DOJ-OGR-00019499.json 7.5 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "2",
  4. "document_number": "292",
  5. "date": "July 27, 2020",
  6. "document_type": "Court Document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 27, 2020\nPage 2\nreferenced in the discovery and guard against prejudicial pretrial publicity, while still ensuring that Ms. Maxwell and defense counsel may adequately prepare and present a full defense at trial.\n\nLegal Standard\nWhere the government seeks to curtail the use of pretrial discovery, Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that it \"show good cause for the issuance of a protective order.\" United States v. Annabi, No. 10 Cr. 7 (CM), 2010 WL 1253221, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010). To establish that good cause exists for proposed restrictions in a protective order, the government must show that disclosure will cause \"a clearly defined and serious injury.\" United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). A finding of harm \"must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements.\" United States v. Gangi, 1998 WL 226196, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). \"Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.\" Wecht, 484 F.3d at 211.\nCourts must be careful not to impose a protective order that is \"broader than is necessary\" to accomplish its goals. United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739, 742 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, courts are instructed to \"weigh the impact\" of requested protections and their extent against a defendant's \"due process right to prepare and present a full defense at trial.\" Id.\n\nDiscussion\n1. Restrictions on Use of Discovery Materials\nThe government and the defense agree that the protective order should include a restriction prohibiting Ms. Maxwell and defense counsel from (i) using discovery materials \"for any civil proceeding or any purpose\" other than defending or preparing for this criminal action; or (ii) posting discovery materials on the Internet. See Ex. A ¶¶ 1(a), 5. The defense's proposed protective order would make those same restrictions applicable to potential government witnesses and their counsel so that they are on equal footing with the defense. See Ex. A ¶¶ 3, 5. The government has indicated that it cannot agree to such a restriction, despite acknowledging that it will very likely share discovery materials with those individuals during the course of trial preparation.\nAs the Court is aware, there is active ongoing civil litigation between Ms. Maxwell and many of the government's potential witnesses. Moreover, numerous potential witnesses and their counsel have already made public statements about this case to the media since Ms. Maxwell's arrest. There is a substantial concern that these individuals will seek to use discovery materials to support their civil cases and future public statements. It is therefore vital that the government's potential witnesses and their counsel be subject to the same restrictions as Ms.\n\nApp.040\nDOJ-OGR-00019499",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "The Honorable Alison J. Nathan\nJuly 27, 2020\nPage 2",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "referenced in the discovery and guard against prejudicial pretrial publicity, while still ensuring that Ms. Maxwell and defense counsel may adequately prepare and present a full defense at trial.",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "Legal Standard\nWhere the government seeks to curtail the use of pretrial discovery, Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that it \"show good cause for the issuance of a protective order.\" United States v. Annabi, No. 10 Cr. 7 (CM), 2010 WL 1253221, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010). To establish that good cause exists for proposed restrictions in a protective order, the government must show that disclosure will cause \"a clearly defined and serious injury.\" United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). A finding of harm \"must be based on a particular factual demonstration of potential harm, not on conclusory statements.\" United States v. Gangi, 1998 WL 226196, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). \"Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing.\" Wecht, 484 F.3d at 211.",
  25. "position": "middle"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "Courts must be careful not to impose a protective order that is \"broader than is necessary\" to accomplish its goals. United States v. Lindh, 198 F. Supp. 2d 739, 742 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, courts are instructed to \"weigh the impact\" of requested protections and their extent against a defendant's \"due process right to prepare and present a full defense at trial.\" Id.",
  30. "position": "middle"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "Discussion\n1. Restrictions on Use of Discovery Materials\nThe government and the defense agree that the protective order should include a restriction prohibiting Ms. Maxwell and defense counsel from (i) using discovery materials \"for any civil proceeding or any purpose\" other than defending or preparing for this criminal action; or (ii) posting discovery materials on the Internet. See Ex. A ¶¶ 1(a), 5. The defense's proposed protective order would make those same restrictions applicable to potential government witnesses and their counsel so that they are on equal footing with the defense. See Ex. A ¶¶ 3, 5. The government has indicated that it cannot agree to such a restriction, despite acknowledging that it will very likely share discovery materials with those individuals during the course of trial preparation.",
  35. "position": "middle"
  36. },
  37. {
  38. "type": "printed",
  39. "content": "As the Court is aware, there is active ongoing civil litigation between Ms. Maxwell and many of the government's potential witnesses. Moreover, numerous potential witnesses and their counsel have already made public statements about this case to the media since Ms. Maxwell's arrest. There is a substantial concern that these individuals will seek to use discovery materials to support their civil cases and future public statements. It is therefore vital that the government's potential witnesses and their counsel be subject to the same restrictions as Ms.",
  40. "position": "bottom"
  41. },
  42. {
  43. "type": "printed",
  44. "content": "App.040\nDOJ-OGR-00019499",
  45. "position": "footer"
  46. }
  47. ],
  48. "entities": {
  49. "people": [
  50. "Alison J. Nathan",
  51. "Ms. Maxwell"
  52. ],
  53. "organizations": [],
  54. "locations": [
  55. "S.D.N.Y.",
  56. "E.D. Va."
  57. ],
  58. "dates": [
  59. "July 27, 2020",
  60. "Mar. 24, 2010",
  61. "May 4, 1998",
  62. "2002",
  63. "2007"
  64. ],
  65. "reference_numbers": [
  66. "10 Cr. 7 (CM)",
  67. "2010 WL 1253221",
  68. "484 F.3d 194",
  69. "1998 WL 226196",
  70. "198 F. Supp. 2d 739",
  71. "292",
  72. "DOJ-OGR-00019499"
  73. ]
  74. },
  75. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case involving Ms. Maxwell. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
  76. }