| 1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829303132333435363738394041424344454647484950515253545556575859 |
- {
- "document_metadata": {
- "page_number": "73",
- "document_number": "79",
- "date": "06/29/2023",
- "document_type": "court document",
- "has_handwriting": false,
- "has_stamps": false
- },
- "full_text": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page73 of 93\n\n60\n\nprosecuted for false testimony at the hearing (id.), and had he hidden his sexual abuse in order to get on the jury, he would not have immediately disclosed it to the media after trial (A.335). To the contrary, in one video interview with the media, Juror 50 \"appears genuinely and completely surprised to learn that the questionnaire\" asked about his history of sexual abuse. (Id.).\n\nMaxwell does not directly challenge Judge Nathan's factual findings on this point, much less demonstrate that they are clearly erroneous. Instead, relying on United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1993), Maxwell argues that McDonough's first step is satisfied by any falsehood, deliberate or otherwise. (Br.66).\n\nThis argument misses the mark. This prong requires a showing of deliberate dishonesty by the juror, rather than mere honest mistake. This Court has explained that, in McDonough, the Supreme Court \"found that the juror's good faith failure to respond, though mistaken, did not satisfy even the first prong of the test.\" United States v. Shaoul, 41 F.3d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1994). The defendant in Shaoul also relied on Langford to contend that a new trial was appropriate \"even if he cannot establish the juror's dishonesty.\" Id. This Court rejected that argument, concluding that \"[s]uch a contorted reading of Langford is incorrect, because it would eliminate the threshold requirement of the McDonough test: juror dishonesty.\" Id. And this Court concluded that the defendant failed to satisfy the first prong of the test because \"defense counsel explicitly conceded the good faith of the juror.\" Id. at 816; see United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d 32, 51 (2d Cir.\n\nDOJ-OGR-00021720",
- "text_blocks": [
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "Case 22-1426, Document 79, 06/29/2023, 3536060, Page73 of 93",
- "position": "header"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "60",
- "position": "top"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "prosecuted for false testimony at the hearing (id.), and had he hidden his sexual abuse in order to get on the jury, he would not have immediately disclosed it to the media after trial (A.335). To the contrary, in one video interview with the media, Juror 50 \"appears genuinely and completely surprised to learn that the questionnaire\" asked about his history of sexual abuse. (Id.).\n\nMaxwell does not directly challenge Judge Nathan's factual findings on this point, much less demonstrate that they are clearly erroneous. Instead, relying on United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1993), Maxwell argues that McDonough's first step is satisfied by any falsehood, deliberate or otherwise. (Br.66).\n\nThis argument misses the mark. This prong requires a showing of deliberate dishonesty by the juror, rather than mere honest mistake. This Court has explained that, in McDonough, the Supreme Court \"found that the juror's good faith failure to respond, though mistaken, did not satisfy even the first prong of the test.\" United States v. Shaoul, 41 F.3d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1994). The defendant in Shaoul also relied on Langford to contend that a new trial was appropriate \"even if he cannot establish the juror's dishonesty.\" Id. This Court rejected that argument, concluding that \"[s]uch a contorted reading of Langford is incorrect, because it would eliminate the threshold requirement of the McDonough test: juror dishonesty.\" Id. And this Court concluded that the defendant failed to satisfy the first prong of the test because \"defense counsel explicitly conceded the good faith of the juror.\" Id. at 816; see United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d 32, 51 (2d Cir.",
- "position": "middle"
- },
- {
- "type": "printed",
- "content": "DOJ-OGR-00021720",
- "position": "footer"
- }
- ],
- "entities": {
- "people": [
- "Maxwell",
- "Judge Nathan",
- "Juror 50"
- ],
- "organizations": [
- "Supreme Court"
- ],
- "locations": [],
- "dates": [
- "06/29/2023",
- "1993",
- "1994"
- ],
- "reference_numbers": [
- "Case 22-1426",
- "Document 79",
- "3536060",
- "DOJ-OGR-00021720",
- "990 F.2d 65",
- "41 F.3d 811",
- "995 F.3d 32"
- ]
- },
- "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court document, likely a legal brief or opinion, discussing a case involving Maxwell. The text references various legal precedents and court decisions. The document is well-formatted and printed, with no visible handwriting or stamps."
- }
|