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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "35",
- "document_number": "82",
- "date": "10/02/2020",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page35 of 37\n29\nshe can appeal to this Court following the entry of final judgment in the criminal case.\nMaxwell presented Judge Nathan with no coherent reason—not to mention good cause—to modify the duly entered Protective Order in this criminal case. In the absence of any explanation of Maxwell's need to use criminal discovery materials to litigate a civil case, Judge Nathan was well within her discretion when determining that Maxwell's arguments “plainly fail to establish good cause.” (A. 101). Judge Nathan's Order falls comfortably within the range of permissible decisions on a motion to modify a protective order, and so she did not abuse her discretion in so ruling.\nthe criminal trial would likely have been subject to deposition. That concern, among others, raised a significant risk that proceeding with the civil matter would adversely affect the ongoing criminal prosecution against Maxwell. Moreover, the interests of judicial economy and the public interest in enforcement of the criminal law were served by a stay in the Doe case because the outcome of the criminal case could resolve disputed issues in the Doe case. Such concerns are not present in Giuffre v. Maxwell.\nDOJ-OGR-00019642",
- "text_blocks": [
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Case 20-3061, Document 82, 10/02/2020, 2944267, Page35 of 37",
- "position": "header"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "29",
- "position": "header"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "she can appeal to this Court following the entry of final judgment in the criminal case.",
- "position": "main body"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Maxwell presented Judge Nathan with no coherent reason—not to mention good cause—to modify the duly entered Protective Order in this criminal case. In the absence of any explanation of Maxwell's need to use criminal discovery materials to litigate a civil case, Judge Nathan was well within her discretion when determining that Maxwell's arguments “plainly fail to establish good cause.” (A. 101). Judge Nathan's Order falls comfortably within the range of permissible decisions on a motion to modify a protective order, and so she did not abuse her discretion in so ruling.",
- "position": "main body"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "the criminal trial would likely have been subject to deposition. That concern, among others, raised a significant risk that proceeding with the civil matter would adversely affect the ongoing criminal prosecution against Maxwell. Moreover, the interests of judicial economy and the public interest in enforcement of the criminal law were served by a stay in the Doe case because the outcome of the criminal case could resolve disputed issues in the Doe case. Such concerns are not present in Giuffre v. Maxwell.",
- "position": "main body"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00019642",
- "position": "footer"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Maxwell",
- "Judge Nathan",
- "Giuffre"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Court"
- ],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "10/02/2020"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "20-3061",
- "82",
- "2944267",
- "DOJ-OGR-00019642"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the case of Giuffre v. Maxwell. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is likely a page from a larger document, as indicated by the 'Page35 of 37' notation at the top."
- }
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