mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES008/DOJ-OGR-00021000.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "17",
    "document_number": "657",
    "date": "04/29/22",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page174 of 221\nA-374\nCase 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 17 of 45\nFollowing the close of the defense case, the Defendant renewed her previous Rule 29 application. Id. at 2736.\nIn her brief, the Defendant reiterates her request that the Court \"enter a judgment of acquittal as to all counts.\" Maxwell Br. at 30. The Court has deemed Counts One and Five multiplicitous, see supra Part I, and therefore the Court will not enter judgment on those counts.\nAnd at trial, the jury found the Defendant not guilty on Count Two. Thus, the Court will consider the sufficiency of the evidence for the remaining counts: Three, Four, and Six. After considering the arguments and evidence, the Court denies the Defendant's Rule 29 motion.\nThe Court first notes that the Defendant has not provided substantive argument on the sufficiency of the evidence—in either the oral application or the post-conviction briefing—for Counts Three, Four, or Six. Instead, for these remaining counts, the Defendant simply asserts that the Court should \"enter a judgment of acquittal as to all counts under Rule 29 . . . because the government failed to prove each element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.\" Maxwell Reply at 18, Dkt. No. 647; Maxwell Br. at 30. The Court disagrees.\nThe Court first considers the substantive counts. Count Four charged the Defendant with the substantive count of transportation of an individual under the age of seventeen with intent to engage in sexual activity in violation of New York law. This count related only to Jane during the period 1994 to 1997. The Government was required to establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the Defendant knowingly transported an individual in interstate commerce, as alleged in the Indictment; (2) that the Defendant transported the individual with the intent that the individual would engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense under New York law, as alleged in the Indictment; and (3) that the Defendant knew that the individual was less than seventeen years old at the time\n17\nDOJ-OGR-00021000",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 58, 02/28/2023, 3475901, Page174 of 221",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "A-374",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 657 Filed 04/29/22 Page 17 of 45",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Following the close of the defense case, the Defendant renewed her previous Rule 29 application. Id. at 2736.\nIn her brief, the Defendant reiterates her request that the Court \"enter a judgment of acquittal as to all counts.\" Maxwell Br. at 30. The Court has deemed Counts One and Five multiplicitous, see supra Part I, and therefore the Court will not enter judgment on those counts.\nAnd at trial, the jury found the Defendant not guilty on Count Two. Thus, the Court will consider the sufficiency of the evidence for the remaining counts: Three, Four, and Six. After considering the arguments and evidence, the Court denies the Defendant's Rule 29 motion.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court first notes that the Defendant has not provided substantive argument on the sufficiency of the evidence—in either the oral application or the post-conviction briefing—for Counts Three, Four, or Six. Instead, for these remaining counts, the Defendant simply asserts that the Court should \"enter a judgment of acquittal as to all counts under Rule 29 . . . because the government failed to prove each element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.\" Maxwell Reply at 18, Dkt. No. 647; Maxwell Br. at 30. The Court disagrees.",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "The Court first considers the substantive counts. Count Four charged the Defendant with the substantive count of transportation of an individual under the age of seventeen with intent to engage in sexual activity in violation of New York law. This count related only to Jane during the period 1994 to 1997. The Government was required to establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the Defendant knowingly transported an individual in interstate commerce, as alleged in the Indictment; (2) that the Defendant transported the individual with the intent that the individual would engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense under New York law, as alleged in the Indictment; and (3) that the Defendant knew that the individual was less than seventeen years old at the time",
      "position": "main"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "17",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021000",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Defendant",
      "Jane"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "Government"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "New York"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/28/2023",
      "04/29/22",
      "1994",
      "1997"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "Case 22-1426",
      "Document 58",
      "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 657",
      "Dkt. No. 647"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is well-formatted and legible."
}