DOJ-OGR-00002509.json 6.8 KB

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  1. {
  2. "document_metadata": {
  3. "page_number": "6",
  4. "document_number": "138",
  5. "date": "02/04/21",
  6. "document_type": "court document",
  7. "has_handwriting": false,
  8. "has_stamps": false
  9. },
  10. "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 138 Filed 02/04/21 Page 6 of 26\n\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\nMs. Maxwell brings this motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(ii) which requires that motions to dismiss an indictment for pre-indictment delay be raised by pretrial motion. She respectfully requests, however, leave to supplement this motion after the government provides her with meaningful discovery. Depending on the status of the case after the disclosure of meaningful discovery, Ms. Maxwell may request that the Court defer ruling on this motion until after any trial if the indictment has not been dismissed on other grounds. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971) (“Events of trial may demonstrate actual prejudice.”); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1516 (5th Cir. 1996) (except for “compelling cases, the district court, rather than grant such a motion prior to trial, should carry it with the case, and make the determination of whether actual, substantial prejudice resulted from the improper delay in light of what actually transpired at trial”; affirmed); United States v. Glist, 594 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1979) (motions to dismiss for preindictment delay taken under advisement prior to trial and granted as to one of four counts after five days of trial).1\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nThe claims made in the Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) occurred approximately twenty-seven years ago. The world has changed significantly during the last three decades.\n\n1 See also, United States v. Scott, 579 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1978) (motion to dismiss two counts of three-count indictment denied without prejudice prior to trial, granted after close of all the evidence, jury acquittal on remaining count; affirmed); United States v. Crabble, No. 16-40101-01-DDC, 2017 WL 4843295, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2017) (defendant permitted to renew his Motion to Dismiss with authority supporting a renewed motion at the close of evidence); United States v. Glenn, No. CR 15-99-1, 2018 WL 4091786, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2018) (defendant granted the opportunity to supplement his post-trial motions so that he could assert the issue of pre-indictment delay and renew his request for discovery); and United States v. Drayton, No. 1:04CR00009, 2006 WL 758742, at *1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2006), aff'd, 267 F. App'x 192 (4th Cir. 2008) (when ruling on a motion to dismiss for pre-indictment delay, the proper course is to reserve decision, in order to make a determination based on the actual evidence presented at trial).\n\n1\n\nDOJ-OGR-00002509",
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  14. "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 138 Filed 02/04/21 Page 6 of 26",
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  19. "content": "PRELIMINARY STATEMENT",
  20. "position": "top"
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  22. {
  23. "type": "printed",
  24. "content": "Ms. Maxwell brings this motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(ii) which requires that motions to dismiss an indictment for pre-indictment delay be raised by pretrial motion. She respectfully requests, however, leave to supplement this motion after the government provides her with meaningful discovery. Depending on the status of the case after the disclosure of meaningful discovery, Ms. Maxwell may request that the Court defer ruling on this motion until after any trial if the indictment has not been dismissed on other grounds. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971) (“Events of trial may demonstrate actual prejudice.”); United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1516 (5th Cir. 1996) (except for “compelling cases, the district court, rather than grant such a motion prior to trial, should carry it with the case, and make the determination of whether actual, substantial prejudice resulted from the improper delay in light of what actually transpired at trial”; affirmed); United States v. Glist, 594 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1979) (motions to dismiss for preindictment delay taken under advisement prior to trial and granted as to one of four counts after five days of trial).1",
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  28. "type": "printed",
  29. "content": "INTRODUCTION",
  30. "position": "middle"
  31. },
  32. {
  33. "type": "printed",
  34. "content": "The claims made in the Superseding Indictment (“Indictment”) occurred approximately twenty-seven years ago. The world has changed significantly during the last three decades.",
  35. "position": "middle"
  36. },
  37. {
  38. "type": "printed",
  39. "content": "1 See also, United States v. Scott, 579 F.2d 1013 (6th Cir. 1978) (motion to dismiss two counts of three-count indictment denied without prejudice prior to trial, granted after close of all the evidence, jury acquittal on remaining count; affirmed); United States v. Crabble, No. 16-40101-01-DDC, 2017 WL 4843295, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2017) (defendant permitted to renew his Motion to Dismiss with authority supporting a renewed motion at the close of evidence); United States v. Glenn, No. CR 15-99-1, 2018 WL 4091786, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2018) (defendant granted the opportunity to supplement his post-trial motions so that he could assert the issue of pre-indictment delay and renew his request for discovery); and United States v. Drayton, No. 1:04CR00009, 2006 WL 758742, at *1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2006), aff'd, 267 F. App'x 192 (4th Cir. 2008) (when ruling on a motion to dismiss for pre-indictment delay, the proper course is to reserve decision, in order to make a determination based on the actual evidence presented at trial).",
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  49. "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002509",
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  53. "entities": {
  54. "people": [
  55. "Maxwell",
  56. "Marion",
  57. "Crouch",
  58. "Glist",
  59. "Scott",
  60. "Crabble",
  61. "Glenn",
  62. "Drayton"
  63. ],
  64. "organizations": [
  65. "Court",
  66. "District Court"
  67. ],
  68. "locations": [
  69. "Kan",
  70. "Pa",
  71. "Va"
  72. ],
  73. "dates": [
  74. "02/04/21",
  75. "1971",
  76. "1996",
  77. "1979",
  78. "1978",
  79. "2017",
  80. "2018",
  81. "2006",
  82. "2008"
  83. ],
  84. "reference_numbers": [
  85. "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
  86. "Document 138",
  87. "404 U.S. 307",
  88. "84 F.3d 1497",
  89. "594 F.2d 1374",
  90. "579 F.2d 1013",
  91. "No. 16-40101-01-DDC",
  92. "No. CR 15-99-1",
  93. "No. 1:04CR00009",
  94. "267 F. App'x 192",
  95. "DOJ-OGR-00002509"
  96. ]
  97. },
  98. "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case. The text is mostly printed, with no handwritten content or stamps visible. The document is well-formatted and legible."
  99. }