mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00002667.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "19",
    "document_number": "144",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 19 of 25\n\nSince Bridges, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutory references to an \"offense involving\" or \"offenses involving\" certain elements call for such an approach. See Shular, 140 S.Ct. at 785; Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012) (interpreting \"offenses that involve fraud or deceit\" to mean \"offenses with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct\") (internal punctuation omitted); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (stating that \"offense that . . . involves\" language \"requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense . . .rather than to the particular facts\" at issue); see also United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328 (2019) (\"In all but the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning.\") Thus, only if the offense \"necessarily entails\" the identified conduct can it be said to be an \"offense involving\" that conduct. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 484.\n\nIn United States v. Morgan, the D.C. Circuit used this approach in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), a venue statute that applies to \"[a]ny offense involving the use of the mails, transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, or the importation of an object or person into the United States.\" The court concluded that \"[t]he most natural reading\" of the statute is \"to construe 'any offense involving' by reference to the elements of the offense at issue.\" 393 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). The court then gave an illustrative example of a case in which a defendant travels in interstate commerce, commits a federal offense, and then returns home via interstate commerce:\n\n[T]he circumstances surrounding the crime include [the defendant's] travel in interstate commerce, but his crime is not an \"offense involving\" transportation in interstate commerce. In other words, a faithful reading of the precise words of the statute in the order in which they are written suggests that an \"offense involv[es]\" transportation in interstate commerce only when such transportation is an element of the offense.\n\n13\nDOJ-OGR-00002667",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 19 of 25",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Since Bridges, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutory references to an \"offense involving\" or \"offenses involving\" certain elements call for such an approach. See Shular, 140 S.Ct. at 785; Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012) (interpreting \"offenses that involve fraud or deceit\" to mean \"offenses with elements that necessarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct\") (internal punctuation omitted); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (stating that \"offense that . . . involves\" language \"requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense . . .rather than to the particular facts\" at issue); see also United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2328 (2019) (\"In all but the most unusual situations, a single use of a statutory phrase must have a fixed meaning.\") Thus, only if the offense \"necessarily entails\" the identified conduct can it be said to be an \"offense involving\" that conduct. Kawashima, 565 U.S. at 484.",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "In United States v. Morgan, the D.C. Circuit used this approach in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), a venue statute that applies to \"[a]ny offense involving the use of the mails, transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, or the importation of an object or person into the United States.\" The court concluded that \"[t]he most natural reading\" of the statute is \"to construe 'any offense involving' by reference to the elements of the offense at issue.\" 393 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). The court then gave an illustrative example of a case in which a defendant travels in interstate commerce, commits a federal offense, and then returns home via interstate commerce:",
      "position": "main body"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "[T]he circumstances surrounding the crime include [the defendant's] travel in interstate commerce, but his crime is not an \"offense involving\" transportation in interstate commerce. In other words, a faithful reading of the precise words of the statute in the order in which they are written suggests that an \"offense involv[es]\" transportation in interstate commerce only when such transportation is an element of the offense.",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "13",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002667",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "Court",
      "D.C. Circuit"
    ],
    "locations": [
      "United States"
    ],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "2012",
      "2004",
      "2019"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 144",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002667"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with a clear and legible text. There are no visible redactions or damage."
}