
  49. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00010699",
  50. "position": "footer"
  51. }
  52. ],
  53. "entities": {
  54. "people": [
  55. "Sarah",
  56. "Elizabeth",
  57. "Maxwell"
  58. ],
  59. "organizations": [
  60. "Justice Department"
  61. ],
  62. "locations": [
  63. "Tennessee"
  64. ],
  65. "dates": [
  66. "06/25/22",
  67. "1991",
  68. "1972"
  69. ],
  70. "reference_numbers": [
  71. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  72. "Document 675",
  73. "18 U.S.C. § 3661",
  74. "18 U.S.C § 3771(c)(1)",
  75. "DOJ-OGR-00010699"
  76. ]
  77. },
  78. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the sentencing of Maxwell in a sex trafficking case. The text discusses the rights of victims to speak at sentencing and the court's discretion in hearing their statements."
  79. }