DOJ-OGR-00019624.json 5.0 KB

12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940414243444546474849505152535455565758596061626364656667686970
  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "17",
  4. "document_number": "82",
  5. "date": "10/02/2020",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page17 of 37\n\n11\n\n\"in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appel-late reversal of a final district court judgment is not sufficient.\" Punn, 737 F.3d at 5. \"Instead, the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the en-try of final judgment would imperil a substantial pub-lic interest or some particular value of a high order.\" Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107; see also Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2006). In a criminal case, the availability of post-judgment relief through reversal or vacatur of convic-tion, if warranted, will generally be sufficient to pro-tect whatever right a defendant claims was abridged by the district court's pretrial decision. See, e.g., Punn, 737 F.3d at 14 (\"Punn's claim can be adequately vindi-cated upon appeal from a final judgment.... [I]f Punn's arguments continue to fail before the district court, purportedly ill-gotten evidence or its fruits are admitted at his trial, and conviction results, appellate review will be available at that point[,] ... [and the Court] may order a new trial without the use of the ill-gotten evidence, or whatever additional remedies are necessary to ensure that Punn's legitimate interests are fully preserved.\"); United States v. Hitchcock, 992 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1993) (district court's refusal to seal documents not immediately appealable because \"[r]eversal after trial, if it is warranted, will ade-quately protect ... interest[s]\" asserted by defend-ants).\n\nWhen applying the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court has \"generally denied review of pre-trial discovery orders.\" Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019624",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page17 of 37",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "11",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "\"in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appel-late reversal of a final district court judgment is not sufficient.\" Punn, 737 F.3d at 5. \"Instead, the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the en-try of final judgment would imperil a substantial pub-lic interest or some particular value of a high order.\" Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 107; see also Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 2006). In a criminal case, the availability of post-judgment relief through reversal or vacatur of convic-tion, if warranted, will generally be sufficient to pro-tect whatever right a defendant claims was abridged by the district court's pretrial decision. See, e.g., Punn, 737 F.3d at 14 (\"Punn's claim can be adequately vindi-cated upon appeal from a final judgment.... [I]f Punn's arguments continue to fail before the district court, purportedly ill-gotten evidence or its fruits are admitted at his trial, and conviction results, appellate review will be available at that point[,] ... [and the Court] may order a new trial without the use of the ill-gotten evidence, or whatever additional remedies are necessary to ensure that Punn's legitimate interests are fully preserved.\"); United States v. Hitchcock, 992 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1993) (district court's refusal to seal documents not immediately appealable because \"[r]eversal after trial, if it is warranted, will ade-quately protect ... interest[s]\" asserted by defend-ants).",
  25. "position": "middle"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "When applying the collateral order doctrine, the Supreme Court has \"generally denied review of pre-trial discovery orders.\" Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981). This Court likewise",
  30. "position": "middle"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00019624",
  35. "position": "footer"
  36. }
  37. ],
  38. "entities": {
  39. "people": [
  40. "Punn",
  41. "Hitchcock"
  42. ],
  43. "organizations": [
  44. "Mohawk Indus.",
  45. "Kensington Int'l Ltd.",
  46. "Republic of Congo",
  47. "United States",
  48. "Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.",
  49. "Risjord",
  50. "Court"
  51. ],
  52. "locations": [],
  53. "dates": [
  54. "10/02/2020",
  55. "1981"
  56. ],
  57. "reference_numbers": [
  58. "20-3061",
  59. "82",
  60. "2944267",
  61. "737 F.3d",
  62. "558 U.S.",
  63. "461 F.3d 238",
  64. "992 F.2d 236",
  65. "449 U.S. 368",
  66. "DOJ-OGR-00019624"
  67. ]
  68. },
  69. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing, likely an appeal or a legal brief, discussing the collateral order doctrine and its application to pretrial discovery orders. The text includes citations to various court cases and legal precedents."
  70. }