DOJ-OGR-00021699.json 4.7 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "52",
  4. "document_number": "79",
  5. "date": "06/29/2023",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page52 of 93\n39\nthe charges against Maxwell did not expire before the statute of limitations was extended. Thus, unlike En-terprise, where resurrection of expired claims would have \"stripp[ed] [defendants] of a complete affirmative defense they previously possessed,\" id. at 410, here Maxwell never possessed that complete defense. Judge Nathan correctly concluded that the 2003 amendment accordingly \"did not deprive [Maxwell] of any vested rights.\" (A.153).\nTo be sure, this Court has observed that there may be \"colorable arguments\" that \"the logic of Enterprise extends to criminal cases where the defendant's stat-ute of limitations defense had not vested when the lim-itations period was extended\" because the extension \"increases the period of time during which a defend-ant can be sued,' thereby 'increasing a defendant's lia-bility for past conduct'\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (quoting Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 410); see also United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 644-46 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing potential defense arguments). But such a claim runs headlong into \"the vast weight of retroac-tivity decisions,\" which recognize that \"revoking a vested statute of limitations defense is different from retroactively extending the filing period for a still-via-ble claim.\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (collecting cases).\nFor example, \"in the criminal context, there is a consensus that extending a limitations period before prosecution is time-barred does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.\" Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Stogner, 539 U.S. at 632 (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause\nDOJ-OGR-00021699",
  11. "text_blocks": [
  12. {
  13. "type": "printed",
  14. "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page52 of 93",
  15. "position": "header"
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  19. "content": "39",
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  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "the charges against Maxwell did not expire before the statute of limitations was extended. Thus, unlike En-terprise, where resurrection of expired claims would have \"stripp[ed] [defendants] of a complete affirmative defense they previously possessed,\" id. at 410, here Maxwell never possessed that complete defense. Judge Nathan correctly concluded that the 2003 amendment accordingly \"did not deprive [Maxwell] of any vested rights.\" (A.153).\nTo be sure, this Court has observed that there may be \"colorable arguments\" that \"the logic of Enterprise extends to criminal cases where the defendant's stat-ute of limitations defense had not vested when the lim-itations period was extended\" because the extension \"increases the period of time during which a defend-ant can be sued,' thereby 'increasing a defendant's lia-bility for past conduct'\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (quoting Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 410); see also United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 644-46 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing potential defense arguments). But such a claim runs headlong into \"the vast weight of retroac-tivity decisions,\" which recognize that \"revoking a vested statute of limitations defense is different from retroactively extending the filing period for a still-via-ble claim.\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (collecting cases).\nFor example, \"in the criminal context, there is a consensus that extending a limitations period before prosecution is time-barred does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.\" Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Stogner, 539 U.S. at 632 (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause",
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  29. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021699",
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  31. }
  32. ],
  33. "entities": {
  34. "people": [
  35. "Maxwell",
  36. "Nathan",
  37. "Miller",
  38. "Cruz",
  39. "Maypa",
  40. "Stogner"
  41. ],
  42. "organizations": [
  43. "Enterprise"
  44. ],
  45. "locations": [],
  46. "dates": [
  47. "06/29/2023",
  48. "2003",
  49. "2014",
  50. "2018"
  51. ],
  52. "reference_numbers": [
  53. "22-1426",
  54. "79",
  55. "3536060",
  56. "52",
  57. "93",
  58. "39",
  59. "A.153",
  60. "865 F.3d",
  61. "391 F.3d",
  62. "911 F.3d",
  63. "773 F.3d",
  64. "539 U.S.",
  65. "DOJ-OGR-00021699"
  66. ]
  67. },
  68. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, likely a legal brief or opinion, discussing the statute of limitations and its application to a specific case involving Maxwell. The text includes citations to various court cases and legal precedents."
  69. }