mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES007/DOJ-OGR-00020177.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "4",
    "document_number": "20-6800",
    "date": null,
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "The language of the extradition treaty between the United States and France and the applicable French statues are clear that anyone seeking to contest extradition on the basis of French citizenship must be a French national at the time of the extradition request. (Id. ¶ 11). The provisions on which the government relies were not intended to apply in cases where the person whose extradition is sought had lost French citizenship. To the contrary, it was designed to apply to individuals who had acquired French citizenship subsequent to the commission of the alleged crime “in order to avoid fraudulent nationality applications of offenders seeking to escape extradition.” (Id. ¶¶ 15-16). If the person is no longer a French national at the time of the request, the provision does not apply. The government cites no case where the relevant statute was applied to protect a formerly French national from extradition, and we have found none ourselves. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21). By contrast, there are numerous examples of French courts deporting individuals who have lost French nationality following the commission of an offense. (Id. ¶ 21). Accordingly, Mr. Julié concludes: “[I]t cannot have been the intention of French lawmakers that Article 696-4 be construed as meaning that a person who has lost French nationality would still be entitled to be protected from extradition.” (Id. ¶ 26). Ms. Maxwell’s agreement to give up both British and French citizenship and waive any and all right to contest extradition is a formidable challenge to the assertion that Ms. Maxwell would likely flee if released from custody and goes above and beyond the “reasonable assurances” that the Bail Reform Act requires to grant bail. While we maintain that Ms. Maxwell’s written waivers of the right to challenge extradition should suffice, her willingness to forfeit citizenship birthrights exceeds what is necessary and profoundly demonstrates her commitment to abide by conditions of release and appear at trial. 4 DOJ-OGR-00020177",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The language of the extradition treaty between the United States and France and the applicable French statues are clear that anyone seeking to contest extradition on the basis of French citizenship must be a French national at the time of the extradition request. (Id. ¶ 11). The provisions on which the government relies were not intended to apply in cases where the person whose extradition is sought had lost French citizenship. To the contrary, it was designed to apply to individuals who had acquired French citizenship subsequent to the commission of the alleged crime “in order to avoid fraudulent nationality applications of offenders seeking to escape extradition.” (Id. ¶¶ 15-16). If the person is no longer a French national at the time of the request, the provision does not apply. The government cites no case where the relevant statute was applied to protect a formerly French national from extradition, and we have found none ourselves. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21). By contrast, there are numerous examples of French courts deporting individuals who have lost French nationality following the commission of an offense. (Id. ¶ 21). Accordingly, Mr. Julié concludes: “[I]t cannot have been the intention of French lawmakers that Article 696-4 be construed as meaning that a person who has lost French nationality would still be entitled to be protected from extradition.” (Id. ¶ 26).",
      "position": "top"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Ms. Maxwell’s agreement to give up both British and French citizenship and waive any and all right to contest extradition is a formidable challenge to the assertion that Ms. Maxwell would likely flee if released from custody and goes above and beyond the “reasonable assurances” that the Bail Reform Act requires to grant bail. While we maintain that Ms. Maxwell’s written waivers of the right to challenge extradition should suffice, her willingness to forfeit citizenship birthrights exceeds what is necessary and profoundly demonstrates her commitment to abide by conditions of release and appear at trial.",
      "position": "middle"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "4",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00020177",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Ms. Maxwell",
      "Mr. Julié"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "United States",
      "France"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "United States",
      "France"
    ],
    "dates": [],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "20-6800",
      "DOJ-OGR-00020177"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to the extradition case of Ms. Maxwell. The text is well-formatted and printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps. The document includes citations to specific paragraphs (e.g., 'Id. ¶ 11') and references to a treaty between the United States and France."
}