mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00002992.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "58",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
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  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 58 of 239\n\nthe resurrection of time-barred prosecutions, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14 But that concern is entirely separate from extending the statute of limitations for live claims, which is what Congress did here. Critically—and as discussed in greater detail below—there is no Ex Post Facto Clause issue in this case, because the statute of limitations for Counts One through Four had not yet expired when the limitations period was extended in 2003.15\n\nAccepting the defendant’s argument would undermine Congress’s plain purpose in extending the limitations period. In 1990, 2003, and 2006, Congress extended—and ultimately abolished—the statute of limitations to ensure that prosecutors could seek justice for child sex abuse victims who come forward or identify their abusers after a delay. Applying the 2003 statute only prospectively subverts that purpose by exempting all past offenders. According to the\n\n14 Moreover, the fact that Congress considered, but ultimately omitted, retroactivity language does not end the Landgraf inquiry, as the defendant suggests. Indeed, Landgraf itself makes this clear. In that case, the statute at issue had a predecessor, which contained a retroactivity provision. That version was vetoed by the President, and the final version of the statute omitted the retroactivity provision. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of the 1990 bill—which was by no means the only source of political controversy over that legislation—is not dispositive because it does not tell us precisely where the compromise was struck in the 1991 Act.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 256. Indeed, “[i]t [was] entirely possible—indeed, highly probable—that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue with the clarity of the 1990 legislation, Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts.” Id. at 261.\n\n15 Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-2 were both younger than 25 in 2003, when Congress extended the limitations period. Minor Victim-3 was not, but this does not alter the inquiry, because the Indictment does not contain any counts that relate to Minor Victim-3 alone. Instead, she is one of multiple victims of the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three. The inclusion of the overt acts relating to Minor Victim-3 in an otherwise timely conspiracy count does not render that count untimely. To the contrary, for conspiracy counts, the Government is only required to prove that one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred within the limitations period. United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, the defendant is incorrect to assert that the government is “barred” from prosecuting the defendant for any offense against Minor Victim-3. (Def. Mot. 2 at 10, n.3). Instead, there is no statute of limitations issue here so long as the jury is properly instructed at trial that it must find at least one overt act within the limitations period—i.e., one overt act that does not relate to Minor Victim-3.\n\n31\nDOJ-OGR-00002992",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 58 of 239",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "the resurrection of time-barred prosecutions, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.14 But that concern is entirely separate from extending the statute of limitations for live claims, which is what Congress did here. Critically—and as discussed in greater detail below—there is no Ex Post Facto Clause issue in this case, because the statute of limitations for Counts One through Four had not yet expired when the limitations period was extended in 2003.15",
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      "content": "Accepting the defendant’s argument would undermine Congress’s plain purpose in extending the limitations period. In 1990, 2003, and 2006, Congress extended—and ultimately abolished—the statute of limitations to ensure that prosecutors could seek justice for child sex abuse victims who come forward or identify their abusers after a delay. Applying the 2003 statute only prospectively subverts that purpose by exempting all past offenders. According to the",
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      "type": "printed",
      "content": "14 Moreover, the fact that Congress considered, but ultimately omitted, retroactivity language does not end the Landgraf inquiry, as the defendant suggests. Indeed, Landgraf itself makes this clear. In that case, the statute at issue had a predecessor, which contained a retroactivity provision. That version was vetoed by the President, and the final version of the statute omitted the retroactivity provision. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of the 1990 bill—which was by no means the only source of political controversy over that legislation—is not dispositive because it does not tell us precisely where the compromise was struck in the 1991 Act.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 256. Indeed, “[i]t [was] entirely possible—indeed, highly probable—that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue with the clarity of the 1990 legislation, Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts.” Id. at 261.",
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      "content": "15 Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim-2 were both younger than 25 in 2003, when Congress extended the limitations period. Minor Victim-3 was not, but this does not alter the inquiry, because the Indictment does not contain any counts that relate to Minor Victim-3 alone. Instead, she is one of multiple victims of the conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three. The inclusion of the overt acts relating to Minor Victim-3 in an otherwise timely conspiracy count does not render that count untimely. To the contrary, for conspiracy counts, the Government is only required to prove that one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred within the limitations period. United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, the defendant is incorrect to assert that the government is “barred” from prosecuting the defendant for any offense against Minor Victim-3. (Def. Mot. 2 at 10, n.3). Instead, there is no statute of limitations issue here so long as the jury is properly instructed at trial that it must find at least one overt act within the limitations period—i.e., one overt act that does not relate to Minor Victim-3.",
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      "04/16/21",
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      "511 U.S. at 256",
      "242 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 2001)",
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  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a formal and legal tone. The text includes citations to legal precedents and references to specific court documents."
}