mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES001/DOJ-OGR-00002669.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "21",
    "document_number": "144",
    "date": "02/04/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 21 of 25\n\nSuch a \"necessarily entails\" or \"elements of the offense\" approach is particularly appropriate for three additional reasons here. First, like the Wartime Suspension Act in Bridges, § 3283 creates an \"exception\" to the general five-year limitations period of § 3282, and such exceptions should be \"narrowly construed.\" Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215-16 (citing United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633, 639 (1926)); see also Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (\"we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision,\" particularly when the exception is \"somewhat ambiguous\"). Second, § 3282 itself requires that any exception to the five-year rule be \"expressly provided by law.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (emphasis added). Nowhere does § 3283 \"expressly\" purport to cover offenses that could (but need not) be proved by facts involving sexual or physical abuse of a minor. And third, under the rule of lenity, ambiguity with respect to criminal statutes should be construed in favor of the defendant. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 216 (2014); see also United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 523 (2d Cir. 2015) (\"where, as here, the Government and the defense both posit plausible interpretations of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires us to adopt the defendant's construction\"). To do otherwise would violate the \"longstanding congressional 'policy of repose' that is fundamental to our society and our criminal law.\" See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215-16; see also Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (\"criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose\" (internal quotation omitted)).8\n\nB. The offenses charged in Counts One through Four do not necessarily entail the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child.\n\nUnder the \"necessarily entails\" approach, § 3283 does not apply: None of the charged counts \"necessarily\" entails \"the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child.\" See 18\n\n8 Nor has the Second Circuit held otherwise. In Weingarten, because the issue arose in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court concluded only that it was \"not obvious\" that § 3283 required an elements-based approach. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 53, 58-59.",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-AJN Document 144 Filed 02/04/21 Page 21 of 25",
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      "content": "Such a \"necessarily entails\" or \"elements of the offense\" approach is particularly appropriate for three additional reasons here. First, like the Wartime Suspension Act in Bridges, § 3283 creates an \"exception\" to the general five-year limitations period of § 3282, and such exceptions should be \"narrowly construed.\" Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215-16 (citing United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633, 639 (1926)); see also Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989) (\"we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision,\" particularly when the exception is \"somewhat ambiguous\"). Second, § 3282 itself requires that any exception to the five-year rule be \"expressly provided by law.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (emphasis added). Nowhere does § 3283 \"expressly\" purport to cover offenses that could (but need not) be proved by facts involving sexual or physical abuse of a minor. And third, under the rule of lenity, ambiguity with respect to criminal statutes should be construed in favor of the defendant. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 216 (2014); see also United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 523 (2d Cir. 2015) (\"where, as here, the Government and the defense both posit plausible interpretations of a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires us to adopt the defendant's construction\"). To do otherwise would violate the \"longstanding congressional 'policy of repose' that is fundamental to our society and our criminal law.\" See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 215-16; see also Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (\"criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose\" (internal quotation omitted)).8",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "B. The offenses charged in Counts One through Four do not necessarily entail the sexual or physical abuse or kidnapping of a child.",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Under the \"necessarily entails\" approach, § 3283 does not apply: None of the charged counts \"necessarily\" entails \"the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child.\" See 18",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "8 Nor has the Second Circuit held otherwise. In Weingarten, because the issue arose in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court concluded only that it was \"not obvious\" that § 3283 required an elements-based approach. Weingarten, 865 F.3d at 53, 58-59.",
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      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002669",
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  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [
      "U.S. Supreme Court",
      "Second Circuit Court of Appeals"
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    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "02/04/21",
      "1926",
      "1989",
      "2014",
      "2015"
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    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-AJN",
      "Document 144",
      "18 U.S.C. § 3282",
      "§ 3283"
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}