DOJ-OGR-00021106.json 4.8 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "59",
  4. "document_number": "59",
  5. "date": "02/28/2023",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page59 of 113\ncrimes. Under this approach, a court “look[s] to the statute defining the crime of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime.” Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483 (2012); see also U.S. v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015, 2020 (2022) (the categorical approach asks only what the Government is required “to prove—beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of its case,” and “precludes...an inquiry into how any particular defendant may commit the crime”).\nHere, applying the categorical approach to § 3283 means holding that this provision is inapplicable here. That is because “sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child” is not a required element of transporting minors in violation of § 2423(a), or conspiracy to do the same. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). The offense is accomplished once a person “transports” a minor with the requisite knowledge and intent; “[t]he government need not prove ... that the unlawful sexual activity actually took place.” U.S. v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366, 375 (2d Cir. 2013). Thus, Counts Three and Four should have been dismissed.\nHowever, to save Counts Three and Four from dismissal, the court rejected this categorical approach altogether and opted instead for a “case-specific” one, which would permit it to examine whether this particular defendant's alleged conduct “involve[ed] the sexual or physical abuse...of a child.” In so doing, the court brushed aside the clear weight of authority, which holds that statutes employing “offense...involves” or “offense...involving” language identical to §\n44\nDOJ-OGR-00021106",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 59, 02/28/2023, 3475902, Page59 of 113",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "crimes. Under this approach, a court “look[s] to the statute defining the crime of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime.” Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483 (2012); see also U.S. v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015, 2020 (2022) (the categorical approach asks only what the Government is required “to prove—beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of its case,” and “precludes...an inquiry into how any particular defendant may commit the crime”).",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "Here, applying the categorical approach to § 3283 means holding that this provision is inapplicable here. That is because “sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child” is not a required element of transporting minors in violation of § 2423(a), or conspiracy to do the same. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). The offense is accomplished once a person “transports” a minor with the requisite knowledge and intent; “[t]he government need not prove ... that the unlawful sexual activity actually took place.” U.S. v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366, 375 (2d Cir. 2013). Thus, Counts Three and Four should have been dismissed.",
  25. "position": "middle"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "However, to save Counts Three and Four from dismissal, the court rejected this categorical approach altogether and opted instead for a “case-specific” one, which would permit it to examine whether this particular defendant's alleged conduct “involve[ed] the sexual or physical abuse...of a child.” In so doing, the court brushed aside the clear weight of authority, which holds that statutes employing “offense...involves” or “offense...involving” language identical to §",
  30. "position": "middle"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "44",
  35. "position": "bottom"
  36. },
  37. {
  38. "type": "printed",
  39. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021106",
  40. "position": "footer"
  41. }
  42. ],
  43. "entities": {
  44. "people": [],
  45. "organizations": [
  46. "U.S. Supreme Court",
  47. "Second Circuit Court of Appeals",
  48. "Department of Justice"
  49. ],
  50. "locations": [],
  51. "dates": [
  52. "02/28/2023",
  53. "2012",
  54. "2022",
  55. "2013"
  56. ],
  57. "reference_numbers": [
  58. "22-1426",
  59. "59",
  60. "3475902",
  61. "113",
  62. "565 U.S. 478",
  63. "142 S.Ct. 2015",
  64. "733 F.3d 366",
  65. "18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)",
  66. "§ 3283",
  67. "DOJ-OGR-00021106"
  68. ]
  69. },
  70. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is printed and there are no visible stamps or handwritten notes. The document is likely a page from a larger filing, as indicated by the 'Page59 of 113' notation at the top."
  71. }