mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES007/DOJ-OGR-00019627.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "20",
    "document_number": "82",
    "date": "10/02/2020",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page20 of 37\n\n14\nprotective order\"); Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2019) (third party intervenors, including members of the press, appealing order denying motion to modify protective order in civil litigation to allow third parties access to sealed filings, after parties to the litigation settled). Thus, appellate jurisdiction in those cases was founded on the principle that when intervenors seek access to sealed records, \"orders denying access are final as to the intervenors.\" Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). Once the courts in those cases denied the intervenors' motions to modify protective orders, there was nothing left for those intervenors to litigate. Here, by contrast, Judge Nathan's Order did not end the entire litigation as to Maxwell. To the contrary, Maxwell is scheduled to file pretrial motions in December 2020 and to proceed to trial in July 2021.\n\nWhen considering interlocutory appeals from rulings on protective orders governing a criminal defendant's use of discovery materials, by contrast, this Court has concluded it lacks jurisdiction. See Caparros, 800 F.2d at 24; Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798. Maxwell cites no case in which this Court has found jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of an order regulating the use of materials a criminal defendant received during litigation, and her efforts to distinguish Pappas and Caparros fall short. Pappas concluded that where a protective order \"prohibits . . . disclosure of information [a defendant] acquired from the Government prior to the litigation, the order is not a typical protective order regulating discovery documents and should be appealable because of the breadth of its restraint.\" Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798 (emphasis added). But that is not the\n\nDOJ-OGR-00019627",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page20 of 37",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "14",
      "position": "top"
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "protective order\"); Brown v. Maxwell, 929 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2019) (third party intervenors, including members of the press, appealing order denying motion to modify protective order in civil litigation to allow third parties access to sealed filings, after parties to the litigation settled). Thus, appellate jurisdiction in those cases was founded on the principle that when intervenors seek access to sealed records, \"orders denying access are final as to the intervenors.\" Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). Once the courts in those cases denied the intervenors' motions to modify protective orders, there was nothing left for those intervenors to litigate. Here, by contrast, Judge Nathan's Order did not end the entire litigation as to Maxwell. To the contrary, Maxwell is scheduled to file pretrial motions in December 2020 and to proceed to trial in July 2021.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "When considering interlocutory appeals from rulings on protective orders governing a criminal defendant's use of discovery materials, by contrast, this Court has concluded it lacks jurisdiction. See Caparros, 800 F.2d at 24; Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798. Maxwell cites no case in which this Court has found jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of an order regulating the use of materials a criminal defendant received during litigation, and her efforts to distinguish Pappas and Caparros fall short. Pappas concluded that where a protective order \"prohibits . . . disclosure of information [a defendant] acquired from the Government prior to the litigation, the order is not a typical protective order regulating discovery documents and should be appealable because of the breadth of its restraint.\" Pappas, 94 F.3d at 798 (emphasis added). But that is not the",
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    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00019627",
      "position": "footer"
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Nathan",
      "Brown"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "Onondaga"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "10/02/2020",
      "December 2020",
      "July 2021"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 20-3061",
      "Document 82",
      "2944267",
      "DOJ-OGR-00019627"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing, likely from a federal court given the citation format (e.g., '929 F.3d 41'). The text discusses legal precedents and jurisdiction regarding protective orders in litigation. There are no visible redactions or significant damage to the text."
}