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- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "52",
- "document_number": "79",
- "date": "06/29/2023",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page52 of 93\n39\nthe charges against Maxwell did not expire before the statute of limitations was extended. Thus, unlike En-terprise, where resurrection of expired claims would have \"stripp[ed] [defendants] of a complete affirmative defense they previously possessed,\" id. at 410, here Maxwell never possessed that complete defense. Judge Nathan correctly concluded that the 2003 amendment accordingly \"did not deprive [Maxwell] of any vested rights.\" (A.153).\nTo be sure, this Court has observed that there may be \"colorable arguments\" that \"the logic of Enterprise extends to criminal cases where the defendant's stat-ute of limitations defense had not vested when the lim-itations period was extended\" because the extension \"increases the period of time during which a defend-ant can be sued,' thereby 'increasing a defendant's lia-bility for past conduct'\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (quoting Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 410); see also United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 644-46 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing potential defense arguments). But such a claim runs headlong into \"the vast weight of retroac-tivity decisions,\" which recognize that \"revoking a vested statute of limitations defense is different from retroactively extending the filing period for a still-via-ble claim.\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (collecting cases).\nFor example, \"in the criminal context, there is a consensus that extending a limitations period before prosecution is time-barred does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.\" Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Stogner, 539 U.S. at 632 (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause\nDOJ-OGR-00021699",
- "text_blocks": [
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page52 of 93",
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "39",
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "the charges against Maxwell did not expire before the statute of limitations was extended. Thus, unlike En-terprise, where resurrection of expired claims would have \"stripp[ed] [defendants] of a complete affirmative defense they previously possessed,\" id. at 410, here Maxwell never possessed that complete defense. Judge Nathan correctly concluded that the 2003 amendment accordingly \"did not deprive [Maxwell] of any vested rights.\" (A.153).\nTo be sure, this Court has observed that there may be \"colorable arguments\" that \"the logic of Enterprise extends to criminal cases where the defendant's stat-ute of limitations defense had not vested when the lim-itations period was extended\" because the extension \"increases the period of time during which a defend-ant can be sued,' thereby 'increasing a defendant's lia-bility for past conduct'\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (quoting Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 410); see also United States v. Miller, 911 F.3d 638, 644-46 (1st Cir. 2018) (discussing potential defense arguments). But such a claim runs headlong into \"the vast weight of retroac-tivity decisions,\" which recognize that \"revoking a vested statute of limitations defense is different from retroactively extending the filing period for a still-via-ble claim.\" Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 57 (collecting cases).\nFor example, \"in the criminal context, there is a consensus that extending a limitations period before prosecution is time-barred does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.\" Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Stogner, 539 U.S. at 632 (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause",
- "position": "middle"
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- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021699",
- "position": "footer"
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- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Maxwell",
- "Nathan",
- "Miller",
- "Cruz",
- "Maypa",
- "Stogner"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Enterprise"
- ],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "06/29/2023",
- "2003",
- "2014",
- "2018"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "22-1426",
- "79",
- "3536060",
- "52",
- "93",
- "39",
- "A.153",
- "865 F.3d",
- "391 F.3d",
- "911 F.3d",
- "773 F.3d",
- "539 U.S.",
- "DOJ-OGR-00021699"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, likely a legal brief or opinion, discussing the statute of limitations and its application to a specific case involving Maxwell. The text includes citations to various court cases and legal precedents."
- }
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