DOJ-OGR-00021692.json 4.6 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "45",
  4. "document_number": "79",
  5. "date": "06/29/2023",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page45 of 93\n32\ncontinuing offenses that continued into 2004, thus post-dating Section 3283's amendment. Moreover, under the Landgraf framework, the 2003 amendment properly applies to pre-enactment criminal conduct that still could have been timely prosecuted at the time of the enactment, as was the case here.\na. There Was No Retroactivity as to Counts Three and Six\nAs an initial matter, Counts Three and Six both charged conduct that continued through 2004, i.e., after the 2003 amendment to Section 3283, and thus presented no retroactivity concerns.\nFor conspiracy charges requiring proof of an overt act, including 18 U.S.C. § 371, the conspiracy statute at issue here, \"[t]he statute of limitations runs from the date of the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.\" United States v. Monaco, 194 F.3d 381, 387 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999); accord United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2001). Similarly, for a continuing substantive offense, the statute of limitations only \"begin[s] to run when the crime is complete,\" meaning when \"the conduct has run its course.\" United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 46 (2d Cir. 2008).\nHere, the Indictment alleged that the conspiracy charged in Count Three and the sex trafficking offense charged in Count Six continued through 2004. (A.127, 132; see also A.123-24, 131-32 (describing conduct through 2004 involving Victim-4)).7 Thus, the statute\n7 To the extent Maxwell's argument challenges the sufficiency of the evidence rather than the denial\nDOJ-OGR-00021692",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page45 of 93",
  15. "position": "header"
  16. },
  17. {
  18. "type": "printed",
  19. "content": "32",
  20. "position": "top"
  21. },
  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "continuing offenses that continued into 2004, thus post-dating Section 3283's amendment. Moreover, under the Landgraf framework, the 2003 amendment properly applies to pre-enactment criminal conduct that still could have been timely prosecuted at the time of the enactment, as was the case here.",
  25. "position": "middle"
  26. },
  27. {
  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "a. There Was No Retroactivity as to Counts Three and Six",
  30. "position": "middle"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "As an initial matter, Counts Three and Six both charged conduct that continued through 2004, i.e., after the 2003 amendment to Section 3283, and thus presented no retroactivity concerns.",
  35. "position": "middle"
  36. },
  37. {
  38. "type": "printed",
  39. "content": "For conspiracy charges requiring proof of an overt act, including 18 U.S.C. § 371, the conspiracy statute at issue here, \"[t]he statute of limitations runs from the date of the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.\" United States v. Monaco, 194 F.3d 381, 387 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999); accord United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2001). Similarly, for a continuing substantive offense, the statute of limitations only \"begin[s] to run when the crime is complete,\" meaning when \"the conduct has run its course.\" United States v. Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 46 (2d Cir. 2008).",
  40. "position": "middle"
  41. },
  42. {
  43. "type": "printed",
  44. "content": "Here, the Indictment alleged that the conspiracy charged in Count Three and the sex trafficking offense charged in Count Six continued through 2004. (A.127, 132; see also A.123-24, 131-32 (describing conduct through 2004 involving Victim-4)).7 Thus, the statute",
  45. "position": "middle"
  46. },
  47. {
  48. "type": "printed",
  49. "content": "7 To the extent Maxwell's argument challenges the sufficiency of the evidence rather than the denial",
  50. "position": "bottom"
  51. },
  52. {
  53. "type": "printed",
  54. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021692",
  55. "position": "footer"
  56. }
  57. ],
  58. "entities": {
  59. "people": [
  60. "Maxwell",
  61. "Victim-4"
  62. ],
  63. "organizations": [],
  64. "locations": [],
  65. "dates": [
  66. "06/29/2023",
  67. "2003",
  68. "2004"
  69. ],
  70. "reference_numbers": [
  71. "Case 22-1426",
  72. "Document 79",
  73. "3536060",
  74. "DOJ-OGR-00021692"
  75. ]
  76. },
  77. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a case involving Maxwell. The text discusses the applicability of a statute of limitations to certain charges. The document is well-formatted and legible."
  78. }