mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00002996.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "62",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
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    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 62 of 239 Facto Clause and Landgraf's second step.\"). Maxwell cites no precedent for the proposition that, in the criminal context, much less in the context of criminal statutes of limitations, Landgraf forecloses prosecutions permitted by the Constitution. Maxwell instead cites dictum by a single judge in a non-criminal case that, \"[i]f [he] were judging on a clean slate,\" he would read Landgraf to prohibit some retroactive application of statutes that, \"while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of' Landgraf's considerations, and that he \"expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions\" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., \"[s]peaking only for [him]self\"). That footnote is too slender a reed to support Maxwell's entire motion to dismiss the Indictment as untimely. Moreover, Maxwell has identified no case in the intervening seventeen years in which the Supreme Court has embraced Judge Calabresi's view. See Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (finding arguments relating to Judge Calabresi's footnote unpersuasive, and concluding that Section 3283 applies retroactively under Landgraf). As Weingarten recognized, any court to hold that \"retroactively extending a filing period for live charges is a presumptively impermissible retroactive effect under Landgraf\" will be the first to do so. 865 F.3d at 58. The defendant also argues that \"criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose,\" relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). Toussie considered whether a person's failure to register for the draft was a continuing offense subjecting him to prosecution eight years later, notwithstanding the five-year limitations period in Section 3282. Id. at 114. In that context, the Court invoked a presumption in favor of repose when determining whether the underlying conduct was time-barred. But that presumption says nothing about whether Congress intended an extension of a statute of limitations to apply purely prospectively, a question governed by Landgraf. Only one case has applied 35 DOJ-OGR-00002996",
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      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 62 of 239",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Facto Clause and Landgraf's second step.\"). Maxwell cites no precedent for the proposition that, in the criminal context, much less in the context of criminal statutes of limitations, Landgraf forecloses prosecutions permitted by the Constitution. Maxwell instead cites dictum by a single judge in a non-criminal case that, \"[i]f [he] were judging on a clean slate,\" he would read Landgraf to prohibit some retroactive application of statutes that, \"while not the equivalent of criminal ex post facto, nevertheless would run afoul of' Landgraf's considerations, and that he \"expect[ed] that the Supreme Court's future decisions\" would confirm such a reading. Thom v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 158, 163 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., \"[s]peaking only for [him]self\"). That footnote is too slender a reed to support Maxwell's entire motion to dismiss the Indictment as untimely. Moreover, Maxwell has identified no case in the intervening seventeen years in which the Supreme Court has embraced Judge Calabresi's view. See Nader, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (finding arguments relating to Judge Calabresi's footnote unpersuasive, and concluding that Section 3283 applies retroactively under Landgraf). As Weingarten recognized, any court to hold that \"retroactively extending a filing period for live charges is a presumptively impermissible retroactive effect under Landgraf\" will be the first to do so. 865 F.3d at 58. The defendant also argues that \"criminal limitations statutes are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose,\" relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). Toussie considered whether a person's failure to register for the draft was a continuing offense subjecting him to prosecution eight years later, notwithstanding the five-year limitations period in Section 3282. Id. at 114. In that context, the Court invoked a presumption in favor of repose when determining whether the underlying conduct was time-barred. But that presumption says nothing about whether Congress intended an extension of a statute of limitations to apply purely prospectively, a question governed by Landgraf. Only one case has applied",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "35",
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    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00002996",
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  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [
      "Maxwell",
      "Calabresi",
      "Weingarten"
    ],
    "organizations": [
      "Supreme Court",
      "Congress"
    ],
    "locations": [],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "1970"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "Page 62 of 239",
      "369 F.3d 158",
      "425 F. Supp. 3d",
      "397 U.S. 112",
      "865 F.3d",
      "DOJ-OGR-00002996"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing related to a criminal case, with a formal and technical tone. The text includes citations to various court cases and statutes."
}