DOJ-OGR-00015152.json 5.5 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "20",
  4. "document_number": "809",
  5. "date": "08/11/25",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 809 Filed 08/11/25 Page 20 of 31\nby State Department official Alger Hiss); see also note 12, supra (citing similar D.D.C. cases).\nNone of these cases involved the secondhand, summary-witness testimony of law enforcement agents. None involved testimony that, by the time of the motion, had already come to light as a result of trial testimony by percipient witnesses on the indictment returned by the grand jury.\nThe Government has not cited any case finding such materials to present a \"special circumstance\" that justifies the exceptional step of unsealing grand jury materials. There is none.\nThe one colorable argument under that doctrine for unsealing in this case, in fact, is that doing so would expose as disingenuous the Government's public explanations for moving to unseal. A member of the public, appreciating that the Maxwell grand jury materials do not contribute anything to public knowledge, might conclude that the Government's motion for their unsealing was aimed not at \"transparency\" but at diversion—aimed not at full disclosure but at the illusion of such. And there is precedent—In re Biaggi, the fountainhead of the Second Circuit's \"special circumstances\" doctrine—permitting a court to order the release of grand jury testimony to correct a movant's misleading public characterization of it.\nIn re Biaggi arose from a motion by a mayoral candidate, Mario Biaggi, to reveal his earlier grand jury testimony, ostensibly to rebut a news report that he had invoked the Fifth Amendment. 478 F.2d at 490–91. Denying he had done so, Biaggi asked, on television and later in a motion, that the court examine his testimony and publicly confirm that he had claimed no constitutional privileges. Id. at 491. The Government moved for disclosure of Biaggi's testimony, redacted to protect others' names, and the district court granted that motion; Biaggi appealed, seeking disclosure of his testimony without redactions. Id. The Second Circuit, per Chief Judge Friendly, authorized disclosure of the testimony, emphasizing that Biaggi and the Government had waived objections to disclosure, and that others' interests could be protected by\n20\nDOJ-OGR-00015152",
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  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 809 Filed 08/11/25 Page 20 of 31",
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  19. "content": "by State Department official Alger Hiss); see also note 12, supra (citing similar D.D.C. cases).\nNone of these cases involved the secondhand, summary-witness testimony of law enforcement agents. None involved testimony that, by the time of the motion, had already come to light as a result of trial testimony by percipient witnesses on the indictment returned by the grand jury.\nThe Government has not cited any case finding such materials to present a \"special circumstance\" that justifies the exceptional step of unsealing grand jury materials. There is none.\nThe one colorable argument under that doctrine for unsealing in this case, in fact, is that doing so would expose as disingenuous the Government's public explanations for moving to unseal. A member of the public, appreciating that the Maxwell grand jury materials do not contribute anything to public knowledge, might conclude that the Government's motion for their unsealing was aimed not at \"transparency\" but at diversion—aimed not at full disclosure but at the illusion of such. And there is precedent—In re Biaggi, the fountainhead of the Second Circuit's \"special circumstances\" doctrine—permitting a court to order the release of grand jury testimony to correct a movant's misleading public characterization of it.\nIn re Biaggi arose from a motion by a mayoral candidate, Mario Biaggi, to reveal his earlier grand jury testimony, ostensibly to rebut a news report that he had invoked the Fifth Amendment. 478 F.2d at 490–91. Denying he had done so, Biaggi asked, on television and later in a motion, that the court examine his testimony and publicly confirm that he had claimed no constitutional privileges. Id. at 491. The Government moved for disclosure of Biaggi's testimony, redacted to protect others' names, and the district court granted that motion; Biaggi appealed, seeking disclosure of his testimony without redactions. Id. The Second Circuit, per Chief Judge Friendly, authorized disclosure of the testimony, emphasizing that Biaggi and the Government had waived objections to disclosure, and that others' interests could be protected by",
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  29. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00015152",
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  32. ],
  33. "entities": {
  34. "people": [
  35. "Alger Hiss",
  36. "Mario Biaggi",
  37. "Chief Judge Friendly"
  38. ],
  39. "organizations": [
  40. "State Department",
  41. "Second Circuit"
  42. ],
  43. "locations": [],
  44. "dates": [
  45. "08/11/25"
  46. ],
  47. "reference_numbers": [
  48. "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
  49. "809",
  50. "DOJ-OGR-00015152"
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  52. },
  53. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible handwritten notes or stamps. The document is page 20 of 31."
  54. }