mirror-epstein-docs/results/IMAGES002/DOJ-OGR-00003065.json

{
  "document_metadata": {
    "page_number": "131",
    "document_number": "204",
    "date": "04/16/21",
    "document_type": "court document",
    "has_handwriting": false,
    "has_stamps": false
  },
  "full_text": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 131 of 239\nmisconduct that would justify the extraordinary remedy the defendant seeks—the motion must be denied.\n\na. Applicable Law\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . .” The Due Process Clause “protects individuals against two types of government action.” Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Procedural due process “ensures that government cannot unfairly and without meaningful process deprive a person of life, liberty, or property,” while substantive due process “prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience, or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration omitted).\nProcedural due process analysis focuses on whether “government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property . . . [is] implemented in a fair manner,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). “Courts examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the [Government]; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\nAs to substantive due process, the Supreme Court is “always . . . reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because of this reluctance, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), “that where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of\n104\nDOJ-OGR-00003065",
  "text_blocks": [
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 204 Filed 04/16/21 Page 131 of 239",
      "position": "header"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "misconduct that would justify the extraordinary remedy the defendant seeks—the motion must be denied.\n\na. Applicable Law\nThe Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . .” The Due Process Clause “protects individuals against two types of government action.” Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Procedural due process “ensures that government cannot unfairly and without meaningful process deprive a person of life, liberty, or property,” while substantive due process “prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience, or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration omitted).\nProcedural due process analysis focuses on whether “government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property . . . [is] implemented in a fair manner,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). “Courts examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the [Government]; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\nAs to substantive due process, the Supreme Court is “always . . . reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because of this reluctance, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), “that where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of",
      "position": "main content"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "104",
      "position": "footer"
    },
    {
      "type": "printed",
      "content": "DOJ-OGR-00003065",
      "position": "footer"
    }
  ],
  "entities": {
    "people": [],
    "organizations": [],
    "locations": [
      "S.D.N.Y."
    ],
    "dates": [
      "04/16/21",
      "2019",
      "1987",
      "2008",
      "1997",
      "1989"
    ],
    "reference_numbers": [
      "1:20-cr-00330-PAE",
      "Document 204",
      "385 F. Supp. 3d 349",
      "481 U.S. 739",
      "592 F. Supp. 2d 590",
      "521 U.S. 702",
      "490 U.S. 386",
      "DOJ-OGR-00003065"
    ]
  },
  "additional_notes": "The document appears to be a court filing with a clear and legible text. There are no visible redactions or damage."
}